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Preface
This volume constitutes the proceedings of the 4th International Conference on
Trust Management, held in Pisa, Italy during 16–19 May 2006. The conference
followed successful International Conferences in Crete in 2003, Oxford in 2004
and Paris in 2005. The first three conferences were organized by iTrust, which
was a working group funded as a thematic network by the Future and Emerging
Technologies (FET) unit of the Information Society Technologies (IST) program
of the European Union.
The purpose of the iTrust working group was to provide a forum for cross-
disciplinary investigation of the applications of trust as a means of increasing
security, building confidence and facilitating collaboration in dynamic open sys-
tems.
The aim of the iTrust conference series is to provide a common forum,
bringing together researchers from different academic branches, such as the
technology-oriented disciplines, law, social sciences and philosophy, in order to
develop a deeper and more fundamental understanding of the issues and chal-
lenges in the area of trust management in dynamic open systems.
The response to this conference was excellent; from the 88 papers submitted
to the conference, we selected 30 full papers for presentation. The program also
included one keynote address, given by Cristiano Castelfranchi; an industrial
panel; 7 technology demonstrations; and a full day of tutorials.
The running of an international conference requires an immense effort from all
parties involved. We would like to thank the people who served on the Program
Committee and the Organizing Committee for their hard work. In particular, we
would like to thank the people at the Institute for Informatics and Telematics at
the Italian National Research Council (IIT-CNR) for handling the logistics for
the conference. We wish to thank also the IIT-CNR, University of Trento and
ERCIM STM WG for the financial support for iTrust 2006.
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Why We Need a Non-reductionist Approach to Trust 
Cristiano Castelfranchi 
Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, 
via San Martino della Battaglia 44, 00185 - Roma Italy, 
69042 Heidelberg, Germany 
cristiano.castelfranchi@istc.cnr.it 
Abstract. I will underline the real complexity of trust (not for mere theoretical 
purposes but for advanced applications), and I will criticize some of those re-
ductionist view of Trust. I will illustrate: how trust can be a disposition, but also 
is an ‘evaluation’, and also a ‘prediction’ or better an ‘expectation’; and how it 
is a ‘decision’ and an ‘action’, and ‘counting on’ (relying) and ‘depending on’ 
somebody; and which is the link with uncertainty and risk taking (fear and 
hope); how it creates social relationships; how it is a dynamic phenomenon with 
loop-effects; how it derives from several sources. 
1   Introduction 
Trust is a major problem in IT:
• in HCI and especially in computer-mediated interaction on the web (for in 
searching for reliable information, in e-commerce, e-communities, virtual or-
ganizations, e-democracy,...); 
• in  human-autonomous-agents interaction, both with software agents (personal 
assistants, mediating agents,..) and with robots; 
• in Agent-Agent interaction and in MAS, in particular in partner selection and in 
negotiation and commitment. 
There are natural tendencies to reduce the theory and the implementation of trust to 
the specific practical aspects needed in each application, without a real perception of 
the complexity of the phenomenon. On the contrary: 
• Trust is a very complex construct, with many interdependent dimensions; and 
• too simplified approaches will not be really adequate for building and managing 
trust in virtual social reality and with artificial intelligences. 
I will underline the real complexity of trust (not for mere theoretical purposes but for 
advanced applications), and I will criticize some of those reductionist view of Trust. 
I will illustrate: how trust can be a disposition, but also is an ‘evaluation’, and also 
a ‘prediction’ or better an ‘expectation’; and how it is a ‘decision’ and an ‘action’, and 
‘counting on’ (relying) and ‘depending on’ somebody; and which is the link with 
uncertainty and risk taking (fear and hope); how it creates social relationships; how it 
is a dynamic phenomenon with loop-effects; how it derives from several sources. 
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Then I will argue: 
• why trust built on a theory of Dependence and of Autonomy, and which is the 
relationship between (bilaterally adjustable) autonomy and the degrees of trust; 
• why trust cannot be reduced to the frequency of a given behavior and requires 
‘causal attribution’ and a model of the ‘kripta’ (hidden, mental) feature deter-
mining the certainty and the quality of the expected behavior; 
• why trust cannot be just reduced to subjective probability; and why a simple 
‘number’ is not enough for managing trust; 
• why trust cannot just be based on ‘norms’ and and their respect; 
• why it is not true that where there are contracts and laws there is no longer trust; 
• why trust has not (only) to do with cooperation (as economists assume); 
• why we need a non simplistic theory of Trust ‘transmission’ beyond its pseudo-
transitivity; 
• why failure and disappointment do not necessarily decrease trust; 
• why trust has to do with knowledge sharing and management; 
• why we have to build  trust on various sources not only on direct experience and 
reputation; 
• why we cannot reduce trust to safety and security, since on the one side what 
matters is first of all the ‘perceived’ safety, and, on the other side, building a 
trust environment and atmosphere and trustworthy agents is one basis for safety.  
Dynamic Trust Federation in Grids
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Abstract. Grids are becoming economically viable and productive
tools. They provide a way of utilizing a vast array of linked resources
such as computing systems, databases and services online within Vir-
tual Organizations (VO). However, today’s Grid architectures are not
capable of supporting dynamic, agile federation across multiple adminis-
trative domains and the main barrier, which hinders dynamic federation
over short time scales is security. Federating security and trust is one of
the most significant architectural issues in Grids. Existing relevant stan-
dards and specifications can be used to federate security services, but do
not directly address the dynamic extension of business trust relationships
into the digital domain. In this paper we describe an experiment which
highlights those challenging architectural issues and forms the basis of an
approach that combines a dynamic trust federation and a dynamic au-
thorization mechanism for addressing dynamic security trust federation
in Grids. The experiment made with the prototype described in this pa-
per is used in the NextGRID1 project to define the requirements of next
generation Grid architectures adapted to business application needs.
1 Introduction
A Grid is a form of distributed computing infrastructure that involves coordi-
nating and sharing resources across Virtual Organizations that may be dynamic
and geographically distributed[20]. The long-term future of the Grid will be to
provide dynamic aggregations of resources, provided as services between busi-
nesses, which can be exploited by end-users and application developers to solve
complex, multi-faceted problems across virtual organizations and business com-
munities. To fulfill this vision, we need architectures and detailed mechanisms
for bringing together arbitrary Grid-based resources, along with other resources
such as conventional web-services, web-based information sources and people, in
a highly dynamic yet manageable way. At present, this is not possible: it takes a
lot of time and effort to implement such a collaboration using current technology.
1 The work presented in this paper has been supported by NextGRID project, a project
funded by the European Commission’s IST programme of the 6th Framework Pro-
gramme (contract number 511563).
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 3–18, 2006.
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The NextGRID project [2] aims to define the architecture for next generation
Grids, and addressing this need for highly dynamic federation is one of its main
design goals.
Federating security and trust is one of the most significant architectural issues
in Grids. Basic Grid security is based on well-developed mechanisms drawing
from a wealth of off-the-shelf technology and standards, and work is now under-
way to address Grid scalability issues and support policy-based access control.
However, trust (i.e. dependency) relationships may be expressed in different ways
by each service, and the infrastructure may itself impose additional dependencies
(e.g. through certificate proxy mechanisms).
In this paper, we focus on the architectural needs of Grid security to sup-
port dynamic federation of trust between Grid services running under different
Grid (or non-Grid) infrastructure according to different binding models and
policies. We examine relevant off-the-shelf components, standards and speci-
fications including WS-Trust and WS-Federation to federate security services
in a usage scenario in the Grid. We describe an experiment to test their use
to federate trust between heterogeneous security mechanisms in a business re-
lationship. We analyse this experiment to show that available standards can-
not directly address the dynamic extension of business trust relationships into
the digital domain. We show that it is possible by combining a trust feder-
ation mechanism and dynamic authorization to enable dynamic federation of
resources based on a short-term, rapidly formed business relationship. We ulti-
mately provide an experimental prototype to evaluate our approach by using a
real example scenario based on rapid outsourcing of computation to a service
provider in order to meet a deadline, based only on commonplace business-
to-business trust mechanisms. This paper is structured as follows: in section 2
we describe the shortcomings of supporting dynamic Federation in Grids and
we will mention why security and trust are the main barriers in this regard.
In section 3, we give a Grid usage scenario that allows us to focus on dynamic
aspects of Federation in Grids for our experiment. Section 4 introduces off-the-
shelf components: GRIA and STS that we use as the starting point for our ex-
periment. Based on these components, an experimental design will be provided
in section 5. In section 6, we give an overview of WS-trust and WS-Federation
as the current existing relevant specifications and in section 7, we analyse the
architectural and standardisation challenges for addressing dynamic trust fed-
eration. Section 8 describes our approach to tackling architectural issues. Con-
clusion and future work are described in section 9.
2 Dynamic Trust Federation and Grids
Today’s Grid architectures are not capable of supporting dynamic, agile federa-
tion across multiple administrative domains. Federation is possible if all parties
use the same software, but to set it up is expensive and time consuming, and thus
it is only occasionally cost-beneficial. It is reasonable to ask the question: why
Dynamic Trust Federation in Grids 5
has the Grid so far failed to deliver the ability to federate resources in a cost-
effective fashion dynamically? We believe there are two main reasons for this:
– Dynamic federation is a holistic property of Grids, but Grid architectures
have been formulated in a fragmented way by specialized working groups
(e.g. those of the Global Grid Forum [19]).
– Previous Grid visions such as those from the Globus team [20], although en
compassing dynamic federation are too high level or too specific to scientific
collaboration scenarios, with insufficient attention to business trust.
It is not possible today for different organizations running different Grid in-
frastructure to support even static federations. For example the GRIP project
showed that some level of interoperability is possible between Globus and UNI-
CORE, but that there were fundamental incompatibilities in the security archi-
tecture and resource descriptions [21] used by each system. Moreover, it is hard
for domains to interact and federate resources even if they run the same Grid
infrastructure. The complex negotiations needed to establish certification across
multiple sites, establish access rights, open firewalls and then maintain software
compatibility are well known and documented [22, 23].
Establishing trust relationships, and using them to facilitate resource sharing
is one of the most challenging issues in Grids. Dynamic trust establishment and
interoperability across multiple and heterogeneous organizational boundaries in-
troduce nontrivial security architectural requirements. The main challenge is to
ensure that:
– Trust formation across organizational boundaries is subject to due diligence,
usually carried out by humans in their business frame of reference.
– Trust exploitation (enabling resource sharing on commercial or non-
commercial terms) is then automated, so the benefits of a decision to trust
can be realized very rapidly.
Current Grids do not support automation, so the number of human decisions
needed is large, and federation takes a long time. Current Grids also do not
support convenient trust scoping mechanisms, so a decision to trust an actor
may involve placing complete trust in them, so the due diligence process is often
arduous and time-consuming.
The OGSA v1 document [1] describes a range of security components to
support access control and identity mapping for VOs. However, all are based
on the existence of services established by the VO to support the necessary
interactions (e.g. credential translation and centralized access control policy ad-
ministration and implementation). These mechanisms assume that a VO is well-
established, already fully-trusted by all participants, and has its own (trusted)
resources to support the required services. We cannot make pre-assumptions
about VO lifecycle or trust relationships between a VO and participating do-
mains. Instead, we must support dynamic evolution of both VO and the trust
relationships they are built upon, in a much more flexible way than before, in
minutes rather than months, and with minimal (ideally zero) overheads and
shared infrastructure [8].
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3 A Grid Usage Scenario
To provide a focus for our work we have chosen a scenario for which the required
application technology is already available from the GRIA project [6]. This al-
lowed us to focus on the dynamic trust federation and access control issues for
our experiment.
KINO is a leading producer of high-quality video content based in Athens. In
the course of their business, KINO has a need to perform high-definition 3D dig-
ital video rendering calculations, taking “virtual” 3D scenes and characters and
generating high-quality video sequences from them. However, this facility is only
needed for a small subset of their work, so KINO cannot justify buying a large
computational cluster to run such computationally intensive calculations. We
assume that an animator is working on a high-definition video rendering job for
a customer. On the day before the deadline, he realizes that there is not enough
time to complete the rendering computations needed using the in-house systems
available to him. However, he learns of the existence of some GRIA services for
rendering high-definition video, operated by GRIA service providers, and capa-
ble of providing the level of computational power required on a commercial basis.
(We do not concern ourselves here with how the animator finds out about these
services, but focus on the trust federation challenges of using them). The anima-
tor tells his supervisor, and they agree that they should outsource the rendering
jobs to meet their deadline. To do this, the supervisor must set up an account
with one or more service providers, so the animator can submit rendering jobs
to them. To meet the deadline, everything must be set up and the jobs submit-
ted by the end of the day, so the animator can collect the output and assemble
the final video in the morning. The problem is that the GRIA services require
that account holders and users be authenticated via X.509 certificates. However,
KINO operates a Kerberos (e.g. Active Directory) domain, and does not have a
relationship with a third party certification authority. To get certificates from a
trusted third party such as Verisign will take far too long – the only solution is
to establish a dynamic VO between itself and at least one service provider.
4 Background
4.1 GRIA
GRIA [6] is a Web Service grid middleware created by the University of
Southampton and NTUA in the GRIA project, based on components developed
by them in GRIA, in the EC GEMSS [17] and UK e-Science Comb-e-Chem
[7] projects. The GRIA middleware was tested using two industrial applications,
one of which was KINO’s high-definition video rendering application. GRIA uses
secure off the shelf web services technology and it is designed for business users
by supporting B2B functions and easy-to-use APIs. It can easily support legacy
applications.
Unlike more “traditional” Grids, GRIA was designed from the outset to sup-
port commercial service provision between businesses [7], by supporting
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conventional B2B procurement processes. The security infrastructure of GRIA is
designed to support and enforce these processes, so that nobody can use GRIA
services without first agreeing to pay the service provider. The procedure for
using GRIA services is summarized in Figure 1:
Fig. 1. GRIA usage procedure
Each GRIA service provider has an account service and a resource allocation
service, as well as services to store and transfer data files and execute jobs to
process these data files. The procedure for using GRIA services is as follows:
1. Account Establishment: First, the supervisor must open an account with the
service provider, providing evidence of creditworthiness (e.g. a credit card
number) to their account service. If the details are accepted, the service
provider will assign an account with a credit limit, to which the supervisor
can control access.
2. Resource Allocation: The animator must then allocate resources using the
service provider’s resource allocation service. This is only possible if the
animator has access to an account (the one controlled by their supervisor),
to which the resource allocation will be billed.
3. Data Transfer: To transfer data, the animator has to set up a data store
using the data service. The animator can only do this if he/she has a resource
allocation from which to assign the necessary resources (maximum storage
and data transfer volume).
4. Data Processing: To process data, the animator has to set up a job using
the job service. This also requires a resource allocation from which to assign
the necessary resources (processing time and power). Once the job has been
set up, the animator can specify which data stores the job should use for
input and output, and subsequently start the job.
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5. Data Retrieval: Once the job has finished, the animator can retrieve results
from the specified output data store(s), or enable access so their customer
can do so.
As indicated in Figure 1, it is not necessary for the same person to carry out
all these steps. Each service provides methods that allow the primary user to en-
able access to a (fixed) subset of methods to a specified colleague or collaborator.
Thus, the supervisor in Figure 1 can enable their animator to initiate resource
allocations charged to the account, and the animator can in turn enable their
customer to have read access to the computational output. This feature is imple-
mented using dynamically updatable access control lists, linked to management
operations of the GRIA services through which the corresponding resources are
accessed. The GRIA middleware was a convenient starting point for these exper-
iments because (a) it already has a dynamic authorization mechanism, and (b)
applications needed for KINO’s scenario are already available as GRIA services
from the original GRIA project.
5 Security Token Service
A Security Token Service (STS) is a Web Service that issues security tokens as
defined by the WS-Trust specification [11]. This service can be used when a secu-
rity token is not in a format or syntax understandable by the recipient. The STS
can exchange the token for another that is comprehensible in recipient domain.
For example, if the user holds a Kerberos ticket asserting his identity, but the
target service needs an X.509 certificate, the Kerberos ticket can be presented to
an STS, which will issue the holder with an equivalent X.509 certificate asserting
the same identity.
The STS developed for this experiment was specifically focused on Kerberos-
PKI interoperability, converting identity tokens only, but is architecturally open
and able to handle attributes other than identity and other token formats such
as SAML[13] . Our STS implementation is based on a Kerberised Certification
Authority (KCA), which issues short-lived user certificates based on the user’s
Kerberos identity. The KCA has its own certificate signing key, and a long-lived,
self-signed CA certificate, which is not widely known. A relying party must trust
the KCA’s own certificate in order to verify user certificates issued by it. Thus,
the KCA does not directly address the problem of establishing trust between
domains. It does however provide a good starting point for experiments involving
identity mapping and trust federation between domains including a translation
between different authentication mechanisms.
6 Experimental Design
In the KINO application scenario described earlier, we assume that the KINO
end users are authenticated via Kerberos, while the GRIA service provider re-
quires X.509 authentication. Other, more complex scenarios involving peer-to-
peer interactions between Kerberos domains are also possible, but these are not
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explored in this paper. We used an STS that can be used to convert identity
credentials between Kerberos and X.509 representations, and GRIA dynamic au-
thorization to support dynamic extension of trust between the two users and the
service provider through dynamic policy updates reflecting the new trust rela-
tionship. The two KINO users will use these capabilities to perform the following
tasks:
1. The supervisor will open an account with a GRIA service provider, using a
credit card to establish KINO’s creditworthiness. To do this, the supervisor
must present an X.509 certificate, which they get from the STS.
2. The supervisor will enable access to the account for the animator, allowing
him to charge work to the account. To do this, the supervisor must specify
the identity of the animator granted access to the account.
3. The animator will then allocate resources and submit their rendering jobs.
To do this, the animator must present an X.509 certificate, which they get
from the STS.
4. The following day the animator will retrieve the rendered video and compose
it with other sequences to create the finished commercial.
5. Later the supervisor will receive a statement of jobs and charges to their
credit card, giving the details of the user(s) who ran these jobs.
For simplicity, we consider only a single service provider even though it is
obviously possible to use the same approach with multiple service providers, at
least in a B2B service grid like GRIA. We assume that the credit card used by
the supervisor is acceptable to the service provider (up to some credit limit),
and that the supervisor is willing to trust the animator to decide how much
rendering computation is needed (within that limit) and to submit the jobs.
Thus, the three parties (supervisor, animator and service provider) are willing
to trust each other sufficiently for the above scenario to be implemented. Our
goals are therefore to conduct experiments to answer the following questions:
1. How can the service provider translate business trust (in the creditworthiness
of the KINO supervisor) into a trusted digital authentication mechanism
based on KINO’s “self-signed” certification mechanism?
2. How can the supervisor dynamically authorize the animator to use this trust
relationship and access the service provider’s rendering service?
3. How can the service provider be sure the animator is the person who the
supervisor intends should have access to his account?
4. When the supervisor gets their statement, how can they recognize that the
correct person has been running jobs on their account?
Finally, in answering these questions, we also want to establish how these
things can be achieved using current and proposed standards, and where (if at
all) those standards cannot meet our needs.
10 M. Ahsant et al.
7 Review of Standards and Specifications
7.1 WS-Trust
WS-Trust [11] defines a protocol by which web services in different trust domains
can exchange security tokens for use in the WS-Security header of SOAP messages
[10]. Clients use the WS-Trust protocols to obtain security tokens from Security
Token Services. WS-Trust is highly relevant to the question of how to obtain an
X.509 certificate for accessing a web service based on a Kerberos-authenticated
identity indeed this is a scenario commonly used to illustrate howWS-Trust works.
Fig. 2. WS-Trust example using Kerberos and X509
In this example, a client presents a Kerberos ticket granting ticket (obtained
when the user logged in to the Kerberos domain) to a ticket granting service,
and gets back a Kerberos ticket for an X.509 security token signing service,
from which it can obtain a signed X.509 certificate for presentation (e.g. in the
WS-Security header) to the target service. WS-Trust defines how the tokens are
exchanged (steps 1 and 2 above). However, WS-Trust does not actually provide
any mechanisms to manage trust between domains, and only describes token
exchange between entities that already trust each other.
7.2 WS-Federation
WS-Federation [12] describes how to use WS-Trust, WS-Security and WS-Policy
together to provide federation between security domains. It gives a number of
scenarios, starting with a simple example involving two domains, as shown in
Figure 3.
In this scenario, a client from domain A authenticates itself to its own organ-
isation’s Identity Provider (a type of security token service). To use the service
in domain B, it needs a different token that will be trusted by that organization.
WS-Federation describes the pattern of WS-Trust exchanges needed for this and
many other scenarios. However,WS-Federation does not define any standard way
to establish this trust relationship dynamically.
According to the specification:
“The following topics are outside the scope of this document:
1: Definition of message security or trust establishment/verification
protocols...”
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Fig. 3. Usage of WS-Federation between two security domains
Thus, trust relationships must already exist between the WS-Trust token
services in a WS-Federation exchange, as indicated in Figure 3. Although these
two specifications describe the message exchanges needed, they do not solve the
problem of dynamic trust and security federation.
8 Architectural and Standardization Challenges
The standards and specifications described above cover many aspects of building
a secure grid spanning multiple security domains over a public network. How-
ever, they leave four major questions unanswered from a Grid architecture and
standards perspective.
Our experiments were designed to answer these questions, as indicated in
Figure 4:
1. How can the security token service guarantee the identity or other attributes
of users (the authentication problem)?
2. How does the security token service know what tokens to issue to a user with
a given set of home domain attributes (the mapping problem)?
3. How can the web service validate tokens issued by the security token service
(the trust problem)?
4. How does the web service know how to interpret the security token issued
tokens (the policy problem)?
Fig. 4. Key architectural challenges
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Some of these questions are unanswered because it is not clear how best to
apply the available specifications, and some because the specifications explicitly
avoid addressing the question.
9 Approach
In practice, the four questions highlighted above are clearly related. For example,
the access control policy used by the target web service specifies the attributes
(tokens) required by a user in order to gain access to the service. This policy
in effect defines how the web service will interpret tokens presented to it. The
mapping used by the security token service to issue tokens to authenticated users
must therefore be consistent with the access policy of the target web service.
Thus the web service can only trust the security token service if the mapping
used IS consistent with its access policy, AND it has a way to digitally verify
that tokens claimed to have been issued by the security token service are gen-
uine, AND the security token service has accurate information about users when
applying its mapping to decide what tokens it can issue.
For example, suppose the web service policy is such that a user identified as
goodguy@kino.gr can access the service. This implies that security token service
will only issue a certificate in this name to a KINO user if they are supposed to
be able to access the service. The mapping might be done as in the following:
– supervisor → goodguy@kino.gr.
– animator → goodguy@kino.gr.
– cameraman → badboy@kino.gr.
This would be fine if the intention is that the supervisor and animator can
access the service but the cameraman cannot. If we now want the cameraman
to have access, we can:
– change the internal identity authentication mechanism so the cameraman
can authenticate themselves to the security token service as “animator”.
– change the security token service mapping so that a user authenticated as
“cameraman” can get a certificate in the name of goodguy@kino.gr.
– ask the web service provide to change their access policy so badboy@kino.gr
can also have access to the service.
This is why we decided to combine dynamic access control and trust (at-
tribute) federation and mapping mechanisms and investigate them together. In
dynamic security these aspects must remain consistent, so treating them sep-
arately will neglect some possible scenarios, and may even be dangerous. Con-
versely, using them together gives us more options to solve the trust and security
federation problems.
Clearly, relationships (1) and (3) in Figure 4 represent critical points in our
investigation, since they are the points where one has to validate some action by
a remote user. The obvious solution is to co-locate two of the services so that
one of these relationships operates within a single trust domain. The normal
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approach is to co-locate the security token service and the target web service,
suggested by Figure 3. This makes it easy to define the meaning of tokens (in
terms of the access rights associated with them), and to digitally verify them
at the target service. However, when users from a new domain wish to use the
service, one must dynamically update the mapping used by the security token
service (taking account of the attributes that might be presented by the new
users), and create a new digital authentication path (1) between the new user
domain and the security token service. Our approach was therefore to place the
security token service in the same domain as the client, co-locating the security
token service and the user authentication service. This makes it easy to establish
the authentication relationship (1) from Figure 5 and it means the mapping used
by the security token service only needs to handle user attributes from one do-
main. (It also makes it easy to implement the security token service in a Kerberos
domain). Then instead of updating the mapping in the security token service, we
can use the dynamic authorization mechanism from GRIA to allow trusted users
on the client side to amend the access control policy (restricted to the resource
they control) in terms of the X.509 security tokens issued by the STS.
Fig. 5. Dynamic authorization in GRIA
There are still some practical problems to be solved, one of which is shown in
Figure 5 to tell the web service (step 3) that a new user is to be authorized, we
need to know what (mapped) token that user would have got from the security
token service. We therefore need a second service for translating user attributes
based on the same mapping. Since the STS is a kinds of CA that issues X.509
identity certificates, the translation service must provide a way to look up the
X.509 certificate that would be issued to a specified user. Note that this second
service does not sign a public key presented by the requester, as the requester
would then be able to claim the attributes specified in the returned token. The
token simply allows the requesters to refer to another user’s identity in a way
that can be recognized later by the target service.
9.1 Dynamic Authorization
Dynamic authorization is only needed at the service provider, following the pat-
tern of Figure 5 . In our experiment, we relied on the existing GRIA process-
based access control (PBAC) dynamic authorization system, but we did consider
14 M. Ahsant et al.
how this might be used in combination with more generic trust mapping facili-
ties in future. One interesting point is that the dynamic authorization functions
are provided by methods of the target service (e.g. enableAccess, disableAccess
on the account service, enableRead, enableWrite on the data service, etc). This
makes sense, because:
– The access policy should refer to capabilities of the service, so dynamic
update options available must also be related to capabilities of the service;
and
– Access to the dynamic update options should also be regulated by the same
dynamic policy, so the full trust lifecycle can be supported in a single archi-
tectural mechanism.
It would be possible to provide a generic “dynamic authorization” WSDL
port type, using a standard method for requesting more access policy amend-
ments. However, any user who was allowed to access this method would be able
to request any policy amendment (not just enabling badboy@kino.gr to access
their account). One would then need a further, more complex authorization pol-
icy regulating what kinds of dynamic policy amendments could be requested by
each user. This “meta-policy” would be quite difficult to generate, since the “tar-
get” would be a constraint on some other (potentially arbitrary) policy update
request. A more sensible arrangement is to retain the approach used in GRIA,
as shown in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. Dynamic authorization infrastructure
In this approach, the interfaces to the dynamic policy store (3) and (5) should
only be accessible to the service provider, so it is not essential that they be stan-
dardised, though it would be advantageous for service implementation portabil-
ity. There are several candidate specifications for checking policy (3) including
XACML [25], and IETF Generic AAA [14], but these do not explicitly address
dynamic policy updating mechanisms. Obviously, when performing operations
like enableAccess, the client must specify the scope of the policy change. In
GRIA, this is done by sending a context identifier specifying what is to be made
accessible (e.g. an account code), as well as a reference token relating to the
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colleague or collaborator who should be added to the access control list for that
context. This approach can also be applied to WSRF resources, and use SAML
tokens or X.509 attribute certificates to indicating more general role-based policy
updates, of course.
10 Implementation and Technical Validation
A proof-of-concept implementation of this prototype has been provided for both:
the client (Kerberos) side and server (X.509) side. The components that client
side contains are: a GRIA client application and middleware, able to send au-
thenticated requests to use GRIA services, A STS, that can supply signed X.509
identity tokens in response to GRIA client and a Public Key Certificate service
that can supply X.509 certificates (but not the private keys) for any user in the
Kerberos domain.
Having located all the trust (attribute) mapping technology on the client
side (inside the client Kerberos domain), the only components we need on the
server side would be a set of GRIA services for managing accounts and resource
allocations, and for transferring and processing data. To validate the modified
GRIA implementation, we ran tests between a prospective client in a Kerberos
domain (at KTH) and a GRIA service provider established at IT-Innovation.
A GRIA client application for rendering was released to KTH, and used to run
rendering calculations at IT Innovation.
The system worked exactly as expected. A user at KTH was unable to access
the GRIA services initially, but he was able to apply for an account. When the
service administrator at IT Innovation approved the account, the service became
capable of authenticating credentials issued by the STS inside the KTH domain.
The user at KTH was then able to use the account and delegate to colleagues
authenticated in the same way, so they could allocate resources and run jobs.
The main lessons learned in conducting these tests were as follows:
Previously untrusted users can open accounts, and become trusted if the ser-
vice provider’s checks show that the business risks are acceptable. However, the
service provider will then accept connections from other users that have X.509
credentials from the same source as the new user. For example, if a school teacher
opened an account using the school’s corporate credit card, their students would
then be able to make connections to the GRIA service as well. Only the original
account holder would be added to the authorization policy of the service, so
requests from the students would be rejected unless explicitly authorized by the
teacher. However, in principle it would be better to impose some authorization
checks at the transport layer as well as the service layer to reduce risks of attack
by “malicious colleagues”.
Trusted users cannot delegate access rights to users from a currently untrusted
Kerberos domain. It is clear that this could be supported by allowing a trusted
user to specify a new token source as well as the attributes of their intended
delegate. The problem is that it would then be a remote (though trusted) user,
rather than a service provider, who approved a decision to trust a new token
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source. The new user’s rights would be tightly specified, but again there could
be a risk of “malicious colleague” attack, so service providers may prefer not to
delegate such decisions to customers.
Adding the client’s STS certificate to the service provider’s trust store once
business trust is established provides for an efficient implementation. One could
use a call-back token authentication mechanism (as in Shibboleth [24]), but that
adds an overhead to each subsequent call to the service by the newly trusted user.
Note that in a conventional X.509 configuration, a call-back would be needed
to check the Certificate Revocation List for the remote user. However, the STS
issues short-lived tokens, so the risks associated with infrequent updates of the
CRL are much lower than in a conventional PKI. The remote server has to be
certified by a “well known” CA that the client already trusts, or else the client
cannot risk passing any sensitive information to it. In our test scenario, the
supervisor passes a credit card number (or other evidence of creditworthiness)
to the GRIA service, so he must be able to authenticate it even if the service
cannot at that stage authenticate him except through the validity of the card
number. Thus, it is necessary to hold a set of “well known” CA certificates in
a trust store, while simultaneously updating the client’s key pair and associated
certificate. It is not normally appropriate to attempt to use simultaneous bi-
directional trust propagation at least not using the mechanisms tried here.
11 Conclusion and Future Work
Dynamic resource federation is an obvious requirement of next generation Grid
architecture, to address the need for short-term virtualization of business rela-
tionships to address transient opportunities and deliver short-term goals. Our
studies have been based on a practical (if small scale) scenario from KINO,
which is driven by a transient, short-term business need. The main barrier to dy-
namic federation over short time scales in such scenarios is security. We have ex-
amined relevant standards and specifications including WS-Security, WS-Trust,
WS-Federation and other WS specifications. These can be used to federate se-
curity services, but do not directly address the dynamic extension of business
trust relationships into the digital domain.
Our analysis of specifications shows that dynamic trust federation and dy-
namic authorization (access control) are intimately coupled aspects of dynamic
security federation on the Grid. The mechanisms used to federate trust (i.e.
authenticate attributes and tokens) are quite different from those needed to en-
force access control policies. However, both aspects must be consistent, and
in a dynamic federation scenario, this means they need to be changed through
some concerted procedure. On the other hand, the fact that dynamic federation
can be achieved through a combination of the two mechanisms offers a wider
range of options for implementing federation mechanisms. Our analysis suggests
that trust (e.g. identity) mapping should normally be performed by the do-
main in which the identity (or other) attributes are assigned to users, while the
consequences are defined in the target domain by using dynamic authorisation
Dynamic Trust Federation in Grids 17
mechanisms to update the policy for the target service. This is not the pattern
traditionally seen in WS-Federation, but uses the same specifications.
We developed an experimental Grid prototype based on trust mapping tech-
nology used by KTH (STS) and a Business-to-Business Grid middleware (GRIA)
that includes dynamic authorization support. The experimental prototype shows
that by combining trust federation and dynamic authorization, one can enable
dynamic federation of resources based on a short-term, rapidly formed business
relationship.
The next step will be to formalize the architectural concepts used to achieve
this as part of the NextGRID next generation Grid architecture. A more general
reference implementation of these concepts is now being produced within the
NextGRID project, and will be made available to the community and incorpo-
rated in a future release of the GRIA middleware, and possibly other NextGRID
compatible Grid middleware in future.
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Abstract. Trust can be viewed as an instrument both for an agent selecting the 
right partners in order to achieve its own goals (the point of view of the trustier), 
and for an agent of being selected from other potential partners (the point of view 
of the trustee) in order to establish with them a cooperation/ collaboration and to 
take advantage from the accumulated trust. In our previous works we focused our 
main attention on the first point of view. In this paper we will analyze trust as the 
agents’ relational capital. Starting from the classical dependence network (in 
which needs, goals, abilities and resources are distributed among the agents) with 
potential partners, we introduce the analysis of what it means for an agent to be 
trusted and how this condition could be strategically used from it for achieving its 
own goals, that is, why it represents a form of power. Although there is a big 
interest in literature about ‘social capital’ and its powerful effects on the wellbeing 
of both societies and individuals, often it is not clear enough what is it the object 
under analysis. Individual trust capital (relational capital) and collective trust 
capital not only should be disentangled, but their relations are quite complicated 
and even conflicting. To overcome this gap, we propose a study that first attempts 
to understand what trust is as capital of individuals. In which sense “trust” is a 
capital. How this capital is built, managed and saved. In particular, how this 
capital is the result of the others’ beliefs and goals. Then we aim to analytically 
study the cognitive dynamics of this object. 
1   Introduction 
In multi-agent systems trust is a growing field of analysis and research and ways to 
calculate it have already been introduced to enhance studies on commercial 
partnership, strategic choice, and on coalition formation. In particular, in almost all 
the present approaches the focus is on the trustier and on the ways for evaluating the 
trustworthiness of other possible trustees. In fact, there are no so many studies and 
analyses about the model of being trusted. Also our socio-cognitive model of trust 
(1, 2) was about the cognitive ingredients for trusting something or somebody, and 
how trust affects decision, which are the sources and the basis for trusting, and so on; 
we never modeled what does it means to be trusted (with the exception of the work on 
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trust dynamics (3) in which the focus was on the reciprocation and potential 
influences on the trustworthiness) and why it is important.  
In this paper we address this point, analyzing what it means that trust represents a 
strategic resource for agents that are trusted, proposing a model of ‘trust as a capital’ 
for individuals and suggesting the implication for strategic action that can be 
performed. Our thesis is that to be trusted: 
i) increases the chance to be requested or accepted as a partner for exchange or 
cooperation; 
ii) improves the ‘price’, the contract that the agent can obtain1. 
The need of this new point of view derives directly from the fact that in multi-
agent systems it is strategically important not only to know who is trusted by who and 
how much, but also to understand how being trusted can be used by the trustee. 
It has been already shown that using different levels of trust represents an advantage 
in performing some tasks such as task allocation or partners’ choice. Therefore, having 
“trust” as a cognitive parameter in agents’ decision making can lead to better (more 
efficient, faster etc.) solutions than proceeding driven by other kind of calculation such 
as probabilistic or statistical ones. This study already represented an innovation since 
usually trust has been studied as an effect rather than a factor that causes the developing 
of social network and their maintenance or structural changing. 
In order to improve this approach and to better understand dynamics of social 
networks, now we propose a study of what happens on the other side of the two-way 
trust relationship, focusing on the trustee, in particular on a cognitive trustee. Our aim 
is an analytical study of what it means to be trusted. The idea of taking the other point 
of view is particularly important if we consider the amount of studies in social science 
that connect trust with social capital related issues. Our claims are: 
- to be trusted usually is an advantage for the trustee (agent Agi); more precisely 
received trust is a capital that can be invested, and that requires decisions and 
costs to be cumulated; 
- it is possible to measure this capital, which is relational, that is depends on a 
position in a network of relationships; 
- trust has different sources: personal experience that the other agents have with 
Agi; circulating reputation of Agi; Agi belongingness to certain groups or 
categories; the signs and the impressions that Agi is able to produce; 
- the value of this capital is context dependent (for example, market dependent) 
and dynamic; 
- received trust strongly affects the ‘negotiation power’ of Agi that cannot simply 
be derived from the “dependence bilateral relationships”. 
Although there is a big interest in literature about ‘social capital’ and its powerful 
effects on the wellbeing of both societies and individuals, often it is not clear enough 
                                                          
1
 This point in particular, does not necessary imply and does not mean that a deceiving trustee 
would have surely an individual advantage. This misinterpretation is a typical point of view 
coming from domains like commerce and exchange in which trust is considered just as an 
instrument for solving questions like Prisoner Dilemma problems. In fact, we are interested to 
model trust in more general domains and contexts: for example, in strict cooperation in which 
a deceiving trustee jeopardizes its own interests and goals. 
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what is it the object under analysis. To overcome this lack, we propose a study that 
first attempts to understand trust as capital of individuals. How is it possible to say 
that “trust” is a capital? How is this capital built, managed and saved? Then we aim to 
analytically study the cognitive dynamics of this object, with a particular focus on 
how they depend on beliefs and goals. 
2   Trust and Relational Capital 
Social Capital (4, 5, 6, 7) can be seen as a multidimensional concept and can be 
studied in its relation both with social norms and shared values and with networks of 
interpersonal relations. While in the former case studies about conventions and 
collective attribution of meanings can be useful to understand how social capital can 
be a capital for the society, in the latter, one of the basic issues that need to be studied 
is how it can happen that networks of relations can be built, which ways they develop, 
and how they can both influence individual behaviours and be considered as an 
individual capital (22). 
We also would like to underline that social capital is an ambiguous concept. By 
social a lot of scholars mean in fact ‘collective’, some richness, advantage of any for 
the collective; something that favors cooperation, and so on. On the contrary, we 
assume here (as a first step) an individualistic perspective, considering the advantages 
of the trusted agent, not the advantages for the community, and distinguishing 
between ‘relational capital’ (8) and the more ambiguous and extended notion of 
‘social capital’. The individual (or organization) Agi could use its capital of trust, for 
anti-social purposes. Although the idea of a clear distinction of the two levels is not 
completely new in literature, usually relational capital is addressed in relation with 
meta-cognitive aspects of human capital (23) rather than being studied through an 
analysis of its own cognitive mechanisms. 
In particular, we would like underline that there is no advantage to use social 
capital at individual level because the two interpretation of it (social and relational) 
are not only ambiguous but also contradictory. Social capital at individual level 
(relational capital) could be in conflict with the collective capital: for example, for an 
individual is better to monopolize trust, while for the community it is better to 
distribute it among the several individuals. 
In economic literature the term “capital” refers to a commodity itself used in the 
production of other goods and services: it is, then, seen as a human-made input 
created to permit increased production in the future. The adjective “social” is instead 
used to claim that a particular capital not only exists in social relationships but also 
consists in some kind of relationships between economical subjects. It is clear that for 
the capital goods metaphor to be useful, the transformative ability of social 
relationships to become a capital must be taken seriously. This means that we need to 
find out what is the competitive advantage not simply of being part of a network, but 
more precisely of being trusted in that network. 
The additional value of trusting has been shown as a crucial argument in decision 
making and in particular in choice of relying on somebody else for achieving specific 
goals included in the plans of the agents. In these studies trust has been analysed as 
valuation of the other and expectations on it, and it has been shown how these 
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characteristics and mechanisms, being part of the decision process at the cognitive level, 
represent an advantage both for the society in terms of realizing cooperation among its 
actors and for the trustier in terms of efficiency of choices of delegation and reliance (9). 
Changing the point of view, we now want to focus on the trusted agent (the 
trustee). What does imply to be trusted for the trustee? As we said, the intuitive 
answer could be that: 
i) the probability to be chosen for exchange or for partnership will grow; 
ii) the negotiation power of that agent will increase. 
However, to account for this it is necessary to rethink the whole theory of 
negotiation power based on dependence (10,11,12,13). 
Try to build a theory of dependence including trust does not mean to base the theory 
of social capital on dependence, but to admit that the existent theory of dependence 
network and the consequent theory of social power is not enough without the 
consideration of trust. What we need, then, is a comprehensive theory of trust from the 
point of view of the trusted agent, in order to find out the elements that, once added to 
the theory of dependence, can explain the individual social power in a network, on one 
hand, and, the social capital meant as a capital for the society, in a second phase. 
Once a quantitative notion of the value of a given agent is formulated calculating on 
how much the agent is valued by other agents in a given market for a given task, we can 
say that this trust-dependent value is a real capital. It consists of all the relationships that 
are possible for the agent in a given market and, together with the possible relationships 
in other markets, it is the so-called relational capital of that agent. It differs from simple 
relationships in given networks, which are a bigger set, since it only consists of those 
relationships the agent has with those who not only need it but have a good attitude 
toward it and, therefore, who are willing to have it as a partner. 
How much the agent is appreciated and requested? How many potential partners 
depends on Agi and would search for Agi as partner? How many partners would be at 
disposal for Agi’s proposals of partnership, and what “negotiation power” would Agi 
have with them? 
These relationships form a capital because (as any other capital) it is the result of 
investments and it is costly cumulated in order to be invested and utilized. In a certain 
sense it represents a strategic tool to be competitive, and, as it happens with other 
capitals such as the financial one, it is sometimes even more important than the good 
which is sold (being it either a service or a material good). For example when Agi 
decides of not keeping a promise to Agj, it knows that Agj’s trust in Agi will decrease: 
is this convenient for future relationships with Agj? Will Agi need counting on Agj in 
future? Or, is this move convenient for reputation and other relationships? 
For all these raising questions it is very important to study how it is possible for the 
agent to cumulate this capital without deteriorating or waste it: since the relational 
capital can make the agent win the competition even when the good it offers is not the 
best compared with substitutive goods offered in the market, it should be shown 
quantitatively what this means and what kind of dynamical relationships exist 
between quality of offered good and relational capital. This is in fact the same 
problem present in the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma, where the agents have to consider 
the future potential exchanges with other agents (before cheating for their own 
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benefits). In other, and more general, terms the relational and reputational capital of 
an agent is more valued than its immediate reward. 
3   Cognitive Model of Being Trusted 
3.1   Objective and Subjective Dependence 
Before considering trust from this new perspective, let us underline a very important 
point, which will be useful for this work. 
The theory of trust and the theory of dependence are not independent from each 
other. Not only because – as we modelled (1, 2), before deciding to actively trust 
somebody, to rely on it (Agi), one (Agj) has to be dependent on Agi: Agj needs an 
action or a resource of Agi (at least Agj has to believe so). But also because objective 
dependence relationships (10) that are the basis of adaptive social interactions, are not 
enough for predicting them. Subjective dependence is needed (that is, the dependence 
relationships that the agents know or at least believe), but is not sufficient; then, it is 
necessary to consider two beliefs: (i) the belief of being dependent, of needing the 
other, (ii) the belief of the trustworthiness of the other, of the possibility of counting 
upon it. If I wouldn’t not feel dependent on, I couldn’t rely on the other. 
The theory of dependence includes in fact two types of dependences: 
(1) the objective dependence, which says who needs whom for what in a given 
society (although perhaps ignoring this). This dependence has already the 
power of establishing certain asymmetric relationships in a potential market, 
and it determines the actual success or failure of the reliance and transaction; 
(2) the subjective (believed) dependence, which says who is believed to be needed 
by who. This dependence is what determines relationships in a real market 
and settles on the negotiation power; but it might be illusory and wrong, and 
one might rely upon unable agents, while even being autonomously able to do 
as needed. 
More Formally, let Agt={Ag1,..,Agn} a set of agents; we can associate to each agent 
Agi∈Agt: 
- a set of goals Gi={gi1,..,giq}; 
- a set of actions Azi={αi1,.., αiz}; these are the elementary actions that Agi is able 
to perform; 
- a set of plans Π ={pi1,..,pis}; the Agi’s plan library: the set of rules/prescriptions 
for aggregating the actions; and 
- a set of resources Ri={ri1,..,rim}. 
The achievement/maintenance of each goal needs actions/plans/resources. Then, 
we can define the dependence relationship between two agents (Agj and Agi) with 
respect a goal gjk, as: Obj-Dependence (Agj, Agi, gjk) and say that: 
An agent Agj has an Objective Dependence Relationship with agent Agi with 
respect to a goal gjk if for achieving gjk are necessary actions, plans and/or resources 
that are owned by Agi and not owned by Agj. 
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More in general, Agj has an Objective Dependence Relationship with Agi if for 
achieving at least one of its goals gjk∈Gj, are necessary actions, plans and/or 
resources that are owned by Agi and not owned by Agj. 
As in (12) we can introduce the unilateral, reciprocal, mutual and indirect 
dependence (see Figure 1). In very short and simplified terms, we can say that the 
difference between reciprocal and mutual is that the former is on different goals while 
the latter is on the same goal. 
 
Fig. 1 
If the world knowledge would be perfect for all the agents, the above described 
objective dependence would be a common belief about the real state of the world. In 
fact, the important relationship is the network of dependence believed by each agent. In 
other words, we cannot only associate to each agent a set of goals, actions, plans and 
resources, but we have to evaluate these sets as believed by each agent (the subjective 
point of view), also considering that they would be partial, different from each of others, 
sometime wrong, and so on. In more practical terms, each agent will have a different 
(subjective) representation of the dependence network as exemplified in Figure 1. So, 
we introduce the BelkGz that means the Goal set of Agz believed by Agk. The same for 
BelkAzz, BelkΠz, and BelkRz. That is to say that the dependence relationships should be 
re-modulated on the basis of the agent subjective interpretation. 
We introduce the Subj-Dependence(Agj, Agi, gjk) that represents the Agj’s point of 
view with respect to its dependence relationships. 
In a first approximation each agent should correctly believe the sets it has, while it 
could mismatch the sets of other agents. 
We define Dependence-Network(Agt,t) the set of dependence relationships (both 
subjective and objective) among the agents included in Agt set at the time t. Each 
agent Agj∈ Agt must have at least one dependence relation with another agent in Agt. 
3.2   Dependence and Negotiation Power 
Given a Dependence-Network(Agt,t), we define Objective Potential for Negotiation of 
Agj∈Agt about a goal of own gjk -and call it OPN(Agj, gjk)- the following function. 
OPN(Agj, gjk)=f( 1
1+ pkii=1
n
¦ ) 
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Where: f is in general a function that preserves monotonicity (we will omit this 
kind of functions in the next formulas); n represents the number of agents in Agt set 
that have a dependence relation with Agj with respect to gjk (this dependence relation 
should be either reciprocal or mutual: in other words, there should also be an action, 
plan, or resource owned by Agj that is necessary for some goal of Agi); pki is the 
number of agents in Agt that are competitors with the Agj on the same actions/plans/ 
resources owened by Agi (useful for gjk) in a not compatible way (Agi is not able to 
satisfy at the same time all the agents). 
 
Fig. 2 
In Figure 2 we show the objective dependence of Agj: A represents the set of 
agents who depend from Agj for something (actions, plans, resources), B represents 
the set of agents from which Agj depends for achieving an own specific goal gjk. The 
intersection between A and B (part C) is the set of agents with whom Agj could 
potentially negotiate for achieving support for gjk. The greater the overlap the greater 
the negotiation power of Agj in that context. In other and more simple words, the 
more the agents being at the same time depending and depended upon Agj, the greater 
the negotiation power of Agj. 
However, the negotiation power of Agj also depends on the possible alternatives 
that its potential partners have: the few alternatives to Agj they have, the greater its 
negotiation power (see below). 
We can define the Subjective Potential for Negotiation of Agj∈Agt about an its 
own goal gjk -and call it SPN(Agj, gjk)- the following function: 
SPN(Agj, gjk) = 1
1+ pkii=1
n
¦  
Where we have the same meanings as for the previous formula but now we make 
reference to the believed (by Agj) dependence relations (not necessarily true in the 
world): in particular both n (the number of direct dependences) and p (the indirect, 
competitive dependences) are believed. 
Analogously, we can interpret Figure 2 as the set of believed relationships (by Agj) 
among the agents. In this case we have the subjective point of view. 
It is also possible to introduce a modulation factor (m) that takes into account the 
special kind of dependence: reciprocal (x=r), mutual (x=mu): 
SPN(Agj, gjk) = mx
1+ pkii=1
n
¦            with  0<mx<1 
Usually, we can say that mmumr. 
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More in general, we can say that the Subjective Potential for Negotiation of Agj∈Agt 
about the whole set of its own goals (Gj) in the Dependence-Network(Agt,t) is: 
SPN(Agj, Gj) = 1
s
mx
1+ pkii=1
ns
¦
k=1
s
¦  
Where s is the number of goals of Agj, and ns is the number of other agents in the 
set Agt, that have a dependence relation with Agj with respect to the goal gjk. pki is the 
number of agents in Agt that are competitors with the Agj on the same actions/plans/ 
resources owened by Agi (useful for gjk) in a not compatible way. In words, the global 
subjective potential for negotiation of an agent in a dependence network with respect 
of all its own goals is the sum of the believed terms above showed2. 
3.3   The Trust Role in Dependence Network 
Before taking into account the trustee’s point of view we would like to introduce into 
the dependence network also the trust relationships. In fact, although it is important to 
consider dependence relationship between agents in a society, there will be not 
exchange in the market if there is not trust to enforce these connections. Considering 
the analogy with the Figure 2, we will have now a representation as given in Figure 3 
(where D  includes the set of agents that Agj considers trustworthy for achieving gjk). 
 
Fig. 3 
 
Fig. 4 
                                                          
2
 An interesting problem is that an agent could be a competitor towards itself for achieving its 
own goals; for example: 
1) Agj needs action αr both for gs and gt and there is only an agent in Agt that has αr but is 
unable to provide two times the action αr. 
2) Agj needs action αr for gr and αs for gs and for both the actions αr and αs it depends 
only from Agi that can provide only an action. 
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We have now a new subset (showed outlined in Figure 4) containing the potential 
agents for negotiation. The analysis of the part E, F and G will result in: part E 
includes agents who depend form Agj, who are trusted but on different tasks; part F 
includes agents not depending from Agj and trusted on different tasks; part G includes 
agents trusted for the achievement of the goal gjk but not depending from Agj. 
Not only the decision to trust presupposes a belief of being dependent, but notice 
that a dependence belief (BelDep) implies on the other side a piece of Trust (as 
modelled in (1,2)). In fact to believe to be dependent means: 
- (BelDep-1) to believe not to be able to perform action α and to achieve goal g; 
and 
- (BelDep-2) to believe that Agi is able and in condition to achieve g, to perform α. 
Notice that (BelDep-2) is precisely one component of Trust in our analysis: the 
positive evaluation of Agi as competent, able, skilled, and so on. However, the other 
fundamental component of trust as evaluation is lacking: reliability, trustworthiness: 
Agi really intends to do, is persistent, is loyal, is benevolent, etc. Thus he will really 
do what Agj needs. 
Given the basic role played by “believed networks of dependence”, established by 
a believed relationship of dependence based on a belief of dependence, and given that 
this latter is one of the basic ingredient of trust as a mental object, we can claim that 
this overlap between theories is the crucial issue and our aim is namely to study it 
deeply. 
So introducing also in the Subjective Potential for Negotiation (of Agj∈Agt about 
an its own goal gjk) the basic beliefs about trust (1,2) we have: 
SPN(Agj, gjk)= Do(Bel j (Ai))* Do(Bel j (Wi))
1+ pkii=1
n
¦  
Where: mmu=mr=1; Do(Belj(Ai)) is the degree of (believed by Agj) ability (with 
respect of the goal gk) of the agent Agi; Do(Belj(Wi)) is the degree of (believed by Agj) 
willingness (with respect the goal gk) of the agent Agi. We do not consider here the 
possible relations between the values of Do(Belj(Ai)) and Do(Belj(Wi))  with the pki 
variable. 1 Do(Belj(Ai)), Do(Belj(Wi))  0. 
Let us, now, explicitly recall what are the cognitive ingredients of trust and 
reformulate them from the point of view of the trusted agent. In order to do this, it is 
necessary to limit the set of trusted entities. It has in fact been argued that trust is a 
mental attitude, a decision and a behavior that only a cognitive agent endowed with 
both goals and beliefs can have, make and perform. But it has been also underlined, 
that the entity that is trusted is not necessarily a cognitive agent. When a cognitive 
agent trusts another cognitive agent, we talk about social trust. 
We consider that the set of actions, plans and resources owned/available by an 
agent can be useful for achieving a set of tasks (τ1, …, τ r). 
We take now the point of view of the trustee agent in the dependence network: 
therefore we present a cognitive theory of trust as a capital, which is, in our view, a 
good starting point to include this concept in the issue of negotiation power. That is to 
say that if somebody is potentially strongly needed by other agents, but it is not 
trusted, its negotiation power does not improve. 
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We call the Subjective Trust Capital of Agi∈Agt about a specific task τk, the 
function: 
STC(Agi, τk) =
j=1
n
¦ Do(Bel j (Aik ))* Do(Bel j (Wik ))
 
Where n is the number of agents need the task τk. Agj, Agi ∈Agt. 
Do(Belji (Aik)) means the Aj’s degree of belief (believed by Ai) with respect the Ai’s 
ability about the task τk. 
Do(Belji (Wik)) means the Aj’s degree of belief (believed by Ai) with respect the Ai’s 
willingness about the task τk. 
In words, the cumulated trust capital of an agent Agi with respect of a specific task 
τk, is the sum (on all the agents needing that specific task in the network dependence) 
of the corresponding abilities and willingness believed by each dependent agent. The 
subjectivity consists in the fact that both the network dependence and the believed 
abilities and willingness are believed by (are the point of view of) the agent Agi. 
We call Degree of Trust of the Agent Agj on the agent Agi about the task τk 
(DoT(Agj Agi τk)): 
DoT(Agj Agi τk ) = Do(Bel j (Aik ))* Do(Bel j (Wik )) 
Analogously, we can also call the self-trust of the agent Agi about the task τk we 
can write: 
ST(Agi, τk) = Do(Beli(Aik))* Do(Beli(Wik )) 
From the comparison between STC(Agi, τk), DoT(Agj Agi τk) and ST(Agi, τk) a set of 
interesting actions and decision are taken from the agents (we will see in the next 
paragraph). 
Starting from the Trust Capital we would like evaluate the usable part of this trust 
capital. In this sense, we introduce the Subjective Usable Trust Capital of Agi∈Agt 
about an its own task τk as: 
SUTC(Agi, τk) = Do(Bel ji(Aik ))* Do(Bel ji(Wik))
1+ pkjj=1
n
¦  
where pkj is (following the Agi’s belief about the beliefs of Agj) the number of other 
agents in the dependence network that can achieve the same task with a trust value 
comparable with the one of Agi. We have two comparable trust values when the 
difference between them is in a range under a given threshold that could be 
considered meaningless with respect to the achievement of the task. 
4   Dynamics of Relational Capital 
What has not been considered enough in organization theory is the fact that the 
relational capital is peculiar in its being crucially based on beliefs: again, what makes 
relationships become a capital is not simply the structure of the networks (who “sees” 
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whom and how clearly) but the levels of trust which characterizes the links in the 
networks (who trusts whom and how much). Since trust is based on beliefs – 
including, as we said, also the believed dependence (who needs whom) – it should be 
clear that relational capital is a form of capital, which can be manipulated by 
manipulating beliefs. 
Thanks to a structural theory of what kind of beliefs are involved it is possible not 
only to answer some very important questions about agents’ power in network but 
also to understand the dynamical aspects of relational capital. In addition, it is 
possible to study what a difference between trustee’s beliefs and others’ expectations 
on her implies in terms of both reactive and strategic actions performed by the trustee. 
4.1   Increasing, Decreasing, and Transferring 
For what concerns the dynamic aspects of this kind of capital, it is possible to make 
hypotheses on how it can increase or how it can be wasted, depending on how each of 
the basic beliefs involved in trust are manipulated. 
First, let us consider what kind of strategies can be performed to enforce the 
other’s dependence beliefs and in particular his beliefs about agent’s competence. 
i) Agi can make the other agent dependent on him by making the other lacking 
some resource or skill (or at least inducing the other to believe so). 
ii) Agi can make the other agent dependent on him by activating or inducing in it a 
given goal (need, desire) on which the other is not autonomous (14) (or it 
believes so). 
iii) Since dependence beliefs are strictly related with the possibility of the others to 
see the agent in the network and to know her ability in performing useful tasks, 
the goal of the agent who wants to improve her own relational capital will be to 
signaling her presence and her skills (15,16,17). While to show her presence she 
might have to shift her position (either physically or figuratively like, for 
instance, changing her field), to communicate her skills she might have to hold 
and show something that can be used as a signal (such as certificate, social 
status etc.). This implies, in her plan of actions, several and necessary sub-goals 
to make a signal. This sub-goals are costly to be reached and the cost the agent 
has to pay to reach them can be taken as the evidence for the signals to be 
credible (of course without considering cheating in building signals). It is 
important to underline that using these signals often implies the participation of 
a third subject in the process of building trust as a capital: a third part which 
must be trusted (2). We would say the more the third part is trusted in the 
society, the more expensive will be for the agent to acquire signals to show, and 
the more these signals will work in increasing the agent’s relational capital. We 
will see later how this is related with the process of transferring trust from an 
agent to another (building reputation). 
Obviously also Agi’s previous performances are ‘signals’ of 
trustworthiness. And this information is also provided by the circulating 
reputation of Agi (18, 19). 
In formal terms, we can say that Agi has to work for increasing: 
Do(Belj(Ai) ) and consequently Do(Belji(Ai) ). 
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iv) Alternatively, Agi could work for reducing the believed (by Agj) value of 
ability of each of the possible competitors of Agi (in number of pkj) on that 
specific task τk. 
Let us now consider how willingness beliefs can be manipulated. In order to do so, 
consider the particular strategy performed to gain the other’s good attitude through 
gifts (20). It is true that the expected reaction will be of reciprocation, but this is not 
enough. While giving a gift the agent knows that the other will be more inclined to 
reciprocate, but she also knows that her action can be interpreted as a sign of the good 
willingness she has: since she has given something without being asked, the other is 
driven to believe that the agent will not cheat on him. Then, the real strategy can be 
played on trust, sometimes totally and sometimes only partially – this will basically 
depend on specific roles of agents involved. 
Again in formal terms, we can say that Agi has to work for increasing: 
Do(Belj(Wi)) and as a consequence Do(Belji(Wi)). Alternatively, it could work for 
reducing the believed (by Agj) value of willingness of each of the possible competitors 
of Agi (in number of pkj) on that specific task τk. 
An important consideration we have to do is that a dependence network is mainly 
based on the set of actions, plans and resources owned by the agents and necessary for 
achieving the agents’ goals (we considered a set of tasks each agent is able to 
achieve). The interesting thing is that the dependence network is modified by the 
dynamics of the agents’ goals, from their variations, from the emergency of new ones, 
from the disappearance of old ones, from the increasing request of a subset of them, 
and so on (21). On this basis changing the role of each agent in the dependence 
network, it changes in fact the trust capital of the agents. 
Relational capital can also circulated inside a given society. If somebody has a 
good reputation and is trusted by somebody else, she can be sure this reputation will 
pass and transfer to other actors – and this is always considered in marketing 
strategies of making voice circulate. What is not clear yet is how these phenomena 
work. But when trust on an agent circulates, it is strategically important for the agent 
to know very well how this happens and in which ways (not only figurate) trust begin 
to expand and keep on doing it. In fact, not all the ways are the same: it is possible 
that being trusted by a particular agent can mean that she just has one more agent in 
her relational capital, but gaining the trust of another agent can be very useful to her 
and exponentially increase her capital thanks to the strategic role or position of this 
other agent. That said, it should be clear the importance of understanding if and how 
much an agent is able to manage this potentiality of her capital. 
Basically, here also, the role of agents involved play a crucial part: for this reason 
it is necessary for agent to know the multiplicative factor represented by the 
recognized and trusted evaluator in the society. It is not necessarily true, in fact, that 
when somebody trusts somebody else and this latter trusts a third one, the first one 
will trust the third one: the crucial question is “which role the first recognizes to the 
second”. If the second one is trusted as an evaluator by the first one, than she can trust 
the third one for specific goals. 
Usually how well these transitive process works depends on what kind of broad-
casting and how many links the valuator has as well as on how much she is trusted in 
each of those links, so, basically, it recursively depends on the valuator’s relational 
capital. 
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4.2   Strategic Behavior of the Trustee 
Until now we just have considered trust as something quantitatively changeable, but we 
did not talk about subjective difference in the way trust is perceived by the two parts of 
the relationship. Nevertheless, to be realistic, we must take into account the fact that 
there is often a difference between how the others actually trust an agent and what that 
agent believes about that; and also between this (believed trust of others on her) and the 
level of trustworthiness that agent perceives in herself. Since being able is not 
necessarily the cause of trust: it can be the case of a diffuse atmosphere that makes the 
others to trust the agent although the agent has not all the characteristics to be trusted. 
In fact, these subjective aspects of trust are fundamental in the process of managing 
this capital, since it can be possible that there is the capital but the agent does not 
know to have it. Can be possible to use the relational capital even if who uses it is not 
aware of having it? 
At the base of the possible discrepancy in subjective valuation of trustworthiness 
there is the perception of how much an agent feels herself trustworthy in a given task 
and the valuation that agent makes about how much the others trust her for that task. 
In addition, this perception can change and become closer to the objective level 
while the task is performed: the agent can either find out of being more or less 
trustworthy than what he believed, or realize that the others’ perception was wrong 
(either positively or negatively). All this factors must be taken into account and 
studied together with the different components of trust, in order to build hypotheses 
on strategic actions that the agent will perform to cope with her relational capital. 
Then, we must consider what can be implied by these discrepancies in terms of 
strategic actions: how they can be individuated and valued? How the trusted agent 
will react when aware of them? 
She can either try to acquire competences in order to reduce the gap between 
others’ valuation and her own one, or exploiting the existence of this discrepancy, 
taking advantage economically of the reputation over her capability and counting on 
the others’ scarce ability of monitoring and testing her real skills. 
5   Conclusions 
As we said, individual trust capital (relational capital) and collective trust capital not 
only should be disentangled, but their relations are quite complicated and even 
conflicting. In fact, since the individual is in competition with the other individuals, 
he has a better position when trust is not uniformly distributed (everybody trusts 
everybody), but when he enjoys some form of concentration of trust (an oligopoly 
position in the trust network); on the contrary the collective social capital could do 
better with a generalized trust among the members of the collectivity. 
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Abstract. A key challenge in emerging multi-domain open environments is the 
need to establish trust-based, loosely coupled partnerships between previously 
unknown domains. An efficient trust framework is essential to facilitate trust 
negotiation based on the service requirements of the partner domains. While 
several trust mechanisms have been proposed, none address the issue of 
integrating the trust mechanisms with the process of integrating access control 
policies of partner domains to facilitate secure interoperation. In this paper, we 
propose a requirements-driven trust framework for secure interoperation in open 
environments. Our framework tightly integrates game-theory based trust negotiat-
ion with service negotiation, and policy mapping to ensure secure interoperation.  
1   Introduction 
In emerging application environments, loosely coupled entities typically collaborate 
to provide unified solutions. This has led to the development of service-based 
applications like Web Services, P2P and Grid applications. Business organizations 
and commercial entities are now moving towards service-based applications to 
provide integrated solutions with reusable components [21]. The components 
themselves may be distributed and only Internet-accessible [22]. Typically, services 
distribution is managed in a centralized manner, either through some service-broker 
or some public directory [23]. Typically, in such cases, even trust establishment and 
management is centralized. But with emerging applications, service requirement 
specification and provision requires a distributed framework. In such cases, recognizing 
service requirements and composing services that can satisfy these requirements, 
becomes quite complex. Furthermore, establishing secure interoperation is crucial 
because of the variety of requirements and the possibility of many domains interoperat-
ing in a collaborative framework. Establishment of trust in such environments is the first 
significant step to establishing secure interoperation. Trust must be negotiated to satisfy 
the security requirements of all the domains involved. This is done by the disclosure of 
sensitive information such as credentials, policies, context of service use etc. A trust 
framework should address all of the above issues.  
Several trust negotiation mechanisms have been proposed in the literature 
including Trust-Serv [1], TrustBuilder [2], H-Trust [4], Trust-X [3] and others [5, 6, 7, 
8, 9]. Earlier work has addressed the issue of trust negotiation and trust establishment 
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separately. But none of these frameworks have used negotiation and trust computation 
together. The level of trust to be established is inherently linked to service 
requirements. These methods fail in the following aspects: (1) primarily based on the 
client-server interaction model, (2) based on credential exchange and do not handle 
credential types, and (3) do not consider service requirements as a factor in trust 
negotiation or establishment.  
In this paper, we propose a requirements-based trust framework to support 
integrated trust and service negotiation, policy mapping, and a ticketing mechanism 
for fast cross domain accesses. The proposed framework includes the trust sustenance 
and evolution components. Following are the key contributions of the paper: 
• Trust negotiation is driven by service requirements. It supports bi-directional 
negotiation of service and context requirements. 
• Trust negotiation involves establishing agreeable trust levels and trust token 
types to facilitate mapping of policy elements for secure interoperation. Once 
negotiation is done, trust tokens are used for authentication and trust tickets are 
generated to support fast authorized accesses for agreed-upon services under the 
given context.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present related 
work. In section 3, we present the proposed trust framework. In section 4, the details 
of service and trust negotiation are presented. In section 5, we discuss the issues 
behind trust sustenance and evolution and some naïve solutions to the problem. 
2   Related Work 
The notion of trust among interoperating domains has been loosely divided into two 
types– negotiation of trust based on credentials and establishing trust based on peer-
measured values such as reputation and ranking. Existing work on trust negotiation 
focuses on the negotiation of credentials, with little focus on the generic requirements 
of secure interoperation, such as in Trust-Serv [1], TrustBuilder [2], H-Trust [4], 
Trust-X [3], and others [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Trust-Serv is a model-driven framework that 
uses state machines to represent and determine credential exchanges for access to 
resources [1]. Both TrustBuilder and Trust-X use credential disclosure trees and 
negotiation strategies to facilitate protection of credential information during 
negotiation. TrustBuilder defines families of disclosure trees to facilitate negotiation 
between entities that have different disclosure trees for the same resource [2]. The 
Trust-X system introduces the notion of trust ticket for efficient negotiation [3], which 
has been adopted in our framework.  
Decentralized systems typically use trust negotiation based on peer reviews and 
reputations. HTrust defines functions to establish, sustain and evolve trust based on 
entity behavior history [4]. Work in [5] defines a trust establishment and sustenance 
framework for peer to peer systems using reputation as a basis for trust establishment. 
Reputation is distributed across peers through the formation of peer grids or p-grids. 
The notion of sustenance is based on the concept of complaints, where peers can 
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make complaints regarding other peers to reduce their rank among other peers [7].  A 
certainty factor can be calculated to quantify the belief (and/or disbelief) a peer has on 
another peer [6]. Another reputation-based model calculates the reputation for every 
session based on the number of authentic responses to a query, where authentic 
responses are defined as original documents matching the query [12]. An approach 
similar to the reputation-based approaches is taken by [13] for Grid systems, where a 
trust index is calculated using fuzzy logic, based on the success rate of a job and the 
defense capability of the domain. A trust index is also calculated as a function of the 
direct relationship between the domains and the reputation of the target domain. The 
direct trust relationship is itself a function of the trust level assigned by the domain 
through interactions and the temporal decay of that trust level [14]. A privacy-enhanced 
reputation based method can be used to attach a trust value to an entity based on certain 
events, but these events cannot be traced back from the trust value [15]. A hybrid 
approach can also be taken, as in [16], where reputation and negotiation is mixed by 
negotiation of trust tokens between the interoperating domains and the domains 
confirming the trustworthiness of these tokens through security/trust agents. Similar to 
the reputation approach is the recommender approach [17, 18]. 
These systems do not satisfy all the requirements for peer-to-peer trust negotiation 
and also are not flexible in terms of their credential exchange technique. Our 
framework is suited for a distributed environment where trust is negotiated based on 
the service requirements of each domain involved. We introduce trust token types 
(discussed in Section 4), for establishing a generic security requirement, but still 
allow negotiation of trust based on the acceptability of different trust token types.  
Further, we also consider negotiation of trust integrated with service negotiation, such 
that different trust levels are established for different services exchanged. Trust levels 
are computed based on a variety of direct and indirect factors, which we shall discuss 
in Section 4.  
3   The Proposed Requirements-Driven Trust Framework 
The proposed trust framework, as shown in Figure 1, is composed of two principle 
modules – the requirements-based Trust Establishment (TE) module and the Trust 
Sustenance and Evolution (TSE) module, which are briefly overviewed below. 
3.1   Requirements-Based Trust Establishment 
Trust establishment involves establishing the services that will be exchanged between 
the interoperating domains and establishing a negotiated trust level for service access.  
Service/Context Negotiation. A service requesting domain will publish its 
requirements, but it is not necessary that there exists a domain that can exactly satisfy 
these requirements. Even if there is one, it may not be able to provide them all. Under 
such circumstances, services and their contexts may need to be negotiated to converge 
on a set of service requirements that can be satisfactorily provided by the other domain. 
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Fig. 1. The proposed Requirements-driven Trust Framework 
Trust Negotiation. Trust negotiation involves negotiation of the set of trust tokens that 
need to be disclosed based on the trust token type required for service access. Trust 
token types are sets of attributes and their allowed range of values, while trust tokens 
represents any set of digital certificates that collectively can show that all the TT attri-
butes have values from the specific range. For instance, a trust token type may indicate 
the requirement for proof of age to be above 18. Digital credentials that form valid trust 
tokens may include Passport, university ID or Driver’s License. The negotiation phase 
establishes which of these credentials could be used as trust tokens. Note that credential 
certificates used as tokens may have attributes with varying protection requirements.  
A key result of the negotiation and trust establishment phase is the mapping of the 
policies in domains if each provides a service to the other, or within the provider 
domain. Our proposed trust framework assumes that the individual domains employ 
GTRBAC policies. The fine-grained service requests are represented as a set of abstract 
permissions that a particular role within the requesting domain needs to access in the 
provider domain. Our preliminary work on integration of GTRBAC policies reported in 
[26] is currently used in the proposed framework. The policy mapping facilitates 
mapping in presence of timing constraints and hybrid hierarchies. We have also 
extended the GTRBAC model for location-based access control, in LoT-RBAC [28], 
and the same policy mapping techniques now be used for secure interoperation in 
mobile environments as well. A brief overview of the policy mapping process is 
presented in Section 4.1. 
3.2   Trust Sustenance and Evolution 
Trust sustenance refers to maintaining trust levels when domain characteristics 
change during the period of interoperation. Trust evolution refers to the change in 
trust levels because of changes in domain characteristics.  
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Evolution of Service Requirements. During a session, a new service requirement 
can arise or some services may no longer be required. Since trust is requirements-
based, evolution of service requirements may trigger a decision on whether to sustain 
the trust value or re-evaluate, or even renegotiate. Changes in trust values could also 
be used to renegotiate services; for instance, to reduce the set of accesses given 
originally. 
Context Monitoring. In highly dynamic environments, context changes are inevitable. 
Since trust levels are context-dependant, it is important to monitor the changes in the 
context and consequently sustain or calculate the changes to the trust level.  
Policy Evolution Evaluation. Changes in policies could cause service usage/provision 
to be affected (like change in contextual constraints on services), leading to either trust 
re-evaluation or re-negotiation. Policy mapping will be particularly affected. 
Session Monitoring. Anomalous and malicious behavior should be tracked and 
immediately recognized, so that trust levels can be changed based on the behavior of 
the other domain. This is a run-time decision on trust sustenance or evolution.  
Trust sustenance is usually associated with changes in domain characteristics that are 
not very significant and can be handled to gracefully end interoperation. Some examples 
of these changes are change of context, policy changes causing conflict in access 
resolution, etc. Trust evolution is usually associated with more significant changes, like 
complete change of context, or access to highly sensitive information. In such cases, 
trust threshold levels are recomputed and if necessary, trust is renegotiated.  
4   Requirements-Based Trust Establishment 
A distinct feature of our framework is the negotiation and establishment of trust based 
on the service requirements of the interoperating domains. Next, we briefly discuss how 
service requests are made and the need for policy mapping for service negotiation.  
4.1   Service Requests and Policy Mapping 
Typically, service requests are made by member entities of a domain (like users that 
have assumed certain roles). The requests are usually access to resources and can 
have a context associated with them. We assume abstract permissions. Following 
definition captures the generalization of a service request [26]: 
Definition 1 (Service Request): A requesting domain dx’s service request is defined as:  
dx.SR = <{r1, (P11, C11), ..., (P1n, C1n)}, …, {rn, (Pn1, Cn1), ..., (Pnn, Cnn)}> 
where ri is a role in domain dx, Pij is the jth permission set requested by ri in context Cij 
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Fig. 2. Role Mapping and Secure Interoperation in GTRBAC-based systems [26] 
The roles {r1, .., rn} may or may not be regular roles in the domain but could also be 
special roles created by the local policy for interoperation management. The service 
provider domain will then determine if the service can be provided by doing a 
preliminary policy mapping, where roles {r1, …, rn} are mapped to some local roles 
for access to the requested permissions. The mapping is done by looking up which 
roles in the role hierarchy are authorized for the requested permissions. Based on 
hierarchy structures and permission-role assignments, roles may be exported for use 
by other domains as such or by creating temporary roles in the hierarchy. Export roles 
are created specifically for the purpose of interoperation. For details on policy 
mapping for secure interoperation please refer to [26]. with explanation of the use of 
Inheritance-only, Activation-only and Inheritance and Figure 2 shows how policy 
mapping is done in GTRBAC-based systems.  
4.2   Services and Trust 
In general, the interoperating domains try to negotiate what services they require and 
can provide, in order to match each other’s service requirements. If any domain 
provides services worth less than it received, then it can pay some incentive to the 
domain that provided more services. Such service requirements-driven service 
negotiation can be seen in practical applications and should be facilitated to support 
ad hoc partnerships between a pair of domains. Various cost factors may play a 
significant role as to how the negotiation may proceed.  
Definition 2 (Service Negotiation Parameters): Let d
x
 and dy be service domains such 
that services requested by each are satisfied by the other after negotiation.
 
Then we 
define the parameters for negotiation as shown in Table 1. 
Definition 3 (Service Negotiation Convergence): We say that the negotiation between 
d
x
 and dy converges when the following condition holds for both dx and dy: 
c  b + i   
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Table 1. Cost parameters for trust negotiation 
y
x
d
dm  Cost incurred to dy for policy mapping, to satisfy requirements of dx (dx.SR) 
y
x
d
dr  Cost incurred to dy for resources used by dx when using services provided by dy (as per dx.SR) 
y
x
d
di   Incentives that dy may receive (or lose) in the interoperation 
y
x
d
dc  Cost incurred by dy for providing services to satisfy dx.SR: yx
d
dc  = 
y
x
d
dm  + 
y
x
d
dr  
y
x
d
db  Benefits for dy when using service provided by dx (as per dy.SR) 
Ideally, the cost incurred to a domain during interoperation should be less than the 
benefits and incentives it gets. Note that the condition for convergence may never occur 
as internal constraints on the services required or provided may restrict further 
negotiation. In such a situation, secure and desirable interoperation may not be possible. 
Trust negotiation is carried out simultaneously with service negotiation to enable 
establishment of interoperation. Typically, if two domains (say d
x
 and dy) are involved 
in interoperation through exchange of services, each domain requests the other to 
disclose some information of a certain type as proof of trustworthiness. We introduce 
the notion of trust token type that indicates a set of attributes and the range of values 
they should be constrained to. Formally we define them as follows: 
Definition 4 (Trust Token Type, Trust Token): Let TT and T denote a trust token 
type and a trust token, respectively. Further, let A={ 1a ,…, na } be a generic set of 
attributes, Dom ( ia ) be the evaluation domain of attribute ia , and A1 ⊆ A. Then, 
• TT = (A1, VS), where VS={V1,…., V|A|}such that Vi⊆ Dom ( ia ). 
• T = (A1, V), where vi∈V  is such that vi∈Vi ⊆ Dom ( ia )  (i = 1.. |A|);  
Further, a trust token T is said to satisfy a trust token type TT (denoted as T Ł TT) 
if the following conditions hold: 
• ∀ ia ∈ TT.A, Vi ∈ TT.VS, [vi∈T.Vi ∧ vi∈Vi ] 
The service-provider domains demand the disclosure of credentials that verify a set of 
trust token types. Some typical examples of trust token types are ({age}, {greater 
than 18}) and ({nationality, residence}, {US and US Minor Islands, 
Pennsylvania}). Credentials are digitally signed endorsements of some attributes of 
an entity. They are basically attribute certificates, as specified in [27]. A trust token is 
constructed by selecting a set of candidate credentials that collectively satisfy the 
trust token type. It is possible that only a subset of the attributes endorsed by each 
credential is needed to satisfy the trust token type. Formally a trust token can be 
defined as follows: 
Definition 5 (Certificates for Trust Token): Let TT be a trust token type, CAi be 
certification authority, and C={
1CACert (A1), …., nCACert (An)} be such that 
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• each element of C at least has one unique a ∈TT.A 
• the attribute set over all elements of C ⊆ TT.A. 
Then ATTCAC
.
 represents a trust token generated by projecting over attribute set 
TT.A. of C and then certified by CA. If ATTCAC . Ł TT, then ATTCAC . is a valid trust token 
for TT. Note that n = 1 is possible in which case the certificate either exactly 
represents a trust token or a projection over its attributes is needed to generate a trust 
token. 
As per the definition, a trust token may need to be generated dynamically to satisfy 
the required trust token type. The requesting domain may decide to generate such an 
on-the-fly trust token using the credentials he has by creating a third party certified 
certificate (CA is a third party). In such a case trust factor will relate to who certifies 
the trust toke. For instance, a military personnel may have certificates given to him by 
the military department and may contain many sensitive attributes and while 
interacting with a private agency may decide to have the military agency certify his 
token to satisfy the trust token type required by the public agency. It is possible that 
the CA is the provider himself. In such a case, to satisfy the trust token type, the 
requester may simply submit a set of credential certificates. An issue here is the 
protection requirements of the attributes in the certificates that are not required. 
Exposure of such is a risk that the requester may take based on the trust that it has on 
the provider and should be incorporated in the trust computation. For the military 
personnel in our example earlier, exposure of such attributes to the private agency 
may not be an option at all.  
Trust Factors. Prior to negotiation, the interoperating domains also compute 
,
y xd d
S Ctr
→
, 
which denotes the trust dx has with regards to dy for services defined by S in contexts 
C. As we shall see later in this section, this is a value that is used to compute the 
payoff of a negotiation strategy. The computation of the overall trust values is the 
weighted sum of the recommended trust and direct trust values [14]. It is possible that 
a domain does not have both these values for another domain. The direct trust 
variables are historical satisfaction level (h) and risk (rk). Here, h indicates the 
cumulative level of satisfaction that a domain has had for another domain on their 
previous interactions and is computed based on session histories and older h values. 
Variable rk captures risks associated with the desired interoperation. An example is 
the risk of too many claimed trust tokens being invalid. Another risk is that of 
services promised but not provided. The historical satisfaction level is also affected by 
the result of the verification of trust tokens in the earlier sessions. That is, if a domain 
presents valid trust tokens, then in interoperation, during actual cross domain 
accesses, the historical satisfaction level will not be negatively affected. 
 
The 
sustenance of the direct trust is based on a family of functions, and can typically be a 
time-decaying value [14].  Recommended trust is determined by the recommendation 
value 
,
R yd d
S Cr
→
and the trust level for the recommender [16, 17, 20], denoted by  
,
x yd d
S Ctr
→
, where dR is the recommending domain, and dR is the recommender. 
A Requirements-Driven Trust Framework for Secure Interoperation in Open Environments 41 
 
Recommended trust can also be a result of a chain of recommendations, where each 
recommender assigns a trust value for the previous recommender [16].  
The parameters that affect the trust relationship are context and the service 
specifications. Earlier works have found the dependence of trust on contextual 
parameters like time and location [14, 19]. With respect to temporal context, it is 
different from time decay of trust, because time decay only shows trust value 
changing over some time, while temporal context for trust refers to the trust levels at 
different instances of time. Trust is also specific to service specifications for a 
particular session – for different services being provided (or requested) the trust levels 
may be different. 
Definition 6 (Trust Level): Let S and C be the services provided by dy and the 
corresponding contexts of interoperation. The trust level 
,
y xd d
S Ctr
→ that dy has on dx, for 
services S in contexts C, is defined in Table 2 follows.  
 
Table 2. Trust level computation 
,
y xd d
S Ctr
→
 = 
(α ×
,
y xd d
S Cdtr
→ ) + (β ×
,
y xd d
S Crtr
→ ) 
,
y xd d
S Cdtr
→
= 
(γ × 
,
y xd d
S Ch
→ ) - (δ × 
,
y xd d
S Crk
→ ) 
,
y xd d
S Crtr
→
 = 
(ψ × 
,
y Rd d
R Ctr
→ ) + (λ × 
,
R xd d
S Cr
→
 ) 
• α,β, γ, δ, ψ, λ and ε are weights 
• α is typically greater than β, as direct trust is usually more 
influential than recommended trust. 
• Very often α is a result of a time-decay function which 
represents the degradation in the trust for a domain, due to the 
lack of interaction.  
• 
,
y xd d
S Ch
→
 is the historical satisfaction level that dy has for dx 
• 
,
y xd d
S Ch
→ is bound by the previous risk levels as follows: 
 
,
y xd d
S Ch
→
 = η × 
,
y xd d
S Crk
→
, where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 
• 
,
y xd d
S Crk
→
 is the risk  
• 
,
R xd d
S Cr
→
 is the recommendation given by dR for domain dx. 
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Trust Estd.
Calculate 
payoff in 
disclosure of 
trust token 
types
Service, 
Context and 
Trust Estd.
IR-Request
IR-Response
IN
EN, Satisfied
EN, Satisfied
NP(SRx’, SRx’.TT, SPx’, SPx’.TT)
NP(SRy”, SRy”.TT, SPy”, SPy”.TT)
 
Fig. 3. Protocol for Service, Context and Trust Negotiation 
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,
y xd d
S Crk
→ is a complex parameter with a simple quantification done by computing a value 
from previous validations of trust tokens of the same type from the same domain. 
,
y xd d
S Ctr
→
 is computed for two purposes – (i) primarily to compute the payoff that is 
determined for each negotiation strategy, described later in this section; or (ii) to set a 
threshold (minimum) level on the trust that a domain must establish with the other. 
This facilitates trust token negotiation as well. 
4.3   Negotiation Protocol  
Negotiation between the domains is done to determine the services required/available 
and to establish trust, based on the trust tokens. Negotiation of services and associated 
trust tokens is done simultaneously as can be seen from Figure 3, which describes a 
protocol for negotiation of services and trust tokens. Note that, simultaneously, even 
context of service is also negotiated. The messages exchanged by the domains are 
given in Table 3.  
To determine the convergence point of the negotiation, we take the game-theoretic 
approach of defining payoffs for different strategies. Here trust tokens are strategies, 
 
dx
dy dy
( )1 1, yx ddp p
……….
….. ….. ….. ( ), yx ddi ip p ( ), yx ddj jp p ( ), yx ddn np p
dx dxdx dx……. ……. 
 
• Negotiation Tree = {V, E} 
V={Root, Non-Leafs, Leafs} 
• The domains alternate every level 
of the tree.  
• Root: Requesting Domain 
• Edges: Strategy execution by a 
domain at the previous level 
• Non-Leafs: State of Negotiation 
after previous domain’s strategy 
• Leaf Nodes: Payoff for a sequence 
of strategies   
 
Fig. 4. The negotiation tree 
Table 3. Message Description for Trust Negotiation 
Message Syntax and Description 
<IR, Required (or Provided), Name, Service, Context> Interoperation 
Request/Response  
(IR) Such messages are sent by the initiator domain and the responder domains 
<IN, Accept> 
Initiate Negotiation  
(IN) 
This is a message sent by the initiator to the domain(s) which it has selected 
from a set of domains that responded to its request, to start negotiation of 
services, context of service and trust token types required. 
<NP, Name, SR, SR.C, SR.TT, Sp, SP.C, SP.TT> Negotiation Proposal 
(NP) The negotiation messages exchanged between the domains 
<EN, Satisfied (or Not Satisfied)> End Negotiation  
(EN) This message is sent to end the negotiation either in satisfaction or disapproval 
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and each trust token has a different overall protection requirement. Based on the 
choice of trust tokens for disclosure, corresponding domains have gains (or losses). 
The payoff for each domain is the linear sum of the payoffs from services and trust 
token negotiations respectively.  
The trust token negotiation payoff is the difference between the trust level established 
and the protection level required of the trust tokens disclosed, as given below: 
φ’ij ( pidx , p jdy ) = (( ,x yd dS Ctr → -ProtLevel(dx.Ti)), ( ,y xd dS Ctr → - ProtLevel(dy.Tj))), 
The service negotiation payoff is the difference between the benefits from usage of 
services and the losses incurred through service exchange and service provision.  
φ”ij( pidx , p jdy )= (  x x xy y yd d dd d db c i− − ,  y y yx x xd d dd d db c i− − ) 
Thus the overall negotiation payoff is given as: 
φij( pidx , p jdy )  = φ’ij ( pidx , p jdy ) + φ”ij( pidx , p jdy ) 
The negotiation is essentially modeled as a negotiation tree. The different strategies 
used by the domains are the disclosure of different trust tokens that satisfy the other 
domain’s requirements but have different protection requirements. It is reasonable to 
assume that protection requirement of a trust token is directly related to trust level 
desired. For instance, a passport is a more trustworthy proof of age, but it also 
contains more sensitive details. Traversal of the tree represents negotiation exchanges 
between the domains. Each domain computes the payoffs at the leaf nodes and selects 
a set of candidate payoffs. Using a goal-driven approach (goal being any of the 
candidate payoffs), the domains negotiate the payoffs. Ideally, both domains select 
the same candidate payoffs, because in game-theory-based negotiation, strategies are 
selected that optimize payoff for both parties. The candidate payoff values are 
selected through empirical studies. Consequently, backtracking is also facilitated in 
the negotiation – if say dy proposes a set of services and trust tokens that would lead 
to poor payoff for say dx, then dx will reject the proposal and dy will have to go back 
and try another proposal. The negotiation tree structure is given in Figure 4.  
Figure 5 shows the flowcharts for service and trust token negotiation, for both 
atheservice requester and provider. For service provision, the domain checks the 
availability of those services before determining the trust token type(s) required for 
each service. The domain may reject the request message if required service is not 
available. If the requested service is available, the domain determines the trust token 
types required. The domain grants interoperation of requested services if the trust 
tokens, claimed to match the trust token types, are satisfactory, otherwise it 
determines a new set of trust tokens required for the next round of negotiation. For 
service requests, the domain checks if the set of services from the provider is enough. 
If so, then the domain checks the availability of trust tokens matching the trust token 
type requested from the other domain. The domain may reject the service request, if it 
does not possess trust tokens of the requested type. Otherwise, it determines the set of 
trust tokens to disclose, that has the best payoff for both domains. We believe that 
although the open environment is assumed, most trust-based relations may be 
established well before there is any access of resources. 
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Fig. 5. a. Service and Trust Token Disclosure for Service Provider; b. Service and Trust Token 
Disclosure for Service Requester 
The time between the trust establishment and resource access can be long enough 
to make some trust-tokens become invalid. In earlier systems, this would lead to re-
negotiation of credentials [1, 2, 3]. But in our model, we would only renegotiate the 
one trust-token type in case the peer might actually have a trust token with different 
protection requirements associated with credential attributes. Thus, when the 
StudentID is proved invalid, E2 asks for another trust token type, and the customer 
discloses the possession of StateID which is then accepted, with the same trust level 
and same set of privileges.   
Trust Ticket. One enhancement to the system is the use of a trust ticket. The trust ticket 
can be used to by pass the trust token validation process. By disclosing a trust ticket, a 
domain can access a set of requested services indicated in a trust ticket. Service provider 
issues a trust ticket for each successful interoperation. Trust tickets offer the flexibility 
in future interoperations, since a set of services and context indicated in the ticket may 
be a part of service requests in other interoperations. The trust ticket issued to service 
requester is encrypted by an established session key ks to ensure integrity of the ticket.  
The data structure of a trust ticket is shown in Figure 6. The detail of the trust 
ticket is as follow: Trust ticket identifier is stored in Ticket ID. The Ticket Issuer 
indicates domain, which issued the ticket and Ticket Holder indicates the domain or 
 
Ticket ID Services Trust Token ID Ticket Issuer 
Ticket 
Holder Lifetime 
Shared 
Secret 
Fig. 6. Trust Ticket data fields 
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a specific users that uses the ticket. A set of service identifiers associated to a ticket is 
specified in Services. Lifetime is an expiration time of the trust ticket. A random 
number, Shared Secret increases with each of multiple accesses. Validity of the ticket 
is specified in Lifetime. The Lifetime indicates the time-interval that the ticket is valid, 
which is usually not greater than duration of interoperation session. It is essential to 
ensure that valid duration of trust ticket is no longer than all lifetime of all certificates 
associated with the ticket.  
During subsequent accesses, trust tickets can now be used instead of the trust 
token which requires credential validation. Once negotiation of services and trust 
token types succeeds, service provider creates a trust ticket to service requester. Both 
domains establish a session key ks for encryption of trust ticket used between both 
parties. Service provider domain evaluates the trust ticket by checking validity of the 
trust ticket and all associated certificates. If the ticket and all the certificates are valid, 
the credential validation process grants access to the requested services without actual 
credential validation.  The trust ticket is encrypted by established shared secret key ks 
to guarantee privacy and integrity of the ticket. Requester domain uses Shared Secret 
value as a counter to keep track of number of service accessing by increasing Shared 
Secret value by one each time he accesses the resource. 
4.4   Implementation 
We have implemented a very basic proof of concept system to ensure that the 
framework works. The implementation involves each domain running three Java 
threads – a Peer, Recommender and Certifier. Peers request services amongst each 
other and credentials. The proposed negotiation trees are created for the prototype. 
We are currently working on a full-fledged implementation along with integration 
with an access-control framework based on the location and time based RBAC model 
(LoT-RBAC [28]). 
5   Conclusions and Future Work 
We introduced the notion of requirements-based trust negotiation to induce more 
effective trust negotiation and establishment. We have used the notion of trust token 
types to abstract the requirements of a domain to establish trust. Some concepts that 
we have touched upon in our work (like protection requirements of trust tokens and 
risk) are out of scope of our discussion, because of which we have not elaborated on 
their computation. But these are important to the trust negotiation and trust 
framework, and we are currently exploring methods of good estimations of these 
values. We have also used the game-theoretic approach for disclosure strategy 
selection and shown flowcharts for strategy selection based on payoffs. Computation 
of the set of potential payoffs is still complex and we are currently working on 
efficient search and computation algorithms for these. We have also briefly addressed 
the issues of trust sustenance and evolution, but the decision to perform either under 
the given conditions is empirically determined. We are currently working on the 
implementation of this framework and will obtain empirical results for trust 
evaluation and sustenance. 
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Abstract. The modelling of trust for the purpose of trust management gives rise 
to a puzzle that opens up fundamental questions concerning the relationship 
between trust and calculative reason as the basis for cooperation. It is argued 
that, ironically, trust management seem not to maximise trust but, instead, to 
reduce the need for trust. This conclusion is used to argue that the normative 
aspects of trust must be given a central role in the modelling of trust and trust 
management. The following question is addressed: What can an agent R infer 
about the future actions of another agent E, if R assumes that E is trustworthy? 
It is suggested that a generalised version of Barwise and Seligman’s theory of 
information flow can be used to model the role of normative structures in 
reasoning in trust relationships. Implications for trust management are discussed. 
1   The Puzzle of Trust Management 
What is it that trust management is supposed to achieve? It is uncontroversial, I 
believe, to claim that the ultimate goal is to enable the development of mutually 
beneficial cooperation. It is natural to suggest, furthermore, that the role of trust 
management is to maximise trust between the parties and thereby provide a basis for 
cooperation to develop. But this further suggestion creates problems. Empirical 
evidence shows, I will argue, that rather than increasing trust, trust management will 
have the effect of reducing the need for trust. Hence, trust is not maximised after all. 
There is no reason to believe, however, that trust management does not support the 
development of cooperation. This is the puzzle, then: how can trust management 
provide the basis for cooperation without maximising trust?  
2   Does Trust Management Maximize Trust? 
As a starting point for the discussion of this puzzle, consider first the perspective on 
trust management provided by Jøsang et. al. (2005). On their definition, which 
expresses a representative view, trust management is:  
“[t]he activity of creating systems and methods that allow relying parties 
to make assessments and decisions regarding the dependability of potential 
transactions involving risk, and that also allow players and system owners to 
increase and correctly represent the reliability of themselves and their 
systems.” (Jøsang et al 2005: 96)  
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The essence of trust management, on this definition, is to provide a better 
informational basis for analysing the risks and benefits of the transaction. Typical 
examples would be the collection of relevant information about the reputation of the 
other party or the systematic analysis of my own experiences from previous 
encounters with her, and the communication of my own policies in situations of this 
kind. The same understanding of the point of trust management emerges from the 
survey of trust management provided by Rouhaama et al. (2005)  
The aim of trust management must be to facilitate beneficial cooperation and to 
avoid interactions that are not beneficial. Secondly, trust is often an important basis 
for cooperation. This idea is found in much of the trust literature, for example in the 
influential account of Marsh and Dibben (2005). They define trust as “the belief (or 
measure of it) that a person (the trustee) will act in the best interest of another (the 
truster) in a given situation, even when controls are unavailable and it may not be in 
the trustee’s best interest to do so.” (Marsh and Dibben 2005: 19) The definition is far 
from clear, but the many questions that it raises need not concern us here. The main 
point is that they view trust as a belief that can be measured, and that they use this to 
formulate a rule which says, roughly, that if the degree of trust is greater than a 
certain cooperation threshold, then the agent will cooperate.  
Marsh and Dibben do not discuss trust management explicitly and they are used 
here only to exemplify a typical view of the positive relationship between trust and 
cooperation. A further, natural suggestion, not made by Marsh and Dibben, would be 
that the function of trust management is, at least in part, to maximise trust. To see why 
this is a plausible idea, let us distinguish the perspective of the truster and that of the 
trustee. From the perspective of the truster, trust management would be, following the 
definition of Jøsang et al. above, to determine the trustworthiness of the trustee. This 
could have the negative result that the he was not trustworthy. In this case there 
cannot be an increase in trust. But in the case the other party is judged to be 
trustworthy, with the aid of reputation mechanisms for example, one could perhaps 
think that the truster’s trust in the trustee would increase. Conversely, if we consider 
trust management from the perspective of the trustee, a natural suggestion would be 
that he could raise the trustor’s level of trust in him by communicating trustworthiness. 
This is an idea that seem to be involved in what we might call this the marketing 
perspective on trust management, i.e. marketing efforts to induce trust in potential 
customers (for an example, see Cheskin 1999). It is not clear, however, whether this 
marketing perspective should be considered to be part of the scientific study of trust 
management. The majority of contributions to the field seem to as its starting point 
the perspective of the prospective truster. In the discussion below I will also focus on 
trust management only from the perspective of the truster.  
3   The Growth of Trust in Social Structures 
My claim, now, is that trust management does not promote cooperation by increasing 
trust. I have two arguments to support this claim, one empirical and one theoretical. 
The empirical argument draws on experiments on trust and cooperation done by 
Kollock (1994) and Molm, Takahashi and Peterson (2000). Kollock studied the 
development of trust under conditions of varying degrees of uncertainty. The contrast 
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between the two types of situations that he simulates in his experiments can be 
illustrated by the markets for rubber and markets for rice. The market for rubber is 
characterized by a high level of uncertainty, Kollock explains. 
Rubber is an interesting commodity in that at the time of sale it is 
impossible to determine its quality. It is not until months later, after extensive 
processing, that the buyer can determine whether the grower took the extra 
time and expense to insure high-quality crop. Within this situation the buyers 
are not motivated to pay a high price for goods of unknown quality and the 
growers are not motivated to produce high quality goods as there is no 
simple, objective way of displaying the care they took. The participants are 
faced with a type of Prisoner’s Dilemma that is the result of asymmetric 
information. Furthermore, there is no regulatory agency to monitor and 
sanction the actions of each exchange partner. (Kollock 1993: 314) 
Still, in this market buyer and sellers have been able to develop a stable pattern of 
cooperation, because “they have abandoned the anonymous exchange of the market 
for personal, long-term exchange relationships between particular buyers and sellers. 
Within this framework it is possible for the growers to establish reputation for fairness 
and trustworthiness.” (Kollock 1993: 314) 
In contrast to the market for rubber, the market for rice is characterised by low 
uncertainty, because “[u]nlike rubber, the quality of rice can be ascertained directly 
and at essentially no cost by rubbing a few grains of together between blocks of 
wood.” (Kollock 1993: 315). In the word of Popkin, who has described this market, it 
is “what Adam Smith thought all capitalism was like – information easily and readily 
ascertainable, easy switching of buyers, little reason for loyalty to any marketer or 
buyer.” (cited in Kollock 1993: 315). For this reason there is in this market little need 
for trust, and “the need for commitment and the concern over reputation will be 
lower.” (Kollock 1993: 315)  
Kollock studied experimentally the development of trust within situations with 
respectively very high and very low uncertainty, to investigate the ideas that exchange 
under uncertainty leads to the development of trust while exchange under certainty 
does not. There is not space here to go into the details of the experimental setup, the 
measurements for trust and commitment or a detailed analysis of the results. What is 
of importance to the present discussion is that Kollock found the following 
hypotheses confirmed:  
(1) “Commitment will be greater in the uncertain-quality condition” 
(2) “Subjects will be more likely to report staying with an exchange partner even 
though they could get a better price else in the uncertain-quality condition” 
(3) “Subjects will rate their partners as significantly more trustworthy in the 
uncertain-quality condition.” (Kollock 1993: 327) 
The explanation for these results is that under conditions of uncertainty, traders are 
given the opportunity to show their trustworthiness in practice. And this proof of 
trustworthiness generates trust in the other party. “Thus, the development of high 
levels of trust requires more than just ongoing interaction. Some level of risk must 
also be present so that there is a test of trust.” (Kollock 1993:319). If the situation is 
“correspondent” in the sense that the interaction is based on a recognition of mutual 
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interest, there is no risk of defection and hence no test of trustworthiness. “The 
implication is that trust is likely to be higher among actors who manage to establish 
successful exchange relations in such situations as the rubber market (where 
information asymmetries introduce significant risks), as opposed to actors in 
situations similar to the rice market (where more information is available and the risks 
are significantly lower). Of course, risk creates a breeding ground not only for trust 
but for exploitation as well.” (Kollock 1993: 319)  
Kollock’s study give support to the idea that more information – i.e. reduced 
uncertainty - goes together with less need for trust and that therefore less trust is 
developed. This result is relevant to the understanding of what goes on in trust 
management. Trust management is precisely the use of techniques for the provision of 
more information relevant to the assessment of the reliability of the trustee, hence to 
reduce uncertainty. This suggests that it is perhaps not plausible to claim that the trust 
management maximises trust as the basis for cooperation. Rather, it is more plausible 
to claim that trust can management facilitates the development of beneficial 
cooperation by reducing the need for trust.  
4   Trust, Assurance and Contracting 
This conclusion is also supported by empirical studies of the relationship between 
trust and negotiated exchange, as compared to development of trust in relationships 
where exchange occurs without negotiation before the exchange. Like Kollock, Molm 
et al. (2000) are conducting experiments to test their prediction, which in their case is 
the classical proposition of exchange theory “that trust is more likely to develop 
between partners when exchange occurs without explicit negotiations of binding 
agreements. Under these conditions, the risk and uncertainty of exchange provide the 
opportunity for partners to demonstrate their trustworthiness.” (Molm et al 
2000:1396) Their approached is based on a distinction between expectation of 
behaviour based on trust and expectations based on assurance. When trust is 
involved, there are “expectations of benign behaviour based on inference a partner’s 
personal traits and intentions”, while there is assurance when we the exchange partner 
has “expectations based .. on knowledge of an incentive structure that encourages 
benign behaviour.” (Molm et al 2000: 1397) Their central claim is that exchanges 
under binding agreement provide assurance, while reciprocal exchanges generate trust 
among the parties.  
Like Kollock’s study, the result of the experiment was that trust is developed 
primarily when the trustworthiness of the partners are tested in practice. And, again, 
this seems to be relevant to the understanding of the role of trust management. 
Assuming that negotiation is a form of trust management, the study supports the claim 
that the function of trust management could not be to generate more trust, but instead 
to reduce the need for trust. Molm et.al make the observation that “ironically, the very 
mechanisms that were created to reduce risk in transactions – the negotiation of terms 
and strictly binding agreements – have the unintended consequence of reducing trust 
in relationships.” (Molm et al 2000: 1398) This observation is relevant also to the 
discussion here because, first, negotiated agreement will be part of trust management 
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in some case, and, secondly, because it makes plausible the more general claim that 
mechanisms to reduce risk in transactions will tend to reduce the need for trust.  
It is not part of my claim here that trust management has negative effects on 
cooperation. On the contrary, I assume that trust management often will result in 
cooperation that would not otherwise develop. My claim is only that trust 
management does not provide the basis for cooperation by raising the level of trust, 
but, instead, by providing a better basis for calculative reason. Consequently, I also 
believe that the studies discussed above shows the need for taking seriously the 
relationship between trust and calculative reason in the theory of trust.1  I will return 
to this in my discussion of trust below. 
5   Trust and Calculativeness 
Williamson (1993) has addressed this issue from the perspective of transaction cost 
economics. One of his claims is that “Calculative trust is a contradiction in terms.” 
(Williamson 1993: 463) Furthermore, he claims that the notion of trust is redundant in 
the understanding of commercial transactions in a society with economic institutions. 
Williamson believes that “trust” is a notion that is needed primarily to describe 
personal relations. In impersonal transactions, Williams argues, only calculative 
reasoning is needed. Calculativeness is defined as a situation where “the affected 
parties (1) are aware of the range of possible outcomes and their associated 
probabilities, (2) take cost-effective actions to mitigate hazards and enhance benefits, 
(3) proceed with the transaction only if expected net gains can be projected, and, (4) if 
X can complete the transaction with any of several Ys, the transaction is assigned to 
that Y for which the largest net gain can be projected.” (Williamsson 1993:  467) He 
then goes on to show that all of the relevant examples offered as examples of trust 
based transactions in the contribution to the classical volume Gambetta (1988)2, can 
be fully explained as exercises of calculativeness. Drawing on the central assumptions 
of transaction cost economics, bounded rationality and opportunism, Williamson then 
concludes that there is no need to bring in the notion of trust at all in order to 
“describe commercial exchange for which cost-effective safeguards have been 
devised in support of more efficient exchange.” (Williamson 1993:  463)  
There is no need for the present purposes to go into a discussion of this general 
claim of Williamson’s that the concept of trust is redundant in the explanation of 
market transactions. The aim of trust management is to provide the basis for 
reasoning about what exchanges to enter into in a specific situation, not to explain 
afterwards why the transaction took place, and for this purpose the notion of trust is 
clearly useful. The interest of Williamson’s discussion in our context is the way he 
clarifies the distinction between trust and calculative rationality. This is again relevant 
to the understanding of trust management, I believe, because it seems clear that the 
implicit ideal of trust management as it is presented in the literature, is to provide the 
basis for the application of calculative reasoning in the sense Williamson identifies. 
                                                          
1
 Note that I do not suggest that this is something to regret, or that calculative reasoning gives 
an inferior basis for cooperation. 
2
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The suggestion, once again, is that trust management should be seen not to aim to 
increase trust, but, instead, to make possible the use of calculative reasoning and 
thereby reduce the need for trust.  
The discussion shows that a satisfactory account of trust should clarify the 
relationship between trust and calculative reasoning and to provide an explanation of 
what constitutes trust in contrast to expectations on the basis of calculative reasoning. 
In the next section I will sketch the elements of such an account. 
6   Trust as a Normative Notion 
In most definitions trust is construed as a form of expectation concerning the 
behaviour of others. Gambetta’s (1988)3 influential definition is an example:  
Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective 
probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group will 
perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such an action (or 
independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context 
in which it affects his own action.  
Many more examples could be given, and we already saw above that Dibben et al 
defined trust in a similar fashion. One problem that immediately arises with 
definitions of trust as expectation arises from the discussion of the results of Kollock 
and others. Drawing on this work, I have been arguing that cooperation based on trust 
should be distinguished from cooperation based on calculation. The difference in 
question is a difference in the sources of motivation to cooperate. Hence, in both 
cases there are expectations about the cooperativeness of the other party, but the basis 
for these expectations are importantly different: trust in the one case and calculation 
of interests in the other. However, by defining trust as expectation or subjective 
probability this difference is simply left out of view. This is problematic because this 
distinction, if I am right, is crucial to the understanding of trust and trust management.  
The element that is missing from these theories of trust and trust management, in 
my view, is recognition of the fact that trust is a normative notion.  My suggestion is 
not that trust is a normative notion in the sense that people trust others because they 
ought to trust them. There are perhaps social norms that prescribe trust in some 
situations, but this is not what is relevant here. And there certainly are social norms 
that prescribe trustworthiness in certain situations: to keep our promises for example. 
But my point is not that trust is normative in the sense that there are norms of 
trustworthiness. My point is conceptual: trust is a normative notion in the sense that 
an essential ingredient in all cases of trust and trustworthiness is the existence of a set 
of norms that provide the motivation to cooperate. People are said to be trusting or 
trustworthy in virtue of being motivated to cooperate by mutually recognised norms.  
To illustrate the suggestion, consider the development of trust and cooperation in 
the market for rubber as analysed by Kollock (1993), discussed above. The analysis 
was that trust developed over time as a result of successful tests of trustworthiness 
and that this was the basis for stable and mutually beneficial cooperation over time. 
                                                          
3
 Can We Trust Trust, in Gambetta 1988, p. 217. 
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One intuitively plausible description of what happened here is, I think, that norms of 
truthfulness and cooperativeness evolved in this process between the parties. 
Furthermore, it seems clear from Kollock’s description that they were motivated by 
these norms in their cooperation. My conceptual suggestion, to repeat, is that what 
distinguishes this cooperation as a relationship based on trust, in contrast to a relation 
of cooperation based on calculativeness, is precisely the role that mutually recognised 
norms play as motivating factors.  
7   Modelling Trust 
The question, now, is how the norms that motivates in trusting relationships should be 
modelled. An account of trust which to some extent takes into consideration the 
normative dimension is the theory of Bacharach and Gambetta (2001a, 2001b) on trust 
in signs. They argue that the theory of should focus on the second order question of 
how to detect whether a signal claiming that the trustee is trustworthy, is trustworthy. 
They start by making a distinction between the “raw payoffs” and “all-in payoffs” of 
the truster and the trustee. Assume, for example, that the trust problem for the trustor is 
whether to give up personal information to a web site or not. The problem is that he 
will do this only if he believes that the web site will protect the information and not use 
it to spam him later on. Bacharach and Gambetta use pairs of payoff structures to 
characterize the basic trust game. For the trustor the structure of the payoff would be 
like in table 1 and the payoff of the trustee would be as in table 2.4  
Table 1 
Possible actions of website  Raw payoff structure of trustor 
Protect information Sell and spam 
Give up information 3 -3 Possible actions of 
visitor (truster) Not give information 0 0 
Table 2 
Possible actions of website  Raw payoff structure of trustee 
Protect information Sell and spam 
Give up information 1 4 Possible actions of 
visitor (truster) Not give information 0 0 
These are the raw payoff structures of the two players in the sense that this is their 
evaluation of the outcomes from the egoistic perspective of each player. However, the 
payoff could look different if a larger set of considerations are brought in, for example 
the relevant privacy norms. If the trustee is committed to privacy norms, such as the 
rule that information should only be used in a way that is compatible with the purpose 
to which the subject has consented, his preferences and payoffs might be more like in 
table 3.  
                                                          
4
 The tables are variants of those used by Bacharach and Gambetta (1999). Of course, only the 
relevant size of the rewards in the structures is relevant.  
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Table 3 
Possible actions of website  All-in payoff structure of trustee with 
norms Protect information Sell and spam 
Give up information 3 -4 Possible actions of 
visitor (truster) Not give information 0 0 
There can be many reasons why the all-in payoffs of the trustee are different from 
her raw payoff, Bacharach and Gambetta observes. “Some of these take the form of 
reasons the trustee has to choose B [to cooperate]. One such reason, is his very belief 
that the truster is trusting him. Another class of reasons [..] include general moral 
principles supporting altruistic behaviour, and context specific norms, such as those 
which govern teamwork. […] From a game theoretic standpoint, all these properties 
have the effect of transforming the trustee’s raw payoffs.” (2001a: 6-7) This is an 
interesting move which brings in the important role of norms in the analysis of trust. 
Bacharach and Gambetta then go on to define trust: “in a basic trust game, the 
truster trusts the trustee E if R expects E to choose B [e.g. to respect the user’s 
privacy]. ” (2001a: 5) Using the notion of trust, they define the trustee to be 
trustworthy in this case: “if E believes R trusts him, E chooses B”. (2001a: 5)  
Two comments are in order. As mentioned already, I think the important 
distinction between trust and calculativeness is left out by defining trust in terms of 
‘expectations’. Furthermore, I believe it is to put things backwards to define 
trustworthiness on the basis of trust. It might be right that a trustworthy person can be 
relied on to follow the rule suggested in the definition. It seems strange to say that this 
is the meaning of trustworthiness. Rather, in my view the natural thing would be, on 
the contrary, to say that to trust someone is to believe that they are trustworthy.5  
Bachrach and Gambetta focus in their theory on the second order problem of 
detecting whether the trustee’s signal that he is trustworthy, is trustworthy. The 
problem is that it would be profitable for cynical websites, for example, to claim that 
they are respecting their visitor’s privacy in order to trick people into trusting 
behaviour, and then exploit their trust for their own benefit. Bacharach and Gambetta 
develop a very sophisticated theory of trust in signs, and analyse this second order 
problem as a signalling game. This is a contribution of great relevance to trust 
management, I believe, but I will not go into this part of their theory. I will however 
adopt their distinction between raw payoffs and transformed all-in payoffs as part of 
an analysis of trust and trustworthiness to be developed below.  
One widely shared intuition is that trust involves risk. A great virtue of the 
approach of Bacharach and Gambetta is that they can give a very sophisticated 
analysis of the risk aspect of a situation involving trust. By making the distinction 
between the two payoff structures, we can see that the problem of risk arises at two 
levels. First, there is the question of the risk in the sense of the potential gains and 
losses in the two payoffs. Second, there is the question of how great the risk is that the 
trustee will not cooperate. This distinction is in my view an important contribution to 
the characterization of situations involving trust.  
                                                          
5
 The point that trustworthiness is basic is also argued at length by Hardin (2002) chapter 2. 
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On the basis of this framework we can account for several conceptual relation-
ships. First, let us say that an agent E is trustworthy if his actions are governed by the 
mutually recognised norms, and that another agent R trust E if R believes that E is 
trustworthy. By characterizing trust in this way we can get a possible explanation of 
how norms enter into the motivation of a trusting agent: trust involves the belief that 
the acts of the trustee will be governed by mutually recognised norms. This account 
also gives a possible explanation of the difference between cooperation based on 
calculativeness and on trust. Note that on this model the trustor can infer the 
intentions of the trustee in two different ways, either directly via the constraints or via 
knowledge about the all-in payoff structure of the trustee.  With cooperation based on 
calculativeness the trustee’s intention is inferred by considerations of his all-in payoff 
structure, I suggest, while in cooperation based on trust the intentions are inferred 
based on the normative constraints alone. I emphasize, however, that I believe that 
there are mixed cases and that actions can be governed both by norms and rationality.   
Molm et al (2000), discussed above, contrasted trust with assurance, where 
assurance was understood as a situation where the parties cooperated on the basis of a 
negotiated contract. In exchange based on contract, Molm et al argued, there was little 
need for trust and, consequently, little by way of trust was developed. On the present 
account, the reason why trust is not involved here is that the parties cooperate on the 
basis of their raw payoff structures.  
A trust relation, on the present account, is characterized by cooperation on the 
basis of mutually recognized norms. A number of objections could be made to this 
suggestion. Let me address only one. It could be argued that people follow norms 
only to avoid social sanctions and that normative behaviour, therefore, is just another 
form of rational, maximizing behaviour.6 But this is not plausible, I think. There are 
many situations where people follow norms even though the risk of negative 
sanctions is nil. For most people trustworthiness is the default even towards strangers 
they will not meet again. I do believe, however, that norm following is sustained by 
guilt and other emotional reactions. But this does not make norm following 
calculative, in my view. It is not plausible to claim that people are always trustworthy 
only to avoid feeling guilty. Jon Elster makes the distinction I am concerned with here 
in a slightly different way. He argues that the crucial difference is that rational action 
is concerned with outcomes while norms are not outcome-oriented. “Rationality says: 
if you want to achieve Y, do X. By contrast, I define social norms by the feature that 
they are not outcome oriented.” (Elster 1989: 99). My suggestion is that relations of 
trust are governed by norms in this sense.  
These considerations show, in my view, the fruitfulness of drawing the distinction 
between raw payoff structures and normatively transformed payoff structures in the 
characterization of situations involving trustworthiness and trust. At this point it is 
important to distinguish two questions. The first question is: how do we as potential 
trusters determine whether the other party is trustworthy? This is the question 
Bacharach and Gambetta pursues. But there is another question that is also important: 
What can the potential truster R infer about the future actions of the other agent E, if 
R assumes that E is trustworthy? To this question I now turn. 
                                                          
6
  This objection was raised by one of the anonymous referees.  
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8   Using Norms to Reason About the Actions of Trustworthy Agents 
The notion of normative constraints on action has an important role to play in 
situations involving trust, I have argued. I will now try to make this notion more 
precise by discussion how these constraints can be modelled as information structures 
in the sense of Barwise and Seligman (1996).7 The suggestion here is that norms play 
the role of information structures in the reasoning about what the other party will do, 
assuming that he is trustworthy. I argue for this by way of showing how such 
reasoning can be represented in the theory of information flow by Barwise and 
Seligman (1996).  
In Barwise and Seligman’s approach, the notion of a classification is central, a 
notion that is borrowed from formal concept analysis where classifications have been 
studied extensively.8 Paraphrasing Barwise and Seligman, a classification is a triple  
R = ¢R, ΣR, |=R² where R is a set of objects to be classified (the tokens of the 
classification), ΣR is a set of types used to classify the objects in R, and |=R is a binary 
relation on R and ΣR that says which tokens are of which type.  
To make the suggestion more concrete and also to illustrate the approach of Barwise 
and Seligman, consider the following example – inspired by the game discussed above. 
Suppose we have three classifications R, N, and E, of the possible actions of the truster 
R, the interaction prescribed by the norms N, and the possible actions of the trustee E. 
Suppose the tokens of these three classifications are as follows: 
Truster R Norms N Trustee E 
Tokens Types Tokens Types Tokens Types 
r
c
 Send n
c
 Cooperate e
c
 Protect 
rd Skip nd Defection ed Spam 
For simplicity we assume that there are only two tokens and two types in each 
classification with the first type classifying the first token and the second type 
classifying the second token. In a more realistic modelling we would have a set of 
tokens -- intuitively sets of actions at different times - classified as being of type Send, 
or the type Skip, etc. and also much richer sets of types. But for the purpose of 
exemplification it is better to keep it simple.  
To model the information relationship between the classifications, and hence the 
flow of information in the system, Barwise and Seligman use the idea of an 
infomorphism. Using the classifications in our example, an infomorphism is defined a 
mapping between two classifications R ' N defined in the following way. Intuitively, 
an infomorphism consists of two functions, one from the type of R to the types of N, 
and one from the tokens of N to the tokens of R. These functions satisfy the following 
constraints.  
Definition. If R = ¢R, ΣR, |=R² and N = ¢N, ΣΝ, |=N² are classifications then an 
infomorphism is a pair f = ¢ftype, ftoken² of functions ftype: ΣR  ΣΝ  and ftoken: Ν R and 
satisfying the following biconditional, where ρ is a type in the classification R: 
                                                          
7
 The following is basically an exposition of Chapter 2 of Barwise of Seligman (1996). But the 
idea to apply the framework to reasoning about norms is however – as far as I know - new. 
8
 See B. Ganter and Wille (1998).  
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ftoken (n)|=R ρ   iff   n |=N ftype (ρ) 
This is “the fundamental property of infomorphisms” in the theory. The point of 
the construction is to formulate in a precise manner the idea that information flows in 
virtue of systematic connections between classifications of parts of a system. 
Informally, the idea is that ‘‘[i]t is by virtue of regularities among connections that 
information about some components of a distributed system carries information about 
other components.’’ (1996: 35)  
Let us now define the information relationships between the three classifications in 
our example.9 The idea is to give a simplified model of a normative system. The core of 
the system is the set of norms to which the two actors relate their actions. The point of 
the example, furthermore, is to see how it is possible to reason about the actions of the 
agents via the norms. Let us therefore use the classification N as the central element in 
the system and the two classifications R and E have relations of infomorphism to this 
core as depicted in this diagram. The arrows that run into N are supposed to stand for 
the functions on types and the arrows that run from N represent the functions on tokens.  
 
Let us now define the functions for the two infomorphisms. Call the function 
connecting the classifications R and N for f, and the function connecting the 
classifications E and N for g.  
ftype ftoken g
type
 gtoken 
ftype (Send) = 
Cooperate 
ftoken (nc) = rc gtype (Protect) = 
Cooperate 
gtoken (nc) = ec 
ftype (Skip) = 
Defection 
ftoken (nd) = rd gtype (Spam) = 
Defection 
gtoken (nd) = ed 
We can now see that the functions f and g are infomorphisms from the classifications 
R and E respectively into the classification N that satisfy the fundamental biconditional.  
The next step is to see what logical structure this gives rise to. The notion of 
entailment is in the theory of Barwise and Seligman formulated as a relation between 
sets of types: 
                                                          
9
 Again, this is in parallel to the discussion in Barwise and Seligman (1996: 37 ff). 
N
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Definition. Let A be a classification and let ¢Γ, Δ² be a sequent of A. A token a of A 
satisfies ¢Γ, Δ² provided that if a is of type α for every α element in Γ then a is of type 
α for some α element in Δ. We say that Γ entails Δ in A, written Γ|−A Δ, if every 
token a of A satisfies ¢Γ, Δ². If Γ|−A Δ then the pair ¢Γ, Δ² is called a constraint 
supported by the classification A. 
If we return to our example, we see that our classifications do not give rise to any 
interesting constraints on their own. We only have constraints of the form  
{Send, Skip} |−R                 - i.e. no token satisfies both types. 
What we are after, however, is the possibility of making inferences about the 
actions of the agents on the basis of the norms. Let us construct therefore a new 
infomorphism from the sum of the classifications R and E into the classification N. 
This infomorphism is characterized by the function h = f + g. This new function 
again can be applied to tokens and types. Applied to tokens n, h(n) = ¢f(n), g(n)². And 
applied to types from R we use ftype, and applied to types from E we use gtype.  
With this construction we can be said to reason about some aspects of the actions 
of agents on the basis of the norms, because we get constraints like this: 
h(Send) |−Ν h(Protect) 
We do not, however, in general get this: 
Send |−R+E Protect 
 - i.e. we cannot infer Protect from Send on the basis of R + E, but we can infer 
this on the basis of the normative classification N taken as the core of the normative 
system in question. The reason this last constraint does not hold is that the sum of 
classifications R + E takes pairs of tokens from each classifications as their tokens 
and not every such pair will in general satisfy the constraint.10  
This is but one example, of course, but I do think it shows that this is an interesting 
approach to the reasoning about the actions of a trustworthy agent. The point of the 
exercise was to suggest how we in the theory of information flow as developed by 
Barwise and Seligman can find an approach to the reasoning abut trustworthiness on 
the basis of knowledge of the norms. 
I am of course not the first to suggest that we should focus on the role of norms in 
the reasoning about properties of trustworthy agents. One interesting proposal is due 
to Jones and Firozobadi (2001). The core of their proposal, coarsely put, is the 
analysis of what it is for an agent’s communicative acts to be trustworthy. In their 
analysis, the normative element pertains to the assumption that the conditions of the 
communicative channel are ideal.  This ideal is understood as ‘‘the conditions under 
which the signalling system concerned is in an optimal state qua (declarative) 
signalling system’’.11 And what they call ‘‘the governing rule’’ of their analysis of the 
reliability of a signal is defined s: 
E
a 
m Hs Os p
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 For the details of the properties of this so called local logic see Barwise and Seligman (1996) 
pp. 38–39. 
11
 Jones and Firozobadi (2001: 164).  
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This says, roughly, that the agent a’s bringing about of the signal m in institutional 
context S under optimal conditions will count as p. This then provides the basis for a 
characterization of what it is for an agent to trust a trustworthy agent’s signalling act. 
The analysis is based on two assumptions that I believe are fundamentally correct. 
The first is that trustworthiness involves the appeal to a normative ideal to which the 
trustee is judged to subscribe. The second idea underlying Jones and Firozobadi’s 
account is that trustworthiness is the fundamental concept and that trust and related 
notions should be defined on this basis. I fully share both assumptions. The approach 
is different from the one discussed above in the sense that in Jones and Firozobadi’s  
account the role of the norms as information structures are not made explicit into the 
analysis.  
9   Conclusion 
The discussion above has brought out four ideas.  
1. The studies of Kollock and others showed the need for a characterization of the 
difference between calculativeness and trust. This difference should be explained at 
the level of motivation for cooperation.  
2. Trust is a normative notion and norms play a central role as motivations to 
cooperate in situations involving trust. 
3. The distinction between the agent’s raw payoff and his all-in payoff, transformed 
by norms, is a central aspect of situations involving trust. 
4. The role of norms in reasoning about a trustworthy agent can be modelled as 
systems of constraints and connections between constraints, where norms are 
analysed as information structures in the sense of Barwise and Seligman’s theory 
of information flow. 
The main argument of the paper has been that the notion of a norm has to be 
brought into the characterization of trust and n the modelling of the reasoning about 
trustworthiness. Furthermore, I have argued that this will give a better account of 
trust, trustworthiness and related notions. This also has implications for trust 
management which should, if my argument is correct, focus more on the role of 
norms than has previously been the case.   
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Abstract. Evidence based trust management, where automated decision making
is supported through collection of evidence about the trustworthiness of entities
from a variety of sources, has gained popularity in recent years. So far work in
this area has primarily focussed on schemes for combining evidence from poten-
tially unreliable sources (recommenders) with the aim of improving the quality
of decision making. The large body of literature on reputation systems is testa-
ment to this. At the same time, little consideration has been given to the actual
gathering of useful and detailed experiential evidence. Most proposed systems
use quite simplistic representations for experiences, and mechanisms where high
level feedback is provided by users. Consequently, these systems provide limited
support for automated decision making. In this paper we build upon our previous
work in trust-based interaction modelling and we present an interaction monitor
that enables automated collection of detailed interaction evidence. The monitor
is a prototype implementation of our generic interaction monitoring architecture
that combines well understood rule engine and event management technology.
This paper also describes a distributed file server scenario, in order to demon-
strate our interaction model and monitor. Finally, the paper presents some pre-
liminary results of a simulation-based evaluation of our monitor in the context of
the distributed file server scenario.
1 Introduction
Trust management is emerging as a promising technology for facilitating collaboration
with entities in environments where traditional security paradigms cannot be enforced
due to lack of centralised control and incomplete knowledge of the environment. In
particular, evidence-based trust management attempts to mitigate the risks inherent in
interactions lacking concrete security assurances by gathering evidence to support trust-
ing decision making.
Studying the literature on evidence based trust management highlights that most sys-
tems focus on sharing evidence and opinions among peers and combining this evidence
to make trust decisions (e.g. [10]). However, the means to gather personal experien-
tial evidence is often lacking. The systems that provide such functionality tend to use
simple representations of experience, such as a numeric rating (e.g. [1]). To support an
expressive trust model for decision making in complex interactions, it becomes more
important to get detailed feedback upon which to base future decisions. Additionally,
many systems rely on the user to provide feedback (e.g. [14]). Even in commercial
systems, such as EBay the user provides very simple feedback ratings. However, many
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 62–76, 2006.
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interaction decisions that might benefit from trust management techniques will take
place in the absence of a user. Even with the user present, it may not be appropriate
or convenient to require them to provide feedback. This introduces a requirement for
feedback to be largely automated.
This work builds upon our earlier work in trust management [5], which defined a trust
model [11] that recognises the strong link between personal observations and trust. The
model views an interaction as a set of possible outcomes, based of a set of observable
events within the interaction, which is organised in an event structure (see [11] for de-
tails). Computations can be defined over interaction outcome histories to derive a trust
value for a specific entity. In conjunction with information on the costs of the possible
outcomes, a trust value enables the evaluation of risk in an interaction to facilitate a
decision process [13]. In [4], we defined an interaction model that extended this trust
model to capture more detailed observations about generic interactions and their asso-
ciated costs. An application developer can instantiate this model for a specific type of
interaction to define a set of observations that may be made either directly or indirectly
about the behaviour of a trustee. The observations are defined to represent the aspects of
the interaction type that the developer deems relevant to a trusting decision. The model
is event based, facilitating the automated gathering of objective evidence for subjective
evaluation in a decision process. The same paper presented initial steps towards au-
tomating this evidence gathering, introducing a preliminary architecture for a generic
monitor that could be used to follow interactions based on the model.
In this paper, we advance our previous work by refining the monitor architecture and
examining the use of existing reactive technologies to provide an implementation of the
architecture. After briefly outlining the interaction model in section 2, we describe the
requirements for the monitor in section 3, followed by a refined monitor architecture
in section 4. These refinements were the result of a more thorough investigation of the
technologies used in the monitor and the instantiation of the model for specific applica-
tion scenarios. In section 5 we present a prototype implementation of the architecture.
In section 6 we present a preliminary evaluation of the prototype. This is based on a
particular instantiation of the interaction model for a file server scenario (presented in
section 6.1), which forms the basis for a simulation platform outlined in section 6.2.
This simulation platform and the prototype monitor provide a basis for our evaluation,
some preliminary results of which are presented in section 6.3. The paper concludes
and looks to the future in section 7.
2 The Interaction Model
Our interaction model provides a number of extensions to the trust model in [11] that
allow more detailed observations to be made about the state of an interaction in or-
der to fully support a trust-based decision process. The focus of our model remains
on observable events that capture a variety of aspects of the interaction. The events
of the model can be further decomposed into a set of trust events (ET ) and a set
of cost events (EC ). The trust events are those which capture the aspects of an in-
teraction that reflect the trustee’s behaviour in some way and hence something rel-
evant to its trustworthiness (e.g. a file server’s integrity). This set takes the form of
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an event structure. The cost events are added to the model in order to represent an
occurrence of something that affects the costs associated with outcomes rather than
the outcomes themselves. Thus we may also capture the dynamism of interaction pro-
gression from a cost perspective. To increase the flexibility of the trust events, we can
further subdivide ET into directly observable events and quantified events. While the
former represent aspects of an interaction that can be expressed through single event
instances, some aspects require the more abstract notion of quantified events, which
are single logical events under which a series of low level observations can be aggre-
gated, to form a measure of the quantified event (e.g. the latency measure of a file
server). The low level observations are referred to as measure events. The relation-
ship between the main event types can be seen in figure 1. Measure events are not
shown, as although observable as single event instances, they are not part of the trust
event structure, merely incorporated into an outcome via the measures of quantified
events.
Trust Events Direct Observable
Events
Quantified Events
(aggregate measures) Cost Events
Model Events
Fig. 1. Event Type Relationships
Modelling a particular type of interaction involves identifying the above sets of ob-
servable events for the set of outcomes. Through these event sets, we have means of
representing the state of an interaction from start to finish. Experience thus represents
objective evidence which can be evaluated subjectively for trust decision making, such
that we can differentiate fact and opinion. The feedback loses no information and can be
as detailed as the specified interaction model. Furthermore, feedback can be provided
throughout an interaction rather than at its conclusion, which can be useful in adjusting
our trust opinions in a timely fashion. The model is described in more detail in [3].
3 The Monitor Requirements
The monitor is designed to operate as a service on a single device that can monitor
interactions for a number of that device’s applications. We have chosen to co-locate the
monitor with the client application as this provides some privacy within the context of a
single user’s machine. In cases where the monitor needs to run on a resource constrained
device, it could run in a proxy configuration providing access to an external service on
a more powerful machine, in a manner transparent to the application.
From the interaction model described above, the natural separation of trust and cost
events provides us with a means of separately representing the trust-state and cost-state
of an interaction. All events from ET seen so far in an interaction represent its trust-
state. The cost-state is represented by a mapping from the possible outcomes to the
currently associated costs and the set of events from EC seen so far. Together, these
states give us the interaction-state, which can be used to provide detailed feedback at
any point during an interaction. The two main issues that arise for the monitor here are
Gathering Experience in Trust-Based Interactions 65
how to collect the events that contribute to the interaction state and when to pass the
collected information back to the client application.
3.1 Event Communication
Even though the monitor and application may exist on the same machine, it is likely that
the sources of many events will be remote. As we may have event sources external to
both the monitor and client application, we can see three categories of interaction model
events emerge. These are events internal to the client application, those external to the
application yet from the trustee and those external to both, perhaps from some separate
service. Event (or messaging) systems provide a form of asynchronous messaging that
allows the monitor to be decoupled from event sources, while supporting many different
event systems via plug-ins and maintaining the generic qualities of the monitor.
Features of individual event systems vary widely. A major factor is the connection
model communication is based on. A single central event broker is inappropriate for dis-
tributed and heterogeneous event sources and prone to failure. Hierarchically distributed
event servers or an even more decentralised peer-to-peer (P2P) network is preferable.
Most event systems support both point-to-point (PTP) or publish/subscribe (pub/sub)
messaging. PTP messaging uses dedicated queues and is suitable for internal client and
trustee events, where the client can inform the monitor on how to subscribe to the par-
ticular source. However, events from an external service will generally be global rather
than interaction specific in scope, such as cost events that affect more than one appli-
cation. These events fit more appropriately with a pub/sub paradigm which allows for
many-to-many event communication where the the subscriber does not need to know
the specific source. Whether PTP or pub/sub is used, the client application must tell the
monitor how and where to subscribe to event sources.
Our event system requirements also include the ability for the source to push events
to a consumer rather than have the consumer periodically request notifications, in order
that they be received in a timely fashion. The event notifications must permit parame-
ters to incorporate any pertinent information about the event itself. Reliability of event
notification is closely linked to the fault tolerance of the underlying connection model
and its network protocols. However, many systems also offer some form of message
persistence like store and forward or polling. Best effort delivery is likely to be the limit
of our reliability guarantee for the monitor in general, as the monitor has little or no
control over the measures the sources employ. Finally, security measures are important
to ensure the privacy of generated events.
3.2 Provision of Feedback
Through the interaction model and a suitable event system, we have the means to both
gather and represent interaction-state. We therefore need some means to reason over it
in order to provide relevant feedback when required. At the end of an interaction, it is
clear that we should pass all collected evidence to the application in order to update
the interaction history with the new outcome and provide the best support for decision
making possible. However, there may be some scenarios in which we would like either
periodic updates during an interaction, or even notification of certain states that we
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deem important in order to take action and minimise damage. Furthermore, prompt
feedback spanning across the ongoing interactions can provide the most up to date
relevant evidence for decisions. We need to be able to communicate to the monitor
the desired feedback and when to deliver it. Therefore, we use a rule-engine-based
architecture whereby the application can specify rules about feedback and the monitor
can reason over the state to meet the needs of a particular client.
We use a particular type of rule, called Event Condition Action Rules (ECA rules).
ECA rule engines have been commonly used in active databases [12] for a number of
years, but are now coming into more widespread use through decoupling them from
specific database systems to make more generic reasoning engines [2]. ECA rules ex-
press an action to execute when some combination of events is witnessed, provided that
a boolean condition holds true. These rules are the natural choice given that we have
an event based interaction model to provide triggers for the rules and values from event
counts, parameters and outcome costs for use in conditions. The client can define a set
of these rules and communicate them to the monitor, such that it can provide feedback
as defined in the action part of a rule. It should be clear that the monitor therefore need
not understand the semantics of the events, rather just match patterns as defined in the
rules. It is up to the definer of a specific rule to specify meaningful feedback for itself,
which might take the form of a pertinent message or reports of current interaction-state.
The features of different existing ECA engines vary a great deal. A good framework
for evaluating the range of functionalities can be found in [12]. For our purposes, it is
mainly important to ensure that the engine provides for the kind of rules that are useful
given the interaction model. For example, the operators permissible for event combina-
tions and conditions is important. This will include primarily logical set combinations
for events, and arithmetic functions and comparisons for the value based conditions.
The engine must support parameterised events such that the associated values can be
of use in conditions. The primary consideration for rule actions is that the communi-
cation mechanism for reporting feedback can be called upon. The mechanism may be
either synchronous or asynchronous, as we can use the same inter-process mechanism
used for the monitor’s management API to provide callbacks, or use the event commu-
nication mechanism to send a feedback message. A further useful feature would be the
ability to have rules generate events upon which other rules could be triggered, com-
monly referred to as the cycle policy of the engine. This would allow the monitor itself
to generate events for chaining or even blocking other rules as specified by the rule
set definer. In section 5 we will describe how our prototype monitor incorporates the
functionality outlined here.
4 The Monitor Architecture
With the above considerations in mind, we can go on to describe an architecture for a
monitor, which operates as a self-contained software component to enable it to be used
in a generic fashion across a range of applications. In [4], we described our preliminary
architecture, which has now been refined. The refined high-level architecture can be
seen in figure 2.
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The architecture highlights the responsibilities of the different components and the
interfaces between them and the management API of the monitor. In this section we
will highlight the major changes from the previous architecture in [4]. The monitor is
itself constructed from various components. Firstly, an Event Manager (EM) is respon-
sible for subscribing to all events. The EM has been refined to clarify its responsibility
for translating events for further processing. The Interaction-state Store (IS) component
maintains trust and cost-state in working memory, accessible to the final major com-
ponent, the ECA Rule Engine (RE), which has been refined based on investigations
into rule engine implementations. These monitor components are not visible to the ap-
plication, which interacts with the monitor mainly via its public API for management
purposes.
The monitor API has been made more concrete in the new architecture, as can be
seen in figure 2. The API provides the means by which an application can register itself
and its interaction model, via the register(appSetUp,responseQ)method. To
initiate monitor ing of a particular interaction, the initialize(xnSetUp,rules)
method can be called. Via the updateCS(CostTable) method, an application can
explicitly define costs to associate with an interaction’s outcomes, perhaps triggered by
feedback when the monitor receives a cost event. This is appropriate when the appli-
cation has some complex means of determining what certain events mean in terms of
costs it will incur. However, in many cases, the application will be abe to define a set
of rules for cost updates which incorporate functions to alter the costs directly on the
monitor.
The EM exposes a subscribe(sources) method for the monitor to forward
subscription details from the API’s subscribe(sources)method. The Subscriber
subcomponent of the EM is responsible for creating and maintaining PTP and pub/sub
connections to event sources based on this information. All event notifications are time-
stamped1 and passed to the Transformation Adapter (TA), which then translates them
from the source format into that used in the IS and RE. The Subscriber and TA can be
extended via plug-ins for new event systems. The EM also provides feedback through
the messaging system when the RE calls thenotifyApp(feedback,responseQ)
method as a rule action. The EM calls the IS’s add(e) method to pass all event notifi-
cations into storage.
The IS represents the working memory for the RE, providing access to the relevant
elements of interaction-state for rules. Sets of events and cost tables are stored and up-
dated for each ongoing interaction. When an interaction’s final outcome has been fed
back to the application, the events of that outcome may be removed from the IS. The
updateCS(costTable)method provides the means for the costs of a specific inter-
action’s outcomes to be updated from the application. The methods query(e set)
and query(expr) allow the components of the RE to query the state of particular
interactions for rule evaluation. Finally, the IS is also responsible for notifying the RE
of new events via its notify(e) method.
Finally, we come to the reactive component of the monitor, the ECA Rule Engine
(RE), consisting of a number of decoupled sub-components. The Rule Manager (RM)
1 The notifications are timestamped in the EM when observed as remote clocks cannot be relied
upon for consistent time.
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manages rule activation, execution, scheduling and represents the state of each active
rule. Rules are registered via the load(rules) method and propagated to the rel-
evant component. The RM maintains state for the event trigger part of rules, to be
processed and updated by the Trigger Evaluator (TE) as notifications of events are re-
ceived through its notify(e) method. Trigger state can be seen as a tree structure
of logical primitive event combinations, the expressiveness of which depends on the
rule language. When the root of the tree becomes true, the evaluate(ruleID)
method of the Condition Evaluator (CE) is called automatically. The CE is then respon-
sible for evaluating the boolean expression in the condition part of the rule by querying
the IS. Again the operators supported in the boolean expression depends on the rule
language. If the condition is true, the CE calls the execute(ruleID) method of
the Action Executor (AE), which schedules relevant rule’s action for execution. The
notifyApp(feedback, responseQ)method of the EM is commonly called by
the action of a rule to pass relevant feedback as message through the appropriate event
system. The message is defined in the rule and should contain all pertinent information.
The application component in figure 2 just outlines the type of components that the
application might have, but this will be up to the developer of the application.
5 A Prototype Monitor
A prototype monitor has been developed for the evaluation of the architecture and inter-
action model. It was implemented in Java to take advantage of available class libraries
and technologies for the two main functional aspects of the monitor; the ECA rule
engine and the event system. The monitor exports an RMI remote interface for the ap-
plication to interaction with, in accordance with the monitor architecture. The monitor
runs as a single thread which enables single-point logging of interaction events as seen
by the event manager, for the purpose of interaction trace replay and testing of different
rule sets.
A myriad of rule engines are available (e.g. [7, 9]), which offer varied functionality.
Having examined a range of such technologies, we chose the Java Expert System Shell
(Jess) [6] to implement the ECA rule engine as it is very well documented and sup-
ported, with a large user community. It provides very good integration with Java, rang-
ing from applications written purely in Java code to mainly Jess code simply launched
through a Java application. The Jess Shell can also be used as a Java scripting envi-
ronment to aid in rapid prototyping. As everything we reason over must be available
in working memory, we have in effect combined the IS and RE into one component,
the ECA Engine, which instantiates the Jess inference engine. Jess uses the Rete al-
gorithm [6], in which rules have state modelled internally in a manner similar to the
complex event tree mentioned in section 4. A Rete network is built from single input
fact nodes and two input join nodes. The fact nodes represent patterns and the join nodes
represent a number of conditional elements such as logical combinations of facts. Rete
shares nodes across the set of rules for more efficient processing. A rule is executed
once for each matching set of facts. Furthermore, queries over working memory can be
defined and run under direct program control to process collections of facts. Jess is not
explicitly designed for ECA rules, rather for inference in applications such as Expert
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Systems. However, ECA rules can be modelled by asserting facts for events and spec-
ifying conditions using test conditional elements that may contain arbitrary boolean
expressions written in the Jess language. Furthermore, it is possible to define functions
in Jess code to extend the functionality/operator set. Similar functions can be defined to
perform the necessary actions, expressed on the left hand side of the rules.
5.1 Coding the Generic Interaction Model in Jess
Before we can assert facts into working memory to represent interaction-state, we must
define templates for the facts in accordance with our interaction model. Thus the generic
interaction model is defined in the monitor by running a batch file of template defini-
tions through the instantiated Jess engine. An interaction template is defined with fields
to store interaction, application and trustee IDs along with the queue-name to which
feedback should be sent. A measure template allows for temporary storage of measure
events until they are assigned to the relevant quantified events at the end of an interac-
tion. An outcome-cost template allows a cost to be associated with a specific outcome
for a specific interaction. An event template is defined with fields to link asserted event
facts to a specific interaction and store a timestamp. This basic event template is fur-
ther extended to a trust-event template and cost-event template, which themselves are
further extended to produce measure-event, direct-observable-event, quantified-event
templates etc. This extension mechanism is also the means by which a specific applica-
tion’s interaction model is defined. New specific event templates extend the basic event
templates to give a hierarchy of event types (see the examples in section 6.1). This en-
ables useful queries to be expressed over the working memory that allow, for example,
all events relating to a particular trustee to be processed in some way. We have defined
a basic set of queries over the templates of the generic interaction model, including
queries over specific application templates based on template names.
(defquery find-xn-named-events
(declare (variables ?xn ?name))
?ev <- (event (xnID ?xn))
(test (eq ((?ev getDeftemplate) getBaseName) ?name)))
The results of queries can be iterated over and processed to provide useful function-
ality for test clauses (i.e. rule conditions). We therefore further define a set of generic
functions that may be used in test clauses or for feedback actions. This set includes
functions to determine the maximum/minimum/average/total value of a particular field
from a collection of facts and functions to extract particular facts or values amongst oth-
ers. An important function notify-xn-app is defined for rule actions, which calls a java
method in the monitor from the Jess engine to return a feedback string via the response
queue for a specified interaction.
(deffunction notify-xn-app (?xnID ?string)
((fetch MONITOR) notifyApp
(get-specific-interaction-response-queue ?xnID) ?string))
In effect these queries and functions extend the expressivity of the rule language, so
to be of use they must be defined in the working memory before rules can be defined
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that use them. In fact, a developer can also define new functions for use in test clauses,
to be supplied as part of the interaction set up phase.
5.2 Implementing the Event Manager
The other major component for the monitor is the Event Manager, implemented to en-
able plug-in event systems via an extension of a MessengerLayer interface. For the
monitor prototype, we wished to use a decentralised system, preferably with a P2P
connection model. Furthermore, we felt a standards based approach that supported both
PTP and pub/sub would be beneficial, to show that a number of implementations of such
a standard could easily be supported. For these reasons, we sought an appropriate im-
plementation of the Java Messaging Service (JMS)interfaces which provide a standard
for asynchronous event communication in the Java language. Various implementations
(or JMS providers) available which support a P2P connection model, but we decided to
use MantaRay [8] as it provides its P2P functionality through a self-contained transport
layer implemented over either TCP or SSH and HTTP, with the necessary discovery
protocols. Furthermore, it implements persistence through a store and forward mecha-
nism and has highly configurable logging mechanisms.
The plug-in built for MantaRay sets up the necessary JMS connections to the transport
layer for both queue (PTP) and topic (pub/sub) based messaging. It manages collections
of message senders, receivers, publishers and subscribers and facilitates the sending and
publishing of events via method calls. Finally it acts as a message listener, passing any
notifications onto the Transformation Adapter component. The messages received must
be in the form of JMS Map messages in the prototype as these enable name-value map-
ping for event parameters. This is to simplify the Transformation Adapter of the plug-in
to have only one input format which it must translate into Jess assertions. To enable trans-
lation, the application must supply the adapter with template objects for all event types
in its interaction model. These templates define which event parameters are strings or
numbers, ensuring correct assertion strings can be built for execution in the Jess engine.
6 Monitor Evaluation
Before presenting the evaluation of the monitor and interaction model, it is important to
discuss the performance of the Jess and MantaRay technologies that form the basis of the
monitor. As the Rete algorithm upon which Jess is based maintains rule state and only
updates changes, its complexity is something like O(R′F ′P ′) where R′ is a number less
than R the current number of rules, F ′ is the number of facts that have changed and P ′
is a number between 1 and the average number of patterns per rule [6]. Furthermore, the
performance of a Rete-based system also depends on the number of partial matches gen-
erated by the rules, so badly written rules may exhibit poor performance. Performance of
join computations for each rule can be tweaked to trade off memory usage against speed
of computation. The usual messaging system performance tests include scalability for
destinations (topics and queues), publishers and subscribers in terms of number of mes-
sages per second throughput. MantaRay’s P2P architecture removes the concern over
destination load as the destinations can be hosted on individual peers. The performance
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of MantaRay depends on logging levels, persistence mechanism choice and transport
layer protocol. MantaRay supports database or file persistence, with file persistence of-
fering far superior throughput. Using file persistence in a single queue or topic, with
minimal logging and TCP connections, message rates between 6000 to 7000 per second
have been reported in online discussion fora. It is also worth mentioning that MantaRay
is a lightweight solution; the transport layer may need only 3 MB hard disk space.
Based on the above performance analysis, it is evident that these technologies, while
suitable for deployment on laptop devices, are too heavy-weight for resource con-
strained devices such as PDAs. This could however be overcome using a proxy con-
figuration to a more powerful machine. As the event sources can implement the queues
and (for this scenario at least) the event notification rate is likely to be well within
the above bounds, scalability is no problem for MantaRay. Furthermore, (at least with
sensible rules) Jess can provide prompt feedback.
For evaluation of our monitor and interaction model we decided to follow a simu-
lation based approach, as this provides the necessary control over the environment for
varied experimentation. Simulation also has the benefit of being able to run a number
of experiments in a short time and removes the possibility of incurring real world dam-
age from running tests on a real implementation. Our approach involves simulation of a
number of application scenarios. So far we have concentrated on a distributed file server
scenario which we will outline below.
6.1 File Server Scenario
In our file server scenario, many users can subscribe to host files on many different
distributed file servers for a specific duration. This is an interesting scenario from the
point of view of the client trusting the server, as there is a rich set of clearly defined
aspects of server behaviour that can be witnessed and the interaction has a duration
that allows for continuous feedback. Furthermore, a number of interactions may be
ongoing at any one point in time (even with the same server), thus prompt feedback from
one interaction may be useful for decisions on others. First we define the trust events
that reflect aspects of server behaviour in terms of the outcome of an interaction. The
specific aspects used will depend on what the application developer deems important
for decision making. The aspects we have chosen are the availability of the server, the
latency of access, how well it protects the integrity of the hosted file, and how well it
maintains the confidentiality of the file.
From this set of aspects, the developer can define the set of events that represent an
outcome. The availability and latency aspects require quantified events to be defined,
with an associated measure, as the individual measure events that reflect these aspects
can be repeated. We model the other aspects as direct observable events. For example,
we assume that the integrity of a file is either maintained throughout or not, although a
different view could have been taken here to incorporate degrees of damage. We assume
that we can only directly observe a breach of confidentiality, as we can never say for sure
that confidentiality was maintained. Furthermore, we model whether the interaction
lasted the full duration or the file was removed early. We thus define the following trust
event and cost event types by extending the basic interaction model event types from
section 5:
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– availability-qe with associated measure events available-me and unavailable-me
one of which is seen for any attempt to access the server.
– latency-qe with associated measure event latency-me with a latency parameter.
– integrity-undermined-event and integrity-maintained-event are conflicting; one
must always occur in an outcome.
– confidentiality-breached-event may or may not occur for any specific interaction.
– host-event and not-host-event are conflicting; no other events are seen if not-host-
event is received for an interaction.
– bad-xnend-event and good-xnend-event are conflicting; one must be seen to sig-
nify the end of an interaction.
– cxn-cost-changed-event has a cxn-cost-change parameter to represent the change
in connection costs when changing, for example, from a broadband connection to
dail-up.
– file-update-event has a file-value-change parameter to show the effects, for exam-
ple, of updating a file with critical data.
As a Jess code example, consider the following which shows the extension of a
generic cost event to give the file-value-event template:
(deftemplate cost-event extends event
(slot appID (default "GLOBAL"))
(slot xnID (default "GLOBAL"))
(slot trusteeID (default "GLOBAL")))
(deftemplate file-update-event extends cost-event
(slot file-value-change))
The event definitions described here, which capture the interaction model for an
application, are passed to the monitor when the application registers with the monitor,
via a batch file of Jess code. This file also contains other set up information, including
the definition of an fs-interaction fact that extends the basic interaction fact to include a
fileID and file-value, and latency-measure and availability-measure facts that extend
the basic measure fact to link the relevant measure events to the relevant quantified
events. The final part of this file contains rules triggered on the cost events to update the
outcome costs. Once this file has run, a rule set for feedback can be defined.
6.2 The Simulation
Based on the file server scenario described in section 6.1, we have developed a simu-
lation environment to provide an experimental platform for the evaluation of the moni-
tor prototype. The simulation (outlined in more detail in [3]) comprises an application
component and a file server component that can be instantiated on a number of remote
machines, to provide a realistic environment in which to test the monitor and interaction
model. Both the application component and the file servers are JMS enabled through
individual Mantaray transport layers. Queues are used for communicating most events
for privacy, with only the global cxn-cost-changed-events passed via topics.
The file server exports an RMI interface for file hosting and subsequent file operations
from which server behaviour can be observed (see figure 3).
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Fig. 3. The File Server and Application
In order to keep the file servers lightweight for the simulation, we define file objects
rather than create real files for storage. These encapsulate the file’s ID, a file value,
an integrity checksum and last modified and accessed timestamps. File servers store
these file objects and perform a number of actions upon them based on a behavioural
profile configured through the interface. This profile influences server behaviour on
each aspect of latency, availability, integrity and confidentiality. The Behavioural Con-
troller component uses these profiles to determine thresholds for certain behaviours,
continually iterating over the currently hosted files and acting upon them in a num-
ber of ways. This includes generating confidentiality-breach-events and
integrity-undermined-events for an interaction via the Event Generator,
simulating an intrusion detection system (IDS) and disk corruption notifications. The
Behaviour Controller can also alter a file’s checksum, value or timestamps without gen-
erating an event, leaving the application to discover faults as a result of later method
calls. Further to this, latency profiles influence the amount of delay added to operations
to simulate a slow or overloaded server and availability profiles influence the chance of
an UnavailableException being thrown by remote methods.
All the events defined in the file server interaction model may also be generated
by the application based on the results of file operations when compared to a local
file store. Once the application’s Interaction Initialiser has hosted a file and initiated
monitoring for the interaction, the Interaction Controller is responsible for iteratively
executing file actions in the set of current interactions. To enable events to be gen-
erated from file operations, it provides wrapper methods around each of the remote
method calls such that the relevant return values can be compared to the local store.
The relevant JMS map messages are generated and sent to the monitor queue. Common
wrapper functionality includes recording the time delay for a method call in order to
generate a latency-me from any successful access. This means an available-me
can be generated, but wrappers also catch UnavailableExceptions in order to
generate unavailable-mes. The wrapper methods also update local storage as nec-
essary based on return values from RMI calls. Additionally, each wrapper method also
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calls the Network Simulator subcomponent to simulate how the current network type
will affect the call. This component periodically changes to a new random connection
type, selecting from dail-up modem, broadband, LAN or WLAN, each of which in-
troduces different network delays and changes the application’s connection cost. This
change triggers a cxn-cost-changed-event, which is global rather than belong-
ing to a specific interaction and is thus published to a topic rather than queue. The
connection cost, along with the value of a new file and hosting costs allows newly ini-
tialised interactions to be assigned realistic outcome-costs at start up.
6.3 Preliminary Results
The file server scenario has the scope, duration and complexity to permit a variety of
interesting experiments to be defined. To give a taste of the kind of experiments, we
consider a situation where feedback is desired when the integrity of any file from the
application is undermined on a server. In this case, feedback tells the application to
terminate all of its interactions with this server. We can express such a rule in the Jess
language, using our generic functions as follows:
(defrule preliminary-experiment (integrity-undermined-event
(appID "fileserverapplication")(xnID ?xn)(trusteeID ?server))
=> (notify-xn-app ?xn (str-cat "TERMINATE-ALL:" ?server)))
To evaluate the usefulness of this rule, the simulation models a storage fault that
gradually propagates through the server affecting more and more files on the way. The
server does not notify of any of the integrity breaches and the application must do so
when it discovers the problem. The evaluation compares the number of files corrupted
on file server when no rule is specified, then runs a trace replay with the rule to deter-
mine how many files were saved by early removal, one file at a time. The experiment is
run with 100 files at different speeds of corruption propagation, the averages number of
corrupted files from 5 runs at each speed seen in figure 4.
As can be seen, the number of files saved is is proportional to the frequency of
corruption, and in each case around 84% of files were saved, with around 35% of the
corruptions occurring after the first termination call.
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Fig. 4. File corruption experimental results
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented our model of interaction, a monitor architecture and a prototype
implementation. Together these support detailed evidence collection during trust-based
interactions and can guide a decision process by providing useful, relevant, detailed
feedback promptly and in an automated manner. While the model requires the developer
to put in more effort to define a particular type of interaction up front, this alleviates the
burden on the user at runtime to provide detailed feedback. Our evaluation is still in
the preliminary stages, but as seen in section 4, our monitor can provide useful and
prompt feedback. We intend to continue validating the monitor using more rules in the
file server scenario and also using other scenarios within a more realistic context.
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Abstract. Current anti-spam tools focus on filtering incoming e-mails. The 
scope of these tools is limited to local administrative domains. With such 
limited information, it is difficult to make accurate spam control decisions. We 
observe that sending servers process more information on their outgoing e-mail 
traffic than receiving servers do on their incoming traffic. Better spam control 
can be achieved if e-mail servers collaborate with one another by checking 
both outgoing and incoming traffic. However, the control of outgoing traffic 
provides little direct benefit to the sending server. Servers in different administrat-
ive domains presently have little incentive to improve spam control on other 
receiving servers, which hampers a move toward cross-domain collaboration. 
We propose a collaborative framework in which spam control decisions are 
drawn from the data aggregated within a group of e-mail servers across 
different administrative domains. The collaboration provides incentive for 
outgoing spam control. The servers that contribute to the control of outgoing 
spam are rewarded, while traffic restriction is imposed on the irresponsible 
servers. A Federated Security Context (FSC) is established to enable transparent 
negotiation of multilateral decisions among the group of collaborators without 
common trust. Information from trusted collaborators counts more for one’s final 
decision compared to information from untrustworthy servers. The FSC mitigates 
potential threats of fake information from malicious servers. The collaborative 
approach to spam control is more efficient than a decision in isolation, providing 
dynamic identification and adaptive restriction to spam generators. 
1   Introduction and Motivation 
Unsolicited Bulk E-mail (UBE), also called junk e-mail or spam, has a significant 
negative impact on the Internet. It wastes the time of users and administrators and 
consumes significant storage, communication, and computational resources. Many 
anti-spam techniques such as spam filters [6] and blacklists [15] are employed by 
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e-mail users and e-mail servers to avoid the receipt of UBE. Although these tools are 
capable of identifying and eliminating some UBE, significant deficiencies remain.  
This paper discusses a peer-to-peer approach for collaborative defensive strategies 
against UBE where e-mail servers in different administrative domains establish a 
collaboration to block unsolicited e-mail. Each server determines a local view of spam 
control by examining what it has recently received. Then, these local views are ex-
changed among collaborative servers and aggregated to form global views. Finally, 
decisions on spam control are made on the basis of these global views. Our frame-
work supports mutual and dynamic actions to restrict servers that generate large 
amounts of unsolicited e-mail, while rewarding the E-mail Service Providers (ESPs) 
that are responsible and efficient with regards to outgoing spam control. Restrictions 
are taken by reducing the flow of e-mail traffic coming from irresponsible ESPs 
whereas ESPs that reduce their volume of outgoing unsolicited e-mails will gradually 
regain higher traffic as the reward. Consequently, all entities have the incentive to 
improve their outgoing spam control in order to avoid the restrictions imposed by the 
collaborating server network. 
Moreover, in our proposed framework, the collaborative group of ESPs can extend 
across administrative domains and cooperate securely in spite of the general absence 
of common trust among ESPs. Each collaborator aggregates its system-wide informa-
tion independently, according to how much it trusts the others. Information from 
trusted collaborators counts more towards the final decision, while information from 
untrustworthy servers contributes less to the final decision, so that potential threats of 
fake information from malicious servers are mitigated. This arrangement is based on 
the establishment of a Federated Security Context (FSC), which is designed to enable 
transparent negotiation of multilateral decisions among a group of potentially skepti-
cal collaborators. 
Experienced spam generators circumvent current anti-spam tools and spam is still 
pervasive in “inboxes” worldwide. Typically, spam generators seek open relays on the 
Internet. In these open relays the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) service is 
not configured to prevent unauthorized users from sending e-mail. The original design 
of SMTP [16][1][2] assumed that all users were trustworthy and required no sender 
authentication. Consequently, in both research and commercial environments there 
are millions of open SMTP servers that “spammers” can use as intermediate servers to 
conceal their real identities.  
One widely-used solution to use of these open relays is the publication of blacklists 
of verified spam sources. Many organizations subscribe to these blacklists, refusing 
e-mail from listed sources. Unfortunately, the use of blacklists for rejecting e-mail is 
problematic because legitimate e-mail sent or relayed by the listed sites are also re-
jected. Even relay only mail from their own domain may occasionally be used by 
zombie machines within the ESP’s own network. In addition, if a blacklist has not 
been updated to reinstate an ESP, mail from that ESP may be wrongly rejected. In this 
situation, it is not desirable to definitively blacklist these ESPs. There exists a di-
lemma here; If such ESPs are blacklisted, good e-mail traffic is also blocked; yet, if 
their responsibility for sending or forwarding spam traffic is not questioned, they have 
no incentive to control spam behavior. This dilemma reveals the difficulties and chal-
lenges in existing spam control techniques and the necessity to make more accurate 
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anti-spam decisions. We think that better spam control can be achieved if e-mail serv-
ers collaborate to check both outgoing and incoming traffic and our collaborative 
defensive framework can assist in such collaboration. 
In the following section we elaborate on the incentives and provide design for 
performing collaborative e-mail control. We discuss the need for collaborative 
defense based on today’s e-mail patterns. In section 3 we describe our collaborative 
defense framework. We explain how a Federated Security Context Agent (FSCA) 
transparently negotiates the multilateral decisions in Section 4. Section 5 presents the 
demonstration scenario of the collaborative defense against UBE. Section 6 presents 
the approach simulation and section 7 discusses related works. 
2   Why Collaborative Defense? 
2.1   Difficulties and Challenges to Existing Spam Control 
Today, we use the following two filtering methods for spam control: 
• The first method uses tools to analyze patterns in the content of the e-mail and an 
automatic analyzer to evaluate the spam suspicion of each e-mail. If the suspicion 
rate is higher than a certain threshold, the e-mail is considered as spam, can be re-
jected and the sender added to the local blacklist of the e-mail server.  
• The second method uses public blacklists to block IP addresses, e-mail accounts or 
e-mail servers that are known to generate or relay spam. E-mail servers can refuse 
any e-mail originating from servers listed on well known public blacklists [15]. 
Nevertheless, apparent deficiencies remain with these two methods: 
• Accuracy: If the filter does not integrate changes made by the new tools used to 
generate spam, this leads to false negatives and false positives1. Blacklisting open 
relays that also deliver legitimate e-mails increases the number of false positives.  
• Impersonation: An experienced spam generator can also easily bypass the black-
list mechanism by stealing legitimate e-mail accounts or forging headers of mes-
sages.  
• Evasion: The elusive nature of spam [10] makes it difficult to identify with exist-
ing methods. Thus, experienced spam generators find ways to circumvent the filter 
by padding conjunctive symbols in sensitive keywords, by intentional misspelling 
of keywords, etc. They scatter e-mail messages by automatically creating many 
different public e-mail accounts or by using the many different open relays. 
• Dependence: Blacklists represent a constrained solution imposed by a third party 
and the system does not adapt to criteria based on individual choices made by ESPs.  
• Length of Correction: When an open relay has been blacklisted and its operator 
closes the relay, the process of removing the relay is often slow. Sometimes there 
is no way to appeal a removal in spite of the operator’s goodwill [17]. 
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2.2   The Merit of Collaborative Spam Identification 
The building of a collaborative framework where a community of ESPs cooperate 
with each other to identify spam presents several advantages: 
• Reciprocal: Spam is better identified by a collaboration of ESPs than by any ESP 
in isolation. Since a spam generator may dispatch its bulk e-mail to many ESPs, the 
spam control information from one ESP may contribute to the protection against 
similar spam traffic on the other ESPs. Collaboration allows ESPs to benefit from 
the varying tools, experiences and knowledge of other ESPs. 
• Dynamic: Because ESPs would cooperate dynamically to control spam behavior, a 
burst of spam traffic is controlled in real-time. This is a control not available via 
public blacklisting that only provides long-term spam control. Furthermore, the 
collaborative framework allows partial and temporary filtering of suspected ESPs, 
thus mitigating the damage to legitimate e-mail traffic. 
• Adaptive: Once a spam source is identified, the framework would not simply 
block all its e-mail traffic and blacklist it indefinitely. Instead, a sending ESP that 
is suspicious is immediately notified of its suspicious behavior by the other 
collaborative servers and it is granted a minimum credit to control its outgoing 
traffic. By decreasing the spam it sends, a suspected ESP can regain its reputation 
among the other servers and thus, has an incentive to improve its behavior. 
2.3   Collaborative Restriction and Incentives for Outgoing Spam Control 
Today, many e-mail server administrators still believe that allowing some spam to go 
out causes little harm to outgoing e-mail servers. However, not employing additional 
spam controls on outgoing e-mail causes inconvenience to the users. The direct 
victims of spam are the users and the servers who receive spam, not the users who 
deliver spam. The receiver suffers from the additional load placed on the server 
resources and the waste of time and money caused by spam. Thus, in practice, it is 
hard to push every server administrator to take partial altruistic responsibility unless 
we can introduce an incentive to make most e-mail servers more responsible for their 
traffic. The problem is very similar to the prisoner's dilemma in game theory [4][5]. If 
a majority of the servers employ spam control on outgoing e-mail, the overall quality 
of service is improved. Yet, if only some individual servers employ it, they incur the 
cost of identifying suspicious ESPs but do not receive the same benefit from other 
potential collaborators. To avoid the prisoner's dilemma, the one who makes the most 
contribution to the others by controlling outgoing spam needs to be rewarded, while 
the one who is irresponsible needs to be put at a disadvantage so that all ESPs have 
the same level of incentive to improve the control on outgoing e-mails.  
Sending ESPs are in a better position to apply spam control to outgoing e-mails. 
Compared to incoming ESPs, they have more adequate information, such as the 
history record of respective e-mail accounts, to distinguish spam and spam generators 
from legitimate senders. If we think in terms of collaboration, the collaborative 
restrictions are a good incentive to push the ESP to apply better outgoing spam 
control. If we restrict the spam sources and reward responsible servers, collaborative 
actions performed by a group of servers are more objective and efficient than isolated 
actions and push ESPs to control their outgoing traffic.  
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Our proposed framework outlines the “how” and “why” of a collaborative design. 
The servers usually lie in different administrative domains and do not have common 
trust among each other. Instead, they evaluate the trust in one another on a case-by-
case basis. If a high volume of incoming spam e-mails is detected by a server, that 
ESP will notify all the collaborative servers. As a restriction, they will cooperatively 
decrease the quota on the number of e-mails they can accept during each time span 
from the server generating spam. The collaborative network will temporarily also 
reject the excessive amount of e-mails with relatively higher spam suspicion.  
A potential problem with this system is having legitimate e-mail rejected at the 
receiving server when the quota is reached. An option to mitigate this issue is to 
impose the resolution of temporal Human Interactive Proof (HIP) [19] or Computat-
ional Proof by the sender as suggested by Goodman et al. [18]. Senders who are real 
legitimate users can choose to pay the cost of resolving the proof. For spammers such 
an expensive burden of proof will act as a deterrent.  
The more spam a server allows to go out, the more serious restrictions it will 
encounter from the collaborative network. The only way for a server to gain back its 
corresponding quota is to improve the spam control on its outgoing traffic in a 
responsible and timely manner.  
3   The Collaborative Defense Framework 
The collaborative defense framework for the particular case of the e-mail service is 
composed of three levels: (1) The e-mail service and the SMTP protocol for the ex-
change of the e-mails among the servers.  
(2) The server-specific Local Delivery Policies (LDP) that specify the conditions to 
accept a message from another server and the conditions to deliver a message to a 
user. These policies are evaluated based on different factors which are: a) Originator 
of the message. b) Destination of the message. c) Content of the message. d) Current 
state of the e-mail server. e) History record of each sender and trust rate on each e-
mail server. f) User preference. g) Suspicion value attributed to the message. The 
decision is taken from various security mechanisms such as the use of blacklists 
and/or whitelists, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), spam, worm and anti-virus fil-
ters. If the policies are local and specific to each e-mail server, the final decisions 
should integrate the more recent evaluation of the other collaborating servers. This is 
provided by the third level. 
(3) The collaborative defense negotiation level that governs the decisions and ac-
tions taken from negotiation with the other servers and establishes a federated security 
context among the community of servers. Each server will integrate the other servers' 
part of the negotiation according to the level of trust granted to each collaborating 
server. The result of each negotiation is integrated locally as updates of the parame-
ters evaluated by the LDP.  
More precisely, in the third level a Federated Security Context Agent (FSCA) inte-
grates the collaborative negotiation in the local decisions taken by each ESP. Figure 1 
explains how a decision is made under the collaborative defense framework for UBE 
detection. When a request for a message arrives from a sending server (1), it is 
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Fig. 1. The Collaborative Defense Framework 
reported to the traffic enforcement level for decision making (2). The counter of in-
coming e-mails from the sending server is increased and the decision is made accord-
ing to the restrictions imposed on this sending server evaluated by the LDP (3). In our 
case, restrictions are imposed in terms of traffic quota. If the quota is exceeded, the e-
mail request is rejected. Otherwise the e-mail is analyzed (4) by the local security 
mechanisms and the corresponding spam suspicion value is computed by SpamAssas-
sin [6] and accumulated with previous suspicion values of incoming e-mails received 
from the same server for a predefined period of time. Periodically the local FSCA 
receives the Local Spam Suspicion (LSS) from the analyzer and the Local Traffic 
Rate (LT) of incoming e-mails from the traffic enforcement level (5) and exchanges 
these values with the other FSCAs (a). Each FSCA integrates these values to compute 
a Federated Spam Suspicion (FSS) and the Global Traffic Rate (GT) of all e-mail 
messages sent from the same server to the others for the last period of time (a detailed 
explanation of the variable integration is given in Section 5). 
Both, FSS and GT are returned to the traffic enforcement level (6). They will be used 
to impose e-mail traffic restrictions to misbehaving servers and also to dynamically 
adjust the threshold value over which SpamAssassin considers the message as spam. 
4   Federated Security Context Agent (FSCA) 
The FSCA is designed to transparently negotiate multilateral decisions among a group 
of collaborating entities without global trust. The FSCA fits an environment where a 
number of independently administrated entities need to share and aggregate informa-
tion to strengthen their security protection. However, one cannot fully trust others and 
use the information presented by others without imposing any constraint. Instead, 
each entity aggregates the information on the basis of how much one can trust the 
other, which is defined by the trust rate. 
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4.1   Trust-Based Security Variable  
In our collaborative spam control framework, email servers share information for 
multilateral spam control decisions. However, since the ESPs in a collaborative group 
may extend across many administrative domains, no global trust exists among the 
collaborators. Other collaborators may make improper judgments, or even be mali-
cious. We can not unconditionally adopt the information from the others. To reconcile 
the conflict between the need for collaboration and the absence of common trust, we 
originate a design of a trust-based security variable (TSV) which integrates the trust 
relationships into the sharing of the FSC. 
From each server’s point of view, the TSV looks similar to a variable in program-
ming language. Nevertheless, the underlying mechanism of TSV is distinct. A TSV is 
globally shared among a collaborating group of servers. Every collaborator keeps two 
separate interface values for each TSV: TSV-shared and TSV-federated. TSV-
shared reflects ones local view and TSV-federated reflects a federated view over the 
whole system. The underlying communication among the collaborators and the inte-
gration of the trust relationship are made transparent. 
The maintenance of the trust-based security variable (TSV) consists of three 
phases: 
• Variable Proposing: First, every collaborator proposes its own share to the TSV, 
which is called TSV-shared. Update operation only takes effect on its local TSV-
shared so that different collaborator may keep different value as its TSV-shared. 
• Variable Exchange: Secondly, the TSV-shared will be dynamically exchanged 
among the collaborators, so that every collaborator can obtain all recent values of 
TSV-shared from other collaborators. 
• Variable Integration: Finally, each collaborator will integrate the collection of 
TSV-shared values into its own TSV-federated. Again, the values of TSV-federated 
may vary from host to host. The integration of TSV depends on two factors: 
(a) Integration Algorithm: Each type of the TSV defines its respective algorithm 
for the variable integration (the details are given in section 4.3). 
(b) Trust Relationship: Each collaborator keeps its respective trust relationship, 
which defines how much one can trust the other collaborators.  
4.2   Trust Rates 
The trust relationship takes a significant role in the negotiation of multilateral security 
decisions. According to the respective relationship of how much one can trust the 
other collaborators, each entity may derive its different view on the same TSV. In our 
framework, the magnitude of how much a collaborator X trusts another collaborator Y 
is defined by the trust rate: TRXY. It is a decimal value in range [0.0, 1.0]. The more 
you trust someone, the higher is the value of the trust rate. In the following, we brief 
the three ways to derive trust rates: 
1) Empirical Assignment: every user assigns empirical trust rates to other users, 
domains, or institutional groups that she knows. The trust rates on unknown collabo-
rators are initialized as 0.0. 
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2) Indirect Derivation: When collaborator X has no direct empirical trust on Y, we 
can still use the following propagation algorithm (Formula 1) to derive the user X's 
trust rate on Y and the algorithm can be applied recursively. 
}00|{)(max ≠∧≠=×=
∈
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3) Dynamic Rectification: The trust relationship can be adjusted in real-time on the 
basis of each entity's past experiences. 
4.3   Integration Algorithms 
Since trust-based security variables serve various data types and various functional-
ities, the FSCA supports many different types of the TSV. Each TSV type defines its 
own integration algorithm. In our collaborative spam control system, we mainly use 
two TSV types: Confined-Global-Quota and Trust-Weighted-Average. The Confined-
Global-Quota is used to enforce each e-mail server with a quota on the e-mail traffic 
rate in total throughout the collaborative group (Section 5, formula 7 and formula 9). 
The Trust-Weight-Average is used to draw the average of spam suspicion rate and 
history reputation rate by each e-mail server. Both types of TSV are calculated on the 
basis of trust rates. 
• Confined Global Quota 
The integration algorithm in Confined-Global-Quota adds up every collaborator's 
local value (TSV-shared) to a total value (TSV-federated), and then check if the total 
value exceeds its corresponding global quota or not. However, we do not fully trust 
all our collaborating ESPs. Some collaborator, with the purpose of blacklisting an e-
mail sender maliciously, may claim a faked TSV-shared with a large value (equal to 
or larger than the global quota). If all the other collaborating ESPs unconditionally 
accept this false claim and believe that the victim user has exceeded his quota, then 
the victim e-mail sender may be blacklisted on all the collaborators although she did 
nothing wrong. By using the Confined-Global-Quota, one does not unconditionally 
accept the values of TSV-shared from the other collaborators. Instead, an upper limit 
of the TSV-shared is assigned to each collaborator. The upper limit that one has on 
each collaborator is derived from the product of the global quota and the trust rate on 
the collaborator. The less you can trust a collaborator, the smaller is the upper limit. 
When some collaborator proposes a TSV-shared that is beyond its upper limit, the 
integration algorithm only counts the upper limit value into its local TSV-federated. 
Thus, for each collaborator H, we can calculate its TSV-federated as follow: 
¦
=
×=
orscollaboratallK
Global
HK
sharedfederated QuotaTRKTSVHTSV )),(min()(   (2) 
• Trust-Weighted-Average 
The integration algorithm in Trust-Weighted-Average calculates an average value 
(TSV-federated) from the local values (TSV-shared) of all the collaborators through-
out the system. Again, to confine the potential threat from malicious collaborating 
ESPs, the aggregation of the average value (TSV-federated) is weighted by the trust 
rates. The more we can trust a collaborator, the more portion of its TSV-shared value 
will be integrated into our own TSV-federated value. On the other hand, the 
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TSV-shared values from less trusted collaborators contribute less to the TSV-
federated value so that the potential threats from it are contained. If a collaborator 
does not have any value evaluated on this TSV, the integration algorithm will not 
count their null TSV-shared values. Thus, for each collaborator H, we have the fol-
lowing integration algorithm for Trust-Weighed-Average:  
})(|{)()( nullKTSVKM
TR
TRHTSV
HTSV shared
MK HK
HKMK
shared
federated ≠=
×
=
¦
¦
∈
∈
 (3) 
For a TSV of type Combined-Global-Quota or Trust-Weighted-Average, every col-
laborator may derive different TSV-federated values according to the different trust 
rates on others, so that each collaborating ESP respectively draws its own view. 
5   Scenario 
In this scenario, a group of collaborative e-mail servers: C={ESP1, ESP2,…,ESPN} 
use FSCA to setup a collaborative environment for the spam control. Each entity 
(ESPX) defines a trust rate TRXY on every other collaborator (ESPY): 0.0 represents no 
trust and 1.0 represents full trust. The practice of collaborative spam control includes 
four major phases: local spam evaluation, federated spam evaluation, restrictions 
imposed from the collaboration, and countermeasures. 
• Local Spam Evaluation 
In the first phase, each e-mail server evaluates its local spam suspicion on all other 
servers with which it communicates. Each server can customize its own application 
[6] and configuration to evaluate the spam suspicion on the basis of keyword filtering, 
pattern recognition, etc. On server ESPX, we name the repository of incoming e-mails 
from ESPY as EXY. For each e-mail e∈EXY, it checks the content of e-mail e and evalu-
ates a spam suspicion value Se on e. Se ranges from 0.0 (no suspicion) to 1.0 (con-
firmed spam). We split the axis of time into spans in length of t (typically, t=1 
minute) and label the spans with a serial number. At the end of each time span K, we 
accumulate the suspicion rates of all e-mails that come from ESPY to ESPX  during 
this time span: 
¦ ≤<−Λ∈= })(|{)( noweTtnowEeeSKAS XYeXY             (4) 
Furthermore, ESPX derives its local spam suspicion rate on server ESPY after the time 
span K, LSSXY(K). The coefficient Ȝ (between 0.0 and 1.0) is introduced to make the 
local suspicion rate time-digressive, so that spam suspicions from more recent e-mail 
messages will count more into LSS than older spam suspicions. 
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• Federated Spam Suspicion 
In the second phase, the N collaborative servers exchange their local suspicion rates 
and integrate their respective federated spam suspicion rates. The value of federated 
spam suspicion highly depends on how much one can trust another. The higher value 
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is the trust rate TRXY, the greater portion of local spam suspicion on ESPY will be 
integrated into the federated spam suspicion on ESPX. Formula 6 calculates ESPX’s 
federated spam suspicion on ESPY. 
¦ ¦∈ ∈⋅= CZ CZ XZXZZYXY TRTRKLSSKFSS )/())(()(      (6) 
• Imposing Collaborative Restriction 
The collaborative servers restrict the server they suspect, ESPY, by imposing local and 
global quotas on the volume of e-mail traffic that ESPY can send in each time span, 
and cut off the exceeded part by rejecting the e-mail sending requests from that sus-
pect server. We have three predefined parameters. The maximum local quota 
(MLQXY) defines the maximum rate of incoming e-mail that ESPX can accept from 
ESPY. The maximum global quota (MGQY) confines the overall rate of incoming e-
mail from ESPY to the entire collaborative group. The blacklist threshold (BTY), de-
termines that when the federated spam suspicion of ESPY is beyond the threshold 
BTY, all traffic from ESPY should be rejected. If no spam comes from ESPY, we as-
sign MLQXY and MGQXY as the local and global quota on ESPY. As suspicious unso-
licited e-mail messages from ESPY are identified and the federated spam suspicion 
rate rises, we should reduce the local quota and global quota on ESPY as a penalty. 
So, the actual local quota (LQ) and global quota (GQ) are decreasing functions of the 
federated spam suspicion (Figure 2). 
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In addition, a counter is maintained to track the volume of incoming e-mails from 
every e-mail server during the past time t, which is called the Local Traffic Rate (LT). 
}))(|({ noweTtnowEeesizeofLT XYXT ≤<−Λ∈=        (8) 
The FSCAs periodically exchange their local traffic rates with one another. Each 
FSCA independently aggregates its overall count of incoming e-mail throughout the 
entire collaborative group according to the trust rate. As it is described in section 4.3, 
for the Confined-Global-Quota the TSV integration algorithm cuts down each local 
traffic rate with a threshold which is proportional to the corresponding trust rate, and 
sum up these tailored values into each server’s Global Traffic Rate (GT). This mecha-
nism can mitigate potential negative effects of global quota imposition if a collaborator 
maliciously claims a fake high rate to impede the regular traffic of other e-mail servers.  
¦ ∈ =⋅= CZ XZXYZYXY orscollaboratallCTRGQLTGT ),min(  (9) 
Each time an e-mail request comes in, the e-mail server should query its local e-
mail agent for inspection. Only after the inspector verifies that the LT is below the 
current local quota (LTX  Y≤ LQXY) and the GT does not exceed the current global 
quota (GTXY ≤ GQXY), will the e-mail be processed. Otherwise, when either LT or GT 
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exceeds the corresponding quotas, ESPX should directly reject the surplus and send 
back an alert of spam control to ESPY. 
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GQGTandLQLTasaccepted
Decision      (10) 
As Figure 2 shows, during the dynamic process of spam control, the e-mail agent 
may encounter three possible circumstances. If both local and global quotas are met, 
ESPY is in the "white area", which means all e-mail requests from ESPY are accepted 
and passed to the spam filter. As LT or GT has exceeded the corresponding quota, 
ESPY enters the "gray area", which means some of the e-mail requests will be rejected 
to cut off the surplus traffic rate. Finally, if spam keeps coming in from ESPY and the 
FSSXY rises beyond the blacklist threshold (BTY), ESPY falls into the "black area" and 
all the e-mail requests from ESPY are rejected. 
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Fig. 2. How Local and Global Quotas Shape E-mail Traffic 
• Countermeasures 
In the last phase, when ESPY perceives that its outgoing e-mails are rejected by the 
other servers because of spam control, it can autonomously decide how to cope with 
the penalty. If no countermeasure is taken and spam keeps going out, the quotas that 
are imposed will be tightened more and more until eventually ESPY is blacklisted 
completely. In contrast, after proper countermeasures (such as demanding temporary 
SMTP authentication, filtering outgoing e-mails with higher spam suspicions) are 
taken and the volume of outgoing unsolicited e-mails is reduced, the quotas that are 
imposed on ESPY will gradually recover to higher values as a reward for taking coun-
termeasures. Since spam suspicion rates are time-digressive and as time elapses, the 
records in the past count for less and less. Even if ESPY falls into the blacklist, after 
its outgoing spam control is improved, it will gradually come back to the gray area 
and then to the white area. 
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6   Approach Simulation 
To assess our approach we implemented the FSCA on different nodes (machines). 
The FSCA is implemented using the Otago Agent Platform (OPAL) [22]. Opal is a 
highly modular FIPA-compliant [23] platform for the development of a Multi-Agent 
System (MAS) where agents can cooperate by exchanging messages. The tests in-
volve four collaborating nodes (ESPs). Each node sends e-mail messages to the other 
nodes at random intervals between 1 and 5 seconds. An e-mail can have a spam sus-
picion between 1 (lowest) and 10 (highest). TR for all nodes is fixed to 0.5. LSS and 
LT are exchanged every minute. 
Two servers (server A and server B) send e-mails with random spam suspicions, 
i.e. simulating no control of outgoing messages (spam suspicion randomly varies 
between 1 and 10). Another server (server C) is sending only messages (spam suspi-
cion < 4), and the last one (server D) sends only bad messages (spam suspicion > 7). 
D might deliberately spam, or might be taken over by an attacker and abused. 
     
 
Fig. 3. Traffic Received by A (Axis Y) sent by B (top-left) - Received by A sent by C (top-right) 
- Received by A sent by D (bottom) during 29 sec (Axis X) 
Figures 3 show (Axis Y) the LSS, FSS, LT, GT, LQ and GQ computed by A for the 
traffic received by the other three nodes during 29 seconds (Axis X) of the test: 
• Figure 3 (top-left) shows the result of traffic coming from C: C sends only good 
messages. The local traffic rate always stays under local quota, and global traffic 
rate always stays under global quota. Therefore C is always in the white area.  
• Figure 3 (top-right) shows the result of the traffic coming from B: B has no outgo-
ing spam control and goes sometimes into the grey area, where its e-mail traffic is 
limited.  
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• Figure 3 (bottom) shows the result of the traffic coming from D: D spams A all 
the time. It goes into the grey area for a short time, before going above the black-
list threshold and being blacklisted (black area). 
In these tests, the MLQ is set to 20 and the MGQ is set to 60 for each node, as 60 
would be the maximum of messages a node could send out if it was sending every 
second. The blacklist threshold is set to 25 (it was chosen seeing that the highest pos-
sible FSS obtained for the test was 55). 
The graphs show clearly how the FSS influences LQ and GQ and how the different 
areas are reached depending on the behaviour of the sending servers B, C or D. 
7   Related Work 
Work related to defensive collaboration of both spam and Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks exhibit similar characteristics and are described below. 
The Defensive Cooperative Overlay Mesh [7] is a peer-to-peer distributed frame-
work allowing exchange of information and services between largely distributed 
nodes for Distributed DoS (DDoS) defense. A tree propagating the DDoS alert is built 
from victim to collaborating nodes of the peer network that forward any traffic to the 
victim. The nodes cooperate to limit the rate of the DDoS traffic through the tree.  
The Cossack [8] architecture allows coordination among defense software 
components called watchdogs. Watchdogs located at different edge networks of the 
Internet fight DDoS attacks. When an attack is in progress the watchdog close to the 
victim notices the increase of the network traffic and multicasts the alert to other 
watchdogs. In the Defensive Cooperative Overlay Mesh [7] and Cossack [8], a 
collaborative detection system constrains the network which is the source of the 
attack to perform better control of outgoing traffic. Both systems [7][8] use a static 
trust relationship between collaborators, rather than a dynamic one that evolves 
during the collaboration. 
Kaushik et al. [9] propose an architecture to encourage beneficial behavior of e-
mail providers by providing better quality of service to good senders and discouraging 
bad senders. Alternate policies enable the e-mail receiving server to specify to the 
sending server what it considers to be abusive mail. The collaboration is only bilateral 
and does not involve other servers. Damiani et al. [10] describe a peer-to-peer 
approach for spam filtering. Several e-mail servers attached to the same super-peer 
server send reports about new spam detected. In case of suspicion, e-mail servers 
query the super-peer to determine whether a message (digest) has been reported as 
spam by other servers or by other super-peers. The super-peer transmits all similar 
digests to the requesting server. The requesting server takes its final decision based on 
a confidence value that measures the propensity of a digest to be spam and a 
reputation associated with the server which reported the spam. The collaboration is 
only used to exchange digests and does not push servers to block their outgoing spam. 
Razor [11], Cloudmark [14] and SmartScreen [13] operate in a manner similar to [10]. 
The Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse (CDD) [12] uses distributed open servers to 
maintain a database of message checksums sent by clients (mail users or ESPs). 
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Clients make decisions about spam based on how many instances of the same 
messages have been reported. The scheme is subject to false positives if many fake 
reports of the same message are intentionally sent by a malicious client. Compared to 
[10], [11], and [12] our approach operates at a higher level, not basing decisions on 
individual messages. The FSC for multilateral decisions allows dynamic integration 
of collaborators’ opinions mitigated by the trust granted to each one of them, limiting 
the impact of  false positives or negatives. 
Goodman et al. [18] present three techniques with initial cost (money, computation 
and HIP), on outgoing e-mail, each designed to impose a minimum cost on legitimate 
users and to be too costly for spammers. Goodman et al. [18] show that not every 
message needs to be charged to discourage spammers. But the average cost for the 
spammer during the lifetime of an account needs to exceed his profit. For that, the 
techniques impose limited initial costs and stop charging until a complaint is received. 
When the sending server receives a complaint, it temporarily terminates the account. 
This is a sufficient discouragement for spam generators because of the cost of a new 
account.  
Jung and Sit [20] present an empirical study of spam traffic and the use of 
blacklists. It shows that blacklists are quantitatively related to one another by 
analyzing how many spam generators appear in the seven main blacklists and 
concludes that correlated blacklists should be considered to estimate that a host is a 
spam generator. This can be dynamically provided through the collaboration between 
blacklist servers. 
8   Conclusion 
This paper presented a framework for collaborative defense against Unsolicited Bulk 
E-mail based on multilateral decision making among e-mail servers and on the trust 
relationships among them. We argued that the collaboration provides better protection 
because of the three principles: (1) Reciprocity: the means employed at one ESP can 
contribute to the protection at another ESP. (2) Dynamics: supports control of spam in 
real-time and deals with temporary bursts of traffic. (3) Adaptive restriction: restricted 
ESPs regain reputation by controlling their outgoing spam. Temporary application of 
restrictions decrease the damage to legitimate users. 
Collaborative actions performed by a group of servers are more objective and ef-
ficient than isolated actions. Collaborative traffic restrictions are applied to spam 
generators and collaborative rewards are applied to responsible ESPs, providing 
ESPs an incentive to improve their outgoing spam control. The collaboration is 
provided using a Federated Security Context (FSC) where a Federated Security 
Context Agent (FSCA) [21][3], transparently negotiates the multilateral decisions 
among ESPs. Each ESP aggregates the information on the basis of how much it 
trusts the other and the final decision made by the FSCA, mitigating the effect of 
false claims from malicious ESPs.  
The collaboration between ESPs was tested using OPAL agents acting on behalf of 
e-mail servers located at different network nodes. The paper presented preliminary 
results of the effect of the FSS on the traffic limitation. 
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Abstract. Social networks are growing in number and size, with hundreds of 
millions of user accounts among them. One added benefit of these networks is 
that they allow users to encode more information about their relationships than 
just stating who they know. In this work, we are particularly interested in trust 
relationships, and how they can be used in designing interfaces. In this paper, 
we present FilmTrust, a website that uses trust in web-based social networks to 
create predictive movie recommendations. Using the FilmTrust system as a 
foundation, we show that these recommendations are more accurate than other 
techniques when the user’s opinions about a film are divergent from the average. 
We discuss this technique both as an application of social network analysis, as 
well as how it suggests other analyses that can be performed to help improve 
collaborative filtering algorithms of all types. 
1   Introduction 
Web-based social networks are growing in size and number every day. A website that 
maintains a comprehensive list of these networks shows 140 networks with well over 
200,000,000 user accounts among them.1 Users spend hours maintaining personal 
information, blog entries, and lists of social contacts. The benefit of this time 
investment is vague. While a small percentage of these networks are dedicated to 
building business contacts, most are for entertainment purposes. 
While entertainment may motivate users to maintain a presence in these web-based 
social networks, there is great potential to utilize the social data for enhancing end 
user applications. Since the networks are web-based, the information is largely 
publicly available. Many of these networks are beginning to output their members’ 
profiles using FOAF, a Semantic Web vocabulary for representing social networks, 
means that the data is not only available but easily readable by applications.  
One space that these social networks can be integrated into applications is in 
creating interfaces that act “intelligently” with respect to the user’s social 
connections. This can be further refined by looking at specific features of social 
relationships. Nearly half of the social networks found in the aforementioned list 
provide some means for users to add information about their relationships with others. 
                                                          
1
 http://trust.mindswap.org/ 
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This could include the type of relationship (e.g. “friend”, “sibling”, “co-worker”, 
etc.), the strength of the relationship (e.g. “acquaintance”, “good friend”, “best 
friend”, etc.), or how much the users trust the people they know. Our research is 
specifically focused on this trust relationship because it has many features that make it 
ideal for integrating into socially intelligent interfaces.  
Specifically, we are will use social trust as the basis for a recommender system. For this 
technique to be successful, there must be a correlation between trust and user similarity. 
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [1] showed that in a predefined context, such as movies, users 
develop social connections with people who have similar preferences. These results were 
extended in work by Ziegler and Lausen [2] that showed a correlation between trust and 
user similarity in an empirical study of a real online community. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to support that users will prefer systems with 
recommendations that rely on social networks and trust relationships over similarity 
measures commonly used for making recommendations. Research has shown that 
people prefer recommendations from friends to those made by recommender systems 
[3] and that users prefer recommendations from systems they trust [4]. By producing 
recommendations through the use of trust in social networks, both of those user 
preferences are addressed. Recommendations come through a network of friends, and 
are based on the explicit trust expressed by the user.  
In this paper, we present FilmTrust, a website that integrates web-based social 
network- king into a movie recommender system. We begin with a description of the 
FilmTrust website, followed by an analysis of its features. TidalTrust, a trust 
inference algorithm, is used as the basis for generating predictive ratings personalized 
for each user. The accuracy of the recommended ratings is shown to outperform both 
a simple average rating and the ratings produced by a common correlation-based 
collaborative filtering algorithm. Theoretically and through a small user study, some 
evidence is also developed that supports a user benefit from ordering reviews based 
on the users’ trust preferences.  
2   Background and Related Work 
Recommender systems help users identify items of interest. These recommendations 
are generally made in two ways: by calculating the similarity between items and 
recommending items related to those in which the user has expressed interest, or by 
calculating the similarity between users in the system and recommending items that 
are liked by similar users. This latter method is also known as collaborative filtering. 
Collaborative filtering has been applied in many contexts, and FilmTrust is not the 
first to attempt to make predictive recommendations about movies. MovieLens [5], 
Recommendz [6], and Film-Conseil [7] are just a few of the websites that implement 
recommender systems in the context of films.  
Herlocker, et al. [8] present an excellent overview of the goals, datasets, and 
algorithms of collaborative filtering systems. However, FilmTrust is unlike the 
approach taken in many collaborative filtering recommender systems in that its goal is 
not to present a list of good items to users; rather, the recommendations are generated 
to suggest how much a given user may be interested in an item that the user already 
found. For this to work, there must be a measure of how closely the item is related to 
the user’s preferences. 
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Before making any computations with trust in social networks, it is vitally important 
to know what trust is. Social trust depends on a host of factors which cannot be easily 
modeled in a computational system. Past experience with a person and with their 
friends, opinions of the actions a person has taken, psychological factors impacted by a 
lifetime of history and events (most completely unrelated to the person we are deciding 
to trust or not trust), rumor, influence by others’ opinions, and motives to gain 
something extra by extending trust are just a few of these factors. For trust to be used as 
a rating between people in social networks, the definition must be focused and 
simplified. We adopt this as the definition of trust for our work: trust in a person is a 
commitment to an action based on a belief that the future actions of that person will lead 
to a good outcome. The action and commitment does not have to be significant. We 
could say Alice trusts Bob regarding movies if she chooses to watch a film (commits to 
an action) that Bob recommends (based on her belief that Bob will not waste her time).  
Other work has touched on trust in recommender systems, including [9] and [10]. 
These works address the use of trust within systems where the set of commonly rated 
items between users is sparse. That situation leads to a breakdown in correlation-
based recommender system algorithms, and their work explores how incorporating 
even simple binary trust relationships can increase the coverage and thus the number 
of recommendations that can be made. 
3   Experimental Platform: The FilmTrust Website 
The FilmTrust system, at http://trust.mindswap.org/FilmTrust, is a website that combines 
a web-based social network and a movie rating and review system. It’s membership 
forms the basis for our investigation. 
 
Fig. 1. A user’s view of the page for “A Clockwork Orange,” where the recommended rating 
matches the user’s rating, even though the average is quite different 
96 J. Golbeck 
3.1   Social Networking with FilmTrust 
The social networking component of the website allows users to maintain a list of 
friends who are also in the network. Our system requires users to provide a trust 
rating for each person they add as a friend. When creating a trust rating on the site, 
users are advised to rate how much they trust their friend about movies. Users are 
advised to consider trust in this context: “...if the person were to have rented a movie 
to watch, how likely it is that you would want to see that film.”  
In the FilmTrust network, relationships can be one-way, so users can see who they 
have listed as friends, and vice versa . If trust ratings are visible to everyone, users can 
be discouraged from giving accurate ratings for fear of offending or upsetting people by 
giving them low ratings. Because honest trust ratings are important to the function of the 
system, these values are kept private and shown only to the user who assigned them. 
3.2   Movie Features 
The other features of the website are movie ratings and reviews. Users can choose any 
film and rate it on a scale of a half star to four stars. They can also write free-text 
reviews about movies.  
Social networks meet movie information on the “Ratings and Reviews” page 
shown in Figure 1. Users are shown two ratings for each movie. The first is the simple 
average of all ratings given to the film. The “Recommended Rating” uses the inferred 
trust values, computed with TidalTrust on the social network, for the users who rated 
the film as weights to calculate a weighted average rating. Because the inferred trust 
values reflect how much the user should trust the opinions of the person rating the 
movie, the weighted average of movie ratings should reflect the user’s opinion. If the 
user has an opinion that is different from the average, the rating calculated from 
trusted friends – who should have similar opinions – should reflect that difference. 
Similarly, if a movie has multiple reviews, they are sorted according to the inferred 
trust rating of the author. This presents the reviews authored by the most trusted 
people first to assist the user in finding information that will be most relevant. 
3.3   Computing Recommended Movie Ratings 
One of the features of the FilmTrust site that uses the social network is the “Recommend-
ed Rating” feature. As Figure 1 shows, users will see this in addition to the average 
rating given to a particular movie. 
The “Recommended Rating” is personalized using the trust values (direct or 
inferred) that the user has the people who have rated the film (the raters).  If a user 
Alice has directly assigned a trust rating to another user, Bob, then the trust value is 
known. If Alice has not rated Bob, we need to infer how much she might trust him. 
Trust inference systems are a growing area of interest. In this application, we utilize 
TidalTrust, a breadth first search-based algorithm that outputs an inferred trust value 
by finding paths form Alice to Bob and composing the trust values found along those 
paths.  Details of that algorithm are beyond the scope of this paper, but can be found 
in [11] and [12].  
To compute the recommended movie rating, the FilmTrust system first searches for 
raters who the user knows directly. If there are no direct connections from the user to 
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any raters, the system moves one step out to find connections from the user to raters 
of path length 2. This process repeats until a path is found. The opinion of all raters at 
that depth are considered. Then, using TidalTrust, the trust value is calculated for 
each rater at the given depth. Once every rater has been given an inferred trust value, 
only the ones with the highest trust values will be selected; this is done by simply 
finding the maximum trust value calculated for each of the raters at the selected depth, 
and choosing all of the raters for which that maximum value was calculated. Finally, 
once the raters have been selected, their ratings for the movie (in number of stars) are 
averaged. For the set of selected nodes S, the recommended rating r from node s to 
movie m is the average of the movie ratings from nodes in S weighted by the trust 
value t from s to each node: 
 
This average is rounded to the nearest half-star, and that value becomes the 
“Recommended Rating” that is personalized for each user. 
As a simple example, consider the following: 
• Alice trusts Bob 9 
• Alice trusts Chuck 3 
• Bob rates the movie “Jaws” with 4 stars 
• Chuck rates the movie “Jaws” with 2 stars 
Then Alice’s recommended rating for “Jaws” is calculated as follows: 
 
4   Experimental Setup and Design 
We are interested in knowing if the trust-based movie ratings offer a benefit to the 
users, and if so, in what instances. To check this, we used the data users have entered 
into the FilmTrust system. 
4.1   Experimental Setup and Design 
The FilmTrust user base was used as the foundation for our experiments. When 
joining the network, members were informed that their participation was part of a 
research project, and they consented to allow their data to be used within experiments. 
The system has just over 500 members.  
Members were invited by friends who were already members and also found out 
about the website from postings in movie related forums. There is a strong Semantic 
Web component to the website (social network and movie information is all published 
in RDF), so members were frequently recruited from this circle of interest. Subjects 
ranged in age from 14 to 79, with an average age of 32.  Subjects were 29% female 
and 71% male.  
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Fig. 2. A visualization of the FilmTrust social network 
FilmTrust users have created approximately 11,250 ratings and movie reviews for 
1,250 different movies. For each movie, the average rating was computed as the 
simple average of all the ratings assigned to the film. To ensure that a common set of 
movies were rated, users were asked during the registration process to assign ratings 
to any movies they had seen the top 50 films AFI Top 100 Films list [13]. 
Not all of these members are connected into the social network. Approximately 150 
of the 500 members do not have any social connections. Their participation is limited to 
entering data about movies. Of the members who are participating in the social network, 
most are connected into a strong central core, with a scattering of small groups. A 
spring-embedded visualization of the social network structure is shown in Figure 2. 
4.2   Experimental Results 
To determine the effectiveness of the recommended ratings, we compare to see how 
closely they resemble the actual ratings a user has assigned to a film.  We use the 
absolute difference between the recommended rating and actual rating as our measure. 
In this analysis, we also compare the user’s rating with the average rating for the movie, 
and with a recommended rating generated by an automatic collaborative filtering (ACF) 
algorithm. There are many ACF algorithms, and one that has been well tested, and 
which is used here, is the classic user-to-user nearest neighbor prediction algorithm 
based on Pearson Correlation [5]. If the trust-based method of calculating ratings is best, 
the difference between the personalized rating and the user’s actual rating should be 
significantly smaller than the difference between the actual rating and the average 
rating.  We label these measures as follows: 
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z r – the absolute difference between the user’s rating and the trust-based 
recommended rating 
z a – the absolute difference between the user’s rating and the average rating 
z cf – the absolute difference between the user’s rating and the recommended 
rating from the collaborative filtering algorithm 
Because the recommended ratings rely on using the trust values in the social 
network, we were only able to make this comparison for users with social connections, 
approximately 350 of the 500 total users. For each user, we selected each movie and 
computed the  values. In the end, we made comparisons for a total of 1152 movies. 
On first analysis, it did not appear that that the trust-based ratings that utilized the 
social network were any more accurate than average. The difference between the actual 
rating and the recommended rating (r) was not statistically different than the 
difference between the user’s actual rating and the average rating (a). The difference 
between a user’s actual rating of a film and the ACF calculated rating (cf) also was 
not better than a in the general case. A close look at the data suggested why. Most of 
the time, the majority of users actual ratings are close to the average. This is most 
likely due to the fact that the users in the FilmTrust system had all rated the AFI Top 
50 movies, which received disproportionately high ratings. A random sampling of 
movies showed that about 50% of all ratings were within the range of the mean +/- a 
half star (the smallest possible increment). For users who gave these near-mean 
rating, a personalized rating could not offer much benefit over the average.  
However, one of our initial motivations for creating the trust-based recommended 
ratings was to help people who disagree with the average.  In those cases, the 
personalized rating should give the user a better recommendation, because we expect 
the people they trust will have tastes similar to their own [10]. 
To see this effect, a, cf, and r were calculated with various minimum thresholds 
on the a value; that is, the user’s rating had to be at least a stars different from the 
average rating. If the recommended ratings do not offer a benefit over the average 
rating, the r values will increase at the same rate the a values do. The experiment 
was conducted by limiting a in increments of 0.5. The first set of comparisons was 
taken with no threshold, where the difference between a and r was not significant. 
As the minimum a value was raised it selected a smaller group of user-film pairs 
where the users made ratings that differed increasingly with the average. Obviously, 
we expect the average a value will increase by about 0.5 at each increment, and that 
it will be somewhat higher than the minimum threshold. The real question is how the 
r will be impacted. If it increases at the same rate, then the recommended ratings do 
not offer much benefit over the simple average. If it increases at a slower rate, that 
means that, as the user strays from the average, the recommended rating more closely 
reflects their opinions. Figure 3 illustrates the results of these comparisons. 
Notice that the a value increases about as expected. The r, however, is clearly 
increasing at a slower rate than a. At each step, as the lower threshold for a is 
increased by 0.5, r increases by an average of less than 0.1. A two-tailed t-test shows 
that at each step where the minimum a threshold is greater than or equal to 0.5, the 
recommended rating is significantly closer to the user’s actual rating than the average 
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Fig. 3. The increase in  as the minimum a is increased. Notice that the ACF-based recommendat-
ion (cf) closely follows the average (a). The more accurate Trust-based recommendation (r) 
significantly outperforms both other methods. 
rating is, with p<0.01. For about 25% of the ratings assigned, a<0.5, and the user’s 
ratings are about the same as the mean. For the other 75% of the ratings, a>0.5, and 
the recommended rating significantly outperforms the average.  
As is shown in Figure 3, cf closely follows a. For a<1, there was no significant 
difference between the accuracy of the ACF ratings and the trust-based recommended 
rating. However, when the gap between the actual rating and the average increases, for 
a>=1, the trust-based recommendation outperforms the ACF as well as the average, 
with p<0.01. Because the ACF algorithm is only capturing overall correlation, it is 
tracking the average because most users’ ratings are close to the average.  
Figure 1 illustrates one of the examples where the recommended value reflects the 
user’s tastes. “A Clockwork Orange” is one of the films in the database that has a 
strong collective of users who hated the movie, even though the average rating was 3 
stars and many users gave it a full 4-star rating. For the user shown, a=2.5 – a very 
high value – while the recommended rating exactly matches the user’s low rating of 
0.5 stars. These are precisely the type of cases that the recommended rating is 
designed to address. 
Thus, when the user’s rating of a movie is different than the average rating, it is 
likely that the recommended rating will more closely reflect the user’s tastes. When 
the user has different tastes than the population at large, the recommended rating 
reflects that. When the user has tastes that align with the mean, the recommended 
rating also aligns with the mean. Based on these findings, the recommended ratings 
should be useful when people have never seen a movie. Since they accurately reflect 
the users’ opinions of movies they have already. Because the rating is personalized, 
originating from a social network, it is also in line with other results [3,4] that show 
users prefer recommendations from friends and trusted systems. 
One potential drawback to creating recommendations based solely on relationships 
in the social network is that a recommendation cannot be calculated when there are no 
paths from the user to any people who have rated a movie. This case is rare, though, 
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because as long as just one path can be found, a recommendation can be made. In the 
FilmTrust network, when the user has made at least one social connection, a 
recommendation can be made for 95% of the user-movie pairs.  
In addition, the quality of results is dependent on users assigning accurate trust 
values to people in the system. If the trust ratings become too noisy, they cease to be 
an effective grounds for making recommendations. The FilmTrust system is still 
relatively small compared to other social networks, which can have tens of thousands 
up to millions of members. It remains to be seen how well this technique will work on 
larger networks. We have not yet been given access to trust values in some of the 
larger networks, and that analysis will be necessary to verify that user behavior will 
support our approach. 
4.3   Presenting Ordered Reviews 
In addition to presenting personalized ratings, the experience of reading reviews is 
also personalized. The reviews are presented to the user in order of the trust value of 
the author, with the reviews from the most trustworthy people appearing at the top, 
and those from the least trustworthy at the bottom. The expectation is that the most 
relevant reviews will come from more trusted users, and thus they will be shown first.  
 
Fig. 4. Reviews of “E.T.” sorted according to the trust value that the user has for each author. Note 
that the ratings of the ordering also corresponds to how closely the reviewers’ ratings of the film 
correspond with the user’s rating, even though that was not considered in choosing the ordering. 
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For example, Figure 4 shows the reviews of “E.T.” ordered for a user. The reviews 
from more trusted people appear at the top of the list, and less trust people are further 
down. Notice that the user’s rating is 2 stars. Even though the reviewers’ rating were 
not considered in the ordering, they are ordered as well; the reviewers with ratings that 
most closely match the user’s rating are shown first, and the reviews further down in the 
list are different from the user. This supports the premise that ordering reviews by trust 
rating will show users the opinions more relevant to their own perspective first. 
Unlike the personalized ratings, measuring the accuracy of the review sort is not 
possible without requiring users to list the order in which they suggest the reviews 
appear. Without performing that sort of analysis, much of the evidence presented so 
far supports this ordering. That definition also supports the ordering of reviews. Trust 
with respect to movies means that the user believes that the trusted person will give 
good and useful information about the movies. The analysis also suggests that more 
trusted individuals will give more accurate information. It was shown there that trust 
correlates with the accuracy of ratings. Reviews will be written in line with ratings 
(i.e. a user will not give a high rating to a movie and then write a poor review of it), 
and since ratings from highly trusted users are more accurate, it follows that reviews 
should also be more accurate. 
A small pilot study with 9 subjects was run on the FilmTrust network. Subjects 
were shown the reviews for a movie and asked to order them according to how 
closely they matched the subject’s opinion. This was frequently identical to the 
ordering based on trust value, and the variations the did occur were typically small. 
When shown the trust-based ordering, our small sample of users had a universally 
strong positive reaction. While these preliminary results show a strong user 
preference for reviews ordered by the trustworthiness of the rater, this study must be 
extended and refined in the future to validate these results. 
5   Conclusions and Discussion 
Within the FilmTrust website, trust in social networks has been used as the foundation 
for generating predictive movie recommendations, The accuracy of the trust-based 
predictive ratings in this system is significantly better than the accuracy of a simple 
average of the ratings assigned to a movie. The trust system also outperforms the 
recommended ratings from a Person-correlation based recommender system.  
Overall, we believe that FilmTrust is an example of how trust and social networks 
can be exploited to refine the user experience.  By using the social network data in 
computations, the efforts users are already putting to web-based socializing can be 
harnessed to enhance existing tools. The purpose of this work is not necessarily to 
replace more traditional methods of collaborative filtering. It is very possible that a 
combined approach of trust with correlation weighting or another form of 
collaborative filtering may offer equal or better accuracy, and it will certainly allow 
for higher coverage. However, these results clearly show that, in the FilmTrust 
network, basing recommendations on the expressed trust for other people in the 
network offers significant benefits for accuracy. 
There are many future steps for both refining this work and taking it in future direct-
ions. One step is to do a deeper comparison with the most advanced collaborative filtering 
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algorithms. We have chosen a common, basic algorithm for comparison in this study. 
Since our goal was not to out perform collaborative filtering techniques, but rather to 
show that the trust-based recommendations were useful,  
One current project we have underway is investigating how users assign trust in 
social networks. The results presented here show that it is not merely correlation of 
opinions; if that were the case, we would have seen equivalent performance between 
the trust-based recommendations and the collaborative filtering recommendations. We 
believe that users assign trust based more on agreement on outliers, rather than on 
overall agreement. For example, say Bob and Alice both hated the “Lord of the 
Rings” movies, loved “From Justin to Kelly” , but otherwise had a large variation in 
movies about which they are less enthusiastic. We believe that they may trust each 
other more than they would trust someone with a higher overall correlation but who 
disagreed about “Lord of the Rings” and “From Justin to Kelly”. Understanding 
which features of user profiles correlate to higher trust values will give social insight, 
but it also suggests how different features of profile similarity can be incorporated 
into collaborative filtering algorithms to improve their accuracy even when social 
networks are unavailable.  
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Abstract. Mutual trust is essential in performing economical transac-
tions. In modern internet-based businesses, however, traditional trust
gaining mechanisms cannot be used and new ways to build trust be-
tween e-business partners have to be found. In consequence, a lot of
models describing trust and the mechanisms to build it were developed.
Unfortunately, most of these models neither provide the right formalism
to model relevant aspects of the trust gaining process (e.g., context and
time of a trust-related interaction), nor do they allow refinement proofs
verifying that a trust management tool implements a certain trust model.
Therefore, we propose the temporal logic-based specification and verifi-
cation technique cTLA which provides a formalism enabling to model
context- and time-related aspects of a trust building process. Moreover,
cTLA facilitates formal refinement proofs. In this paper, we discuss the
application of cTLA to describe trust purposes by means of simple ex-
ample systems which are used to decide about the application of certain
policies based on the reputation of a party. In particular, we introduce
a basic and a refined reputation system and sketch the proof that the
refined system is a correct realization of the simple one.
1 Introduction
Since the very beginnings of mankind, trust is an essential ingredient for human
cooperation. In a society based on the division of labor, people often are willing
to rely on others, even though they might face negative consequences. According
to McKnight and Chervany [1], however, this is exactly the definition of trust.
Ways to build trust include personal experience with the party, one relies on,
recommendation by third parties as well as the reduction of the negative con-
sequences in the case of unfounded trust (e.g., by using an insurance covering
financial losses in case of malicious behavior of a trusted party).
These traditional trust gaining mechanisms, however, can hardly be applied
in modern internet-based businesses. Here, one performs transactions on an ad-
hoc basis with often changing anonymous partners living in other countries with
different legal systems. Thus, it is difficult to gain any personal experience about
transaction partners and trustworthy third persons which can give meaningful
recommendation are also hardly available. Furthermore, suing for ones personal
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 105–119, 2006.
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rights in another legal system is stressful. Many security mechanisms are also
only of limited benefit in an electronic environment providing ad hoc coopera-
tions between anonymous parties. For example, it is tedious to use a password-
based authentication system with proof of identity and exchange of passwords
if the user wants to perform a business transaction only once. Instead, a party
needs mechanisms to foster the building of well-founded trust to its partner
based, for instance, on recommendations by trustworthy third parties or by the
partner’s reputation. The creation of this kind of mechanisms is a goal followed
up by the Trust Management research discipline.
To support the trust building process by a computer, one has to find suitable
representations of trust, so-called trust values (cf. [2, 3]). Moreover, one needs
mechanisms to compute the trust values in a way that the natural way to build
up trust is modeled fairly realistically. Thus, these mechanisms should be able
to consider experiences and recommendations of computer users to compute
suitable trust values. As pointed out by Falcone and Castelfranchi [4], new trust
is influenced by already existing trust in rather complex ways which should
also be reflected by a trust value computation mechanism. Furthermore, the
mechanism has to consider the context in which building of trust takes place
(cf. [1, 5]). Relevant aspects of a trust context are according to Jøsang et al. [6]
the utility of possible outcomes, environmental factors (e.g, law enforcement,
contracts, security mechanisms) as well as the risk attitude of the trusting party.
Another important aspect of a trust building mechanism is time. Falcone
and Castelfranchi, for instance, call in [4] trust a very dynamic phenomenon
evolving in time and having a history. Likewise, a Cheskin Research study [7]
examining trust concepts of e-commerce sites describes trust as “function of time
and specific formal characteristics of sites”. Also Mezzetti [8] states that trust
values may be changed in the course of time. He considers recent events more
relevant than older events for building trust, “since obsolete information is not
considered to accurately describe more recent behaviors”.
In between, several trust models describing formats for trust values as well
as trust building mechanisms were proposed (cf. Sec. 2). Some of these models
focus on the description of relevant aspects of the human trust building process
per se which may be viewed from a rather formal mathematical or philosoph-
ical perspective (e.g. [9, 10]) as well as from a more sociological-cognitive view
(e.g. [5, 8, 11]). Other models are devoted to computer-implementable solutions
fostering the gaining of the trust [12, 13, 14]. While these approaches offer a vari-
ety of very useful concepts to specify and compute the generation of trust, most
of them, however, miss the sufficient formalism to model all relevant aspects of
trust building including context and time. Moreover, they do not allow to carry
out deduction proofs that an implementation of a trust management system ful-
fills a trust model and particular trust properties. For this reason, we propose
the temporal logic cTLA (compositional Temporal Logic of Actions [15]) as a
method to model and to verify trust mechanisms. cTLA is based on Lamport’s
Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA, [16]). It supports the modular description of
processes which, in contrast to TLA, can be coupled to system models both in
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a resource-oriented and a constraint-oriented specification style (cf. [17]). In a
resource-oriented style a process describes a physical system resource in its en-
tirety, while processes in the constraint-oriented style model certain functional
properties of a system which may be realized by several cooperating resources.
This specification style facilitates system descriptions by composing models of
the various system constraints which reflects the logical connections and depen-
dencies of a system very well. cTLA also enables the description of continuous
flows [18]. Thus, it is possible to model the dynamic trust building process as a
continuous process which is influenced by discrete events (e.g., the selection of
an access policy based on positive or negative valuations of a party).
The composition of cTLA processes to a system has the character of super-
position (cf. [19]) guaranteeing that all relevant properties of a process or a sub-
system are also properties of the systems embedding it [15]. Therefore, one can
simplify formal deduction proofs of properties by considering only a subsystem
guaranteeing the property to be verified. In combination with the constraint-
oriented specification style, one can define often very small subsystems which
can easily been proven to realize a certain property. Thus, the structuring of a
verification process into relatively simple proof steps is supported.
All-in-all, we consider cTLA as a suitable method to model complex context-
and time-dependent trust building mechanisms since it facilitates the description
of various context-relevant aspects by separate constraint-oriented modes which
also makes the refinement proofs simpler. Yet, we do not intend to create a com-
pletely new trust model but adapt existing approaches like Jøsang’s Subjective
Logic [9] or Mezzetti’s work [8] to cTLA.
In the remainder, we discuss several trust models (Sec. 2) followed by an
introduction to cTLA (Sec. 3). Thereafter we will point out the specification
of trust management systems by means of two example systems. A more ab-
stract system introduced in Sec. 4 describes a simple reputation system collect-
ing good and bad experiences based on which one of two policies is selected. In
Sec. 5 we introduce a refined system collecting the experiences from two sepa-
rate users which have to be combined in a fair manner. Afterwards, in Sec. 6
we sketch the carrying out of refinement proofs in cTLA by outlining the veri-
fication that the more complex system correctly implements the more abstract
one. The cTLA processes and proofs can also be looked at in the WWW (URL:
http://www.item.ntnu.no/∼herrmann/specs/trust).
2 Trust Model Survey
Trust is a rather complex human emotion and the models describing it tend
to be complex as well. To reduce the complexity, however, most models con-
sider only certain aspects of trust building. A class of trust models specifies
relevant issues of trust very realistically without being devoted directly to im-
plementation purposes. These models tend to be relatively formal and describe
trust gaining from a mathematical-philosophical or from a sociological-cognitive
perspective.
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An approach to describe trust by uncertain probabilities is Jøsang’s Subjective
Logic [9] which is introduced to more detail in Sec. 4. Here, a trust value is
modeled by a so-called opinion which consists of three values modeling the belief
resp. disbelief in the honesty of a party as well as the uncertainty about it.
Operators of the logic enable various combinations of trust values. Unfortunately,
it does not allow to model time-dependent behavior yet. In contrast, Jones and
Firozabadi [10] use a modal logic of action to describe that a party a receiving
a piece of information by a party b has to decide based on b’s credibility if
the information is true. The trust gaining processes are modeled in a rather
descriptive way and can hardly be realized on a computer.
Falcone and Castelfranchi [5, 11] provide an extensive model to describe trust
building from a sociological and cognitive-psychological view. Their so-called
Socio-Cognitive Model of Trust considers various forms of social dependence
between parties which lead to different forms of beliefs (i.e., ability/competence,
disposition/availability, unharmfulness, opportunity and danger beliefs). Mez-
zetti [8] defined a simpler model consisting of a set of rules which specify the
building of trust from experience and recommendations based on aspects like
competence, willingness, and dependence. This model reflects time aspects of
experiences and uses a decay function.
Other approaches concentrate more on the realization of trust values and
trust building mechanisms on computers. An early approach to integrate trust
issues into software emerges from the field of access control. Since traditional ac-
cess control models are not adequate for the Internet with its many fluctuating
participants, so-called credential-based systems like PolicyMaker, REFEREE or
KeyNote were designed (cf. [12]). Parties interested to access a resource have
to pass credentials to the resource provider stating that the credential issuer
considers the credential owner as trustworthy. Based on his own trust in the
recommendations of the credential issuer, the resource owner decides to provide
access. Another framework for trust-based policies was developed by Grandison
and Sloman [13]. It enables descriptions of trust policies by means of Prolog state-
ments which may be evaluated in order to support trust-based decisions about
granting access to certain resources. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [14] designed a
trust management system enabling to rate experiences with a party by differ-
ent values. The trust in recommendations of a party is computed by comparing
the difference between the values of a recommendation and the later evalua-
tion of the recommended party. Later recommendations of the recommender are
adapted by adding this difference, the so-called semantic distance.
Of these interesting and innovative models we consider Jøsang’s Subjective
Logic, the formalization of Falcone’s and Castelfranchi’s Socio-Cognitive Model
of Trust, Mezzetti’s work as well as the more practical-oriented approaches as
well suited to be integrated into our cTLA-based approach. One may even think
to combine different models in order to get a better description of the actual
building of trust. For instance, a combination of different approaches is used
in our example models in which we combine elements of Jøsang’s Subjective
Logic [9] with a decay function similar to that proposed by Mezzetti (cf. [8]).
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3 cTLA
TLA [16] is a linear time temporal logic describing properties of state transition
systems by means of often lengthy and complex canonical formulas. To provide
a better understanding of specifications, in contrast, cTLA [15, 18] omits the
canonical parts of TLA formulas. It is oriented at programming languages and
introduces the notion of processes. A specification is structured into modular
definitions of process types. An instantiation of a process type forms a process
which either has the form of a simple process or that of a process composition.
Simple processes, which directly refer to state transition systems, are used to
model single system resources or system constraints.
Fig. 1 depicts the example of a simple process type used to model a part of our
example trust systems. The header declares the process type name (e.g., Policy-
Decider and generic module parameters (e.g., beliefThreshold). These parameters
facilitate the modeling of similar but not identical processes by a single process
type specification. The part headed by the keyword CONSTANTS enables the
definition of constant expressions (e.g., the record type TrustValues).
The process type body defines the state transition system. The state space is
specified by state variables (e.g., policy) and the subset of initial states is modeled
by the predicate INIT. Moreover, the body contains actions. An action (e.g.,
retrievePolicy) is a predicate on pairs of current and next states and specifies
a set of state transitions. The state variables referring to the current state are
noted in simple form (e.g., policy) while variables describing the successor state
occur in the primed form (e.g., policy’). An action may have action parameters
enabling to specify different actions by a single representation. The disjunction
of the actions forms the next state relation of the process. In the course of time, a
process may perform action steps (i.e., it changes its state in accordance with an
action) or stuttering steps (i.e., it does not change its state while the environment
performs a state transition).
PROCESS PolicyDecider (beliefThreshold : real;
disbeliefThreshold : real)
CONSTANTS
TrustValues
Δ= [[ b : real; d : real; u : real ]];
BODY
VARIABLES
policy : {"lowTrust","highTrust"};
INIT
Δ= policy = "lowTrust";
ACTIONS
retrievePolicy (p : {"lowTrust", "highTrust"})
Δ=
p = policy ∧ policy ′ = policy;
CONT (INPUT i : TrustValues)
Δ=
policy ′ = IF i.b ≥ beliefThreshold ∧ i.d ≤ disbeliefThreshold
THEN "highTrust" ELSE "lowTrust";
END
Fig. 1. cTLA Process Type Policy Decider
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Following [21], real-time is represented by means of a real-valued state variable
now which is incremented lively by a clock action tick in non-constant intervals.
Unlike other variables, which are private in exactly one process, now can be read
by all processes of a system. Additional real-time constructs specify minimum
waiting times and maximum reaction times for actions.
Continuous properties of a process are expressed by means of the special ac-
tion type CONT. The CONT-actions of all processes modeling a system and the
tick-action of the clock occur simultaneously. A CONT-action specifies difference
equations and, since an execution corresponds to a very small time step, con-
tinuous behavior is approximated well. In the difference equations, we express
the time steps by now’-now. The inputs and outputs of continuous processes are
modeled by action parameters. In Fig. 1, the variable policy is set according to
the IF-THEN-ELSE-statement depending on the input value i.
Systems and subsystems are described as compositions of concurrent process
instances. The coupling of the processes is specified by synchronously executed
process actions while, with exception of now, the process variables are encap-
sulated and cannot be read or modified by other processes. In consequence, a
system state is the vector of the process variables. The system transitions are
modeled by system actions and each process contributes to a system action by
either exactly one process action or a stuttering step. Therefore a system action
is a conjunction of process actions and process stuttering steps. Fig. 2 shows an
example of a system specification. In the part PROCESSES, the processes of the
system are listed as instantiations of process types (e.g., process E of the type
TrustValueEngine and process PD of the process type PolicyDecider depicted in
Fig. 1). In addition, the instantiations of the module parameters are listed (e.g.,
the module parameters beliefThreshold and disbeliefThreshold of process PD are
replaced by the values 0.99 resp. 0).
PROCESS OneUserReputationSystem
CONSTANTS
TrustValues
Δ= [[ b : real; d : real; u : real ]];
PROCESSES
E : TrustValueEngine(0.01,0.04,0.001,0.004);
PD : PolicyDecider(0.99,0);
ACTIONS
reportGoodExperience
Δ=
E.reportGoodExperience ∧ PD.stutter;
reportBadExperience
Δ=
E.reportBadExperience ∧ PD.stutter;
retrievePolicy (p : {"lowTrust", "highTrust"})
Δ=
PD.retrievePolicy(p) ∧ E.stutter;
CONT (OUTPUT o : TrustValues)
Δ=
E.CONT(; o) ∧ PD.CONT(o; );
END
Fig. 2. System One User Reputation System
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In the part headed by ACTIONS, the system actions are defined as conjunc-
tions of process actions and stuttering steps. For instance, the system action
retrievePolicy models that process PD performs its process action retrievePolicy
while E carries out a stuttering step.
4 Simple Trust Management Model
We introduce the application of cTLA to specify trust models by means of two
example systems. The first trust management model describes a very simple
reputation-based policy decision system. In particular, users report positive and
negative experience reports about a party in question from which trust values
are computed. Based on the trust values, the system selects one out of two
trust-based policies to be used, for instance, to decide about granting access to a
resource. The system specification is a composition of two cTLA processes. One
of them models the collection of experience reports and the computation of the
trust values while the other specifies the trust policy selection.
The specification and computation of the trust values is based on Jøsang’s
Subjective Logic [9]. There, trust values are described as so-called opinions which
are triples of real values b, d and u in the range between 0 and 1. b and d state
the belief resp. disbelief in a party while u describes uncertainty. Thus, one can
distinguish if the lack of trust results from malicious experience or from missing
knowledge about a party. Since a trust value fulfills the constraint b+ d+u = 1,
it can be modeled by a point in the so-called opinion triangle (cf. Fig. 3). A
trust value stating a high degree of uncertainty is described by a point close to
the top of the triangle while points on the right or left bottom state great belief
resp. disbelief based on a lot of experience with a party.
Trust values are used to describe both the direct trust in a party itself and the
trust in the recommendation of a party about another one. Jøsang and Knapskog
introduce the following metric [20] to compute trust values from the number p
of positive valuations and n of negative valuations of the party in question:
b = pp+n+1 d =
n
p+n+1 u =
1
p+n+1 (1)
BeliefDisbelief
Uncertainty
0
0
0
1 1
b
u
d
1
Fig. 3. Opinion Triangle (taken from [20])
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PROCESS TrustValueEngine (pDMin, pDMax, nDMin, nDMax : real)
CONSTANTS
TrustValues
Δ= [[ b : real; d : real; u : real ]];
BODY
VARIABLES
p : real; n : real;
INIT
Δ= p = 0 ∧ n = 0;
ACTIONS
reportGoodExperience
Δ=
p ′ = p + 1 ∧ n ′ = n;
reportBadExperience
Δ=
n ′ = n + 1 ∧ p ′ = p;
CONT (OUTPUT o : TrustValues)
Δ=
o = [[ b → p / (1 + p + n); d → n / (1 + p + n);
u → 1 / (1 + p + n) ]] ∧
p ′ ≤ max(0,p - (now ′-now) · pDMin) ∧
p ′ ≥ max(0,p - (now ′-now) · pDMax) ∧
n ′ ≤ max(0,n - (now ′-now) · nDMin) ∧
n ′ ≥ max(0,n - (now ′-now) · nDMax);
END
Fig. 4. Process Type Trust Value Engine
Unfortunately, this metric does not reflect the time when an experience report
was handed over. In reality, the trust resp. distrust in a party is definitely higher
if it is based on more recent experience in comparison to older impressions which
leads to a higher degree of uncertainty (cf. e.g., [5]). Therefore, we combine the
trust value-computation metric with a decay function reducing the numbers p
of positive and n of negative experience reports in the cause of time. In order to
model the decay per time-unit in a flexible way, we do not describe it by a fixed
function but enforce that it has to stay within certain borders. Therefore we
define four values pDMin, pDMax, nDMin and pDMax describing the minimum
resp. maximum decay rates of positive and negative valuations as stated in the
following formula1:
p − Δt · pDMax ≤ p′ ≤ p − Δt · pDMin
n − Δt · nDMax ≤ n′ ≤ n − Δt · nDMin (2)
The time-related generation of trust values is modeled by the cTLA process
type TrustValueEngine depicted in Fig. 4. Here, the values pDMin, pDMax,
nDMin and pDMax determining the minimum resp. maximum decays of the
experiences are specified as module parameters. Therefore a user can adapt the
decay values to the requirements of the trust model modeled by the particular
cTLA specification. The constant expression TrustValues defines the three tuple
used to model trust values as a record. Moreover, we specify the numbers p of
positive resp. n of negative experiences by two variables of the type real which
both carry the value 0 initially.
1 Following the cTLA style, p′ and n′ refer to the next state.
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The state changes modeled by instances of this process type are specified by
means of two atomic actions describing discrete steps and the special action
CONT defining continuous behavior. The action reportGoodExperience models
the reception of a positive valuation. It increments the variable p by 1 while
n remains unchanged. In similar, the action reportBadExperience describes the
submission of a negative experience report resulting in an increment of n by 1.
As discussed in the introduction, we consider the computation of the trust values
and the “forgetting” of older experience reports as a continuous process. There-
fore the corresponding behavior is specified by the action CONT modeling very
small time steps now’-now (cf. Sec. 3). The action contains an output parameter
o describing the current trust value which may be used as an input for other
cTLA processes. The calculation of o from the variables p and n according to the
metric introduced in formula 1 is described by the first conjunct of the action.
The other conjuncts model the decay of p and n by the inequations listed in
formula 2. Since neither p nor n must get values below 0, we added the function
max to the inequations.
The selection of a low trust resp. a high trust policy based on the current trust
value is specified by the cTLA process type PolicyDecider listed in Fig. 1. The
policy selection is guided by two thresholds beliefThreshold and disbeliefThres-
hold which are introduced by means of module parameters. The variable policy
describes the currently active policy. Initially it is set to “lowTrust” stating that
in the first state the low trust policy is active. The action retrievePolicy enables
external cTLA processes to read the current policy. It contains a parameter p
describing the current value of the variable policy which is not changed by the
action. The adjustment of the currently active policy based on the trust value
is a continuous process and therefore modeled by the action CONT. We assume
that the high trust policy is only available if the belief element b of the current
trust value, which is modeled by the import parameter i, is not lower than
beliefThreshold while the disbelief element d must not exceed disbeliefThreshold.
The example system is modeled by the process type OneUserReputation Sys-
tem depicted in Fig. 2. It consists of instances E of the process type TrustVal-
ueEngine and PD of PolicyDecider. The module parameters of E are instantiated
in a way that the decay limits of positive experiences are 0.01 and 0.04 while
those of the negative experiences are 0.001 resp. 0.004. Thus, a positive expe-
rience is “forgotten” in between 25 and 100 time units while a negative one is
lost after between 250 and 1000 time units2. The parameter instantiations of PD
state that the high trust policy is only used if the belief b in the current trust
value is at least 0.99 while the disbelief has to be 0. Thus, one needs at least 99
positive but no negative valuations to run the high trust policy.
The couplings of the process actions to system actions are straightforward.
The system actions reportGoodExperience and reportBadExperience are conjunc-
tions of the corresponding process actions of E and stuttering steps of PD while
retrievePolicy is coupled the other way round. The interaction between the two
2 These settings do not reflect well-founded experience about trust gaining processes
but are only used to exemplify the application of cTLA.
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process instances is basically an exchange of the current trust value which is
modeled by the coupling of the two process actions CONT where the output
parameter of action E.CONT and the input parameter of PD.CONT are identi-
cal. In consequence, in the system action CONT, the parameters of both process
actions are set to the system action parameter o.
5 Refined Trust Management Model
The simple trust management model introduced above includes only one single
trust value engine and, thus, does not distinguish whether the experience reports
are submitted by one or more users. In contrast, the model introduced below uses
two trust value engines in order to distinguish between two separate sources for
valuations. Thus, two trust values ω1 and ω2 are created and have to be combined
to a third trust value ω in order to determine the active trust policy. An adequate
means to compute ω fairly from ω1 and ω2 is the consensus operator ⊕ introduced
in Jøsang’s Subjective Logic [9]. If ω1 = (b1, d1, u1) and ω2 = (b2, d2, u2) are two
trust values stating trust in a party based on two separate sources, one can
describe by this operator a consensus of these two opinions. The operator is
specified by the formula
ω = ω1 ⊕ ω2 =̂ ((b1u2 + b2u1)/κ, (d1u2 + d2u1)/κ, (u1u2)/κ) (3)
in which κ is defined as u1 + u2 − u1u2. Since the consensus-operator is com-
mutative and associative, it can be used to combine trust values from various
sources.
The operator is specified by the cTLA process type ConsensusOperator listed
in Fig. 5. Since the process type models only stateless behavior, it does not
contain variables. The action CONT specifies formula 3 in which the operands
are specified by the input parameters i1 and i2 while the result corresponds to
the output parameter o. The LET-IN-construct enables the definition of constant
expressions (e.g., κ) in the LET-section which can be used in the formula listed
behind the keyword IN.
PROCESS ConsensusOperator
CONSTANTS
TrustValues
Δ= [[ b : real; d : real; u : real ]];
BODY
INIT
Δ= True;
ACTIONS
CONT (INPUT i1, i2 : TrustValues; OUTPUT o : TrustValues)
Δ=
LET κ
Δ= i1.u + i2.u - i1.u · i2.u;
IN o = [[ b → (i1.b · i2.u + i2.b · i1.u) / κ;
d → (i1.d · i2.u + i2.d · i1.u) / κ;
u → (i1.u · i2.u) / κ ]];
END
Fig. 5. Process Type Consensus Operator
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PROCESS TwoUserReputationSystem
CONSTANTS
TrustValues
Δ= [[ b : real; d : real; u : real ]];
PROCESSES
E1 : TrustValueEngine(0.01,0.02,0.001,0.002);
E2 : TrustValueEngine(0.01,0.02,0.001,0.002);
CO : ConsensusOperator;
PD : PolicyDecider(0.99,0);
ACTIONS
reportGoodExperience1
Δ=
E1.reportGoodExperience ∧ E2.stutter ∧ CO.stutter ∧ PD.stutter;
reportGoodExperience2
Δ=
E2.reportGoodExperience ∧ E1.stutter ∧ CO.stutter ∧ PD.stutter;
reportBadExperience1
Δ=
E1.reportBadExperience ∧ E2.stutter ∧ CO.stutter ∧ PD.stutter;
reportBadExperience2
Δ=
E2.reportBadExperience ∧ E1.stutter ∧ CO.stutter ∧ PD.stutter;
retrievePolicy (p : {"lowTrust", "highTrust"})
Δ=
PD.retrievePolicy(p) ∧ E1.stutter ∧ E2.stutter ∧ CO.stutter;
CONT (OUTPUT o1, o2, o : TrustValues)
Δ=
E1.CONT(; o1) ∧ E2.CONT(; o2) ∧ CO.CONT(o1, o2; o) ∧ PD.CONT(o; );
END
Fig. 6. System Two User Reputation System
The refined system is modeled by the cTLA process type TwoUserReputation-
System depicted in Fig. 6. The system contains two trust value engines specified
by the processes E1 and E2. In contrast to the simple system in Sec. 4, the engines
uses maximum decay rates of only 0.02 resp. 0.002. Thus, a positive experience
is lost not before 50 and a negative one not before 500 time units passed. The
system also contains a process CO modeling the consensus operator. Finally, we
use a policy decider which is modeled by the process PD and uses the same
parameter instantiations as in the simple system.
Due to the use of two trust value engines, the system specification defines
each two actions to model the reception of positive resp. negative experiences.
Moreover, it declares an action to retrieve trust policies and the action CONT
defining the continuous trust value computation. Here, the outputs o1 and o2 of
the trust value engines are the operands of the consensus operator. The result o
of this operator forms the input of the policy decider. Thus, we model that the
active trust policy is determined based on the experience reports of both trust
value engines, the generated trust values of which are combined by means of the
consensus operator.
6 Example Proof
Due to the superposition property of cTLA, we can reduce a cTLA refinement
proof, that a more detailed system T implements a more abstract system O, to
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some relatively simple proof steps. At first, we verify that each process of O is
implied by a subsystem of T . At second, we prove that the processes of T and O
are consistently coupled which, however, profits significantly from the other proof
steps. Thus, the verification, that an instance T of process type TwoUserRep-
utationSystem (cf. Fig. 6) implies an instance O of OneUserReputationSystem
(cf. Fig. 2) can be reduced to the following proof steps:
1. A subsystem T̂ of T implies the process E of O.
2. The process PD of T implies the process PD of O.
3. The actions of the processes in T are coupled in consistence with those in O.
The subsystem T̂ used in the first proof step consists of the processes and
action couplings of TwoUserReputationSystem with the exception of the process
PD. In consequence, we omitted the system action retrievePolicy and the other
system actions include the same conjuncts as their counterparts in TwoUser-
ReputationSystem except for those referring to PD.
A problem of the proof T̂ ⇒ O.E is that T̂ and O.E contain different state
types. Therefore we define a so-called refinement mapping (i.e., a function map-
ping the state space of T̂ to that of O.E which has to contain some side prop-
erties to be proven below; cf. [22]). Here, we define the refinement mapping by
the following formulas:
O.E.p =̂ T.E1.p + T.E2.p O.E.n =̂ T.E1.n + T.E2.n (4)
Thus, the numbers of positive and negative valuations in the simple model cor-
responds to the sum of the numbers of experience reports stored by the two
trust value engines in the refined model. Now we can start to carry out the first
proof step, for which we have to verify that the initial states of T̂ are mapped to
initial states of O.E and that each action of T̂ implies either an action of O.E
or a stuttering step.
The first proof T̂ .INIT ⇒ O.E.INIT is merely trivial since T̂ .INIT implies
T.E1.p = 0 ∧ T.E1.n = 0 ∧ T.E2.p = 0 ∧ T.E2.n = 0 which according to the
refinement mapping in formula 4 implies O.E.p = 0∧O.E.n = 0. This, however,
is exactly the definition of O.E.INIT .
At next, we verify that the action T̂ .reportGoodExperience1 implies O.E.re-
portGoodExperience. From T̂ .reportGoodExperience1 we can infer T.E1.p′ =
T.E1.p + 1 while all other variables do not change their values. Due to the
refinement mapping, however, O.E.p′ = O.E.p+1∧O.E.n′ = O.E.n holds which
implies O.E.reportGoodExperience. Similarly, we can prove that T̂ .reportGood-
Experience2 implements O.E.reportGoodExperience and that the two actions,
modeling reception of negative experience reports in T̂ , imply O.E.reportBad-
Experience.
In the next step3, which is the most complex of the overall proof, we verify
that the action CONT of T̂ implies O.E.CONT (i.e., ∀o1, o2, o ∈ TrustV alues :
3 The semicolons in the action parameter sections state that o1, o2 and o are output
parameters.
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T̂ .CONT (; o1, o2, o) ⇒ O.E.CONT (; o)). In particular, we prove for each con-
junct of O.E.CONT that it is fulfilled by T̂ .CONT . To verify the first con-
junct of O.E.CONT , we prove firstly that T̂ .CONT implies the setting of the
record element o.b (i.e., o.b = O.E.p/(1 + O.E.p + O.E.n)). For clarity, we
use in this proof the two auxiliary constants λ1 = 1 + T̂ .E1.p + T̂ .E1.n and
λ2 = 1+ T̂ .E2.p+ T̂ .E2.n. From T̂ .CONT , we can infer the following formulas:
o1.b = T.E1.pλ1 o2.b =
T.E2.p
λ2
o.b = o1.b·o2.u+o2.b·o1.uo1.u+o2.u−o1.u·o2.u (5)
By inserting the first two of these formulas into the third one, we get the following
result:
o.b =
T.E1.p
λ1
· 1λ2 +
T.E2.p
λ2
· 1λ1
1
λ1
+ 1λ2 − 1λ1λ2
=
T̂ .E1.p + T̂ .E2.p
λ1 + λ2 − 1 (6)
By application of the refinement mapping in formula 4 we can, however, infer
that the right term of formula 6 implies o.b = O.E.p/(1+O.E.p+O.E.n) which
was the goal of this partial proof. In a very similar way, we can also prove that
T̂ implies the settings of o.d and o.u which guarantees that the first conjunct of
O.E.CONT is correctly implemented by T̂ .
To verify the four other conjuncts of O.E.CONT describing the decay of the
variables O.E.p and O.E.n, we use the following inequations which can easily
be proven by means of a case separation:
∀a, b, k ∈ real : a, b, k ≥ 0 ⇒
max(0, a + b − 2k) ≤ max (0, a − k) + max(0, b − k) ≤ max(0, a + b − k)
(7)
To prove, for instance, the third conjunct of O.E.CONT , we use the fact that
T̂ .CONT implies both T̂ .E1.p′ ≥ max(0, T̂ .E1.p − (now′ − now) · 0.02) and
T̂ .E2.p′ ≥ max(0, T̂ .E2.p− (now′−now) ·0.02). By a simple invariant proof, we
can show that both T̂ .E1.p and T̂ .E2.p are never smaller than 0. Therefore we
can apply the left inequation of formula 7 and verify that T̂ .E1.p′ + T̂ .E2.p′ ≥
max(0, T̂ .E1.p+T̂ .E2.p−(now′−now)·0.04) holds. According to the refinement
mapping, this corresponds to the conjunct to be proven. Likewise, we verify
the remaining conjuncts of O.E.CONT finishing the formal proof T̂ .CONT ⇒
O.E.CONT . Thus, we now achieved the first proof step T̂ ⇒ O.E entirely.
The second proof step stating T.PD ⇒ O.PD is very simple since both
T.PD and O.PD use the same module parameter instantiation. Therefore, the
two cTLA process instances are identical and T.PD implies O.PD trivially.
The third proof step states that the actions of the two systems are be-
ing consistently coupled. A consistent coupling is guaranteed if the process
actions participating in a system action of T are mapped to process actions
all being coupled to the same system action of O. This verification, however,
is also merely trivial since we can apply the intermediate results of the first
two proof steps. A sketch of the complete proof is listed on the WWW (URL:
http://www.item.ntnu.no/∼herrmann/specs/trust).
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7 Concluding Remarks
We introduced the use of the temporal logic cTLA to specify trust models and
to perform refinement proofs. We can also apply cTLA to specify more detailed
specifications of computer implementations and to verify that the realizations
fulfill the trust models. For instance, the trust model with two users can be re-
fined to a model which does not specify continuous behavior. Here, the actions
CONT are replaced by repeatedly executed discrete system actions which com-
pute the decay of the experience numbers and calculate the trust values based
on the time-step since the last execution. The cTLA processes of the implemen-
tation and the refinement proof can be retrieved from our web page.
Due to the compositionality of cTLA, specifications can be designed and re-
finement proofs can be carried out in a quite simple way. Nevertheless, one
can facilitate the use of cTLA even more by using so-called specification frame-
works [15]. Here, cTLA process types describing aspects of a certain application
domain are collected in repositories. The framework user creates system specifi-
cations by taking suitable process types from the framework, instantiating their
module parameters and composing them to a system model. Moreover, a specifi-
cation framework contains repositories of theorems. A theorem is proven by the
framework designer and states that an instance of a cTLA framework process
type is fulfilled by a certain subsystem consisting of other framework process
instances. The framework user can reduce a refinement proof into proof steps
which correspond directly to the framework theorems. Thus, the verification ef-
fort is reduced to some simple checks guaranteeing that a certain theorem can be
applied in a particular proof. These checks can be automated and tool support is
available. cTLA-based specification frameworks were realized for telecommunica-
tion protocols [15], hazard analysis of hybrid technical systems [18] and security
proofs of component-structured software [23]. Another framework to describe
trust-based systems and trust models is under development.
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Abstract. Misunderstandings arise in international trade due to difference in 
cultural background of trade partners. Trust and the role it plays in trade are in-
fluenced by culture. Considering that trade always involves working on the re-
lationship with the trade partner, understanding the behaviour of the other is of 
the essence. This paper proposes to involve cultural dimensions in the model-
ling of trust in trade situations. A case study is presented to show a conceptuali-
sation of trust with respect to the cultural dimension of performance orientation 
versus cooperation orientation. 
1   Introduction 
“High quality! Traced and guaranteed!” Thus yells an American middleman in a ses-
sion of the Trust and Tracing Game [1]. The man is buying and selling envelopes that 
have an invisible quality attribute. They can be either high quality or low quality, and 
of course the first variant fetches a better price. But why is he having his products 
traced up front? The producer he buys from knows the hidden quality of each enve-
lope, and if the middle man trusted him he could save himself the tracing cost.   
The answer has to do with trust. The middle man may or may not trust his pro-
vider, but he expects that no buyer will trust him to be sincere about the quality of his 
pretended high-quality envelopes unless he has them traced. So he makes the best of a 
cost factor and he uses the act of tracing as a marketing device. 
The same game, played with Dutch participants, yields a different network. The 
game’s pace tends to be slower and some negotiations are prolonged. Nobody traces 
anybody else, until the game leader reveals that consumers have been cheated and are 
stuck with low quality after having paid for high quality. This induces some tracing in 
the next round, but not much. By having his purchase traced, a Dutch buyer would in-
dicate distrust of the seller, and that is not done. The seller himself would never think 
of tracing up front, because that would be throwing away money in vain, and he ex-
pects to be trusted anyhow. 
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We have been witness to the above events. In miniature, they mirror the unwritten 
rules of the game of real trade in the US and the Netherlands. The same game with the 
same explicit rules yields very different behaviour of the trade network because the 
hidden rules and assumptions differ. 
Agent models of trade networks have been around for some years. The behaviour 
in an agent model is an emergent property resulting from the behaviour of all the 
agents. The role of the agents’ preferences in such a model is not too hard to repre-
sent. But can we also incorporate the unwritten rules and expectations of culture? 
That is the subject of this paper. 
The context of this study is research into social aspects of food supply chains and 
networks, as introduced in [2]. That research aims to increase insight in human behav-
iour in trade relations, with the goal to design efficient institutional environments for 
production and distribution of food, meeting high standards of to consumer satisfac-
tion, health, food safety, and social responsibility.  Especially for food with its poten-
tial hidden contaminations that can lead to severe health effects, trust is a key research 
item [3]. But this preliminary study abstracts from the food context and applies to any 
trade situation in which the products have hidden quality attributes. Human simula-
tion games are used in combination with multi-agent simulations, to develop models 
for the role of trust in supply networks, by iteratively implementing models in multi-
agent simulations, comparing simulation results with human simulations, and refining 
the models [4]. As illustrated by the example in the beginning of this section, observa-
tions of human games indicate that culture cannot be ignored. 
Models of player’s behaviour in simulation games entail models for deciding about 
agent’s intentions, based on agent’s beliefs and desires. According to March [5], deci-
sion making processes may be rational or rule following. Rational decision making 
aims to maximize a utility function. In rule following decision making, a decision 
maker classifies the situation and its own role in it; subsequently, she applies rules to 
answer the question: what is appropriate for a person like me to do in a situation like 
this? Human decision making processes often have both rational and rule-following 
aspects. Rule-following decision making can be seen as imposing moral boundaries 
on acceptable outcomes of rational decision making. It can also be seen as consoli-
dated experience or an evolutionary outcome of rational decision making [5]. 
It is an interesting question to ask if artificial agents like human decision makers 
should apply both types of decision making. Agents that are designed to outperform 
people in rational decision making processes by use of superior computation power 
can probably do without rule-following. Agents that are designed to simulate human 
behaviour in some way will probably need to apply both processes of decision making 
simultaneously, although it may not strictly be necessary to follow equal procedures 
to get sufficiently resembling results. Especially in simulations that aim to increase 
understanding of human decision making, simulation of human rules is a sine qua 
non. This implies that the latter kind of agents must have cultural scripts. 
Both a decision maker’s desires (goals of the decision making) and its procedures 
for decision making are culture-dependent in several ways. First, the priority of goals 
depends on culture; for instance “maximize personal wealth” may have priority over 
“maintain pleasant interpersonal relations”. Second, preferences for rational versus 
rule following procedures differ across cultures; e.g. in collectivistic cultures with 
large power distance, following the rules is more appropriate then in individualistic 
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cultures with little power distance where rational decision making will prevail. Third, 
if a rule following procedure is chosen, the rules depend on culture. Fourth, a decision 
may be interpreted offensive by an opponent having adifferent cultural background. 
Also, the appropriate reaction to inappropriate behaviour differs across cultures.  
The focus of this paper is on the relation between culture and trust in human trade 
networks. We abstract from personality and select a single dimension of culture as a 
modelling case. The next sections describe the background of culture theory, the 
background of trust literature used for the case study, the Trust and Tracing Game, a 
case study of modelling a dimension of culture, its application to the Trust and Trac-
ing Game, and conclusions. 
2   Culture and Trust 
Culture is what distinguishes one group of people from another [6]. This implies that 
culture is not an attribute of individual people, unlike personality characteristics. It is 
an attribute of a group that manifests itself through the behaviours of its members. 
For a trading situation, culture of the trader will manifest itself in four ways. First, 
culture filters observation. It determines the salience of clues about the acceptability 
of trade partners and their proposals. Second, culture sets norms for what constitutes 
an appropriate partner or offer. Third, it sets expectations for the context of the trans-
actions, e.g. the enforceability of regulations and the possible sanctions in case of 
breach of the rules. Fourth, it sets norms for the kind of action that is appropriate 
given the other three, and in particular, the difference between the actual situation and 
the desired situation. 
Our US middle man, for instance, sees as acceptable a trade partner who has his 
products traced so that quality is out in the open. He will be keen to observe any offer 
of untraced high-quality goods and to distrust the one offering it. He expects his 
clients to think in the same way, and in order to be deemed respectable, he has traces 
performed himself. It also helps that he expects heavy-handed punishment in case of 
infringement of explicit laws. 
Our Dutch trader, on the other hand, likes trade partners who are forgiving and 
friendly and who place implicit trust in one another’s good intentions. He will 
perceive it when somebody asks for a trace and label that person as distrustful. In 
order not to be thought distrustful himself, he will not trace until proven wrong, and if 
proven wrong he will try to avoid the bad guy, or most likely (if it is the first offence) 
ask the cheater to be honest the next transaction and sell for a low price to make up 
the losses from the cheated transaction. 
What is it that makes these two traders behave in such different ways? It could be 
their personalities, or their experiences, or it could be the way they were brought up, 
in other words: their culture. It turns out that in terms of culture, the USA and the 
Netherlands are unusually easily comparable, because they are rather alike but for one 
aspect. Culture at the national level is concerned with five big issues of social life: 
hierarchy, identity, cooperation-performance orientation, the unknown, and the 
gratification of needs. Hofstede and Hofstede [6] conceptualize each of these issues as 
a bipolar continuum ranging from about 0 to about 100: from small to large power 
distance, from collectivist to individualist, from cooperation oriented to performance 
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oriented, from weak to strong uncertainty avoidance, and from short-term to long-
term orientation. As figure 1 shows, the Netherlands and the USA differ considerably 
on the Cooperation-Performance orientation dimension and little on the other four. 
Incidentally, this is not to say that culture only occurs at a national level – but the 
national averages in these two countries happen to differ. Of course, every individual 
is unique, and many subgroups with their own culture exist within any country.  
In this article, we shall abstract from the real world in an important way. We shall 
describe agents as if the dimension of performance orientation were the only one. 
This is a deliberate choice, but it should be borne in mind that in reality, behaviour is 
always the outcome of a mix of factors: all elements of one’s culture, all elements of 
one’s personality and all contextual and historical coincidences. 
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Fig. 1. The cultures of the Netherlands and the USA compared (PDI = Power Distance index, 
IDV = Individualism index, MAS = Masculinity index, also called the cooperation-performance 
orientation index, UAI = Uncertainty avoidance index, LTO = Long-term orientation index) 
What does the dimension of performance orientation indicate? Let us describe the 
two extremes – more extreme in fact than any real-world culture – to give the big idea. 
Performance oriented cultures are cultures in which people are expected to place value 
on measurable performance criteria such as size, speed and quantity.  Money is good 
and rich people are admired. Life is conceptualized as a series of contests and winning is 
paramount while losing is a disaster. Implicit trust is low; if you get cheated upon it is 
your own fault and you are a loser. If you do good, you also do it in a large way. If you 
commit crimes, they are large ones, not petty ones. Big is beautiful in everything.  
Cooperation oriented cultures are the opposite. Winners are at risk of awakening 
feelings of jealousy. Small is beautiful, implicit trust is high, and cheaters are looked 
down upon. Yet small-scale cheating occurs a lot because society is permissive, and 
punishments are low or, in the case of small misdemeanours, you may be forgiven. 
Good intentions are more important than good performance.  
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These two descriptions are stereotyped extremes. Yet citizens from either of these 
two countries who have been exposed to the other one’s culture probably recognize 
quite a bit of them. And because the Netherlands and the USA also have quite many 
contacts in actual business life, the comparison is meaningful in the real world. 
The meaning of trust across cultures is related to this dimension of culture. In fact, 
the statement ‘Most people can be trusted’ was one of the constituents of the dimen-
sion in Hofstede’s original research. In cooperation-oriented cultures, people agree 
with it more. Since then, many others have investigated the variations of the meaning 
of the concept across cultures. See e.g. chapter 8 in [3] for a discussion of the dynam-
ics of trust and transparency across cultures, and [7] for a conceptualization of trust 
and a literature review. This latter article distinguishes intrinsic trust from enforce-
able trust. Intrinsic trust is trust that accepts vulnerability, while enforceable trust is 
trust in good performance that is backed up by the option of rewarding and punishing 
the trustee. To sum it up in a simplified way: the former is what people mean by trust 
in cooperation oriented cultures, and the latter is what they mean by trust in perform-
ance oriented cultures.  
Some published results confirm the relevance of cultural difference for electronic 
trade, for instance Huang et al. [8] report relations between nationality, trust and 
internet adoption. Jarvenpaa and Tractinsky [9] report only slight differences in 
consumer trust in on-line bookstores across cultures. The latter results were based on 
observations in three countries with an individualistic culture: Australia, Finland and 
Israel. The authors assume that larger differences may exist between individualistic 
and collectivistic nations. They emphasize the importance of gathering more data. 
However, only few publications have appeared, presenting fragmented data of only a 
few countries. An example is the study by Vishwanath [10] that relates on-line auc-
tion participation and the effect of seller ratings in Germany, France and Canada. His 
findings confirm that in a country with higher masculinity index, trust is less relevant: 
bidders do rely on the information in seller ratings; they do not trust. 
All available data suggest a relation between culture and trust in internet participa-
tion. However, available data are insufficient for foundation of cross-cultural models 
of consumer trust that can be used for agent design. Development of well-founded 
trust models incorporating culture requires empirical, preferably experimental, data. 
3   Agent Based Simulations of Trust and Trade 
Castelfranchi and Falcone proposed a model of trust that can serve as a basis for agent 
based simulations [11, 12]. The main issues in their model are: 
- Trust is at the same time: a mental attitude towards another agent, a decision to 
rely on another agent, and a behaviour that entails a relation with another agent. 
- Trust consists of beliefs about another agent’s competence and willingness to fulfil 
some task. Willingness arises from a complex of motivations.  
- A condition for trust is the belief that it is better to rely on the trustee than not. 
- The decision to trust may be influenced by environmental factors: opportunities, 
obstacles, adversities, and interferences. 
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- In the decision whether to trust or not, an agent weights and prioritises the above 
influences and compares the result with a threshold of acceptable risk. Weight 
factors, priorities and risk threshold depend on context and agent’s personality. 
Although the authors do not relate trust with culture, their model offers opportunities 
to do so. When viewing trust as a mental attitude towards another agent, an agent’s 
cultural background and the cultural context will influence its valuation of the motiva-
tions to trust. When viewing trust as an intention to rely on an agent, the criteria, pri-
orities, and weight factors for the decision process reflect cultural background. 
Trust models can be put into operation in a testbed. A recently proposed approach 
is the ART testbed architecture [13]. The authors propose a software architecture for 
testing and comparing reputation and trust models, either in experimentation or in 
competition mode. The testbed provides relative performance indicators for reputation 
and trust models. The testbed offers a java environment where researchers can im-
plement java methods to implement the models. Thus, it can test any model with any 
cultural script in any cultural or cross-cultural setting. However, the testbed approach 
is not related to data from real human cultures. 
Jonker et al. [4] present an approach to interrelate multi-agent simulations and hu-
man simulation games in order to validate and refine trust models, especially with re-
spect to different cultural and institutional settings. The game focuses on the role of 
trust in supply chains with asymmetrical information about product quality between 
sellers and buyers. Playing this game with people from different countries showed dif-
ferent development of patterns of trust and co-operation between cultures. The ap-
proach is effective in producing empirical data. As it requires multiple game sessions 
of several hours with some twenty players, it is very time-consuming. This is the nec-
essary cost of a controlled way to acquire empirical data for model formulation, pa-
rameter estimation and model validation in multi-agent systems. 
Simpler experiments, e.g. those presented by Jonker et al. [14], could be used to 
compare isolated aspects of trust across cultures. The paper presents a method for 
measuring the effect of sequences of positive experiences and disappointments on the 
level of trust. Results are acquired from a single cultural setting. It would be interest-
ing to compare dynamics of trust across cultures using this experimental approach. 
Partner selection is a special point of attention in trade models, especially in multi-
agent simulations. Partner selection starts with models for partner preference. Models 
based on experience with regard to negotiation success are describeded by, for in-
stance, Tesfatsion [15] and Munroe and Luck [16]. Sen et al. [17] present a model for 
players that anticipate their opponents selecting partners based on experience.  How-
ever, none of these models explicitly represents cultural dimensions.  
4   Trust and Tracing Game 
The Trust and Tracing [1] game for human players is a research tool for supply chain 
and network studies. This tool places the choice between relying on trust versus 
spending money on complete information in trade environments at the core of a social 
simulation game. The game is used both as a data gathering tool about the role of 
reputation and trust in various types of business networks, and as a tool to make par-
ticipants reflect on their own daily experiences in their respective jobs.  
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In the game sellers of a commodity have more information about the quality of the 
goods than buyers, as quality is invisible and only known by the producers. This leads 
to information asymmetry and the opportunity for deceit. Meijer and Hofstede [1] de-
scribe the dilemma similar to the well-known Prisoners Dilemma in the so-called 
Trader’s Predicament. 
Producers Middlemen ConsumersRetailers
 
Fig. 2. Supply network configuration 
In the human Trust and Tracing game 12 to 25 participants play roles in a supply 
network. There are producers, middlemen, retailers and consumers (see Figure 2). The 
producers receive an initial amount of goods. The good traded is a sealed envelope 
that comes in 3 different types (colours) and each of the types in two qualities (high 
and low). The quality is invisible, as it is hidden in the sealed envelope. Producers 
know which envelopes are high quality and which are low. The only person in the 
game allowed to open an envelope is the tracing agency.  Table 1 specifies satisfac-
tion values of each good for a consumer (utility).  
Table 1. Consumer satisfaction value by the type and quality 
Type Quality 
Blue Red Yellow 
Low 1 2 3 
High 2 6 12 
An agent buying a high quality envelope takes a risk, as he cannot know the real 
quality. The buyer can check afterwards by doing a trace at the tracing agency, but 
this costs money. Tracing is cheaper early on in the network than for consumers. 
When consumers prefer traced goods (certified high quality) it would be economical 
to let a middleman do the trace and sell the traced product throughout the network 
along with the certificate. Successful deception is beneficial for a seller as he receives 
an additional income. (The difference between the price of a high and that of a low-
quality product) However, if the deception is discovered the cheater has to pay a fine. 
Resellers of cheated products who did not check the quality themselves have to pay a 
smaller “ignorance” fine. 
In the case study a situation is considered in which two traders meet for the first 
time and know nothing about each other. Trader P is very much performance oriented, 
trader C is the opposite, i.e., cooperation oriented. The traders negotiate about one en-
velop, said to contain a high quality commodity. The profile of trader P is such that he 
is willing to trade for a final price of about Q. The profile of trader C is such that he is 
willing to trade for a final price of about Q. Given that Q is an acceptable price, 
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everything is set in such a way that a deal is possible if the negotiations are performed 
in an acceptable manner, acceptable that is to the other party.  
5   Modelling Cooperation- Versus Performance Orientation 
The dimension of performance orientation versus cooperation orientation has its effect 
on the way people will behave in the Trust and Tracing Game. In this section this effect 
is described informally and then (partially) specified formally as prodcution rules).  
A performance oriented trader is interested in fast trades, with as many goods as 
possible in one trade. This trader is rather impatient, and if bids are too far off from 
his profile, he will walk away quickly. The performance oriented trader always traces 
the goods after buying, since he expects the possibility of deception. He sticks to the 
contract of the deal, and will deceive the trade partner to the limits of the contract 
without any compunction. As a consequence, the performance oriented trader sees no 
problems in dealing again with a trader that conned him in the past: “It’s all in the 
game”. Each subsequent negotiation will be dealt with without taking past trustwor-
thiness into account. Each new contract will be set up from scratch. The trader learns 
from mistakes to make sure that the contract will not lead to new and uncomfortable 
surprises on his side. 
A cooperation oriented trader is interested in the relationship with the trade partner, 
building trust is important, the amount of goods is not of the most interest. The trader 
is also interested in negotiating about one envelope only, because the relationship 
built during that negotiation might pay off in future negotiations. Given the interest in 
the relationship with the trade partner, a first negotiation with a trade partner will take 
time that is willingly spent by the trader. During such negotiations, the trader 
appreciates a negotiation process in which both partners show a willingness to 
accommodate the other over time. Past negotiations do play an important role in 
subsequent negotiations. The trader is perfectly willing to see the current negotiation 
as a kind of continuation of the previous one. If the trade is about the same 
commodity, the trader will start the negotiation from the deal of the last one. If the 
other accepts, then the deal can be made in one round and in seconds, whereas the 
first deal might have taken a lot of rounds and lots of time. In principle, the co-
operation oriented trader does not trace, since in his mind this would constitute 
ostentation of distrust. If conned, then the cooperation oriented trader will avoid the 
conman if possible, or give him one more chance. In the human games we observed 
that he then asks for a very good new deal to reaffirm the relationship. In the 
application of the rules to the setting described in Section 4, the following 
simplifications are made. The cooperation oriented trader C is content in a first ever 
trade with another trader T, if negotiation takes 5 rounds before a deal is found, and 
over the rounds T tries to accommodate C. A bad negotiation is one that is not 
satisfying. A performance oriented trader P is content in a first ever trade with another 
trader T, if negotiation is successful and fast (at most 2 rounds), and both P and T 
showed steadfastness in their bidding. Trader P respects and appreciates steadfastness 
in T and will show the same behaviour towards T. For trader P a satisfying 
negotiation is one that is short (at most 2 rounds) and in which both traders show 
steadfastness.  
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Both trader P and trader C prefer reaching a deal after a satisfying negotiation over 
a deal that was reached on the basis of a bad negotiation. Not reaching a deal after a 
satisfying negotiation is better than having no deal after a bad negotiation. Bear in 
mind that the traders differ strongly in what is considered a satisfying negotiation. 
Furthermore, note that their cultural scripting will also lead them to behave differently 
during the negotiations. Trader P might very well walk away (no deal) as soon as he 
receives a first bid of trader C that is very far off price Q. Whereas trader C might be 
put off by the steadfastness of trader P, and certainly by his walking away after few 
rounds. However, C will be forgiving and willing to negotiate with P one more time, 
although C will trust P less and avoid risk in the next deal. 
Some essential parts of the specification are presented in the remainder of this sec-
tion; more can be found in Appendix A, and a full specification can be obtained from 
the authors. The specifications are formulated as production rules. 
The cultural dimension has performance orientation at one extreme of the spec-
trum, and cooperation orientation at the other. This dimension is modelled by one 
value, indicated by the function named pc_orientation. A value of 0 corresponds to 
extreme cooperation orientation, whereas value 1 corresponds to extreme perform-
ance orientation. A personality factor is used to account for individual differences in 
decision making. 
 
(1) If cultural_script_contains(pc_orientation(F: Real)) 
   And minimum_utility(M: Real) 
   And personality_factor(impatience, I: Real) 
Then impatience_factor(F: Real * (I: Real + 0.5)) 
   And preferred_relative_deal_size(F: Real) 
   And allowed_relative_gap_size(F: Real) 
   And cut_off_value(M: Real * F: Real); 
 
At each moment during the negotiation the trader can decide to cut off the 
negotiations without a deal, or to accept the opponent’s last offer (deal), or to 
continue with the negotiations. The other party can of course also take the initiative to 
accept the deal of the trader or to cut off the negotiations without a deal. A deal 
corresponds to a contract that stipulates the conditions of the sale. His decisions after 
a negotiation has ended in a deal depend on the role that the trader is playing. As a 
seller, he has to decide whether or not to cheat upon his trade partner. This aspect is 
not considered in this paper, see [18] for a model on cheating in the Trust and Tracing 
Game. If the agent is a buyer, he has to decide whether or not to trace the 
commodities sold to him. Aspects of the negotiation process determine whether or not 
he changes his opinion of his trade partner. A change in opinion is regulated by 
change factors (values between 0 and 1). The change factors (big and small) and their 
dynamics are part of the personality profile of the trader, and not further elaborated 
here. The negotiations in the Trust and Tracing Game have a closed character, 
therefore, both negotiation partners only have their own utility function to evaluate 
both own bids and those of the negotiation partner. In reality many factors influence 
decisions to continue negiation, to trust or deceive a trade partner, etc. Where not all 
of the factors can be included in the model, random factors between 0 and 1 are used 
to obtain a more natural variability in behaviour.  
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Rule 2 describes that the trader will stop the negotiation if he considers the starting 
points of the bidding as too far apart. The impatience factor influences the decision; 
the higher F, the sooner the trader will stop for this reason. 
 
(2) If impatience_factor(F: Real) 
   And current_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List) 
   And current_round(X: Integer) 
   And others_bid_utility_in_round(U: Real, X: Integer) 
   And cut_off_value(C: Real) 
   And U: Real < C: Real 
   And random(0, 1, S: Real) 
   And 0.5 < S: Real * (F: Real + 0.5) 
Then stop_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List, gap); 
 
The lower the impatience factor, the higher the probability that the trader will stop 
the negotiation if progress is slow: 
 
(3) If impatience_factor(F: Real) 
   And current_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List) 
   And current_round(X: Integer) 
   And progress_in_bids(X: Integer – 3, X: Integer, P: Real) 
   And minimal_progress_value(M: Real) 
   And P: real < M: Real 
   And random(0, 1, S: Real) 
   And 0.5 < S: Real * (1.5 - F: Real) 
Then stop_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List, no_accom); 
 
Rule 4 is an example of using a random factor to obtain more natural behavior. The 
rule updates the acceptability of the negotiation partner.  The impatience factor influ-
ences the decision whether or not a change is made. If a decision is made for change, 
the size of the change depends on the change factor, which is part of the agent’s per-
sonality profile. 
 
(4) If stop_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List, gap) 
   And impatience_factor(F: Real)  And acceptability(T: Trader, R: Real) 
   And change_factor(B: Real, big_change) And random(0, 1, S: Real) 
   And 0.5 < S: Real * (F: Real + 0.5) 
Then new_acceptability(T: Trader, R: Real * B: Real) ; 
 
Rule 5 describes the effect of a negotiation in which the other partner did not ac-
commodate our trader. The smaller the impatience factor, the more the acceptability 
will decrease; the bigger the impatience factor, the more the acceptability will in-
crease (see rule 1 for the relation of impatience with culture and personality). The 
turning point is at 0.5 at which no change occurs. Normalisation functions can be 
added to maintain the acceptability value between 0 and 1, however, they are left out 
for reasons of transparency. 
 
(5) If stop_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List, no_accom) 
   And impatience_factor(F: Real) 
   And acceptability(T: Trader, R: Real) 
Then new_acceptability(T: Trader, R: Real * (F: Real + 0.5) ); 
 
A buyer that is rather performance oriented will almost always trace the deal. Other 
aspects that play a role are his personality profile (for this example, only risk-attidude 
is taken into account) and the trustworthiness of the other party. Notice, that for a per-
formance oriented trader the issue of trust is not that important as it is for cooperation 
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oriented traders. The changes he makes to partner’s trustworthiness are small, thus 
impact of trust on the next item is related to his initial trust in people. For the coopera-
tion oriented trader, trust is important. Thus, for the cooperation oriented trader, the 
trust he has in others has a higher impact on his decision to trace or not. 
 
(6) If cultural_script_contains(pc_orientation(F: Real)) 
   And deal_in_round(T: Trader, B: Bid, X: Integer) 
   And my_role(buyer)    
   And personality_factor(risk_attitude, I: Real) 
   And trustworthiness(T: Trader, H: Real)    
   And random(0, 1, S: Real) 
   And 0.5 < S: Real * (F: Real – H: Real – I: Real + 1.5) 
Then to_be_traced(B: Bid); 
 
Rules 7-10 model the opposite effects of the length of a negotiation on perform-
ance oriented and cooperation oriented traders. The p-round boundary used in rule 7 
is the number of rounds that a performance oriented trader typically allows before cut-
ting off. The c-round boundary is the number of rounds a cooperation oriented trader 
would minimally prefer in negotiation with a trader he has no experience with. The p-
round boundary could, for example, be set to 2 and the c-round boundary to 5. 
 
(7) /* performance oriented trader appreciates a fast deal */ 
If deal_in_round(T: Trader, B: Bid, X: Integer) 
   And impatience_factor(F: Real)  And p_round_boundary(A: Integer) 
   And F: Real > 0.5   And X: Integer ≤ A: Integer 
   And change_factor(I: Real, big_change) And acceptability(T: Trader, R: Real) 
Then new_acceptability(T: Trader, R: Real * I: Real * (F: Real + 0.5) ); 
 
(8) /* performance oriented trader dislikes long negotiation */ 
If deal_in_round(T: Trader, B: Bid, X: Integer) 
   And impatience_factor(F: Real)  And F: Real > 0.5 
   And change_factor(D: Real, big_change) And p_round_boundary(A: Integer) 
   And X: Integer > A: Integer  And acceptability(T: Trader, R: Real)  
Then new_acceptability(T: Trader, R: Real * D: Real); 
 
A cooperation oriented trader appreciates a first long negotiation, even if it ends 
without a deal. To get a big increment, given change factors between 0 and 1, the 
change factor is mirrored in the line x=1, thus the factor 2 – I: Real.  
 
(9) If stop_negotiation(T: Trader, B: Bid, X: Integer, W: Reason) 
   And number_of_earlier_negotiations_with(0, T: Trader) 
   And not W: Reason = no_accom  And impatience_factor(F: Real) 
   And F: Real < 0.5    And acceptability(T: Trader, H: Real) 
   And change_factor(I: Real, big_change) And c_round_boundary(A: Integer) 
   And X: Integer > A: Integer  
Then new_acceptability(T: Trader, H: Real * (2 - I: Real) ); 
 
A cooperation oriented trader dislikes a first short negotiation, even if it ended in a 
deal. Note that earlier rules can intensify this effect if during the negotiation the other 
party made no accommodations in his direction. 
 
(10) If stop_negotiation(T: Trader, B: Bid, X: Integer, W: Reason) 
   And number_of_earlier_negotiations_with(0, T: Trader) 
   And impatience_factor(F: Real)  And F: Real < 0.5 
   And change_factor(D: Real, big_change) And c_round_boundary(A: Integer) 
   And X: Integer < A: Integer   And acceptability(T: Trader, H: Real) 
Then new_acceptability(T: Trader, H: Real * I: Real); 
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The trader compares different negotiation options as offered by other traders. 
These offers can be made to him on the initiative of the other trader, or on his request.  
 
(11) If offered(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List) 
   And my_wish_list(L’: Commodity_List) 
   And subset_of(L: Commodity_List, L’: Commodity_List) 
Then possible_negotiation_with(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List); 
 
Traders choose their trade partners on the basis of their acceptability value. As can 
be seen from the rules above, the performance oriented trader directly updates the ac-
ceptability value in many of these rules. The cooperation oriented trader decides 
mostly on trust, and only slightly updates the acceptability value directly. However, 
the cooperation oriented trader also chooses a trade partner on the basis of the accept-
ability values. In general, the acceptability value of a trade partner is an accumulation 
of several factors: effects as described by the rules above, personality traits, and other 
cultural dimensions. In this paper the only aspect modelled is the following. For the 
cooperation oriented trader the trustworthiness of the partner has a higher impact on 
the computated value of acceptability than for the performance oriented trader. Fur-
thermore, the acceptability value used to determine new trade partners is recalculated 
after all negotiations have finished. 
 
(12) If cultural_script_contains(pc_orientation(F: Real)) 
   And no_ongoing_negotiations 
   And acceptability(T: Trader, R: Real) 
   And trustworthiness(T: Trader, H: Real) 
Then new_acceptability(T: Trader, F: Real * R: Real + (1 – F: Real) * H:Real); 
6   Application of the Model in the Trust and Tracing Game 
Consider a performance oriented buyer P (pc_orientation 0.9) and cooperation ori-
ented seller C (pc_orientation 0.1). The traders meet each other for the first time and 
start a negotiation about 1 envelope. Both traders have in mind to trade for a price of 
about 10 euro. The (relevant parts of the) profiles for the players are: 
 
 Player C Player P 
Minimum utility 0.7 0.7 
Personality factor impatience 0.4 0.6 
Impatience factor 0.09 0.99 
Cut off value 0.07 0.63 
Minimal progress 0.1 0.01 
 
In the first round P offers 9 euro for a high quality red commodity, and C replies 
with a bid including 16 euro and high quality. The utility of C’s bid in the eyes of P is 
0.6, which is below the cut-off value of 0.7. Now P has to decide whether he will con-
tinue or stop. Let us assume that P decides to continue (only rule 2 would apply, but 
assume the random factor determines otherwise), and bids 9 euro in the second round 
for high quality. C responds with 14 euro for high quality (none of the stopping rules 
apply). The utility is 0.62 which is again below P’s cut-off value. We assume that P 
decides to continue the negotiation again (assume rule 2 randomly discarded), and he 
offers 10 for high quality in the third round. C continues and responds with 12 euro 
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and low quality. P’s utility for that bid is 0.5, again below his cut-off value. We as-
sume that this time P decides to stop the negotiation (rule 2). P evaluates the process 
using the “gap” rule (4), and considerably lowers the acceptability of C. C uses the 
“no_accom” rule (5) and considerably lowers the acceptability of P. A shame because 
the prices they had in mind allowed for reaching a deal, but this behaviour is in con-
formity with the culture scripts.  
7   Conclusion 
Trade situations in the real world can be better understood by taking into account the 
cultural background of the traders. Concepts like trust and honesty do not mean the 
same in different cultures, nor do practical aspects such as cheating, negotiation time 
and good relationships. To be able to model and test agents with culture scripts a 
comparable data set from real world trade is needed. The Trust and Tracing game 
provides a conceptualisation of trust in a well-defined laboratory trade environment to 
compare artificial agent behaviour with. 
This case study models one of the culture dimensions of Hofstede, that of coopera-
tion-orientation versus performance orientation. This dimension is obviously related 
to the meaning of trust. Although singling out one dimension is a deliberate distortion 
of reality, there is a look-alike real-world case. American and Dutch cultures are alike 
on all dimensions but this one and thus provide a good analogy.  
The culture scripts of performance and cooperation oriented agents presented use 
the four ways in which a culture manifests itself: culture filters observation, culture 
sets norms for what constitutes an appropriate partner or offer, it sets expectations for 
the context of the transactions, and it sets norms for the kind of action that is appro-
priate given the other three. 
This paper advocates the incorporation of culture scripts in the modelling of trade 
and associated aspects such as trust. As an example, the paper presents a model of the 
effects of the Cooperation-Performance orientation index of the culture scripts in the 
models of trustworthiness and acceptability of trade partners in negotiation settings. 
An application of the model to an extreme setting of performance orientated versus 
cooperation oriented traders shows the expected behaviour as sketched in Section 2. 
Future research should test our scripts against data from human games to validate 
the approach and find plausible values for the parameters in the models. Then the 
model can be extended to take into account other dimensions of culture as well, in-
creasing validity.  
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Appendix A. Additional Parts of the Formal Specification 
If a trader feels he has no more room to accommodate the other party, then he will 
stop the negotiations.  
 
(13) /* stop: no more room */ 
If current_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List) 
   And current_round(X: Integer) 
   And my_bid_utility_in_round(U: Real, X: Integer -1) 
   And minimum_utility(M: Real) 
   And U: Real - M: Real < 0.01 
Then stop_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List, no_more_room); 
 
If the trader has decided to stop the negotiation because his minimal utility was 
reached, then he also checks the progress made during the whole negotiation process. 
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Apparently, the negotiation originally did not stop for this reason, so this rule only af-
fects the acceptability and trustworthiness once. 
 
(14) If stop_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List, no_more_room) 
   And progress_in_bids(1, X: Integer, P: Real) 
   And minimal_progress_value(M: Real) 
   And P: real < M: Real 
Then stop_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List, no_accom); 
 
In negotiations the trader can accept the current bid of the other party if the utilities 
(according to his own function) of that bid and his own last bid are close enough. This 
notion of close enough is formalised by the acceptable_utility_gap. 
 
(15) If current_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List) 
   And current_round(X: Integer) 
   And others_bid_utility_in_round(U: Real, X: Integer) 
   And my_bid_utility_in_round(U’: Real, X: Integer) 
   And acceptable_utility_gap(R: Real) 
   And | U: Real – U’: Real | ≤ R: Real 
Then stop_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, accept_offer); 
 
(16) If current_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List) 
   And current_round(X: Integer) 
   And other_accepted_my_bid_in_round(T: Trader, B: Bid, X: Integer) 
Then stop_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, my_offer_accepted) 
   And deal_in_round(T: Trader, B: Bid, X: Integer); 
 
(17) If stop_negotiation(T: Trader, X: Integer, accept_offer) 
   And other_bid_in_round(B: Bid, X: Integer) 
Then deal_in_round(T: Trader, B: Bid, X: Integer); 
 
Once the acceptability of the traders is determined, and the current negotiations 
have all stopped, new trade partners can be identified. 
 
(18) If no_ongoing_negotiations  And acceptability(T: Trader, R: Real) 
   And acceptability(T’: Trader, R’: Real) And R: Real > R’: Real 
Then more_acceptable_with_diff(T: Trader, T’: Trader, |R: Real – R’: Real| ); 
 
(19) If no_ongoing_negotiations  And acceptability(T: Trader, R: Real) 
   And acceptability(T’: Trader, R’: Real) And R: Real < R’: Real 
Then more_acceptable_with_diff(T’: Trader, T: Trader, |R: Real – R’: Real| ); 
 
(20) If no_ongoing_negotiations 
   And possible_negotiation_with(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List) 
   And possible_negotiation_with(T’: Trader, X’: Integer, L’: Commodity_List) 
   And more_acceptable_with_diff(T: Trader, T’: Trader, R: Real) 
   And allowed_acceptability_difference(Epsilon: Real) 
   And R: Real > Epsilon: Real 
Then to_be_ignored(T’: Trader, X’: Integer, L’: Commodity_List); 
 
(21) If no_ongoing_negotiations  And preferred_relative_deal_size(F: Real) 
   And max_deal_size(M: Integer) And P: Real = M: Integer * F: Real 
   And possible_negotiation_with(T: Trader, X: Integer, L: Commodity_List) 
   And possible_negotiation_with(T’: Trader, X’: Integer, L’: Commodity_List) 
   And | X: Integer – P: Real | < | X’: Integer – P: Real| 
   And acceptability_difference(T: Trader, T’: Trader, R: Real) 
   And allowed_acceptability_difference(Epsilon: Real) 
   And R: Real < Epsilon: Real 
Then to_be_ignored(T’: Trader, X’: Integer, L’: Commodity_List); 
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Abstract. When evaluating alternative security solutions, such as se-
curity mechanism, security protocols etc., “hard” data or information is
rarely available, and one have to relay on the opinions of domain ex-
perts. Log-files from IDS, Firewalls and honeypots might also be used.
However, such source are most often only used in an “penetrate and
patch” strategy, meaning that system administrators, security experts
or similar surveillance the network and initiate appropriate reactions to
the actions observed. Such sources refers to real-time information, but
might also be used in a more preventive manner by combining it with
the opinions provided by the domain experts. To appropriately combine
the information from such various sources the notion of trust is used.
Trust represents the degree to which a particular information source can
be trusted to provide accurate and correct information, and is measured
as information source relative trustworthiness. In this paper we show
how to assign this relative trustworthiness using two trust variables; (1)
knowledge level and (2) level of expertise.
1 Introduction
Achieving the correct level of security in an application depends not only on the
security level, but also on the time-to-market (TTM) and budget constraints
imposed upon the system. This advocates the need for evaluating alternative
security solutions. The security standard ISO 15408:1999 Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation [7] supports the evaluation of secu-
rity solutions through a hierarchy of evaluation assurance levels (EAL). These
levels and associated guidelines takes an evaluator through activities assessing
the security level of a security solution. Risk management standards, such as the
Australian/New Zealand standard for Risk Management AS/NZS 4360:2004 [1]
and its companion guideline standard HB 436:2004 Risk Management Guide-
lines [2], evaluate security solutions through a set of risk treatment assessment
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 135–149, 2006.
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activities. However, in most cases both security standards and risk management
standards relies heavily on subjective assessment by one or few assessors. Rather
than having an assessor interpret information, it would be beneficial to directly
make use of information from various information sources when doing security
solution evaluation. Such an approach would not only simplify the process of se-
curity solution evaluation, but would also provide technique that aid evaluators
by offering a way to structurally combine the large amount of information that
such evaluations include.
Because the information that are available in security solution evaluations are
both subjective and experience or empirical, aggregation techniques that can
handle information of various degrees of uncertainty is needed. This paper de-
scribes a trust-based performance strategy for aggregating various information
using information sources’ relative trustworthiness. This relative trustworthiness
is an expression of the ability of an information source to provide accurate infor-
mation, and is assessed by examining its past and expected future performance.
The expected future performance is determine by examining to what degree the
knowledge and expertise level of an information source is in accordance to that
required for the problem in question. Expected future performance is evaluated
by looking at the currently perceived performance of an information source using
the two trust variables; (1) knowledge level and (2) level of expertise.
The paper describes how to determine the information source relative trust-
worthiness using the two trust variables. The approach is demonstrated by an
example that determines the relative trustworthiness for four domain experts
and a honeypot.
The paper is organised as following. Section 2 provides a brief description
of potential information sources that might be used in security solution eval-
uations. Section 3 describes how to determine the information source relative
trustworthiness using the two trust variables. Section 4 demonstrate how to use
the approach described in Section 3. Section 5 puts the work into context and
Section 6 conclude the paper with some pointers to future directions.
2 Information Sources for Security Solution Effect
Evaluation
Information sources can be both active and passive entities, and their relative
trustworthiness vary depending on the problem being assessed. When evaluating
security solutions there are two main categories of information sources available;
directly and indirectly observable sources. Directly observable or empirical and
experience sources are sources that either have access to empirical information or
that have directly observed a phenomena. Such sources have not been biased by
human opinions, meaning that the source has gained knowledge and experience
by observing actual events. Indirectly observable or interpreted sources includes
sources that have indirectly observed a phenomena, such as subjective expert
judgments or other types of interpreted information.
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Commonly used directly observable information source are real-time informa-
tion sources, such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), log-files from
firewalls, internet gateways (routers) and honeypots [16]. Other directly observ-
able sources are company experience repositories, public experience repositories,
domain knowledge, recommendations (best practices) and related standards.
Examples of public repositories are the quarterly reports from Senter for In-
formasjonssikkerhet (SIS) in Norway, incident and security reports and white
papers from CERT, NIST, NSA and CSO, reports from the Honeynet-project
[17] and other attack trend reports.
For security solution evaluation two types of indirectly observable sources are
commonly used; subjective expert judgment and interpreted expert information.
In subjective expert judgment the experts have directly gained knowledge and
experience that they use when providing information. Interpreted expert infor-
mation refers to events observed by a third party, such as another expert or a
directly observable source, and given as a recommendation. In such cases, the
expert interprets the information given by other sources before providing the
information.
3 Determining Information Source Relative
Trustworthiness
Determining information source relative trustworthiness, in the trust-based per-
formance approach for aggregating information for security solution evaluation,
is done using two trust variables: (1) knowledge level and (2) level of expertise.
Before describing the trust variables and explain how they are used to determine
information source relative trustworthiness, we look into what is meant by the
notion of trust.
The definition of trust and distrust used in the trust-based performance ag-
gregation approach is modified from Ray and Chakraborty (2005) [15].
Trust is the firm belief in the competence of an information source to provide
accurate and correct information within a specific context.
Distrust is the firm belief in the incompetence of an information source to
provide accurate and correct information within a specific context.
As can be seen by the definitions, trust is specified in relation to a particular
context and might exist in some situations and not in others, as described in the
xTrust framework by Branchaud and Flinn (2004) [4]. Trust context describes
the environment, purpose, assumptions and validity of a trust relationship. The
way the trust context is specified might include a variety of variables, as well as
vary from case to case depending on the trust purpose, as discussed in [4]. We
will not elaborate more on the trust context in this paper, but rather assume that
the trust context is specified in such a way that the available information can
be combined. However, the reader should note that information from different
information sources cannot directly be combined in situations where the trust
context differs.
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A trust relationship is usually established for some purpose between an truster
A and a trustee B, and are valid in a particular time frame. A trust relationship
is furthermore established under some assumptions, for a particular case in a
particular environment. However, when determining the relative trustworthiness
of information sources it is the information source’s ability that is measured, and
not an external entity’s degree of trust in the information source.
3.1 Knowledge Level
The trust variable knowledge level are used to determine the level of domain
knowledge of an information source, which is measured in terms of knowledge
score. Knowledge in this context covers facts and experience that an information
source has obtain in some way, most often through either education or profes-
sional work situations. The level of knowledge is clearly a subjective measure and
should therefore be assessed not only by the information source itself, but also by
the evaluator or a third party that has sufficient overview of both the education
and work experience for the information source, as well as being sufficiently aware
of the purpose of the information that the information source is providing.
The relative knowledge score for an information source are determined by
establishing a general domain relation model, specify the knowledge domain
relation model for the information source and then comparing this model with
the general knowledge domain model. Estimating the relative weight from the
comparison might be done in a variety of ways. In the example in Section 4
we use a score-based approach that are fairly simple, but that makes it easy to
observe the effects of changing any of the domain models. The knowledge score
is denoted Ki, where i represent information source number i.
Figure 1 shows a general reference knowledge domain model consisting of four
domains. This domain model describes which knowledge domains that are rele-
vant when evaluating security solutions, as well as specify the internal relations
or relative weight/importance between the knowledge domains. In Section 4 we
give an example of a reference knowledge domain model, information source
knowledge domain models and how to compare the two models to derive at the
knowledge score.
25 %
25 %25 %
25 %
Domain A
Domain B
Domain C
Domain D
Fig. 1. General reference knowledge domain model
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As mentioned earlier, each knowledge domain have a particular importance
wimp and coverage ccov for the security solution evaluation being performed.
Both the importance and coverage weights might be assigned by any of the in-
volved stakeholders, standards, regulations, the evaluator or similar. The knowl-
edge domain importance is modelled as the one-dimensional array wimp =
[w(1), ...w(j), . . . , w(m)], where wj represent the importance weight for knowl-
edge domain j, which stores these knowledge domain importance weights. The
coverage is similarly modelled as the one-dimensional array ccov = [c(1), . . . ,
c(j), . . . , c(m)]. The values of these arrays might be specified in the trust con-
text or given during the evaluation process. It is often hard to assign w(j) and
c(j) before the stakeholders or evaluator have gained sufficient overview of the
involved knowledge domains.
The importance and coverage weight for knowledge domains are part of the
knowledge domain relative score model, which are used to compute the knowl-
edge score for the knowledge domain involved in the security solution evaluation.
The knowledge score is determined using (3), which multiplies each knowledge
domain importance weight, derived using (1), with the coverage for each knowl-
edge domain, derived using (2). The results are then normalised over the set
of knowledge domains in (5) using the knowledge domain normalisation factor
fknowledge derived in (4).
Knowledge domain relative score model is used to derive the relative
score for each knowledge domain involved in a particular security solution
evaluation.
wimp = [w(1), . . . , w(j), . . . , w(m)] (1)
ccov = [c(1), . . . , c(j), . . . , c(m)] (2)
PKscore(K(j)) =
∑m
j=1
c(j) × w(j)
m
(3)
fknowledge =
1∑m
j K(j)
(4)
PrelativeKscore(K(j)) = fknowledge × K(j) (5)
The subjective nature of assessing knowledge has some problems, such as e.g.
that it requires a large amount of experience on the abilities of an information
source for a third party to assess its knowledge domains accurately. We are
therefore working on establishing a set of calibration variables for the level of
knowledge variable. Calibration variables in this context could e.g. be in terms
of several questions targeting the same issue, but formulated in such a way that
their answers would contradict if not answered accurately enough. This is a well
known method used during interrogations in crime investigation.
3.2 Level of Expertise
The second trust variable, level of expertise, are used to determine the relative
level of expertise for an information source in relation to a particular security
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Table 1. Example seed/calibration variables for determining the level of expertise
Variables Categories
level of expertise low, medium and high
age under 20, 20-25, 25-30, 30-40, 40-50, over
50
years of relevant education 1 year, 2 years, Bsc, Msc, PhD, other
years of education others 1 year, 2 years, Bsc, Msc, PhD, other
years of experience from industry 1-3 years, 5 years, 5-10 years, 10-15 years,
over 15 years
years of experience from academia 1-3 years, 5 years, 5-10 years, 10-15 years,
over 15 years
role experience database, network management, developer,
designer, security management and decision
maker
solution evaluation. As for knowledge level, the level of expertise is measured
in terms of a score, in this case called expertise score. This expertise score is
determined based on seed/calibration variables, which are assessed using a in-
formation source level of expertise questionnaire. Table 1 shows an example
questionnaire containing an example set of seed/calibration variables. The asso-
ciated categories for each of the seed/calibration variables are used to determine,
in addition to the knowledge level, the relative trustworthiness for an informa-
tion source. The reader should note that the categories used in this paper serves
the purpose of being an example. The demonstration of its use is given in the
example described in Section 4.
To determine the weight that should be given to each of the seed/calibration
variables, the relative importance of each of the variables for the security eval-
uation being performed need to be determined. The relative importance for
the calibration variables are modelled as the one-dimensional array wimp =
[w(1), . . . , w(k), . . . , w(l)], where w(k) refers to calibration variable for deter-
mining level of expertise number k and l is the number of calibration variables,
as described in (6). Importance in this context relates to how essential or critical
a particular calibration variable are for the ability of the information source to
provide accurate and correct information. These importance weight might be
provided as part of the trust context, but are also often provided during the
security solution evaluation. The values might also be updated whenever new
information becomes available.
During an security solution evaluation appropriate values for the calibration
variables for each information source is provide. Because these variables are
used to describe the information source, the values might be provided either
by the information source or by a third party. Third party, in this context,
does not refers to some other entity providing recommendation on a partic-
ular entity, as described in [15], but are represent knowledge and experience
related to the information source. These values are then inserted into the cal-
ibration variable value array, which is modelled as the one-dimensional array
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cexp = [c(1), . . . , c(k), . . . , c(l)], where c(k) refers to the provide value for calibra-
tion variable number k and l is the number of calibration variables, as described
in (7).
The calibration variable score for an information source is then determined
using (8), which multiplies each calibration variable importance weight from (6)
with the belonging value from (7). The results are then normalised over the set
of calibration variables in (10) using the knowledge domain normalisation factor
fexperience derived in (9).
Expertise level relative score model is used to derive the relative score for
each seed/calibration variable from the level of expertise questionnaire used
in a particular security solution evaluation.
wimp = [w(1), . . . , w(k), . . . , w(l)] (6)
cexp = [c(1), . . . , c(k), . . . , c(l)] (7)
PEscore(E(k)) =
∑l
k=1
c(k) × w(k)
l
(8)
fexpertise =
1∑l
k E(k)
(9)
PrelativeKscore(E(k)) = fexpertise × E(k) (10)
As for the level of knowledge variable, estimating an information source’s level
of expertise also have a high risk of bias. However, in this case one use a set of
calibration variables, rather than a subjective evaluation, to estimate the level.
This still does not represent an “objective” assessment because the relations
between these variables is not always modelled accurately (and in this case,
not at all). Aspects that might be of importance is to examine if their are any
difference in relative importance between years of experience from industry and
years of experience from academia. E.g. does one year from the industry have
more influence on the expertise level than one year in academia, or visa versa.
Another important aspect is to look into how the different age groups assess
their own perceived level of expertise. These issues are part of an controlled
experiment that we are currently performing.
3.3 Estimating Information Source Relative Trustworthiness
The result from the two trust variables; the knowledge and expertise score, is
combined when estimating the information source relative trustworthiness us-
ing the estimate relative IS trustworthiness model. The initial trustworthiness
is computed by the initial trustworthiness function T (i), where i refers to infor-
mation source number i and n is the number of information sources. This initial
weight is derived by combining the relative knowledge and experience score for
information source i. ε is the error function, which is used to neutralise any
over and underestimation, and represent the models ability to capture experi-
ence gained on the use of the information source i. We will not elaborate more
on this, but merely make the reader aware that this issue is handled in other
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parts of the trust-based performance aggregation approach. More information
on the problem of under and overestimation or elicitation of expert judgments
in general can be found in e.g. Cooke (1991) [9], Goossens et al. (2000) [11],
Cooke Cooke and Slijkhuis (2003) [8] and similar sources.
After deriving the trustworthiness weight for each information source in (11),
the weights need to be normalised. Normalisation is done in (12) and the rel-
ative trustworthiness normalisation factor frelativeTrustw is derived. The initial
trustworthiness weights for each information source is then updated in (13).
Estimate relative IS trustworthiness model is used to combine the knowl-
edge and expertise score such that the information source relative trustwor-
thiness is derived.
T (i)=
∑m
j=1
(PrelativeKscore(j)×K(j)) +
∑l
k=1
(PrelativeEscore(k)×E(k))− ε
(11)
frelativeTrustw =
1∑n
i=1 T (i)
(12)
TTrustw(i) = T (i) × frelativeTrustw (13)
TrelativeTrustw(i) =
1∑n
i=1 TTrustw(i)
(14)
Because the relative weight are normalised, trustworthiness is expressed with
values in the range [0, 1]. The value 0 means no trustworthiness. Values close to
0 expresses little trustworthiness and values close to 1 describe high trustworthi-
ness. Unknown trustworthiness can also be expressed, but is not covered here.
However, the symbol ⊥ is used to express such situations.
Whenever using the relative trustworthiness weight to evaluate a security
solution, the relative trustworthiness weights are first combined with the infor-
mation each of the information sources has provided, and then normalised over
the number of information sources.
4 Example of Determining Information Source Relative
Trustworthiness in Security Solution Evaluation
We use a .Net e-commerce system to demonstrate how to derive the relative
trustworthiness for information sources using the two trust variables. The infor-
mation sources included in this example are the directly observable information
source log-files from a honeypot and four domain experts, which are indirectly
observable or interpreted information sources.
Consider the login service of the .NET e-commerce platform prototype de-
veloped by the EU-project ACTIVE [10]. To access any of the services in the
platform users must login. Users login using a web browser on their local machine.
The browser communicates with a web server unencrypted over the Internet us-
ing the http protocol. For more details on the login mechanism the reader is
referred to Houmb et al. (2005) [12].
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Typical security threats for such a login service are different types of denial of
service (DoS) attacks, such as TCP SYN flooding [6] and IP spoofing attacks [5].
A potential security solution for these type of attacks is a patch to the network
stack software that keeps track of the state of sessions. This is done by first
sending a cookie to the client, and then removing the pending connection. If
the client does not respond within a short period of time, the cookie expires
and the client must re-start the request for a connection. If the client responds
in time, the SYN-ACK message is sent and the connection is set up. Adding
the cookie message makes it unlikely that an attacker can respond in time to
continue setting up the connection. The cookie will expire on the server, and the
connection attempt is closed. If the client address has been spoofed the client
will not respond in any event.
Another security solution for these two DoS attacks is a filtering mechanism,
which is depicted in Figures 2 and 3. The filtering mechanism has an outbound
and inbound part that checks the source address, srcAddr, against a set of ac-
cepted source IP addresses stored in internalNetAddr. Rather than adding con-
trol through the additional cookie, the filtering mechanism is implemented on
the server side (usually on a firewall or an internet router) and configured to
block unauthorised connection attempts.
To evaluate these two security solutions the directly observable source real-
time data from a honeypot and the indirectly observable information source
expert opinions from 18 domain experts were used. The honeypot was set up
to reflect the configuration of the .NET e-commerce platform (Windows NT
4.0 operating system and IIS 4.0). As a second layer of logging the Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) Snort were used. For more information on the honeypot
and its configuration the reader is referred to Østvang (2003) [14]. The group of
NetworkStack-Client NetworkStack-ServerfilteringRouter
srcAddr = checkSourceAddr
[internalNetAddr->excludes (srcAddr)]
deny
[else]
outboundMessage (...)
Outbound
outboundMessage (...)
Fig. 2. Filter mechanism outbound
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NetworkStack-Client NetworkStack-ServerfilteringRouter
srcAddr = checkSourceAddr
[internalNetAddr->includes (srcAddr)]
inBoundMessage (...)[else]
Inbound
inBoundMessage (...)
deny
Fig. 3. Filter mechanism inbound
experts used were undergraduate students at Norwegian University of Science
and Technology. Further information on the collection of expert judgments is
provided in Houmb et al. (2004) [13].
For the honeypot information source only the connection attempts to TCP
port 80, which is intended for the web server, were considered. Logging was
done for the same amount of time, 24 hours, for the three different configura-
tions: (a) system without any security solutions, (b) system with the patch to
the network stack software; the cookie solution and (c) system with the filtering
mechanism. The result of these three logging configurations are then used, as
the information provided from the information source “honeypot”, when eval-
uating the two security solutions. However, in this paper we focus on how to
derive the relative trustworthiness. Because “honeypot” is an observable in-
formation source that observes fact, we assign to it the initial trustworthiness
weight Thoneypot = 1′′ according to (13). The value 1 indicates that the evalu-
ator has complete trust in the ability of “honeypot” to provide accurate and
correct information on number of DoS attacks. This means that the evaluator
has a set of positive experience of using “honeypot”. For information on how
to derive such an trust weight the reader is referred to Ray and Chakraborty
(2004) [15]. It should be noted that honeypots and IDSs are subject to the
problem of false positives and the problem of simulating sufficiently realistic
system environment and use.
Elicitation of expert judgments were done using a simple knowledge and ex-
pertise score questionnaire. The information provided on each expert for the
variables in the questionnaire was then used to derive the knowledge and exper-
tise score as described in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2. Due to space restrictions
only the judgment from 4 of the 18 experts are included. For discussion on prob-
lems and possible biases related to the procedure of collecting expert judgment
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50 %
20 %
15 %
10 %
5 %
Domain A: security
management
Domain B: network
management
Domain C: database
Domain D: design
Domain E: developer
Domain A
Domain B
Domain C
Domain D
E
Fig. 4. The reference knowledge domain relation model for the example
the reader is referred to Cooke (1991) [9] and Goossens et al. (2000) [11] and
similar sources.
As described in Section 3.1 the knowledge score for an information source
is determined by comparing the information source knowledge domain models
with the reference knowledge domain model. The reference knowledge domain
model is created by identifying the relevant knowledge domains and assess-
ing their internal relative importance. Here the relevant knowledge domains
are; security management, design, network manager, database and developer.
Figure 4 shows the four knowledge domains and their internal relative im-
portance. For demonstrational purpose the focus is put on the result of the
identification, rather than discussing techniques that can be used to identify
these knowledge domains.
In this example a domain expert, one of the authors, that was not part of the
expert judgment panel, performed the identification based on prior experience in
the domain of secure system development. Due to the subjective nature of this
assessment potential biases need to be assessed. We are currently working on
establishing alternative and more “objective” techniques for knowledge domain
identification.
The knowledge domains coverage for each expert is: 80 percentages on security
management and 15 percentage on database for expert 4. 100 percentages on
database for expert 6. 60 percentages for design, 30 percentages on developer
and 10 percentages for security management for expert 15. 100 percentages on
developer for expert 18. The knowledge level for each expert is computed using
the knowledge domain relative score model from Section 3.1 and (11) from the
estimate relative IS trustworthiness model.
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Table 2. The expertise and knowledge level questionnaire and the information provided
Expert
num-
ber
Calibration variable Information provided
4 level of expertise medium
years of relevant of education Bsc
years of experience from industry 0
role experience database and security
management
6 level of expertise low
years of relevant of education Bsc
years of experience from industry 0
role experience database
15 level of expertise high
years of relevant of education Bsc
years of experience from industry 0
role experience designer, developer and
security management
18 level of expertise low
years of relevant of education Bsc
years of experience from industry 0.5
role experience developer
For expert 4, 6, 15 and 18 the initial knowledge score K(4), K(6), K(15)
and K(18) are (the values are divided by 100 to make the computation more
tractable):
PKscore(K(4)) = (50 × 85) + (15 × 15) = 4475/100 ≈ 45
PKscore(K(6)) = (100 × 1) = 1500/100 = 15
PKscore(K(15)) = (60 × 10) + (30 × 5) + (10 × 50) = 1250/100 ≈ 13
PKscore(K(18)) = (100 × 5) = 500/100 = 5
Normalising the result is done using (4) to derive the normalisation factor
fknowledge and (5) to update the knowledge scores. Using (4) gives fknowledge
= 0.013 and the updated approximated knowledge scores are: KrelativeKscore
(4) = 0.6, KrelativeKscore(6) = 0.2, KrelativeKscore(15) = 0.19 and
KrelativeKscore(18) = 0.01.
The level of expertise for each information source are derived using the calibra-
tion variables in Table 2. In this example we use three of the seed/
calibration variables to determine level of expertise; level of experience, years of
relevant education and years of experience from industry. For the calibration vari-
able level of experience the importance weights using (6) are wimp(low) = 0.2,
wimp(medium) = 0.5 and wimp(high) = 1.0. For the calibration variable years
of relevant education the importance weight are wimp(Bsc) = 0.2. For the
calibration variable years of experience from industry the importance weight
is wimp(peryear) = 0.2 for each year of industrial experience.
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Using (8) the initial expertise level scores PEscore(E(k)) are derived:
PEscore(E(4)) = 0.5, PEscore(E(6)) = 0.2, PEscore(E(15)) = 1.0 and
PEscore(E(18)) = 0.02.
These initial expertise level scores are then normalised by first determining
the expertise level normalisation factor using (9), which gives fexpertise = 0.6.
Then the expertise level scores are updated in (10), which gives the approximate
scores PEscore(E(4)) = 0.3, PEscore(E(6)) = 0.19, PEscore(E(15)) = 0.6 and
PEscore(E(18)) = 0.01.
Finally, we use the estimation relative IS trustworthiness model to derive
the information source relative trustworthiness. In this model one first deter-
mine the initial trustworthiness using (11), which gives the approximated values:
T (honeypot) = 1.0, T (4) = 0.2, T (6) = 0.04, T (15) = 0.1 and T (18) = 0.01.
The second step in the model is to find the relative trustworthiness normali-
sation factor using (12), and the third step is to derive the initial information
source relative trustworthiness using (13) and normalising the result in (14). This
gives frelativTrustw = 0.7. The resulting trustworthiness score for the informa-
tion source “honeypot” is TrelatveTrustw(honeypot) = 0.7. The resulting trust-
worthiness score for expert 4, 6, 15 and 18 are: TrelatveTrustw(expert4) = 0.1,
TrelatveTrustw(expert6) = 0.1, TrelatveTrustw(expert15) = 0.1 and
TrelatveTrustw(expert18) = 0.0.
As can be seen by the result, these information source relative trustworthiness
reflects the information provided on each source’s knowledge domains and level
of expertise. E.g. expert 1 has two knowledge domains where one of the domains
is security management, which are assigned a high level of importance. Expert
1 also has medium level of expertise. It is therefore reasonable that expert 1 are
given a higher trustworthiness score than expert 18, because expert 18 have a
low level of expertise and one knowledge domain for which are given a low level
of importance. As also can be seen by the result, we are not able to distinguish
between expert 4, 6 and 15. This is also reasonable taking into account that their
knowledge domains and level of expertise combined equals out the differences.
In security solution evaluation these information source relative trustworthi-
ness weights are combined with the information each of the sources provide,
which in this example gives the estimated security solution effect.
5 Related Work
There exist a variety of trust models. However, many of these models are designed
for establishing trust relationships between entities for exchange of particular
information in an distributed setting, such as e.g. encryption keys or session
keys. In these cases trust is measured using binary entities, such as total trust
or no trust. Example of more flexible trust models is the vector trust model
developed by Ray and Chakraborty [15], XTrust developed by Branchaud and
Flin [4] and the BBK metric developed by Beth, Borcherding and Klein [3].
However, our work does not concern entities that engage in information ex-
change in distributed networks or other system environments. The relative
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trustworthiness in our model relates to information sources providing informa-
tion in security solution evaluation. The information sources are mostly domain
experts of some kind, and the trustworthiness is not a measure of the value of
the trust relationship between a truster and some trustee, as describe in [15],
but between the trustees by examine their level of knowledge and experience
related to the security solutions that are being evaluated. One might use any
other trust model to derive the relative measures of trust. We have, however,
focused on capturing how an evaluator works when assessing security targets,
such at what kind of information are being used, how are the information being
used etc., and therefore our model can be used to aid such processes.
6 Conclusion
The paper describes how to derive information source relative trustworthiness for
security solution evaluation. The relative trustworthiness for each information
source is determined using the two trust variables (1) knowledge level and (2)
level of expertise. An information source’s knowledge level is measured using a
knowledge score, while the level of expertise is measure using a expertise score.
It is important to note, however, that the derived relative trustworthiness of
information sources still merely represent the combination of domain knowledge
and human interpretation of what is important to take into consideration in a
particular security solution evaluation. This means that the construction of the
knowledge domain models and the assessment of the level of expertise are critical
for the correctness of the results.
Further work includes implementing the approach using Bayesian Belief Net-
works (BBN). BBN handle large scale conditional probability computations and
allows for reason under uncertainty. More information the reader is referred to
Houmb et al. (2005) [12].
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Abstract. Unlike traditional mobile wireless networks, ad hoc networks do not
rely on any fixed infrastructure. Nodes rely on each other to route packets to
other mobile nodes or toward stationary nodes that may act as a gateway to a
fixed network. Mobile nodes are generally assumed to participate as routers in
the mobile wireless network. However, blindly trusting all other nodes to respect
the routing protocol exposes the local node to a wide variety of vulnerabilities.
Traditional security mechanisms rely on either the authenticated identity of the
requesting principal or some form of credentials that authorise the client to per-
form certain actions. Generally, these mechanisms require some underlying in-
frastructure, e.g., a public key infrastructure (PKI). However, we cannot assume
such infrastructures to be in place in an ad hoc network. In this paper we pro-
pose an extension to an existing ad hoc routing protocols, which selects the route
based on a local evaluation of the trustworthiness of all known intermediary nodes
(routers) on the route to the destination. We have implemented this mechanism
in an existing ad hoc routing protocol, and we show how trust can be built from
previous experience and how trust can be used to avoid routing packets through
unreliable nodes.
1 Introduction
The notion of an ad hoc network is a new paradigm that allows hosts (called nodes) to
communicate without relying on a predefined infrastructure to keep the network con-
nected. Most nodes are assumed to be mobile and communication is generally assumed
to be wireless. This means that traditional routing protocols are inadequate for ad hoc
networks and a number of new routing protocols have been proposed for such net-
works [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Ad hoc networks are collaborative in the sense that each node is
assumed to relay packet for other nodes that will in turn relay their packets. Thus, all
nodes in an ad hoc network form part of the network’s routing infrastructure. The mo-
bility of nodes in an ad hoc network, means that both the population and the topology
of the network can be highly dynamic.
In traditional networks, such as the Internet, routers within the central parts of the
networks are owned and managed by a few well-known operators. These operators are
generally assumed to be trustworthy, and this assumption is mostly justified since their
entire business hinges on the preservation of this image of trustworthiness. However,
this assumption no longer holds in ad hoc network, where all nodes may belong to users
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 150–163, 2006.
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from different organisations and where all nodes may be called upon to route packets
for other nodes. Malfunctioning or malicious nodes may disrupt the routing protocol by
distributing false routing information to other nodes or by not performing the routing
correctly themselves, thereby disrupting service in an area of the ad hoc network. In
this paper, we propose a novel security mechanism, for ad hoc routing protocols, that
addresses this issue by allowing autonomous nodes to identify and avoid malfunctioning
or malicious routers.
Sending packets in an ad hoc network, where the majority of routers1 may be un-
known, entails a certain element of risk and requires the sending node to trust those
routers to deliver the packet to the final destination. Since a node may initially know
nothing about any other router, this challenge is not unlike the challenge faced by human
beings confronted with unexpected or unknown interactions with each other. Human so-
ciety has developed the mechanism of trust to overcome initial suspicion and gradually
evolve privileges. Trust has enabled collaboration amongst humans for thousands of
years, so modelling route selection on the notion of trust offers an obvious approach to
addressing the security requirements faced by secure routing in ad hoc networks.
We propose a trust-based route selection mechanism where the sending node evalu-
ates the trustworthiness of all known routers on the route to the destination, in order to
select which route to use. The freedom of choice depends on the number of available
routes and the sending node’s knowledge of the routers involved. If a single route exists,
the sending node has no choice but to use that route and hope for the best; if, however,
multiple routes exist, the sending node may select the route according to some route
selection strategy. Different selection strategies may be used: one is to maximise the
average trustworthiness of the known routers, possibly considering the ratio between
the trustworthiness and the length of the route, another is to avoid untrusted routers,
preferring unknown routers over untrusted ones, and a third is to prefer routes through
known routers, regardless of their trustworthiness, in order to increase the predictability
of the routing protocol. This list is non exhaustive and the experiments reported in this
paper focus mainly on the first of these strategies.
We have implemented trust-based route selection as an extension to the dynamic
source routing (DSR) protocol [4, 6]. In DSR, all routers on the path from source to
destination are enumerated in the packet by the sending node, each router simply for-
ward the packet to the next router in the list, so the sending node knows the identity of
all involved routers.
Initially all routers are unknown and a random route is selected. However, every
acknowledged packet will increase the sending node’s trust in all the routers in the
path to the destination, while every retransmission decreases the trust in all the routers,
because it is impossible for the sender to know where the problem occurred. The route
to the destination is re-calculated if it becomes too unreliable, but the information about
all routers is retained since new routes may pass through some of the same routers. This
means that trust-based route selection is self-configuring, an important property in ad
hoc networks.
1 Routers are simply other nodes in the network, so we use the two terms interchangeably in this
paper.
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Unlike existing security mechanisms based on a public key infrastructure (PKI) [7, 8]
or incentive based schemes based on payments [9, 10], trust-based dynamic source rout-
ing does not rely on a trusted third party to certify keys or sell/redeem tokens. In-
stead, we only need the ability to recognise trustworthy routers. This means that we
can “anonymously” identify routers by their public-key as long as they use the same
private-key every time they sign a message.
The rest of this paper is organised in the following way: Section 2 presents related
work on security in ad hoc networks, Section 3 presents an overview of the Dynamic
Source Routing protocol and shows how to incorporate trust in the selection of routes.
Section 4 describes our implementation while Section 5 describes the evaluation of our
prototype. Section 6 presents directions for our future work and our conclusions are
presented in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Trust-based dynamic source routing combine ideas from two active fields of research,
namely ad hoc networks and trust management systems. An overview of related work
in each of these areas is presented in the following.
2.1 Ad Hoc Networks
Existing work on security in wireless ad hoc networks has largely focused on two main
areas: authentication (including key-management) and routing security. The role of au-
thentication is to ensure that the receiving node is the intended recipient, while routing
security ensures that messages reach the receiving node.
Authentication in wireless ad hoc networks cannot rely on traditional infrastructure
rich solutions, e.g., certificate based authentication using a public key infrastructure.
Instead, authentication is either based on a shared secret which is established using a
location-limited channel [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] or based on a distributed key-management
mechanism [5, 16, 17]. Other approaches include entity recognition [18] where nodes
are recognised without verifying their identity and cryptographically binding public-
keys to the network address of nodes in the network [19, 20].
Routing security has received less attention than authentication, but we have identi-
fied two proposals that are related to the mechanism presented in this paper.
Marti et al. [21] investigate the ability to identify misbehaving nodes in mobile ad
hoc networks. They focus on DSR and propose a mechanism based on the ability of
most network interfaces to enter “promiscuous mode” where all received packets are
forwarded to the network layer. This enables each node to monitor whether the next
node in the source route relays the packet as intended and to report misbehaving nodes
back to the sender. This assumes that radio coverage is symmetric, which limits the sta-
tions’ ability to manage their transmission power independently. Moreover, the authors
themselves identify the inability of their mechanism to deal with Byzantine behaviour
such as collusion and framing.
The CONFIDANT protocol [22] extends the simple mechanism defined by Marti
et al. The protocol relies on feedback (ALARMS) from trusted nodes (friends) in the
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network. Whenever a node observes that a router does not forward a packet, it sends
a ALARM to all its friends and the sender of the packet, warning them about the mis-
behaving node. Relying on feedback from trusted entities reduces the problem of one
node framing another node, but selection of these trusted nodes remain an unsolved
problem. In fact, “the reputation system is based on negative experience”, so there is no
way to bootstrap the system. Trust-based DSR complements the CONFIDANT protocol
by providing a mechanism to establish initial trust among nodes in the network.
2.2 Trust Management in Distributed Systems
Research on security in large-scale open network infrastructures, such as the Internet,
has exposed implicit assumptions about trust in existing security infrastructures.
Recent research in computer security, attempts to incorporate trust as an explicit
component of the security model through trust management systems [23, 24, 25]. How-
ever, these trust management systems may help decide whether sufficient trust exists
for a given principal to perform a given action, but they ignore the dynamic properties
of trust, i.e., how trust is initially formed, and how trust evolves during the life-time of
the participating entities.
Trust has also been investigated in the context of public key infrastructures, which
lead to the development of such notions as “a trusted path” [26] between certificate
authorities in separate administrative domains, a “web-of-trust” among peer-to-peer
users [27] and a probabilistic model for reasoning about the benevolence and com-
petence of key servers [28]. Certificate authorities and key distribution centres are sup-
posed to be well-known entities that can be equally trusted by a large community (like
a notary), so this research has been limited to the static properties of trust. In general,
this research has developed detailed knowledge in a very limited area.
3 Trust-Based Dynamic Source Routing
We have extended the dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol with a route selection
strategy based on an evaluation of the trustworthiness of all known nodes on the route
to the destination. We chose DSR, because the sending node has to know about all
nodes on the route to the destination, so trust-based route selection will be particularly
effective in this protocol. However, we believe that trust-based route selection can be
added to any ad hoc routing protocol, where the sender is offered the choice of multiple
routes to the destination.
3.1 Dynamic Source Routing
Nodes in mobile networks have a finite communication range. For a given node, a subset
of all the nodes is expected to be within range. Sending data to one of these nodes is
relatively simple, since packets can be routed directly. However, sending data to nodes
further removed, involves enlisting the help of intermediate nodes to relay the packet.
Dynamic source routing is one of many routing protocols for ad hoc networks that
address the problem of relaying packets to remote nodes. We refer the reader to the
literature [4, 6] for a more comprehensive description of DSR.
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Overview. The dynamic source routing protocol relies on source routing to relay pack-
ets from source to destination in an ad hoc network. It establishes these routes on de-
mand, i.e., whenever they are needed to forward a packet to a new destination. Dynamic
source routing relies on two separate protocols to dynamically discover new routes and
to maintain routes to a dynamic set of remote nodes.
Route Discovery. The route discovery procedure involves broadcasting a route request
to all nodes within communication range. Each such request contains the address of the
requesting node and an identifier for the destination node. The request is relayed from
each node to all of its neighbouring nodes, continually building a record of the route
taken, until such time as it arrives at its destination. Upon doing so, the destination node
reverses the recorded route and sends it back to the initiator of the request in the form of
a route reply. The initiator can now use this route to send packets to any node along the
route. The request initiator can receive multiple replies, each one specifying a different
route to the same destination. It can use any one of them as the route of choice for
sending data to a node along that route.
Route Maintenance. In the route maintenance protocol, every router waits for an ac-
knowledgement from its successor in the route. Routers report unacknowledged packets
back to the sending node, so that it may prune the source route at that point and repeat
the route discovery procedure.
3.2 Routing Security in DSR
The security characteristics of ad hoc networks are very different from traditional fixed
networks. The absence of a fixed/trusted infrastructure means that routers cannot rely on
information from trusted servers, such as certificate authorities [11]. Therefore, every
node must autonomously decide which route to use to send a packet to a given destina-
tion. Moreover, although certificate authorities can sometimes be used to establish the
identity of another node, this identity conveys no a priori information about the likely
behaviour of that node. Therefore, identity alone cannot be used for route selection de-
cisions. This fact excludes the use of most security mechanisms currently in use on the
Internet.
Protocol Vulnerabilities. We have identified the following vulnerabilities in the dy-
namic source routing protocol:
Corrupting the route request packet
A malicious router can disrupt the dynamic source routing protocol by corrupting
the router list in the route request packet, e.g., by adding a non-existing router to
the list or removing an existing router from the list.
Spoofing route replies
A malicious router may send a route reply back to the sending node, pretending that
it was the last hop before the destination. It could then pretend to be the destination,
or disrupt communication by not relaying the packet; this would result in a black
hole [29].
Trust-Based Route Selection in Dynamic Source Routing 155
Corrupting payload of relayed packets
A malicious router may try to compromise the confidentiality and the integrity of
any packet that it is relaying. It may also perform traffic analysis and try to learn
about the location of remote nodes. These problems also exist in fixed networks and
a large number of solutions have been proposed. Moreover, these vulnerabilities are
not specifically related to the routing protocol, so we do not consider them further
in this paper.
Security Goals. As shown above, a malicious router has two ways of disrupting the
routing protocol, either by diverting packets in the wrong direction or by attracting and
ignoring packets.
Since we cannot assume a priori knowledge about the other routers, we cannot ex-
pect to completely avoid routing though untrustworthy nodes. Instead, we require the
ability to detect malicious or malfunctioning routers and to route packets through alter-
native routes once such routers have been identified.
3.3 Trust-Based Dynamic Source Routing
In order to accommodate trust-based route selection in DSR, we have to extend DSR
with functions that establish and maintain trust in other nodes and modify DSR to in-
clude a trust evaluation of all known routers when selecting the source route. These
modifications are described in the following sections.
Trust-Based Route Discovery. Dynamic source routing returns a list of routers that
should be included as a source route in the header of the packet. We need to recognise
these nodes in order to find them in the trust management system and correctly assign a
trust value to them. We have modified the route discovery mechanism of DSR, so that
every router includes a signed hash value of the source route in the packet that it receives
along with its own public-key and its IP-address in the relayed route request message.
Thus, the destination node signs the complete source route, which is then returned in
the route reply message. This prevents a router from selectively corrupting the route;
either all of the routers from a certain point in the preceeding route are removed from
the list or none of them.
The sending node adds a signed hash of the source route to every packet, in order
to prevent intermediate nodes from corrupting the source route. This signature is only
generated once for every source route. However, including the signed hash in every
packet may introduce an unacceptable overhead for some applications, e.g., telephony,
so we propose that this extension is made optional.
The addition of public-keys and signatures to every entry in the route request mes-
sage introduces a substantial overhead in the protocol. However, this overhead is mostly
confined to the route request message, which we believe to be acceptable. Moreover,
the public-keys can be omitted from the route request message and instead obtained
through a direct peer-to-peer key-exchange protocol between the sender and every node
on the route to the receiver. The sender start by exchanging keys with the first node in
the source route. Once this node’s signature has been verified, it can be used to relay
packets to exchange keys with the second node in the source route, etc.
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Trust Formation. There is three basic ways to establish trust in an unknown entity,
these are in order of decreasing reliability: personal experience, recommendations and
reputation. Personal experience is gained when a node is trusted and it either honours
or betrays this trust. It is important to balance risk and trust when building personal ex-
perience. A recommendation is a signed assessment of another node’s trustworthiness.
It is used to introduce a node to other nodes that trust the node that signed the recom-
mendation, thereby accelerating the trust formation process. It is important to note that
a recommendation can be issued by any node in the system and that routers make au-
tonomous decisions about whether they trust this recommendation or not, i.e., we do not
need a PKI to issue recommendations. This mechanism is similar to the web-of-trust in
PGP [27]. A node’s reputation is a summary of all other nodes’ trust in that node. This
summary is generated from a combination of recommendations from other, possibly
unknown, nodes and from direct observations that a node can make, e.g., if all other
nodes route their traffic through a particular node, that node gets a good reputation and
it is probably trustworthy.
In order to build personal experience, a node must be able to observe the behaviour
of other nodes, i.e., determine the behaviour of other nodes through observable system
events. In trust-based routing, the observable event is whether the packet reaches its
destination or not, which requires the receiving node to send acknowledgements back
to the sender. In order to prevent intermediate nodes from forging acknowledgements,
we require the receiving node to sign all acknowledgements. However, we do not need
to acknowledge every packet, as long as the sender receives periodic feedback from
the receiver. This reduces the overhead of acknowledgements when streaming audio or
video across UDP.
Building personal experience is slow at first, when all nodes are unknown, but all
packets pass through routers within the range of the sending node, so these nodes will
appear in most source routes. Experience gained from routing through these nodes, is
then used in subsequent route discoveries, so the trust evaluation process becomes faster
and faster as more nodes are known, and untrustworthy nodes can be avoided.
Trust Management. The trust management process deals with maintaining and compar-
ing trust information about other nodes. In order to reduce storage requirements and fa-
cilitate comparisons of trustworthiness, routers summarise their observations about other
routers into a single value, known as the trust value, for a particular router. Trust values
fall in the range [0,1] with the value 0.5 representing an unknown node. Routers with
high trust values are assumed to be more trustworthy than routers with low trust values,
so trust values can be compared directly by the trust-based route selection strategy.
The trust management system is also responsible for managing the trust life cycle,
i.e., initial trust formation, updating trust values based on experience and expiring nodes
that are no longer used. Trust that is not maintained through continuous interactions will
slowly erode until information about the node can be removed from the trust manage-
ment system. The delay until a node is removed depends on its trust value at the last
interaction. Nodes with very high or very low trust values will remain in the system
longer than nodes that are already close to the initial trust value of 0.5. The trust man-
agement system can also attribute different weights to experience, recommendations
and reputation based on the context and the disposition of the node.
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Route Selection. The route selection strategy calculates an aggregate trust value for
each of the possible source routes to the destination. These aggregate values are then
compared and the optimal source route is selected. The optimality of a particular route
selection depends on the context; so different selection criteria may be used by different
devices and in different environments.
Stimulating Collaboration. Trust-Based DSR is primarily designed to identify and
avoid misbehaving routers. However, we believe that it could also be used to stimulate
collaboration among nodes, if routers primarily forward packets from nodes that they
trust, e.g., by only forwarding route requests from nodes with a minimum trust value.
This means that routers that reliably forward packets from other nodes have a greater
probability of getting their own packets forwarded by those same nodes.
3.4 Security Analysis
The sending node can only detect disruption to the routing protocol, by observing that
its packets do not reach the intended destination, i.e., it does not receive acknowledge-
ments.
Since none of the other nodes are a priori trusted, the sending node cannot know
which router malfunctioned; its only option is to try with another source route. If the
second route fails as well, a third route is tried and if that succeeds, there is a high prob-
ability that the malfunctioning router belongs to the intersection of the two malfunc-
tioning source routes. The more alternative routes are being used, the more precisely
we will be able to pinpoint the malfunctioning router. However, the main goal of the
proposed mechanism is not to identify misbehaving routers, so once a reliable source
route is found, this route will be used for all subsequent packets, which give reliable
routers the opportunity to increase their trust value.
One of the fundamental problems in ad hoc networks is that we cannot assume the
presence of a certificate authority, so nodes cannot be reliably authenticated. This means
that every node has the ability to change its identity (IP-address and public-key) at will,
e.g., immediately after misbehaving. In order to mitigate this risk, the sending node
records the time when it first learns of another node; the age of a node’s entry in the trust
management system can then be taken into account when the trust values are calculated.
4 Implementation
We have implemented a DSR simulator in Java, which allows us to experiment with
trust-based route selection in our extension to the dynamic source route protocol.
4.1 Overview
The architecture of our trust-based dynamic source routing system is shown in Figure 1.
The extended functionality of trust-based dynamic source routing has been added as
a layer between the application and the DSR protocol. This layer consists of a trust man-
agement system and two components that interact directly with the DSR protocol and
with each other through the trust management system. These components are described
in greater detail in the following.
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Fig. 1. Trust-based dynamic source routing architecture
4.2 Trust Formation
We dynamically assign a simple numerical trust value to all nodes that we encounter.
This value lies in the interval [0,1], where 0 designates an unreliable node and 1 des-
ignates a node that reliably forwards all packets. We assume no prior knowledge about
the surrounding nodes, so initially all routers have a trust value of 0.5. The trust for-
mation component updates the trust values, in the trust management system, every time
a packet is routed through the node. If the packet reaches its destination safely, the
trust values of all routers on the route are incremented by a fixed amount; otherwise
their trust values are decremented with the same amount. The trust management system
ensures that the trust values remain within the specified interval.
4.3 Trust Management
We have implemented a simple trust management system, where a trust value is associ-
ated with every node that forms part of the source route. If the node is already known,
the current trust value is used; otherwise the default value for unknown nodes is used.
4.4 Route Selection
DSR normally returns a number of routes to the route selection component after sending
a route request. The route selection component stores all routes for analysis and selec-
tion. For each source route, the route selection component calculates the average trust
value for that route and divides it by the number of intermediary nodes, thus favouring
shorter routes.
Then, the route with the highest overall value is selected and used for subsequent at-
tempts to send data to that route’s destination. If the route fails, the trust-based dynamic
source route selection algorithm is restarted.
5 Evaluation
We have used our simulator to evaluate the trust-based source routing protocol using
a network consisting of 9 nodes. The topology of the network is shown in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. 9-node network used in the evaluation
While this configuration may appear overly simplistic, it includes all relevant features.
In particular, it allows us to examine the benefits of multiple independent paths from
sender to receiver and the effects of misbehaviour in some nodes on the trust value of
well behaved nodes in the neighbourhood.
The behaviour of each node in the network is configurable and the probability that
a router works reliably ranges between 1 (forward all packets correctly) to 0 (corrupt
every packet). The main goal of this evaluation is to show that the trust based DSR
system correctly identify and avoid untrustworthy nodes.
5.1 Identification of Untrustworthy Nodes
The goal of the initial experiment is to demonstrate that a sending node can identify
an untrustworthy node. The simulator is configured so that nodes 4 and 5 corrupt all
packets that are routed through them, but all other nodes forward their packet correctly.
We sent groups of 5 packets from node 1 to each of the nodes 9, 8 and 7. The trust
values of node 1, for each of the nodes in the different routes, are shown in Figure 3.
It can be seen that node 4 is immediately found to be untrustworthy, and that nodes
3, 6 and 8 are identified as trustworthy. It can be seen that later in the experiment
node 5 is singled out as being the least trustworthy. In fact, nodes 4 and 5 are equally
Fig. 3. Change of Node 1’s trust values
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untrustworthy; we simply have more experience with the untrustworthiness of node 5.
The trust values for nodes 2 and 7 are identical to that of node 4, so they are unfairly
viewed as being untrustworthy because of their proximity to nodes 4 and 5. An experi-
ment in which packets are sent to all nodes in the network should allow nodes 2 and 7
to be disassociated from nodes 4 and 5.
5.2 Selection of Most Trustworthy Route
The goal of the second experiment is to demonstrate the behaviour of the route selection
algorithm and show how it reacts to the trustworthiness of nodes in the network. The
same nine-node topology was used, but nodes 4 and 5 have been configured to route
50% of the packets correctly. The experiment monitors the behaviour of the route se-
lection algorithm when 20 packets are passed between nodes 1 and 9. The results of the
experiment are shown on Figure 4.
A number of observations can be made from the graph about trust-based route se-
lection. Initially, all nodes have the same trust value (0.5), so route length becomes the
determining factor for route selection and the longer routes are avoided. The routes are
broken into three groups, which reflect the 3 possible route lengths.
Initially route [1,2,4,7,9] is selected, but node 4 immediately drops the packet. All
routes containing these nodes are decremented, the longer routes are able to absorb
this reduction more, and so their trust values do not fall at the same rate. The next
route selected by the sending node is route [1,3,5,8,9], which initially behaves well but
then begins to drop packets. We see a reduction in its trust value from packet 6 to 13.
Eventually route [1,3,6,8,9] is selected; this route delivers all packets correctly.
This experiment shows how trust-based route selection adapts to changes in the en-
vironment (the reliability of nodes 4 and 5) by discarding unreliable routes. Moreover,
it indicates how trust-based route selection will eventually identify a reliable route, if
Fig. 4. The change in the route trust value over the number of packets sent
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such a route exists, and send all packets using that route. Finally, it shows that, although
the unreliability of node 5 unfairly devalues the trust value of node 3, the final selection
of a reliable route through node 3 eventually revalues this trust value.
6 Future Work
The implementation of trust-based routing, presented in this paper, allows us to ex-
pand our work in a number of ways. First, we would like to conduct further ex-
periments with a combination of different route selection strategies, e.g., completely
avoiding routes where the trust value of one of the routers is below a certain low wa-
termark. Second, we would like to integrate a recommendation mechanism similar to
the CONFIDANT protocol [22]. Third, we plan to extend our implementation with
a more comprehensive trust management system (e.g., by replacing our simple trust
management system with KeyNote [24]). Fourth, we plan to further investigate the
issue of representing and maintaining trust in the form of scalar trust values. Finally
we wish to extend our investigation of appropriate feed back mechanisms for build-
ing personal experience, in order to determine what events the nodes in the system
should monitor.
The sending node’s trust value for another router, summarises the sending node’s
experience with the other router’s ability to deliver packets correctly to the destination.
It can therefore be considered a subjective measurement of the other node’s quality
of service and the aggregate value for a particular route may be used to anticipate the
quality of service of that particular route. We would like to further investigate the use
of trust values for quality of service assessments.
7 Conclusions
Ad hoc networks have unique security characteristics. The fundamental assumption
that nothing can be assumed about the underlying infrastructure excludes the use of
authentication servers and certificate authorities, which means that existing identity
based or credential based security mechanisms cannot be used. We have introduced
a mechanism that evaluates the trustworthiness of other nodes based on past experi-
ence. The mechanism compares the aggregate values of the trustworthiness of all the
routers on alternative routes, in order to select the route with the highest probability
of delivery.
Trust-Based route selection represents a radical new approach to computer and
network security, where sensitive operations are performed on the basis of trust
rather than identity. This facilitates collaboration among nodes in environments that
cannot rely on a common trusted third party (certificate authority), such as ad hoc
networks.
Our evaluation has shown that trust-based route selection is able to identify a subset
of all routers, which contains the unreliable nodes. We have also shown that trust-based
routing is able to adapt to changes in the trustworthiness (reliability) of certain nodes.
We therefore believe that an evaluation of the trustworthiness of other routers should be
an important parameter for route selection in ad hoc networks.
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Abstract. Credential networks have recently been introduced as a gen-
eral model for distributed authenticity and trust management in open
networks. This paper focuses on issues related to the implementation of
credential networks. It presents a system called Caution, which consists
of a simple language to define credential networks and an underlying ma-
chinery to perform the evaluation. The paper also describes the necessary
algorithms in further details.1
1 Introduction
Managing trust in large open networks is an emerging topic in different areas
such as electronic commerce, public-key cryptography, peer-to-peer technologies,
the Semantic Web, and many more. Two principal trust problems arise from the
fact that network participants generally do not know each other in person. The
first one is related to the identity and the second one to the reliability of an
unknown network participant. We will refer to them as the problems of judging
somebody’s authenticity and trustworthiness, respectively.
The common approach to establish (indirect) trust between two unrelated
participants is through (direct) trust statements from intermediate participants.
Following [1], such statements are called credentials. To prevent forgeries, they
are required to be digitally signed. There is a distinction between positive, neg-
ative, and mixed credentials. A credential referring to somebody’s authenticity
is called certificate (if it is positive) or revocation (if it is negative). Similarly, a
credential referring to somebody’s trustworthiness is called recommendation (if
it is positive) or discredit (if it is negative). Ratings are corresponding mixed
credentials used for both authenticity and trustworthiness.
In the general (decentralized) case, all network participants are allowed to
issue credentials. The resulting collection defines a credential network. This is
the basis for the derivation of indirect trust. The problem is thus to evaluate a
given credential network.
1 This research is supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation, project
no. PP002–102652, and the Hasler Foundation, project no. 2042. Furthermore, we
would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Michael Wachter.
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The evaluation method proposed in [1] makes use of the theory of proba-
bilistic argumentation. This is a theory of uncertain reasoning which comes up
with a pair of values called degree of support and degree of possibility [2, 3].
These are probabilities of provability, which are derived from corresponding sets
of arguments and counter-arguments. In a credential network, arguments and
counter-arguments correspond to chains of credentials between the two partici-
pants. An algorithm to find these (minimal) chains is described in [1], but it is
restricted to positive credentials.
The most important roots of our approach are PGP’s web of trust [4] and
the deterministic PKI model of Maurer [5]. The latter stands out because of
the soundness and clarity of its formalism, however, does not include negative
evidence at all. His model has been readopted in [6] and recently extended in [7]
by including time issues, revocations, and other things. Another closely related
approach is Jøsang’s Certification Algebra [8], which is very general in many
respects (e.g. opinions as pieces of evidence), but the evaluation mechanism is
somehow limited since it may be applied to a certain class of network scenarios
only. Other important formal trust models include [9, 10, 11, 12]. Various other
approaches for trust and authenticity management have been proposed, e.g. in
the areas of e-commerce, reputation systems, and peer-to-peer networks.
This paper is a continuation of [1]. Its contribution is twofold. First, it presents
a system called Caution, which consists of a simple language to define credential
networks and an underlying machinery to perform the evaluation. Second, it
describes the necessary algorithms for the general case of positive, negative, and
mixed credentials. These are the two main parts of the paper, see Section 3 and 4,
respectively. Section 2 gives a short formal introduction to credential networks,
Section 5 presents an example, and Section 6 finally concludes the paper.
2 Credential Networks
The model proposed in [1] deals with the particular view of a participant or user
X0 of a distributed network. U denotes the set of other network users in which
X0 is interested in, and U0 = {X0}∪ U is the set of all users including X0. In
the context of a corresponding credential network, X0 is called owner .
From the perspective of X0, the problem is to judge whether another net-
work user Y ∈ U is authentic and/or trustworthy. To formally describe this,
[1] suggests to use two propositions AutY and TrustY , which are either true or
false. Intuitively, AutY means that the available information about Y ’s identity
is authentic. This usually requires a corresponding public key KY to belong to
user Y [5]. It is assumed that AutX0 is implicitly true.
The intuition of TrustY is that Y behaves in a reliable way. Since there are
many different things Y may do (offer a service, issue credentials, etc.), it is
possible that Y is reliable in doing one thing but not the other. In this paper,
we adopt the simplifying assumption of [1] and use TrustY as a general propo-
sition about anything Y may do. Again, it is assumed that TrustX0 is implicitly
true.
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If we assume that Y ∈ U is unknown to X0, then there is no direct or explicit
way of proving the truth or falsity of AutY or TrustY . The judgment of X0
must therefore rely upon statements about Y ’s authenticity and trustworthiness
issued by third parties, i.e. by other users X ∈ U \{Y } of the network. Examples
of such statements are:
– “I am 90% sure that Y is trustworthy.”
– “I know that Y is not the one she/he claims to be.”
– “on a scale between 0 and 10, I would rate Y ’s trustworthiness with 7.”
If statements like this are digitally signed, they are called credentials. Note that
the use of digital signatures is an important security requirement [1]. A cre-
dential is always issued by a user X ∈ U0, the issuer , and concerns another
user Y ∈ U0, the recipient . Figure 1a depicts a set of credentials as a graph
for U0 = {A,B,C,D}. Different arrows represent different credential types (see
following subsection).
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>> (users a b c d)
>> (owner a)
>>
>> (cert a b 0.8)
>> (cert a c 0.5)
>> (cert b c 0.6)
>> (a-rate c d 0.9)
>> (rev b d 0.3)
>>
>> (rec a b 0.9)
>> (rec a c 0.7)
>> (t-rate b d 0.4)
(b)
Fig. 1. (a) An example of a credential network. Nodes represent users, the owner being
emphasized by a double circle. An arrow from X to Y denotes a credential issued by
X for Y . (b) Corresponding Caution commands, producing the network shown in (a).
2.1 Credentials
There is a general distinction between two classes T and A of credentials, depend-
ing on whether it is a statement about the trustworthiness or the authenticity
of the recipient. The convention is to denote A-credentials issued by X for Y by
AXY and T-credentials by TXY . Note that the owner X0 may as well issue and
receive credentials, and issuing self-credentials AXX or TXX is not prohibited.
In addition to the two classes A and T, there is another distinction between
three different signs +, −, and ± for positive, negative, and mixed credentials,
respectively. The intuitive idea here is that the issuer of a credential may either
want to make a positive or a negative statement about the authenticity or trust-
worthiness of another network user. A mixed statement can be seen as a rating.
The combination of classes and signs yields six different credential types:
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Class A Class T
+ Certificate Recommendation
Sign − Revocation Discredit
± Authenticity Rating Trust Rating
Another feature of the model allows the issuer of a credential, by assigning a
value π ∈ [0, 1], to specify the weight of the credential. π = 0 and π = 1 are
the two extreme cases of minimal and maximal weight, respectively. Formally, a
credential is a 5-tuple
C = (class, sign, issuer, recipient, weight) (1)
with class ∈ {T,A}, issuer ∈ U0, recipient ∈ U0, sign ∈ {+,−,±}, and
weight ∈ [0, 1]. To distinguish between the two classes, and to make the formal
notation more compact, the convention in [1] is to denote A-credentials by
Asign,weightissuer,recipient = (A, sign, issuer, recipient, weight) (2)
and T-credentials by
T sign,weightissuer,recipient = (T, sign, issuer, recipient, weight). (3)
Sets of A- and T-credentials are denoted by A and T , respectively. A credential
network N owned by user X0 is defined as a 4-tuple
N = ( U0, X0,A, T ). (4)
For a pair of users X,Y ∈ U0, each set A and T is restricted to include at most
one credential AXY ∈ A and TXY ∈ T , respectively. Note that this does not ex-
clude cases in which the sets A and T both include a credential between the same
issuer X and recipient Y . In other words, X may issue at most one A-credential
for Y , but at the same time, X may also issue (at most) one T-credential for Y .
An example of a simple credential network is shown Fig. 1a. It is specified by
U0 = {A,B,C,D}, X0 = A, and
A = {A+0.8AB , A+0.6AC , A+0.5BC , A−0.3BD , A±0.9CD }, T = {T+0.9AB , T+0.7AC , T±0.4BD }.
Solid arrows are A-credentials, and dotted arrows denote T-credentials. The
sign and number attached to an arrow indicate the sign and the weight of the
credential.
2.2 Evaluation
For a given credential network, the question that arises now is how to evaluate
it. On the basis of the evidence encoded in the network, and with respect to a
particular user X ∈ U , the primary goal is to quantitatively judge the authen-
ticity (of a given public key) and the trustworthiness of X . The judgment should
return corresponding values on a continuous scale between 0 and 1. The owner
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of the credential network may then use this information to decide whether a
public key or a service is accepted or not.
The approach proposed in [1] is to translate the credential network into a
probabilistic argumentation system [2, 3]. The main part of a probabilistic argu-
mentation system is a set Σ of propositional sentences describing the available
knowledge. The idea thus is to express a given credential network by logical
sentences, like in Maurer’s model [5].
To illustrate the translation, consider the case of a certificate A+πXY ∈ A. Let
A+XY be the proposition representing the event that the certificate A
+π
XY holds.
Since X may only be partially confident in A+XY , one can think of it as a random
event with a given prior probability p(A+XY ) = π. In order to use A
+π
XY to logically
prove AutY , it is necessary that AutX , TrustX , and A+XY all happen to be true
at the same time. As Maurer pointed out in [5], this can expressed by the logical
rule AutX∧TrustX∧A+XY → AutY . The following table shows the corresponding
logical rules for all six credential types [1].
Certificates Recommendations
(C) AutX ∧TrustX∧A+XY →AutY (R) AutX∧TrustX ∧T+XY → TrustY
Revocations Discredits
(V) AutX ∧TrustX∧A−XY →¬AutY (D) AutX∧TrustX ∧T−XY →¬TrustY
Authenticity Ratings Trust Ratings
(CV) AutX ∧TrustX → (A±XY ↔AutY ) (RD) AutX∧TrustX → (T±XY ↔TrustY )
The logical rule for a particular credential C ∈ A ∪ T is denoted by γ(C), i.e.
Σ = {γ(C) : C ∈ A ∪ T } ∪ {AutX0 , T rustX0} is set of propositional sentences
representing a credential network. This is the basis for the evaluation, which con-
sists of two parts. In the first qualitative part, the problem consists in finding the
sets Args(AutX) and Args(TrustX) of arguments and the sets Args(¬AutX)
and Args(¬TrustX) of counter-arguments, for which the hypotheses AutX and
TrustX become true respectively false. Corresponding sets of minimal arguments
args(AutX) = μ(Args(AutX)) are obtained by applying the minimisation op-
erator μ. Arguments and counter-arguments correspond to chains of credentials
between the owner and the participant under consideration. For more details on
this we refer to [1]. The necessary algorithms to compute these sets are described
in Subsection 4.2.
The second quantitative part of the evaluation consists in computing the prob-
abilistic weights of these arguments and counter-arguments. The resulting de-
grees of support dsp(AutX) and dsp(TrustX) are the proabilities that AutX
respectively TrustX are supported by arguments. Similarly, the degrees of possi-
bility dps(AutX) and dps(TrustX) are the probabilities that ¬AutX respectively
¬TrustX are not supported by arguments, thus the probabilities that AutX re-
spectively TrustX remain possible.
To decide whether to accept or reject the propositions TrustX and AutX
of a user X , the owner may define a threshold λ ∈ [0, 1] in order to accept
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AutX whenever dsp(AutX) ≥ λ and TrustX whenever dsp(TrustX) ≥ λ. Note
that not accepting a hypothesis is not necessarily a reason to reject it. For this,
it may be necessary to define another threshold η ∈ [0, 1], for which AutX is
rejected if dps(AutX) ≤ η and similarly for TrustX . Note that η < λ is a
necessary condition to exclude the case of simultaneously accepting and rejecting
a hypothesis. If a hypothesis is neither accepted nor rejected, it means that the
available information is insufficient to make a decision, i.e. more credentials are
needed. This second part of the evaluation will be further discussed in Section 5.
3 The System CAUTION
This section is devoted to a system called Caution, which allows the specifica-
tion, evaluation, and visualization of credential networks.2 The name Caution is
is an abbreviation for credential-based authenticity and trust in open networks.
The system consists of the following three main components:
I. A description language for the specification of credential networks.
The language also contains query commands to start the evaluation
and print out the results.
II. A set of algorithms to perform the qualitative and quantitative eval-
uation with respect to a specified credential network.
III. A visualization environment to obtain a graphical representation of
the network.
Data
Structure
DOT-File
Graphical
Representation
Credential
Network
II. Evaluation
III. Visualization
Algorithm
Sect. 4.2
I. Specification
Arguments,
Counter-
Arguments
Degrees of
Support &
Possibility
Algorithm
Sect. 4.3
GraphvizLanguage
a
b
a b
a b c d
Fig. 2. The Caution framework: components and workflow
The structure of the Caution system with its main components and workflows
is depicted in Fig. 2. An example of a network specification is given in Fig. 1(b).
The corresponding graphical representation is depicted in Fig. 1(a). Examples
of queries with corresponding outputs will be shown in the course of the paper.
2 Consider the Caution website at http://www.iam.unibe.ch/∼run/trust.html.
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The Caution language is a simple description language designed for the spec-
ification and evaluation of credential networks. There is a distinction between
commands for general credentials between two arbitrary users and commands
for credentials issued by the owner. The latter may be considered as special
cases of the former. The Caution language is implemented as a set of Common
Lisp macros, i.e. it can easily be executed or integrated in any Common Lisp
compatible environment. The following self-explanatory list shows all available
Caution commands.
(users <X1> . . . <Xn>) ::= Creates n new users X1, . . . ,Xn.
(owner <X>) ::= Specifies the owner of the network. User X must already exist.
(cert <X> <Y > [<π>]) ::= Specifies a certificate issued by user X. The recipient
is user Y , and π is the (optional) weight of the certificate. If no weight is given,
the default weight π = 1 is assumed. The users X and Y must already exist.
(rec <X> <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for recommendations.
(rev <X> <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for revocations.
(dis <X> <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for discredits.
(a-rate <X> <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for authenticity ratings.
(t-rate <Y > <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for trust ratings.
(aut <Y > [<π>]) ::= Specifies a certificate issued by the owner. The recipient is
user Y , and π is the (optional) weight of the certificate. If no weight is given, the
default weight π = 1 is assumed. The users X and Y must already exist. This
is an abbreviation for (cert <X> <Y > [<π>]), where X denotes the owner.
(trust <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for recommendations.
(negaut <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for revocations.
(distrust <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for discredits.
(show-args [<X1> . . . <Xn>]) ::= Starts the evaluation and outputs the sets of
arguments for each specified user X1, . . . ,Xn. If no user is specified, the sets of
arguments are printed for all users.
(show-counter-args [<X1> . . . <Xn>]) ::= Analogous for counter-arguments.
(show-dsp [<x1> . . . <xn>]) ::= Starts the evaluation and outputs the degrees
of support for each specified user X1, . . . ,Xn. If no user is specified, the degrees
of support are printed for all users.
(show-dps [<x1> . . . <xn>]) ::= Analogous for degrees of possibility.
(show-accepted <λ>) ::= Starts the evaluation and outputs all accepted hypothe-
ses according to the specified threshold λ.
(show-rejected <η>) ::= Analogous for rejected hypotheses.
The starting point for both the evaluation and visualization is a credential net-
work specified with the aid of the Caution language. The execution of the
corresponding Caution commands produces two types of output: an internal
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Common Lisp data structure (step Ia) and a DOT-file3 (step Ib). Both types of
output include all the relevant network data.
The internal data structure is the input for the algorithms to compute the
sets of (minimal) arguments and counter-arguments for AutX and TrustX and
all specified network users X ∈ U0 (steps IIa and IIb). These algorithms will be
further discussed in Section 4.2. The sets of arguments and counter-arguments
are then the inputs for the algorithms to compute corresponding degrees of
support and possibility (steps IIc and IId). Section 4.3 describes a sampling
technique to perform this step.
The above-mentioned DOT-file is the interface to the Graphviz3 software
(step IIIa), which renders the credential network as a directed and weighted
multigraph (step IIIb). Several output formats such as PDF or JPEG are sup-
ported. The picture in Fig. 1a is an output example generated by Graphviz.
4 Algorithms
This section is devoted to the main computational problem related to creden-
tial networks, namely the problem of finding sets of (minimal) arguments and
counter-arguments. General argument finding algorithms are well documented in
the literature [3, 13, 14], but the goal here is a special purpose algorithm for the
particular type of probabilistic argumentation system obtained from a creden-
tial network. This is the main part of this section and the topic of the first two
subsections. The last subsection discusses an approach to compute degrees of
support and possibility by Importance Sampling [16], which is an improvement
of the classical Monte-Carlo method.
4.1 General Idea
In Section 2.1, we have seen how to express the meaning of credentials by logical
rules [1, 5]. Since the rules for ratings are logically equivalent to corresponding
pairs of rules for simple credentials, we only have to deal with the four rules (C),
(R), (V), and (D). In these cases, the conjunction on the left hand side of the
implication is a sufficient condition for the literal on the right hand side. This
means that any combination of arguments for the propositions on the left hand
side is an argument for the literal on the right hand side. This is the basic idea
of the algorithm described in [1], but it is restricted to positive credentials.
In the general case, it is necessary to consider all logically equivalent rules
of the same form, i.e. with a conjunction of literals on the left hand side and a
single literal on the right hand side of the implication. In this way, we obtain four
different versions for each of the above-mentioned rules. Since we are interested
in arguments and counter-arguments for AutX and TrustX , only the ones with
AutX , ¬AutX , TrustX , and ¬Trust on the right hand side are important. The
remaining twelve rules are shown in the following table:
3 DOT is a description language for the specification of arbitrary graphs and Graphviz
is the corresponding rendering tool. See http://www.graphviz.org for details.
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Certificates Recommendations
(C1) AutX ∧ TrustX ∧ A+XY → AutY (R1) AutX ∧ TrustX ∧ T+XY → TrustY
(C2) AutX ∧ ¬AutY ∧ A+XY → ¬TrustX (R2) AutX ∧ ¬TrustY ∧ T+XY → ¬TrustX
(C3) TrustX ∧ ¬AutY ∧ A+XY → ¬AutX (R3) TrustX ∧ ¬TrustY ∧ T+XY → ¬AutX
Revocations Discredits
(V1) AutX ∧ TrustX ∧ A−XY → ¬AutY (D1) AutX ∧ TrustX ∧ T−XY → ¬TrustY
(V2) AutX ∧ AutY ∧ A−XY → ¬TrustX (D2) AutX ∧ TrustY ∧ T−XY → ¬TrustX
(V3) TrustX ∧ AutY ∧ A−XY → ¬AutX (D3) TrustX ∧ TrustY ∧ T−XY → ¬AutX
Of course, the above-mentioned basic idea is applicable to all twelve cases, i.e.
any combination of arguments for the propositions on the left hand side of such
a rule is an argument for the literal on the right hand side. Consider now all
four cases of certificates, recommendations, revocations, and discredits with the
corresponding rules (C1) to (C3), (R1) to (R3), (V1) to (V3), and (D1) to (D3).
This leads us to the following theorems:
Theorem C. Let A+XY ∈ A be a certificate issued by user X for user Y . If
αX ∈ Args(AutX), α¯Y ∈ Args(¬AutY ), and βX ∈ Args(TrustX), it follows:
1. αX ∧ βX ∧ A+XY ∈ Args(AutY ).
2. αX ∧ α¯Y ∧ A+XY ∈ Args(¬TrustX).
3. βX ∧ α¯Y ∧ A+XY ∈ Args(¬AutX).
Theorem R. Let T+XY ∈ T be a recommendation issued by user X for user
Y . If αX ∈ Args(AutX), βX ∈ Args(TrustX), and β¯Y ∈ Args(¬TrustY ), it
follows:
1. αX ∧ βX ∧ T+XY ∈ Args(TrustY ).
2. αX ∧ β¯Y ∧ T+XY ∈ Args(¬TrustX).
3. βX ∧ β¯Y ∧ T+XY ∈ Args(¬AutX).
Theorem V. Let A−XY ∈ A be a revocation issued by user X for user Y . If
αX ∈ Args(AutX), βX ∈ Args(TrustX), and αY ∈ Args(AutY ), it follows:
1. αX ∧ βX ∧ A−XY ∈ Args(¬AutY ).
2. αX ∧ αY ∧ A−XY ∈ Args(¬TrustX).
3. βX ∧ αY ∧ A−XY ∈ Args(¬AutX).
Theorem D. Let T−XY ∈ A a discredit issued by user X for user Y . If αX ∈
Args(AutX), βX ∈ Args(TrustX), and βY ∈ Args(TrustY ), it follows:
1. αX ∧ βX ∧ T−XY ∈ Args(¬TrustY ).
2. αX ∧ βY ∧ T−XY ∈ Args(¬TrustX).
3. βX ∧ βY ∧ T−XY ∈ Args(¬AutX).
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The four theorems C, R, V, and D form the computational basis for the algo-
rithms discussed in the next subsection. Formal proofs are given in [15].
In the presence of counter-arguments, it is also necessary to compute sets of
possible conflicts [3]. With respect to a credential network, computing conflicts
is a rather trivial issue (see [15]), which will not be further discussed here.
4.2 Computing Arguments
We are now in a position to discuss the algorithm for the computation of the sets
of (minimal) arguments and counter-arguments. The discussion will be based on
the following notational conventions. Sets of users receiving a credential C from
X will be denoted by U A+X→ (if C is a certificate), U T
+
X→ (if C is a recommen-
dation), U A−X→ (if C is a revocation), and U T
−
X→ (if C is a discredit). Similarly,
sets of users issuing a credential C for X are written as U A+X← (if C is a cer-
tificate), U T+X← (if C is a recommendation), U A
−
X← (if C is a revocation), and
U T−X← (if C is a discredit). The initially empty sets of arguments will be denoted
by args∗(AutX), args∗(TrustX), args∗(¬AutX), and args∗(¬TrustX). Finally
args∗(⊥) denotes the set of conflicts.
The idea now is to generalize the simple algorithm proposed in [1] to the case of
positive and negative credentials. This means that the two recursive procedures
addPosAutArg(α,X) and addPosTrustArg(α,X), on which the algorithm in [1]
is based, need to be extended and accompanied by two additional procedures
addNegAutArg(α,X) and addNegTrustArg(α,X).
a) Arguments. Let us first have a look at the extended versions of the pro-
cedures addPosAutArg(α,X) and addPosTrustArg(α,X). In the following, we
will describe the former procedure in detail.
The idea of the algorithm is to incrementally fill up the sets args∗(AutX)
and args∗(TrustX) according to the theorems C, R, V, and D described in
the last subsection. Each recursive call means to add a new argument α to
the current set of arguments. At the beginning (line 3), the new argument α
is checked for minimality with respect to the current set args∗(AutX). If it is
not minimal, the procedure stops. If α is minimal, it is added to args∗(AutX)
and other non-minimal arguments are deleted (line 4). According to the twelve
logical rules and the corresponding theorems, the new argument α generates
then a cascade of recursive calls (line 6 downward). Note that AutX or AutY
appears ten times as a positive literal on the left hand side of the twelve logical
rules, i.e. addPosAutArg(α,X) includes ten recursive calls. For example, line
6 and 7 in the procedure correspond to the statements (1) and (2) of Theo-
rem C. The situation in the case of addPosTrustArg(α,X) is analogous. On
the left hand side of the twelve logical rules, TrustX or TrustY appears ten
times as a positive literal, i.e. addPosTrustArg(α,X) contains ten recursive
calls as well. The duality between addPosAutArg(α,X), which is shown below,
and addPosTrustArg(α,X) is obvious. This allows us to abstain from showing
the procedure addPosTrustArg(α,X) explicitly. For more details we refer to [15].
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procedure addPosAutArg(α,X)1
begin2
if not ∃ α′ ∈ args∗(AutX) such that α′ ⊂ α then3
set args∗(AutX) to μ(args∗(AutX) ∪ {α})4
for Y ∈ U A+X→ do5
for βX ∈ args∗(TrustX) do addPosAutArg(α ∧ βX ∧ A+XY , Y )6
for α¯Y ∈ args∗(¬AutY ) do addNegTrustArg(α ∧ α¯Y ∧ A+XY , X)7
end8
for Y ∈ U T+X→ do9
for βX ∈ args∗(TrustX) do addPosTrustArg(α ∧ βX ∧ T+XY , Y )10
for β¯Y ∈ args∗(¬TrustY ) do addNegTrustArg(α ∧ β¯Y ∧ T+XY , X)11
end12
for Y ∈ U A−X→ do13
for βX ∈ args∗(TrustX) do addNegAutArg(α ∧ βX ∧ A−XY , Y )14
for αY ∈ args∗(AutY ) do addNegTrustArg(α ∧ αY ∧ A−XY , X)15
end16
for Y ∈ U T−X→ do17
for βX ∈ args∗(TrustX) do addNegTrustArg(α ∧ βX ∧ T−XY , Y )18
for βY ∈ args∗(TrustY ) do addNegTrustArg(α ∧ βY ∧ T−XY , X)19
end20
for Y ∈ U A−X← do21
for αY ∈ args∗(AutY ) do addNegTrustArg(α ∧ αY ∧ A−YX , Y )22
for βY ∈ args∗(TrustY ) do addNegAutArg(α ∧ βY ∧ A−YX , Y )23
end24
end25
end26
b) Counter-Arguments. The corresponding procedures responsible for computing
counter-arguments follow the same scheme, but they are considerably simpler.
This is due to the fact that AutY appears only in the conditions of (C2) and
(C3) as a negative literal. Similarly, TrustY appears only in the conditions of
(R2) and (R3) as a negative literal. Both procedures addNegAutArg(α,X) and
addNegTrustArg(α,X) are thus limited to two recursive calls only. In the case
of addNegAutArg(α,X), the procedure looks as follows:
procedure addNegAutArg(α,X)1
begin2
if not ∃ α′ ∈ args∗(¬AutX) such that α′ ⊂ α then3
set args∗(¬AutX) to μ(args∗(¬AutX) ∪ {α})4
for Y ∈ U A+X← do5
for αY ∈ args∗(AutY ) do addNegTrustArg(α ∧ αY ∧ A+YX , Y )6
for βY ∈ args∗(TrustY ) do addNegAutArg(α ∧ βY ∧ A+YX , Y )7
end8
end9
end10
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Again, since addNegTrustArg(α,X) is fully analogous to addNegAutArg(α,X),
we abstain from showing it explicitly.
c) Main Procedure. The main procedure computeArgs begins with the initial-
isation of the sets of arguments and counter-arguments to the empty set. The
recursive computation of the arguments starts by adding the empty argument 
(the one that is always true) to the sets args∗(AutX0) and args∗(TrustX0). This
reflects the assumption that X0 is implicitly authentic and trustworthy. The two
initial calls are therefore addPosAutArg(, X0) and addPosTrustArg(, X0).
Finally, the conflicts are computed and added to each argument set in order
to complete the computation. This step is performed by calling the procedure
addConflicts, which is a very simple one (see [15] for further details). Once the
computation terminates, the procedure returns the sets of minimal arguments
for all users X ∈ U0 in the credential network. We will see in Section 5 how the
sample network of Fig. 1 is evaluated within the Caution environment.
function computeArgs()1
begin2
for X ∈ U0, h ∈ {AutX , T rustX ,¬AutX ,¬TrustX ,⊥} do3
set args∗(h) to ∅4
end5
do addPosAutArg(, X0)6
do addPosTrustArg(, X0)7
do addConflicts(args∗(⊥))8
return {args∗(h) : h ∈ {AutX , T rustX ,¬AutX ,¬TrustX ,⊥}, X ∈ U0}9
end10
4.3 Computing Degrees of Support and Possibility
Once the sets of minimal arguments have been computed, we can proceed with the
quantitative evaluation, thus the computation of degrees of support and possibil-
ity for a hypothesis of interest. The problem is to calculate the probabilities of the
argument sets args(h), which means to compute the probability of a DNF, a prob-
lem that is known to be a hard. The alternative we propose is to approximate the
exact solution by applying a technique called importance sampling [16].
The algorithm computeProb follows a general setting with m ordered, non-
exclusive events E1, ..., Em ⊆ U (universe) with associated probabilies p1, ..., pm.
The problem is to estimate the probability of the union E = E1 ∪ ... ∪ En. The
main idea is the following: instead of sampling uniformly from U , we concentrate
on the sets of interest Ei and thus sample uniformly from E. Applying this
setting to our problem means to choose an argument αi ∈ args(h) according to
its probability p(αi) and then to choose (uniformly) a random sample compatible
with αi. The trial is successful if the sample is not contained in another argument
αj , j < i. This procedure is repeated N times. The ratio of successful trials to
the total number of trials, multiplied with the sum of probabilities of all involved
arguments, gives an estimate for the probability of the entire argument set under
consideration. The general algorithm is shown below.
176 J. Jonczy and R. Haenni
function computeProb({E1, . . . , Em}, {p1, . . . , pm}, N)1
begin2
set success to 03
for k from 1 to N do4
select i randomly with probability pi/
Pm
i=1 pi5
select x ∈ Ei uniformly at random6
if  j < i such that x ∈ Ej then set success to success + 17
end8
return success
N
·Pmi=1 pi9
end10
5 Example
Consider again the credential network of Fig. 1. With respect to user D, there
are some arguments and counter-arguments for both AutD and TrustD. The
following output box shows the arguments obtained by calling (show-args d)
and the counter-arguments by calling (show-counter-args d) in the Caution
environment. Each numbered line denotes a minimal (counter-) argument.
>> (show-args d)
USER: D
args(Aut_D):
0: ((CERT A C) (CERT C D) (REC A C))
1: ((CERT A B) (CERT B C) (CERT C D) (REC A B) (REC A C))
args(Trust_D):
0: ((CERT A B) (CERT B C) (CERT C D) (REV B D) (REC A B) (REC A C))
1: ((CERT A B) (CERT A C) (CERT C D) (REV B D) (REC A B) (REC A C))
2: ((CERT A B) (REC A B) (REC B D))
>> (show-counter-args d)
USER: D
counter-args(Aut_D):
0: ((CERT A C) (REC A C) (REV C D))
1: ((CERT A B) (REV B D) (REC A B))
2: ((CERT A B) (CERT B C) (REC A B) (REC A C) (REV C D))
counter-args(Trust_D):
0: ((CERT A B) (CERT B C) (CERT C D) (REV B D) (REC A B) (REC A C))
1: ((CERT A B) (CERT A C) (CERT C D) (REV B D) (REC A B) (REC A C))
2: ((CERT A B) (REC A B) (DIS B D))
Assume now that the corresponding degrees of support and possibility have
been calculated for the hypotheses AutX and TrustX , for all network users X ∈
{A,B,C,D}, as shown in the table below. Suppose now the owner A uses two
thresholds, namely λ = 0.7 for accepting a hypothesis and η = 0.6 for rejecting
it. In this case, the hypotheses AutB and TrustB are accepted. The owner may
thus consider user B as being trustworthy as well as authentic. A himself receives
of course maximal support for both, authenticity and trust, therefore AutA and
TrustA are accepted too. On the other hand, only TrustD is rejected because
its degree of possibility is below the threshold. All other hypotheses are left
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open. In the following table, the values of all accepted and rejected hypotheses
are emphasised in bold. In the output box next to it, the values for user D are
shown, as returned by the corresponding Caution commands.
A B C D
dsp(AutX) 1.000 0.776 0.681 0.384
dps(AutX) 1.000 0.969 0.969 0.837
dsp(TrustX) 1.000 0.888 0.663 0.274
dps(TrustX) 1.000 0.986 0.948 0.589
>> (show-dsp d)
USER: D
dsp(Aut_D) = 0.384
dsp(Trust_D) = 0.274
>> (show-dps d)
USER: D
dps(Aut_D) = 0.837
dps(Trust_D) = 0.589
In Fig. 3(a), pairs of degree of support and degree of possibility are depicted as
points in the opinion triangle [8]. The right corner stands for dsp = 1 (max.
support), the left corner stands for dps = 0 (min. support), and the top corner
means dps − dsp = 1 (max. ignorance). The two thresholds are values on the
unit interval between Rejection and Acceptation. Figure 3(b) shows all accepted
and rejected hypotheses as returned by the corresponding Caution commands.
Rejection Acceptation
AutD
AutC
TrustC
AutB
η = 0.6 λ = 0.7
TrustB
TrustD
TrustA
AutA,
(a)
>> (show-accepted 0.7)
0: Aut_A
1: Trust_A
2: Aut_B
3: Trust_B
>> (show-rejected 0.6)
0: Trust_D
(b)
Fig. 3. (a) Hypotheses lying within the left subtraingle are rejected, those lying within
the right subtraingle are accepted, and the remaining hypotheses are left open. (b)
Output of the commands show-accepted and show-rejected.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents expressive algorithms for the computation of measures for
the quantification of user trust as well as public key authenticity in open net-
works. The recently introduced concept of credential networks serves as the
underlying formal model. The algorithms proposed in this paper work for arbi-
trary credential networks, i.e. where all types of credentials are involved. The
resulting degrees of support and possibility state to what extent a user should
be regarded as being authentic and trustworthy. A second contribution of this
paper is the introduction of the Caution system, which provides an interactive
environment used for the specification, evaluation, and visualisation of a creden-
tial network. Arbitrary networks can be described and evaluated by means of a
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simple description and query language. Future work will concentrate on a more
differentiated trust model. Another goal is to speed up the necessary probability
calculation using more efficient data structures.
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Abstract. Trust propagation is the principle by which new trust relationships
can be derived from pre-existing trust relationship. Trust transitivity is the most
explicit form of trust propagation, meaning for example that if Alice trusts Bob,
and Bob trusts Claire, then by transitivity, Alice will also trust Claire. This as-
sumes that Bob recommends Claire to Alice. Trust fusion is also an important
element in trust propagation, meaning that Alice can combine Bob’s recommen-
dation with her own personal experience in dealing with Claire, or with other
recommendations about Claire, in order to derive a more reliable measure of trust
in Claire. These simple principles, which are essential for human interaction in
business and everyday life, manifests itself in many different forms. This paper
investigates possible formal models that can be implemented using belief reason-
ing based on subjective logic. With good formal models, the principles of trust
propagation can be ported to online communities of people, organisations and
software agents, with the purpose of enhancing the quality of those communities.
1 Introduction
Trust is a phenomenon that only exists among living species equipped with advanced
cognitive faculties. One usually considers the appreciation of trust to be a purely human
characteristic, but it would be arrogant to exclude animals. When assuming that soft-
ware agents can equipped with capabilities to reason about trust, risk assessment and
decision making, one can talk about artificial trust. There is a rapidly growing growing
literature on this topic [2, 3, 12, 19].
What humans perceive through their senses is a more or less distorted version of
a reality which they assume exists. A considerable part of human science consists of
modelling aspects of the world for the purpose of understanding, prediction and control.
When trying to make statements about the assumed world, we actually make statements
about the subjective perceived world. However, most reasoning models are designed for
the assumed reality, not for the perceived reality.
A quite different approach would be to design a reasoning model for the perceived
world. A key component of such a model is to include uncertainty resulting from partial
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 179–192, 2006.
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ignorance. Several alternative calculi and logics which include degrees of uncertainty
have been proposed and with some success applied to practical problems [4, 20]. The
problem with many of the proposals has been that the calculi diverge considerably from
standard probability calculus and therefore have received relatively little acceptance. A
second key component of a model for the perceived world is to accept the fact that every
belief is individual.
Subjective logic, which will be described here, takes both the uncertainty and indi-
viduality of beliefs into account while still being compatible with standard logic and
probability calculus. The migration from the assumed towards the perceived world is
achieved by adding an uncertainty dimension to the single valued probability measure,
and by taking the individuality of beliefs into account.
A distinction can be made between interpreting trust as a belief about the reliabil-
ity of an object, and as a decision to depend on an object [14]. In this paper, trust is
interpreted in the former sense, as a belief about reliability. As a calculus of beliefs,
subjective logic can therefore be used for trust reasoning. Although this model can
never be perfect, and able to reflect all the nuances of trust, it can be shown to respect
the main intuitive properties of trust and trust propagation.
As soon as one attempts to perform computations with input parameters in the form
of subjective trust measures, parameter dependence becomes a major issue. If Alice for
example wants to know whether tomorrow will be sunny, she can ask her friends, and
if they all say it will be sunny she will start believing the same. However, her friends
might all have based their opinions on the same weather-forecast, so their opinions are
dependent, and in that case, asking only one of them would be sufficient. It would in fact
be wrong of Alice to take all her friends’ opinions into account as being independent,
because it would strengthen her opinion without any good reason. Being able to identify
cases of dependent opinions is therefore important, but alas difficult.
2 Trust Modeling with Subjective Logic
Subjective logic is a belief calculus specifically developed for modeling trust relation-
ships. In subjective logic, beliefs are represented on binary state spaces, where each
of the two possible states can consist of sub-states. Belief functions on binary state
spaces are called subjective opinions and are formally expressed in the form of an
ordered tuple ωAx = (b, d, u, a), where b, d, and u represent belief, disbelief and un-
certainty respectively where b, d, u ∈ [0, 1] and b + d + u = 1. The base rate pa-
rameter a ∈ [0, 1] represents the base rate probability in the absence of evidence, and
is used for computing an opinion’s probability expectation value E(ωAx ) = b + au,
meaning that a determines how uncertainty shall contribute to E(ωAx ). A subjective
opinion is interpreted as an agent A’s belief in the truth of statement x. Ownership of
an opinion is represented as a superscript so that for example A’s opinion about x is
denoted as ωAx .
Subjective opinions are equivalent to beta PDFs (probability density functions) de-
noted by beta (α, β) [1]. The beta class of density functions express probability density
over the same binary event spaces as for subjective opinions, and this is also the basis
for their equivalence.
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Let r and s express the number of positive and negative past observations respec-
tively, and let a express the a priori or base rate, then α and β can be determined as:
α = r + 2a , β = s + 2(1 − a) . (1)
The following bijective mapping between the opinion parameters and the beta PDF
parameters can be determined analytically [5, 17].⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎩
bx = r/(r + s + 2)
dx = s/(r + s + 2)
ux = 2/(r + s + 2)
ax = base rate of x
⇐⇒
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎩
r = 2bx/ux
s = 2dx/ux
1 = bx + dx + ux
a = base rate of x
(2)
Without evidence, the base rate alone determines the probability distribution. As more
evidence becomes available, the influence of the base rate diminishes, until the evidence
alone determines the probability distribution. In order to separate between base rate and
evidence in the beta PDF, we define the augmented beta PDF notation below.
Definition 1 (Augmented Beta PDF Notation). Let the a priori beta PDF as a function
of the base rate a, without evidence, be expressed as beta(2a, 2(1 − a)). Let the a
posteriori beta PDF with positive evidence r and negative evidence s be expressed as
beta(r + 2a, s + 2(1 − a)). The augmented beta PDF with the 3 parameters (r, s, a)
is then simply written as ϕ(r, s, a), defined by:
ϕ(r, s, a) = beta(r + 2a, s + 2(1 − a)) . (3)
Opinions can be mapped into the interior of an equal-sided triangle, and augmented
beta PDFs can be visualised as 2D plots, as illustrated in Fig.1.
Fig.1 illustrates the example of a subjective opinion ωx = (0.7, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5), and
the corresponding equivalent augmented beta PDF ϕ(7, 1, 12 ).
The fact that subjective logic is compatible with binary logic and probability calculus
means that whenever corresponding operators exist in probability calculus, the proba-
bility expectation value E(ω) of an opinion ω that has been derived with subjective
a
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Fig. 1. Example equivalent subjective opinion and beta PDF
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logic, is always equal to the probability value that would have been derived had sim-
ple probability calculus been applied. Similarly, whenever corresponding binary logic
operators exist, an absolute opinion (i.e. equivalent to binary logic TRUE or FALSE)
derived with subjective logic, is always equal to the truth value that can be derived with
binary logic.
Subjective logic has a sound mathematical basis and is compatible with binary logic
and traditional Bayesian analysis. Subjective logic defines a rich set of operators for
combining subjective opinions in various ways [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18]. Some
operators represent generalisations of binary logic and probability calculus, whereas
others are unique to belief calculus because they depend on belief ownership. With
belief ownership it is possible to explicitly express that different agents have different
opinions about the same issue.
The advantage of subjective logic over probability calculus and binary logic is its
ability to explicitly express and take advantage of ignorance and belief ownership. Sub-
jective logic can be applied to all situations where probability calculus can be applied,
and to many situations where probability calculus fails precisely because it can not cap-
ture degrees of ignorance. Subjective opinions can be interpreted as probability density
functions, making subjective logic a simple and efficient calculus for probability den-
sity functions. An online demonstration of subjective logic can be accessed at:
http://www.fit.qut.edu.au/∼josang/sl/.
3 Trust Fusion
3.1 Fusion of Independent Trust
This operator is most naturally expressed in the evidence space, so we will define it
there first and subsequently map it over to the opinion space.
Definition 2 (Consensus Operator for Independent Beta PDFs). Let ϕ(rAx , sAx , aAx )
and ϕ(rBx , sBx , aBx ) be two augmented beta PDFs respectively held by the agents A and
B regarding the trustworthiness of x. The augmented beta PDF ϕ(rABx , sABx , aABx )
defined by ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
rABx = r
A
x + r
B
x
sABx = s
A
x + s
B
x
aABx =
aAx (r
A
x +s
A
x )+a
B
x (r
B
x +s
B
x )
rAx +rBx +sAx +sBx
is then called the consensus of A’s and B’s estimates, as if it was an estimate held by
an imaginary agent [A,B]. By using the symbol ⊕ to designate this operation, we get
ϕ(rABx , s
AB
x , a
AB
x ) = ϕ(r
A
x , s
A
x , a
A
x ) ⊕ ϕ(rBx , sBx , aBx ).
The consensus rule for combining independent opinions is easily obtained by using
Def.2 above and the evidence-opinion mapping of Eq.(2).
Theorem 1 (Consensus Operator for Independent Opinions). Let ωAx = (bAx , dAx ,
uAx , a
A
x ) and ωBx = (bBx , dBx , uBx , aBx ) be trust in x from A and B respectively. The
opinion ωABx = (bABx , dABx , uABx , aABx ) is then called the consensus between ωAx
and ωBx , denoting the trust that an imaginary agent [A,B] would have in x, as if
Exploring Different Types of Trust Propagation 183
that agent represented both A and B. In case of Bayesian (totally certain) opinions,
their relative weight can be defined as γA/B = lim(uBx /uAx ).
Case I:
uAx + u
B
x − uAx uBx = 0⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
bABx =
bAx u
B
x +b
B
x u
A
x
uAx +uBx −uAx uBx
dABx =
dAx u
B
x +d
B
x u
A
x
uAx +uBx −uAx uBx
uABx =
uAx u
B
x
uAx +uBx −uAx uBx
aABx =
aAx u
B
x +a
B
x u
A
x−(aAx +aBx )uAx uBx
uAx +uBx −2uAx uBx
Case II:
uAx + uBx − uAx uBx = 0⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
bABx =
(γA/B bAx +b
B
x )
(γA/B+1)
dABx =
(γA/B dAx +d
B
x )
(γA/B+1)
uABx = 0
aABx =
γA/B aAx +a
B
x
γA/B+1 .
By using the symbol ‘⊕’ to designate this operator, we can write ωABx = ωAx ⊕ ωBx .
It can be shown that ⊕ is both commutative and associative which means that the order
in which opinions are combined has no importance. Opinion independence must be
assured, which obviously translates into not allowing an entity’s opinion to be counted
more than once.
The effect of independent consensus is to reduce uncertainty. For example the case
where several witnesses give consistent testimony should amplify the judge’s opinion,
and that is exactly what the operator does. Consensus between an infinite number of not
totally uncertain (i.e. u < 1) opinions would necessarily produce a consensus opinion
with u = 0. Fig.2 illustrates an example of applying the consensus operator for inde-
pendent opinions where ωAx = {0.8, 0.1, 0.1, a} and ωBx = {0.1, 0.8, 0.1, a}, so that
ωABx = ωAx ⊕ ωBx = {0.47, 0.47, 0.06, a} .
d
u
b
⊕
bd
u
=
d b
u
Fig. 2. Example of applying the consensus operator for fusing independent trust
3.2 Fusion of Dependent Trust
Assume two agents A and B having simultaneously observed the same process. Be-
cause their observations are identical, their respective opinions will necessarily be de-
pendent, and a consensus according to Def.2 would be meaningless.
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If the two observers have made exactly the same observations, and their estimates
are equal, it is sufficient to take only one of the estimates into account. However, al-
though two observers witness the same phenomenon, it is possible (indeed, likely) that
they record and interpret it differently. The observers may have started and ended the
observations at slightly different times, one of them may have missed or misinterpreted
some of the events, resulting in varying, but still dependent opinions.
We will define a consensus rule for dependent beta PDFs based on the average of
recorded positive and negative observations. Let two dependent augmented beta PDFs
be ϕ(rAx , sAx , aAx ) and ϕ(rBx , sBx , aBx ), then we define the consensus estimate by the
average of their parameters as ϕ( r
A
x +r
B
x
2 ,
sAx +s
B
x
2 ,
aAx +a
B
x
2 ). The general expression for
the consensus between n dependent augmented beta PDFs can be defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Consensus Operator for Dependent Beta PDFs). Let ϕ(rAix , sAix , aAix ),
where i ∈ [1, n], be n dependent augmented beta PDFs respectively held by the agents
A1, ..., An about the proposition x. The depended consensus beta PDF is then
ϕ(rA1...Anx , s
A1...An
x , a
A1...An
x ), where:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
r
A1...An
x =
n
1 r
Ai
x
n
s
A1...An
x =
n
1 s
Ai
x
n
a
A1...An
x =
n
1 a
Ai
x
n
By using the symbol ⊕ to designate this operation, we get
ϕ(rA1...Anx , s
A1...An
x , a
A1...An
x ) = ϕ(rA1x , sA1x , aA1x )⊕ . . .⊕ϕ(rAnx , sAnx , aAnx ). 
The corresponding consensus operator is obtained by applying Eq.(2) to Def.3.
Theorem 2 (Consensus Operator for Dependent Opinions). Let ωAix = {bAix , dAix ,
uAix , a
Ai
x } where i ∈ [1, n], be n dependent opinions respectively held by agents
A1, ..., An about the same proposition x. The depended consensus is then ωA1...Anx =
{bA1...Anx , dA1...Anx , uA1...Anx , aA1...Anx }, where:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
b
A1...An
x =
n
1 (b
Ai
x /u
Ai
x )
n
1 (b
Ai
x /u
Ai
x )+ n1 (d
Ai
x /u
Ai
x )+n
d
A1...An
x =
n
1 (d
Ai
x /u
Ai
x )
n
1 (b
Ai
x /u
Ai
x )+ n1 (d
Ai
x /u
Ai
x )+n
u
A1...An
x = nn
1 (b
Ai
x /u
Ai
x )+ n1 (d
Ai
x /u
Ai
x )+n
a
A1...An
x =
n
1 a
Ai
x
n
where all the uAix are different from zero. By using the symbol ⊕ to designate this
operation, we get ωA1...Anx = ωA1x ⊕ . . .⊕ωAnx .
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The ⊕ operator is both commutative and associative. The effect of the dependent con-
sensus operator is to produce an opinion which is based on an average of positive and
an average of negative evidence. Fig.3 illustrates an example of applying the con-
sensus operator for dependent opinions where ωAx = {0.8, 0.1, 0.1, a} and ωBx =
{0.1, 0.8, 0.1, a}, so that ωABx = ωAx ⊕ωBx = {0.45, 0.45, 0.10, a} .
d
u
b
⊕
bd
u
=
d
u
b
Fig. 3. Example of applying the consensus operator for dependent opinions
3.3 Fusion of Trust Under Partial Dependence
Let two agents A and B observed the same process during two partially overlapping
periods. If it is known exactly which events were observed by both, one of the agents
can simply dismiss these observations, and their opinions will be independent. However,
it may not always be possible to determine which observations are identical.
Fig.4 illustrates a situation of partly dependent observations. Assuming that the
fraction of overlapping observations is known, the dependent and the independent
parts of their observations can be estimated, so that a consensus operator can be
defined [13].
In the figure, ωAi(B)x and ωBi(A)x represent the independent parts of A and B’s opin-
ions, whereas ωAd(B)x and ωBd(A)x represent their dependent parts.
Let ϕAx ’s fraction of dependence with ϕBx and vice versa be represented by the de-
pendence factors λAd(B)x and λBd(A)x . The dependent and independent augmented betas
can then be defined as a function of the dependence factors.
xϕ
   ’s observations
   ’s observations
A
B
ϕ
xϕ
xϕ
A  (B) B  (A)i ix
dB  (A)
dA  (B)
Fig. 4. Beta PDFs based on partly dependent observations
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ϕ
Ai(B)
x :
{
r
Ai(B)
x = rAx (1 − λAd(B)x )
s
Ai(B)
x = sAx (1 − λAd(B)x )
ϕ
Bi(A)
x :
{
r
Bi(A)
x = rBx (1 − λBd(A)x )
s
Bi(A)
x = sBx (1 − λBd(A)x )
ϕ
Ad(B)
x :
{
r
Ad(B)
x = rAx λ
Ad(B)
x
s
Ad(B)
x = sAx λ
Ad(B)
x
ϕ
Bd(A)
x :
{
r
Bd(A)
x = rBx λ
Bd(A)
x
s
Bd(A)
x = sBx λ
Bd(A)
x
(4)
The cumulative fusion of partially dependent beta PDFs can then be defined as a
function of the dependent and independent parts.
Definition 4 (Consensus Operator for Partially Dependent Beta PDFs). Let ϕAx and
ϕBx be two augmented beta PDFs respectively held by the agents A and B regarding
the trustworthiness of x. We will use the symbol ⊕˜ to designate consensus between
partially dependent augmented betas. As before ⊕ is the operator for entirely dependent
augmented betas. The consensus of A and B’s augmented betas can then be written as:
ϕAx ⊕˜ϕBx = ϕABx
= ϕ(Ad(B)Bd(A))Ai(B)Bi(A)x
= (ϕAd(B)x ⊕ϕBd(A)x ) ⊕ ϕAi(B)x ⊕ ϕBi(A)x
(5)
The equivalent representation of dependent and independent opinions can be obtained
by using Eq.(4) and the evidence-opinion mapping Eq.(2). The reciprocal dependence
factors are as before denoted by λAd(B) and λBd(A).
ω
Ai(B)
x :
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
b
Ai(B)
x = bAx μ
Ai(B)
x
d
Ai(B)
x = dAx μ
Ai(B)
x
u
Ai(B)
x = uAx μ
Ai(B)
x /(1 − λAd(B)x ) ,
μ
Ai(B)
x =
1−λAd(B)x
(1−λAd(B)x )(bAx +dAx )+uAx
ω
Ad(B)
x :
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b
Ad(B)
x = bAx μ
Ad(B)
x
d
Ad(B)
x = dAx μ
Ad(B)
x
u
Ad(B)
x = uAx μ
Ad(B)
x /λ
Ad(B)
x ,
μ
Ad(B)
x =
λAd(B)x
λ
Ad(B)
x (bAx +dAx )+uAx
ω
Bi(A)
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b
Bi(A)
x = bBx μ
Bi(A)
x
d
Bi(A)
x = dBx μ
Bi(A)
x
u
Bi(A)
x = uBx μ
Bi(A)
x /(1 − λBd(A)x ) ,
μ
Bi(A)
x =
1−λBd(A)x
(1−λBd(A)x )(bBx +dBx )+uBx
ω
Bd(A)
x :
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
b
Bd(A)
x = bBx μ
Bd(A)
x
d
Bd(A)
x = dBx μ
Bd(A)
x
u
Bd(A)
x = uBx μ
Bd(A)
x /λ
Bd(A)
x ,
μ
Bd(A)
x =
λBd(A)x
λ
Bd(A)
x (bBx +dBx )+uBx
(6)
Having specified the separate dependent and independent parts of two partially de-
pendent opinions, we can now define the consensus operator for partially dependent
opinions.
Theorem 3 (Consensus Operator for Partially Dependent Opinions). Let A and
B have the partially dependent opinions ωAx and ωBx respectively, about the same
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proposition x, and let their dependent and independent parts be expressed according to
Eq.(6). We will use the symbol ⊕˜ to designate consensus between partially dependent
opinions. As before ⊕ is the operator for entirely dependent opinions. The consensus of
A and B’s opinions can then be written as:
ωAx ⊕˜ωBx = ωABx
= ω(Ad(B)Bd(A))Ai(B)Bi(A)x
= (ωAd(B)x ⊕ωBd(A)x ) ⊕ ωAi(B)x ⊕ ωBi(A)x
(7)
It is easy to prove that for any opinion ωAx with a dependence factor λ
Ad(B)
x to any other
opinion ωBx the following equality holds:
ωAx = ω
Ai(B)
x ⊕ ωAd(B)x (8)
4 Trust Transitivity
Assume two agents A and B where A trusts B, and B believes that proposition x is true.
Then by transitivity, agent A will also believe that proposition x is true. This assumes
that B recommends x to A. In our approach, trust and belief are formally expressed
as opinions. The transitive linking of these two opinions consists of discounting B’s
opinion about x by A’s opinion about B, in order to derive A’s opinion about x. This
principle is illustrated in Fig.5 below. The solid arrows represent initial direct trust, and
the dotted arrow represents derived indirect trust.
A
A
B
B
xωω
A
BB
xx
A:B
xω
Fig. 5. Principle of the discounting operator
Trust transitivity, as trust itself, is a human mental phenomenon, so there is no such
thing as objective transitivity, and trust transitivity therefore lends itself to different
interpretations. We see two main difficulties. The first is related to the effect of A dis-
believing that B will give a good advice. What does this exactly mean? We will give
two different interpretations and definitions. The second difficulty relates to the effect
of base rate trust in a transitive path. We will briefly examine this, and provide the defi-
nition of a base rate sensitive discounting operator as an alternative to the two previous
which are base rate insensitive.
4.1 Uncertainty Favouring Trust Transitivity
A’s disbelief in the recommending agent B means that A thinks that B ignores the truth
value of x. As a result A also ignores the truth value of x.
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Definition 5 (Uncertainty Favouring Discounting). Let A, B and be two agents
where A’s opinion about B’s recommendations is expressed as ωAB ={bAB, dAB, uAB, aAB},
and let x be a proposition where B’s opinion about x is recommended to A with the
opinion ωBx = {bBx , dBx , uBx , aBx }. Let ωA:Bx = {bA:Bx , dA:Bx , uA:Bx , aA:Bx } be the opin-
ion such that: ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
bA:Bx = b
A
Bb
B
x
dA:Bx = b
A
Bd
B
x
uA:Bx = dAB + u
A
B + b
A
Bu
B
x
aA:Bx = a
B
x
then ωA:Bx is called the uncertainty favouring discounted opinion of A. By using the
symbol ⊗ to designate this operation, we get ωA:Bx = ωAB ⊗ ωBx . 
It is easy to prove that this operator is associative but not commutative. This means that
the combination of opinions can start in either end of the path, and that the order in
which opinions are combined is significant. In a path with more than one recommending
entity, opinion independence must be assumed, which for example translates into not
allowing the same entity to appear more than once in a transitive path. Fig.6 illustrates
an example of applying the discounting operator for independent opinions, where ωAB =
{0.1, 0.8, 0.1} discountsωBx ={0.8, 0.1, 0.1} to produce ωA:Bx ={0.08, 0.01, 0.91}.
bd
u
⊗
d
u
b
=
d b
u
Fig. 6. Example of applying the discounting operator for independent opinions
4.2 Opposite Belief Favouring
A’s disbelief in the recommending agent B means that A thinks that B consistently
recommends the opposite of his real opinion about the truth value of x. As a result, A
not only disbelieves in x to the degree that B recommends belief, but she also believes
in x to the degree that B recommends disbelief in x, because the combination of two
disbeliefs results in belief in this case.
Definition 6 (Opposite Belief Favouring Discounting). Let A, B and be two agents
where A’s opinion about B’s recommendations is expressed as ωAB ={bAB, dAB, uAB, aAB},
and letx be a proposition whereB’s opinion aboutx is recommended to A as the opinion
ωBx ={bBx , dBx , uBx , aBx }. LetωA:Bx ={bA:Bx , dA:Bx , uA:Bx , aA:Bx } be the opinion such that:⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
bA:Bx = bABb
B
x + dABd
B
x
dA:Bx = bABd
B
x + dABb
B
x
uA:Bx = u
A
B + (b
A
B + d
A
B)u
B
x
aA:Bx = a
B
x
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then ωA:Bx is called the opposite belief favouring discounted recommendation from B
to A. By using the symbol ⊗ to designate this operation, we get ωA:Bx = ωAB ⊗ ωBx . 
This operator models the principle that “your enemy’s enemy is your friend”. That
might be the case in some situations, and the operator should only be applied when the
situation makes it plausible. It is doubtful whether it is meaningful to model more than
two arcs in a transitive path with this principle. In other words, it is doubtful whether
the enemy of your enemy’s enemy necessarily is your enemy too.
4.3 Base Rate Sensitive Transitivity
In the transitivity operators defined in Sec.4.1 and Sec.4.2 above, aAB had no influence
on the discounting of of the recommended (bBx , dBx , uBx ) parameters. This can seem
counterintuitive in many cases such as in the example described next.
Imagine a stranger coming to a town which is know for its citizens being honest. The
stranger is looking for a car mechanic, and asks the first person he meets to direct him
to a good car mechanic. The stranger receives the reply that there are two car mechanics
in town, David and Eric, where David is cheap but does not always do quality work,
and Eric might be a bit more expensive, but he always does a perfect job.
Translated into the formalism of subjective logic, the stranger has no other info about
the person he asks than the base rate that the citizens in the town are honest. The stranger
is thus ignorant, but the expectation value of a good advice is still very high. Without
taking aAB into account, the result of the definitions above would be that the stranger is
completely ignorant about which if the mechanics is the best.
An intuitive approach would then be to let the expectation value of the stranger’s
trust in the recommender be the discounting factor for the recommended (bBx , dBx )
parameters.
Definition 7 (Base Rate Sensitive Discounting). The base rate sensitive discounting
of a belief ωBx = (bBx , dBx , uBx , aBx ) by a belief ωAB = (bAB, dAB, uAB, aAB) produces the
transitive belief ωABx = (bABx , dABx , uABx , aABx ) where⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎩
bABx = E(ω
A
B)b
B
x
dABx = E(ωAB)d
B
x
uABx = 1 + E(ωAB)u
B
x − E(ωAB)
aABx = a
B
x
(9)
where the probability expectation value E(ωAB) = bAB + aABuAB .
However this operator must be applied with care. Assume again the town of honest
citizens, and let let the stranger A have the opinion ωAB = (0, 0, 1, 0.99) about the
first person B she meets, i.e. the opinion has no basis in evidence other than a very high
base rate defined by aAB = 0.99. If the person B now recommends to A the opinion
ωBx = (1, 0, 0, a), then, according to the base rate sensitive discounting operator
of Def.7, A will have the belief ωA:Bx = (0.99, 0, 0.01, a) in x. In other words,
the highly certain belief ωA:Bx is derived on the basis of the highly uncertain belief
ωAB , which can seem counterintuitive. This potential problem could be amplified as the
190 A. Jøsang, S. Marsh, and S. Pope
trust path gets longer. A safety principle could therefore be to only apply the base rate
sensitive discounting to the last transitive link.
There might be other principles that better reflect human intuition for trust transitiv-
ity, but we will leave this question to future research. It would be fair to say that the base
rate insensitive discounting operator of Def.5 is safe and conservative, and that the base
rate sensitive discounting operator of Def.7 can be more intuitive in some situations,
but must be applied with care.
5 Mass Hysteria
One of the strengths of this work is in its analytical capabilities. As an example, consider
how mass hysteria can be caused by people not being aware of dependence between
opinions. Let for example person A recommend an opinion about a particular statement
x to a group of other persons. Without being aware of the fact that the opinion came
from the same origin, these persons can recommend their opinions to each other as
illustrated in Fig.7.
D E F G
B C
A
x
Fig. 7. The principle of mass hysteria
The arrows represent trust so that for example B −→ A can be interpreted as saying
that B trusts A to recommend an opinion about statement x. The actual recommenda-
tion goes, of course, in the opposite direction to the arrows in Fig.7.
It can be seen that A recommends an opinion about x to 6 other agents, and that
G receives 6 recommendations in all. If G assumes the recommended opinions to be
independent and takes the consensus between them, his opinion can become abnormally
strong and in fact even stronger than A’s opinion.
As a numerical example, let A’s opinion ωAx about x as well as the agents’ opinions
about each other (ωBA , ωCA , ωCB , ωDA , ωDB , ωDC , ωEA , ωEB , ωEC , ωED, ωFA , ωFB , ωFC , ωFD, ωFE ,
ωGA , ω
G
B , ω
G
C , ω
G
D, ω
G
E , ω
G
F ) all have the same value given by (0.7, 0.1, 0.2, a).
In this example, we will apply the consensus operator for independent beliefs to
illustrate the effect of unknown dependence. We also apply the uncertainty favouring
discounting operator which does not take base rates into account.
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Taking all the possible recommendations of Fig.7 into account creates a relatively
complex trust graph, and a rather long notation. In order to reduce the size of the no-
tation, the transitivity symbol “:” will simply be omitted, and the cumulative fusion
symbol  will simply be written as “,”. Analysing the whole graph of dependent paths,
as if they were independent, will then produce:
ω
GA, GBA, GCA, GCBA, GDA, GDBA, GDCA, GDCBA, GEA,GEBA,GECA,
GECBA, GEDA,GEDBA, GEDCA, GEDCBA, GFA, GFBA, GFCA, GFCBA,
GFDA, GFDBA, GFDCA, GFDCBA, GFEA, GFEBA, GFECA, GFECBA,
GFEDA, GFEDBA, GFEDCA, GFEDCBA
x = (0.76, 0.11, 0.13, a)
For comparison, if G only took the recommendation from A into account (as he
should), his derived opinion would be ωG:Ax = {0.49, 0.07, 0.44, a}.
In real situations it is possible for recommended opinions to return to their originator
through feedback loops, resulting in even more exaggerated beliefs. When this process
continues, an environment of self amplifying opinions, and thereby hysteria, is created.
6 Conclusion
Subjective logic is a belief calculus which takes into account the fact that perceptions
about the world always are subjective. This translates into using a belief model that can
express degrees of uncertainty about probability estimates, and we use the term opin-
ion to denote such subjective beliefs. In addition, ownership of opinions is assigned to
particular agents in order to reflect the fact that opinions always are individual. The
operators of subjective logic use opinions about the truth of propositions as input pa-
rameters, and produce an opinion about the truth of a proposition as output parameter.
In this paper, trust is interpreted as a belief about reliability, and we have shown
how subjective logic can be used for trust reasoning. Although this model can never be
perfect, and able to reflect all the nuances of trust, it can be shown to respect the main
and intuitive properties of trust and trust propagation.
One difficulty with applying subjective logic is that trust and beliefs can be depen-
dent without people being aware of it, in which case the calculus will produce “wrong”
results. Our example illustrated how dependent opinions can influence peoples opinions
without any objective reason, and even cause hysteria. In order to avoid this problem
we introduced operators for belief and trust fusion that explicitly take dependence into
account. This makes it possible to models real world situations involving dependent
beliefs more realistically.
Another difficulty is to find a sound and intuitive operator for trust transitivity. This
problem comes from the fact that trust transitivity is a psychosocial phenomenon that
can not be objectively observed and modelled in traditional statistical or probabilistic
terms. We have proposed possible alternative models to the traditional and conservative
uncertainty favouring transitivity operator of subjective logic. However, we feel that
more research and experiments are needed in order to determine optimal principles of
modelling trust transitivity. It might also be the case that no single transitivity operator
is suitable for all situations, and that particular situations will require specially designed
transitivity operators.
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Abstract. Virtual Organizations enable new forms of collaboration for 
businesses in a networked society. During their formation business partners are 
selected on an as-needed basis. We consider the problem of using a reputation 
system to enhance the member selection in Virtual Organizations. The paper 
identifies the requirements for and the benefits of using a reputation system for 
this task. We identify attacks and analyze their impact and threat to using 
reputation systems. Based on these findings we propose the use of a specific 
model of reputation different from the prevalent models of reputation. The 
major contribution of this paper is an algorithm (called PathTrust) in this model 
that exploits the graph of relationships among the participants. It strongly 
emphasizes the transitive model of trust in a web of trust. We evaluate its 
performance, especially under attack, and show that it provides a clear 
advantage in the design of a Virtual Organization infrastructure. 
1   Introduction 
We consider the problem of member selection in Virtual Organizations (VO). A VO 
is understood as a temporary coalition of geographically dispersed individuals, 
groups, enterprise units or entire organizations that pool resources, facilities, and 
information to achieve common business objectives. The partners in a VO enjoy equal 
status and are dependent upon electronic connections (ICT infrastructure) for the co-
ordination of their activities [1]. This concept of VOs is advocated as a promising 
model for e-activities and it is strongly supported by the European Union Sixth 
Framework Program. Each VO has an initiator who is responsible for creating and 
managing the VO. The VO management function can be performed by a group of 
persons delegated by the VO initiator. A person becomes a VO initiator when he 
notifies the system of his intention to create a VO.  
A VO has a lifecycle which is a state model, which we have adopted from [15] and 
extended [12]:  
1. Identification: the preparatory phase of a VO, where the initiator specifies required 
business roles (e.g. storage provider or data analyzer in a Collaborative 
Engineering scenario), high-level work units and interactions in what is referred to 
as the “Collaboration Definition” (CD) and defines control requirements [4]. 
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2. Formation: the phase of the VO where members are discovered, selected and 
assigned to fulfilling the identified service requirements derived from the CD. 
There is therefore a period of negotiation between the initiator and members that 
concludes with these agreements being signed by the relevant interacting parties. 
3. Operation: the Collaboration Definition is enacted and the end-points of the role 
assignments (i.e which are selected VO members) interact and exchange 
messages, documents and production information. Operation also has the implicit 
sub-state “dormant” when all members are inactive due to some technical or 
contractual exception that needs to be handled. 
4. Dissolution: the final phase of the VO, where the business objective specified in 
the CD is met, or some technical or contractual violation occurs that invalidates 
the existence of the VO. 
The focus of the paper is on the Formation phase and, especially, member selection 
during this phase. In the Formation phase the initiator has to perform following 
actions: 
1. Query: the initiator sends a query containing keywords derived from the roles in 
the CD to a public registry and receives a list of candidates that have previously 
registered. 
2. Invitation: the initiator contacts the candidates, informs them of his intention to 
form a VO and invites them to play a specific role. He sends them the partner 
profile detailing the expectations derived from the CD. 
3. Negotiation: the initiator engages in negotiation about contractual terms with the 
candidates that have expressed interest in joining the VO. The initiator can 
negotiate with multiple candidates in parallel and pause or resume a negotiation to 
achieve the best result possible. 
4. Selection: The initiator chooses the best-suited candidate and assigns him a role in 
the VO. The chosen candidate now becomes a member of the VO and other 
candidates are finally rejected. 
If we expect a VO initiator to use a reputation system for member selection, it has 
to provide a benefit for him. There is likely no direct monetary benefit in using the 
reputation system rather he is likely to receive better service (or in general 
performance) by using a high reputable provider. So, one expectation would be that 
the overall number of positive transactions increases when using a reputation service 
for member selection. 
The second benefit of using a reputation system arises when the initiator has to 
deal with unknown parties. Their business record may be unknown to the initiator and 
a reputation system can help establish trust. In our model one would then expect that a 
certain percentage of reputation values is based on the transitive trust evaluation. 
We consider the question what kind of reputation system can support the selection 
of members for the VO. First, the initiator can invite only candidates whose reputation 
is above a certain threshold. The threshold can be fixed or adaptive to the candidates 
found (e.g. the ten best reputation values). Second, the initiator can choose from the 
set of candidates based on reputation. There are many other differentiating factors for 
candidates, such as price or delivery time, which must be considered in this decision, 
but reputation can be used as another weighted component in this mix or it can be 
used to make the final decision among a group of equally well-suited candidates.  
 PathTrust: A Trust-Based Reputation Service for Virtual Organization Formation 195 
 
The degree of influence reputation has varies with the selection method, but in any 
case: the higher the reputation the more likely a candidate is to be selected. And a 
higher selection ratio means more business and more profit. This implies that there is 
an incentive for attacking the reputation system, such that the attacker’s reputation 
increases. A reputation system suitable for member selection needs to be resistant 
against this kind of attack. 
We present a model of reputation that is derived from the way business partners are 
currently selected and differs from most other models of reputation, as discussed in 
the related work section. It is particular well-suited to withstand attacks from 
participants trying to increase their reputation. We present an algorithm that 
implements this model in our framework of VOs and evaluate its performance. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews related work, section 3 
presents our model of reputation and system architecture. Section 4 analyzes the 
attacks and outlines the design requirements on a reputation system for member 
selection. We then present in section 5 the design of our algorithm and show its 
evaluation in section 6. The last section concludes the paper. 
2   Related Work 
From a productive use perspective, reputation systems already play a role in several 
online businesses, such as eBay or Amazon. As in the work presented in this paper, 
business in those communities exhibits a transactional behavior and the partner 
selection for transactions is supported by reputation systems. Since the transactions 
are real business transactions involving money transfer, their reputations systems 
were subject of several published vulnerability and attack analysis [1][5][11]. 
Especially Resnick et al. in [11] classified the most common forms of attacks on 
reputation systems like badmouthing, liars or collusion attacks. They also put an 
emphasis on initial values, what kind of reputation value is initially assigned to a 
newly arriving entity without available prior knowledge or history. Josang et al. in [5] 
provide a quite exhaustive survey of reputation systems in industry and academic 
research. They also address the previously mentioned attacks for particular reputation 
systems. Bolton’s analysis in [1] revealed that most productive reputation systems are 
susceptible to fraudulent behavior, for instance cheaters and liars in an eMarketplace. 
Addressing this particular issue of liars, Padovan et al. [9] and Sen et al. [14] present 
reputation systems which try to counteract fraudulent behavior or provide an 
augmented decision process. The work we present in this paper is rather changing the 
internal reputation mechanism/algorithm than working around a vulnerable system. 
An experimental evaluation of reputation systems was done in [13]. Many attacks, 
including fake transactions have been considered, but their main draw-back was the 
model of reputation that only considered global reputation values. We have designed 
a reputation algorithm that uses personalized reputation ratings and can show that it 
significantly performs better against this very important attack. 
For Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks several reputation algorithms have been proposed. 
These algorithms are related to ours, but usually need to consider different kind of 
attacks as they occur in real P2P networks. The algorithm proposed in [8] implicitly 
uses a personalized model of reputation, but is simpler than ours due to the restriction 
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that it needs to be computed in a distributed fashion. The EigenTrust algorithm 
suggested in [7] is a global reputation system, but explicitly builds on the notion of a 
web of trust by computing the global reputation from the entire matrix of ratings. It 
has been evaluated against attacks in P2P networks and furthermore in [13]. It is 
based on Google’s PageRank algorithm and therefore has a well established basis. We 
use it as our reference to compare against. A personalization of EigenTrust has been 
attempted in [3] by applying an extension for PageRank to EigenTrust, but the 
personalization is very limited. A related approach has been followed in [10], but the 
reputation is not feed-back based. 
A reputation algorithm for eCommerce P2P networks has been suggested in [18]. It 
is a global reputation algorithm, but uses the reputation of the rater in a restricted 
fashion without explicit reference to a web of trust. It has been evaluated against some 
attacks, but not fake transactions. In [19] a reputation algorithm also for electronic 
marketplaces is described that exploits the graph for properties of the ratings to 
compute a personalized reputation. The algorithm itself uses all paths instead of our 
maximum-weight path which deteriorates in cyclic, fully connected graphs like ours 
and, most importantly, is not evaluated (or has any new design properties) to resist 
attacks from fake transactions. The Beta reputation system by Josang et al. [5] tries to 
predict future performance based on a statistical approach. It follows the global model 
of reputation and is suggested for eCommerce applications. In [17] it has very 
successfully been made resistant to the related attack of unfair ratings, but a brute-
force attack of fake transactions has not yet been evaluated. 
Voss suggests the use of reputation for VOs [16], but does not detail its 
suggestions, nor evaluates the threats that are derived from the suggested uses. The 
main contribution of the paper, an algorithm to privately leave feed-back ratings, is 
unrelated to our contribution. 
3   Model of Reputation 
In the non-electronic business world business partners are selected based on personal 
relationships. A business owner has experience of interacting with his partners and 
therefore bases his trust in them performing business transactions as expected on this 
experience. The more (positive) experience he has with a partner, the more trust he 
usually places in that partner. In a highly dynamic, electronic, geographically 
dispersed environment such as VOs it is difficult to form such personal relationships. 
Often one is confronted to make choices among candidates with which one has no 
previous experience. The reputation system can help form trust in such candidates. 
We view such relationships as the combination of previous performance and 
recommendation trust, since we believe that an established positive relationship will 
foster honesty in future recommendations and vice-versa. 
In most reputation systems [7][13][18] reputation is scalar value R(A) for each 
participant A that is a global ranking of the participants. Our reputation model views 
the system as a web of trust relationships, such as the personal relationships formed 
by the business owners. Reputation is the relation of a participant A wishing to engage 
in business with participant B: R(A, B). It is a two-variable function of the two 
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participants, i.e. two participants A and C may have very different views R(A, B) and 
R(C, B) of B’s reputation. 
The idea of using a web of trust is not new and many other reputation system 
involve the relationships of the participant in the computation of the reputation []. Our 
algorithm operates directly on the trust relationships and combines transitive trust (as 
in e.g. certificates or PGP keys) with a reputation rating: If a participant A trusts 
participant B (with a certain rating) and participant B trusts participant C (with a 
certain rating), then participant A trusts participant C (with a rating as a function of 
the other two ratings). One can also compare our algorithm to a recommender system. 
In some sense, B recommends C to A in the example above. It is also necessary to 
evaluate this model of reputation and its specific algorithm under the attacks 
important in its intended area of use (here selection of members for VOs). 
This model of reputation (using the trust relationships amongst the participants) 
particularly lends itself to resistance against the attack of faking positive feedback. A 
group of attackers collaborate in order to boost their reputation rating by leaving false, 
positive feed-back for each other. In our model of reputation this will only strengthen 
the trust relationship among themselves, but not necessarily strengthen the path from 
an honest inquirer to the attacker, such that the reputation from the honest inquirer’s 
point of view should remain unaffected. We test this hypothesis in the evaluation 
section of our algorithm. 
The trust relationship between two participants is formed based on the past 
experience they had with each other. A participant leaves a feed-back rating after each 
transaction and these ratings are accumulated to a relationship value. The reputation 
R(A, B) can therefore also be seen as a function of all ratings left in the system, i.e. the 
ratings are the only input to form the pairs of reputations. 
Another benefit of exploiting established relationships in member selection is the 
formation of long-term relationships. By relying on positive past experience well-
performing members are likely to be selected again and business networks of 
participants can form. Such networks have the benefit that they can exploit further 
long-term optimization of business processes by investing in infrastructure and 
business process adaptation technology rather than just the short-term satisfaction of a 
common (temporary) business objective. 
4   System Architecture 
Underlying each VO there is an Enterprise Network Infrastructure (EN). This 
infrastructure provides basic services, such as registration and notification. It also 
provides the reputation service. 
Each participant of a VO must first register with the EN in order to be eligible for 
membership status in a VO. He must present some credential (e.g. an entry in local 
administration’s business registry) in order to obtain membership status in the EN. 
Each VO in turn is registered with the EN, as well. The set of registered participants 
is queried for candidates for a role in a VO during Formation phase. This service is 
also provided by the EN. 
The reputation service is a centralized service offered by the EN. We anticipate 
there being one reputation service for all VOs, but different EN providers might 
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choose to allow competing reputation services to cater for different needs and 
preferences. In the dissolution phase of each VO all members leave feed-back ratings 
with the reputation server for the other members with whom they have completed 
transactions. Each such rating can be authenticated to be associated with a specific 
VO and one cannot leave unsubstantiated feed-back. Nevertheless it is difficult for the 
EN provider to verify that a business transaction has taken place and an attacker can 
create fake VOs and leave feed-back for these with the reputation server, i.e. it is still 
possible for an attacker to create fake transactions. 
Since each EN participant needs to register with some real-world credential in 
order to obtain EN member status, the multiple identities attack on the reputation 
system, where a participant always starts with a new identity once he has ruined his 
reputation of the old one, is sufficiently deterred, if not impossible. 
Since the reputation service is central, it has access to all ratings and can do its 
computation locally instead of distributed, preventing difficulties in the reliability of 
the computation and the overhead of communication cost. Each query just sends the 
two parties (A and B) to the reputation service, which does a local trusted computation 
and returns the result. 
5   Analysis of Attacks and Design Requirements 
5.1   Analysis of Attacks 
As described in the introduction the use of reputation in member selection can provide 
substantial gains to participants with high reputation, it is therefore necessary to 
prevent attacks that raise reputation. 
The first attack we consider on the reputation system is the creation of fake 
transactions with positive feed-back. In most reputation systems this clearly raises the 
expected reputation of the participants the positive feed-back was left for. It therefore 
has the potential to increase profit when reputation is used for member selection and 
the attack is very critical. We evaluate the performance of our algorithm under this 
attack in section 6. A potential mitigation of this attack is to collect fees for every 
transaction that are supposed to capture the additional profit gained by the fake 
transactions, but the more vulnerable a reputation system is to this attack, the higher 
the fees have to be. A built-in resistance to this attack allows the fees to be lower 
covering the costs of the transaction rather than being used as a deterrence to create 
fake transactions. We don’t consider using the value of the transaction in the 
reputation a useful deterrence of this kind of attack as suggested in [18], since the 
value of the transaction can be faked as well. Even if combined with fees, the attacker 
then can just replace several small fake transactions with one big one or vice-versa. 
Also the value of the transaction might be confidential in several business cases. 
An attack on the overall system rather than on the reputation system itself is to 
consistently deliver bad performances. This attack is commonly considered for 
reputation systems in P2P networks, since it is actively being pursued in many real 
P2P networks. We do not consider this attack here, since we do not believe that any 
successful business model can be built on consistently performing badly. Differently 
from P2P networks, we do not see a motivation for this attack in our scenario and 
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therefore ignore it in our evaluation. We consider however subtle differences in well 
performing participants, which are supposed to be highlighted by the reputation 
system. 
A third attack is to leave false or no feed-back at all. First, currently methods are 
being researched in the TrustCoM1 project that leave feed-back automatically and, 
second, leaving no or false feed-back has an immediate negative impact on the 
participant’s own feed-back left by the partner. If a participant is allowed to change 
his feed-back he is capable of reacting to such actions by the business partner, even 
after he has left feed-back. Since in our setting it is in the attacker’s best interest to 
raise (and not lower) his reputation this attack seems unlikely and we do not evaluate 
its impact. 
There have been “successful” fake business attacks where the attacker offered 
some services, engaged in many business transactions, collected payments, but never 
delivered the goods or services. One could imagine the attacker exploiting the 
reputation service to lure customers to his business. This corresponds to the erratic or 
changing behavior attack considered in other reputation systems. Luckily there are 
some economic deterring factors to using reputation for this kind of attack, besides 
the “legal deterrence” of prosecution. First, building reputation can be a slow process 
and requires real (successful) transactions. Therefore the attacker would be required 
to at least set up a minimal real business which is, of course, associated with the 
initial investments. Second, there are many other differentiating factors, such as prices 
or advertisement, which can attract customers to a business that work much faster 
than building a good reputation. We opt for the “legal deterrence” and leave this 
attack as a whole to the authorities. 
The last attack on the reputation system is to create new identities every time one’s 
reputation drops below a certain threshold. This attack is prevented in our system by 
requiring a real-world credential (such as an entry into local administration’s business 
registry) to enter the system. Furthermore, the attacker always starts out with an initial 
reputation that is lower than the one of established successful businesses leaving him 
at a competitive disadvantage. 
5.2   Design Requirements 
Besides attacks on the system and the reputation system there are other scenarios that 
a reputation system might have to deal with. A business’ reputation might be subject 
to a rapid decline, e.g. if it has entered an insolvency process. Such participants 
should not be selected as members in a VO, but it is very difficult to represent this 
scenario using a reputation system, since reaction would need to be immediate and 
harsh (upon the first indication of such circumstances). Such harsh action often invites 
another kind of attack where the attacker leaves false feed-back in order to eliminate a 
competitor (similar to spreading false rumors). Although, one can design for such 
cases, e.g. using authorization for very negative feed-back, we didn’t and would like 
to see such cases handled outside the scope of the reputation system, since they only 
provide means for an “emergency” case. 
                                                          
1
 www.eu-trustcom.com 
200 F. Kerschbaum et al. 
 
Another important aspect for a B2B system, such as the VOs, is to support growth. 
The system will need to start slowly and continuously attract more and more 
participants. New participants need to be able to enter the market. We believe that VO 
system offers sufficient differentiating factors for business to be able to enter 
established markets and build good reputation. Furthermore, new services are offered 
all the time and allow business to build a good reputation that can be transferred to 
markets of established services in order to enter those markets as well. 
6   Algorithm 
Based on our model of reputation, the requirements and attacks, we designed an 
algorithm for a reputation system used for member selection, called PathTrust. As 
described earlier, the input to PathTrust is the set of all ratings. For each transaction in 
the system, the user of a service can leave feed-back for the provider. A feed-back 
rating r is a binary value, either positive or negative. Let pos[i, j] be the number of 
positive feed-back ratings left by participants i for participant j and neg[i, j] be the 
negative ones. 
PathTrust sees the system as fully connected graph with edges between all 
participants registered with the EN. Each edge cij is a function of pos[i, j] and neg[i, j]:  
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We lower-bound the system to the interval by 0.001 and normalize each edge by 
the number of total transaction a participant has performed, thereby limiting the 
weight to the interval [0.001, 1]. This provides a relative measure of trust for the 
participant in another participant (compared to his overall experience), but prevents 
comparison between edges from different participants.  It allows us nevertheless to 
interpret the weight in our path-searching algorithm as a probability value. The lower 
bound allows our selection algorithm to choose edges with no experience, even if 
there are edges with experience from that participant. We weight negative feed-backs 
by the ratio between positive and negative feed-backs a participant has given to allow 
the algorithm to react even to fine-grained performance differences. This normalizes 
average performances to the lowest possible rating. If a ratio is not defined, because 
the denominator is zero, we default to the other option of the max operation. 
We define the weight of a path <i,j,k> from participant i to participant k via 
participant j as: w<i,j,k> = cij⋅cjk. Upon receiving a query R(A,B) for reputation of B 
from A PathTrust computes the path with the maximum weight from A to B. Since 
0 < cij ≤ 1 (and therefore each path weight is constantly decreasing), we can do this 
simply using Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm. The maximum path weight is 
returned as the reputation for R(A,B). 
The algorithm fully exploits the graph properties of the system, and therefore should 
provide the required resistance against fake transactions. An attacker generating fake 
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(positive) transactions just increases the weight of the edges with his colluders, but no 
trust relationship is formed with the other participants. Therefore the path between the 
honest participants and attackers is only strengthened if they engage in real (positive) 
transaction with each other. We evaluate the algorithms performance against this 
attack in the next section. Nevertheless the algorithm can form indirect paths based on 
transitive trust between participants allowing successfully querying the reputation of 
participants with whom there is no prior experience. 
The algorithm supports the growth of the system for providers as described in the 
previous section, but the first query of an initiator will return equal reputations for 
every other participant. This applies to the very first query only, and therefore an 
initiator entering the system should be offered to choose a small set (one is actually 
enough) of trusted business partners. The value pos[⋅,⋅] will be initialized to 1 for 
these participants simulating one positive transaction. The first query will then return 
the trust of those trusted partners. Over time as the initiator engages in more and more 
transactions the influence of the initial choice will be marginal. If an initiator is 
entering the system for the purpose of engaging in a specific transaction, this step can 
be replaced by the first transaction. 
7   Evaluation 
We ran several simulations to evaluate the performance of our proposed algorithm for 
VO member selection. The design of the experiments and their results are described 
in this section. 
First, we need to describe how we intend the reputation system to be used for 
member selection. The service registry returns to the initiator a list of candidates from 
which the initiator chooses one (after negotiation). In our experiments we do not 
model negotiation or other differentiating factor between candidates, such as price. 
We assume that all candidates offer similar conditions and propose the weighted 
reputation selection algorithm: Let Φ be the set of candidates and let I be the initiator, 
then for each candidate C ∈ Φ the probability that she is chosen is 
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This approach supports our notion that reputation is a soft criterion for choosing 
candidates, since it is probabilistic and allows lower ranked candidates to be selected 
as well, e.g. they could have differentiated using additional services, such as payment 
options or price. 
Besides the actual algorithm we proposed a specific model of reputation that views 
reputation as a function of the inquirer and the queried. We argued that this model 
provides inherent benefits in attack resistance compared to models that see reputation 
as a function of the queried only. We therefore compare our algorithm to the 
EigenTrust [7] algorithm. The EigenTrust algorithm also works on the web of trust, 
since it uses the rater’s reputation in computing the final reputation. Nevertheless it 
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still adheres to the model that reputation is a global function (i.e. equal for every 
inquirer). Furthermore it has performed well in studies of such algorithms [13]. 
We used 1000 participants (nodes in the graph) in our test bed. 30 services were 
available to initiators and each participant offers 3 services. The providers for a 
service were uniformly chosen from the set of participants, i.e. there are 100 providers 
for each service. 
We then simulated the formation of a VO. Each VO has an initiator which has the 
need for a specific service. The initiator was uniformly chosen among all participants 
and the requested service uniformly among all services. The initiator then queries the 
registry for all available providers of that service and chooses a business partner using 
the weighted selection algorithm explained above. Each such transaction has a value 
associated with it. The value was chosen uniformly from the domain [1, 100] and given 
to the initiator. It represents the profit the service provider makes when being chosen for 
that VO. We did not simulate the profit of the initiator since the inception of the VO is 
random. The goal of each participant is to maximize its profit and since so far all 
choices are random, the means to achieve that is to boost reputation which has a direct 
impact on the probability being chosen for a VO. This models the situation and risk we 
have been discussing for choosing VO members using the reputation service. 
We divided the simulation into rounds. During each round 100 VOs where formed 
in parallel and there were 100 rounds, i.e. we simulated 10000 transactions per test 
run.  The reported numbers are averages of 3 test runs. 
7.1   Resistance Against Fake Transaction 
Our first test was to create fake transactions and see if the profit of cheaters increases 
compared to honest participants. Each cheater created one false transaction per round, 
 
 
Fig. 1. Resistance to cheating 
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i.e. about 10 fake transactions per 1 real transaction. He always chose an assigned 
collaborator for the fake transaction and its value does not count towards the 
accumulated profit. In general, each transaction was positively rated, whether it was 
real or fake. 
The results are summarized in Fig. 1. We increased the percentage of cheaters from 
1% to 10% and depicted the average profit a cheater and an honest participant makes. 
From the graph we can see that EigenTrust is clearly more vulnerable to this kind of 
attack than PathTrust, since the average profit of a cheater in EigenTrust exceeds the 
one in PathTrust up to a factor of 5.6. From these numbers we can conclude that 
transaction fees that consume the additional profit of a cheater would need to be 10 
times higher in EigenTrust consuming 47% of the profit of an honest participant 
compared to 4.8% using PathTrust. 
7.2   Percentage of Positive Transactions 
Our second test is supposed to measure the impact of the reputation system on overall 
system performance. A reputation value is supposed to predict the performance of a 
participant. It therefore should help choose the best provider for a given service. 
Besides acquiring trust in unknown candidates this is a further benefit for the initiator. 
We divided the set of participants into two: good performers which provide good 
service in 99% of the transactions and not-so-good performers which provide good 
service in 95% of the transactions. This reflects our view that all businesses need to 
achieve a reasonable level of performance to be successful and it makes it difficult for 
the reputation system to operate on those small differences. There were 100 bad 
performers, i.e. 10% of the participants. This implies that the expected average 
percentage of good performances of all transactions is 98.6% when using a random 
choice of VO members (i.e. no reputation system at all). An improvement over this 
number indicates an advantage of using this reputation system, i.e. the higher this 
number the better the reputation system. Even if the reputation system managed to 
separate the two groups completely and only chose good performers, the percentage 
of good performances would be 99%. So the possible improvement from using a 
reputation system in this scenario is small and even small improvements are difficult 
to achieve. 
The results of this experiment are summarized in Fig. 2. We increased the 
percentage of bad performers that cheated using fake transactions attack as above 
from 0% to 100%. We thought that bad performers might be particularly inclined to 
conceal their disadvantage by resorting to cheating. No additional (good performing) 
cheaters were introduced. The graph depicts the percentage of good transactions given 
the percentage of cheaters. We can see that the EigenTrust algorithm looses its 
advantage over random choice once we introduce cheating. Furthermore, we see that 
this loss is much lower in the PathTrust, but still it looses its advantage to random 
choice suggesting that cheating annihilates one of the benefits of using a reputation 
system. We therefore suggest using transaction fees to deter cheating (which can be 
much lower in the PathTrust algorithm than in the EigenTrust algorithm as discussed 
in the previous section) and then both systems provide nearly the same benefit in 
performance gain to the initiator. 
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Fig. 2. System performance 
8   Conclusion 
We evaluated the requirements for a reputation system to be used for VO member 
selection. We identified threats and attacks that can be used against the whole system 
and the use of the reputation system in particular. Based on these findings we 
developed a model to be used for reputation system for VO member selection that 
seems particularly well suited to resist the major threats. Then we built a new 
reputation algorithm in this model and evaluated its performance in a simulation of 
VO formation against a chosen candidate from the prevalent model of reputation. The 
evaluation shows that our algorithm provides clear benefits in the presence of attacks. 
It is therefore beneficial to the operators of a VO infrastructure while preserving the 
advantages of using a reputation system to the users of that system, the VO initiators. 
Currently, a VO infrastructure is being developed by the TrustCoM project that is 
supposed to be made available for use by business. It would be a great enhancement 
to this work to study the use and impact of a reputation system and the PathTrust 
reputation algorithm in particular in a real-world system. 
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Abstract. In open multi-agent systems, agents typically need to rely
on others for the provision of information or the delivery of resources.
However, since different agents’ capabilities, goals and intentions do not
necessarily agree with each other, trust can not be taken for granted in
the sense that an agent can not always be expected to be willing and able
to perform optimally from a focal agent’s point of view. Instead, the focal
agent has to form and update beliefs about other agents’ capabilities and
intentions. Many different approaches, models and techniques have been
used for this purpose in the past, which generate trust and reputation
values. In this paper, employing one particularly popular trust model,
we focus on the way an agent may use such trust values in trust-based
decision-making about the value of a binary variable.
We use computer simulation experiments to assess the relative effi-
cacy of a variety of decision-making methods. In doing so, we argue for
systematic analysis of such methods beforehand, so that, based on an in-
vestigation of characteristics of different methods, different classes of pa-
rameter settings can be distinguished. Whether, on average across many
random problem instances, a certain method performs better or worse
than alternatives is not the issue, given that the agent using the method
always exists in a particular setting. We find that combining trust values
using our likelihood method gives performance which is relatively robust
to changes in the setting an agent may find herself in.
1 Introduction
In open multi-agent systems such as grid-based virtual organizations [1], agents
typically need to rely on others for the delivery of information or resources or for
the execution of tasks. Since different agents’ capabilities, goals and intentions
do not necessarily agree with each other, however, trust can not be taken for
granted in the sense that an agent can not always be expected to be willing and
able to perform optimally from a focal agent’s point of view.
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In many different circumstances and application settings, therefore, it turns
out to be worthwhile for an agent to build up a measure of her trust in other
agents in her environment, and to update it on the basis of her experiences with
those other agents, or on the basis of other agents’ experiences to the extent
she has access to those experiences, e.g. through a centralized or decentralized
reputation storage. The term ‘agent,’ in whose capabilities, intentions, etc. trust
is being built, can be construed very broadly here, in the sense that, in previous
work, it has encompassed such diverse entities as human or corporate transaction
partners in online e-commerce settings [2,3,4], software agents in multi-agent
systems [5,6,7,8,9], peers in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems [10], providers of web
services on the semantic web [11,12], potential members of virtual organizations
on the grid [1], sensors in distributed sensor networks [13], or nodes in mobile
ad-hoc networks [14].
For the purpose of assessing trust, many different computational trust models
have been proposed in the literature, based on a wide variety of techniques (see,
e.g., [15] for an overview of trust models in e-commerce settings, or [16] for a re-
view of computational trust models in multi-agent systems). Once an agent has
established a trust or reputation value for a particular agent, resource, service,
etc., the agent needs to act on the basis of that value. In some circumstances, this
may involve ordering or ranking a number of alternatives, e.g. service providers
or potential trade partners; in others, a decision needs to be made about whether
or not the agent should interact or continue interacting with a particular other
agent. In general, the value of a certain, often binary, random variable typically
needs to be established, which might be the presence or absence of some envi-
ronmental feature (fire, injured people, hazardous materials) in the context of
incident management [7,8], or whether some other agent has good vs. bad inten-
tions in a strategic interaction setting [17] or in a mobile ad-hoc network or a
peer to peer network.
The bulk of previous work has focused on designing (computational) trust
models that take direct interactions and possibly third-party (reputation) infor-
mation into account in making as accurate as possible an assessment of another
agent’s capabilities or intentions, including, for example, making truthful report-
ing of reputation information incentive compatible for those third parties [18,19],
or filtering out unfair reputation ratings provided by third parties [20]. In the
current paper, we focus on the subsequent decisions that need to be taken by
agents based on these trust values: if some agents are trusted (highly) and some
are not and they’re providing conflicting information, how should one combine
these trust values with the information provided? Which of the agents are more
important, and how should conflicting claims be weighted?
For simplicity, we investigate how an agent should choose between just 2
possible values of an unobservable random variable, when she receives possibly
conflicting reports about the actual value of the variable from a set of observers in
whom she adaptively develops different amounts of trust, based on the feedback
she obtains after making her decision. We investigate the relative effectiveness
of a variety of methods for combining trust values. The remainder of the paper
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is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the computational model an
agent uses to establish and update her trust in other agents’ capabilities, based
on past experiences. Section 3 introduces and discusses a number of different
ways in which the agent may combine trust values to accomplish her task. A
comparison among them is done using simulation experiments, results of which
are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Beta Trust Model
In this paper, we look at agents establishing trust in other agents’ capabilities,
rather than their intentions (cf. [21]). We employ a popular trust mechanism to
let an agent establish and update her trust in various other agents’ capabilities
[22], and focus on the way in which the agent may combine those trust values
when making decisions based on possibly conflicting information provided by
those other agents.
In many studies, the Beta probability density function (pdf) is used for mod-
eling trust [13,3,22,8,23,24,4]. The Beta pdf is a probability density of a contin-
uous random variable θ ∈ [0, 1]. In the context of trust models, θ governs an
agent j’s behavior, and the pdf is interpreted as another agent i’s belief function
over the values of that random variable. Usually then, the expected value of the
Beta pdf is used as agent i’s trust in agent j’s capabilities or intentions: agent
i’s subjective probability that j is trustworthy.
Most of the popularity of the Beta pdf stems from the fact that it is conve-
nient mathematically: in Bayesian inference, the Beta pdf is a conjugate prior
for binomial likelihood functions, meaning that the posterior is from the same
family as the prior (see below). Furthermore, a trust value expressed as the ex-
pected value of a Beta random variable is a very simple functional form of the
parameters of the Beta pdf. Finally, it has features which capture some of the
intuition of trust models, in particular, that an agent’s trust in another agent
gradually goes up with positive experiences and down with negative experiences,
as captured by the Beta pdf’s parameters.
As explained above, trust models based on the Beta distribution are typically
used to estimate the parameter θ of a distribution generating binary events,
such as a trading partner behaving honestly or opportunistically, or an agent
delivering true or false information. In the case of such a binary event, with
‘success’ or ‘failure’ as possible outcomes, the number of successes n out of a
total of N (of these so-called Bernoulli trials), is described probabilistically by
the binomial distribution (see [25] for a more complete discussion):
p(n | θ,N) =
(
N
n
)
θn(1 − θ)N−n, (1)
where θ is the ‘bias,’ the probability of success in each independent trial—
the quantity we wish to infer the value of. Apart for the binomial coefficient
(the leading factor in Eq. 1), the binomial likelihood p(n | θ,N) has the shape
θn(1 − θ)N−n, which has the same structure as the Beta distribution:
Versatile Approach to Combining Trust Values for Making Binary Decisions 209
Beta(θ | r, s) = 1
β(r, s)
θr−1(1 − θ)s−1, (2)
for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 and r, s > 0, where β(r, s) is the beta function.
The expected value of the Beta distribution is E(θ) = rr+s . The fact that the
Beta distribution is a conjugate prior for the binomial likelihood, means that,
when it is used as a prior function in Bayesian inference problems concerning a
binomial likelihood, the posterior distribution is still a Beta distribution (disre-
garding the normalization factor in the denominator of Bayes’ rule, since it does
not depend on θ):
posterior︷ ︸︸ ︷
p(θ | n,N, r, s) ∝
likelihood (see Eq. 1)︷ ︸︸ ︷[
θn(1 − θ)N−n]
prior (see Eq. 2)︷ ︸︸ ︷[
θr−1(1 − θ)s−1]
∝ θn+r−1(1 − θ)N−n+s−1.
Defining r′ = r + n and s′ = s + N − n, the expected value becomes E(θ) =
r′
s′+r′ =
r+n
r+s+N , so in effect, one simply adds the new counts of successes (n) and
failures (N − n) to the old values of the parameters of the Beta distribution r
and s, respectively, and obtains a new distribution which can be used as a prior
for calculating the posterior given yet more evidence.
In the context of trust models, an agent i’s trust in another agent j’s ca-
pabilities or intentions, is calculated as the expected value of the current beta
distribution
trustji =
r
r + s
,
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Fig. 1. The Beta pdf of θ for different values of r and s, as indicated. The expected
value of θ in each case is indicated by a vertical line of the corresponding type. (Of
course, the vertical line for (r, s) = (2, 1) overlaps with that of (4, 2).).
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where r and s are the current counts of positive and negative experiences (‘suc-
cesses’ and ‘failures,’ respectively) that i has had with j. In the absence of such
experiences, the values r = s = 1 are used, yielding a uniform prior, and an
expected value of 0.5 for the value governing j’s behavior (random behavior).
Figure 1 gives the shape of the Beta probability density function of θ given
different amounts of evidence.
3 Combining Trust Values
The combination of evidence from multiple sources has received ample attention
in the context of Bayesian reputation systems, which model an agent’s reputation
as the trust to be established in its capabilities or intentions on the basis of
different agents’ experiences with that agent. In this paper however, we focus on
the way in which an agent j’s reputation value, irrespective of the way in which it
was constructed, should be used in making decisions on the basis of information
received from that agent j, for which purpose it should also be combined with
different other agents’ reputation values.
We suggest a variety of different ways to combine trust values: when an
agent receives information from a variety of source-agents or sensors, it needs to
combine the information from these sources, taking into account that they have
different capabilities, as witnessed by agent i’s distinct individual interaction
histories with each of them. Agent i needs to guess what the value a ∈ {0, 1} of
a binary variable A is, given that each in a set J of observing agents j = 1, . . . , J
reports to i its (possibly incorrect) observation aj of the value of A, where agent
j’s probability of a correct observation is θj . After having combined all this
information, and chosen and reported the value she thinks is correct, agent i
learns the true value and can adjust her trust in each of the J agents’ capabilities.
The methods we give agent i to combine trust values are the following.
Majority (m). This method lets agent i simply report the value for A which is
observed by the majority of agents in J . (We only allow odd values for J .)
Average (a). In this case, agent i reports the value for A which is observed
by the group in which she holds the highest average trust: i averages her
trust across all agents reporting each possible value a ∈ {0, 1} and chooses
the values which is reported by the group in which she places the highest
average trust:
trustJai =
∑
j∈Ja trust
j
i
|Ja| ,
where Ja is the subset of all agents who observed a, for a ∈ {0, 1}. She
chooses the value for a which maximizes trustJai .
Evidence (e). Agent i adds her positive and negative experiences across all
agents claiming each of the values a ∈ {0, 1} and estimates the average
capability in each of the 2 groups of agents.
E(θJa ) =
∑
j∈Ja positive
j
i + 1∑
j∈Ja positive
j
i +
∑
j∈Ja negative
j
i + 2
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She chooses the value for a which maximizes E(θJa).
Although they look similar, especially when the same number of experi-
ences has been had with each observer, there is a difference between the ‘a’
and ‘e’ methods: the ‘a’ method averages across the estimates of different ob-
servers’ capabilities, whereas the ‘e’ method estimates the observers’ average
capability. Both do this on the basis of the expected value of the resulting
distribution, but the ‘a’ method takes the average of the expected values
of different distributions (one per observer), while the ‘e’ method takes the
expected value of the distribution that results when the experiences with dif-
ferent observers have been added together. The difference in our case (where
the number of experiences with each observer is the same) is negligible, so
we will not be showing results from using the ‘a’ method in this paper.
Likelihood (l). Using this method, agent i calculates the joint probability of
the observations twice—assuming each value for A to be the correct one. The
intuition is the following: each value a ∈ {0, 1} will have been observed by a
subset Ja of the set of observers J . So, assuming each value to be correct,
agent i calculates the joint probability of the observations, which is the same
as the likelihood of each of the two values for a, given the observations. For
each value of a ∈ {0, 1} (where a¯ = 1− a), the likelihood of it being the true
value of A is equal to
L(A = a|observations)=p(observations|A = a)=
∏
j∈Ja
trustji
∏
j∈Ja¯
(1 − trustji )
where Jb (for b ∈ {a, a¯}) is the subset of J claiming A = b. In other words, if
A is equal to a (or a¯, respectively), then all the agents in Ja (Ja¯) are correct,
which, from the perspective of i, has a joint probability of
∏
j∈Ja trust
j
i ,
while at the same time, all agents in Ja¯ (Ja) are incorrect, which has a
joint probability of
∏
j∈Ja¯(1 − trust
j
i ). Since different agents’ observations
are conditionally independent, the joint probability is the product of these
marginal probabilities. Agent i reports the value b ∈ {a, a¯} which maximizes
the likelihood L(A = b|observations).
4 Simulation Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
In our initial experiments, each of the j = 1, . . . , J observers has a capability
θj which determines the probability of his success in observing the true value of
A.1 In order to be able to capture the effect of dynamics of the situation, each
of these θj has an independent probability 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 of changing in each round
of the simulation, which we vary across different experiments. The different θj
1 Because agent i is ultimately not interested in learning the value of A directly, but
just in assessing each observer’s capability and, particularly, in sensibly using those
assessments in choosing the value she thinks is most likely (according to the methods
discussed in Section 3), we fix the true value at A = 0 without loss of generality.
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start out at 0.5 and in the case of a change, there is an increase of ±0.05, chosen
uniformly at random, while keeping θj between 0 and 1.
4.2 Initial Experiments
As an illustration, Figure 2 shows the results from one run of one of our exper-
iments. In this particular case, agent i uses the ‘evidence’ method to combine
observations from J = 5 observers, whose dynamically changing capabilities are
shown by the dashed lines that start at 0.5 in round 0, and that change in each
round with a probability δ = 0.05. Agent i updates her estimate of the true val-
ues of these θj as her trust in each of the J agents’ capabilities. The line marked
“|error|” (near the bottom of the graph) is the absolute value of the difference
between agent i’s assessments and the true values of these θj , averaged across
all J agents. Finally, each ‘+’ marks whether, in the given round, agent i ended
up reporting the correct value for A: if the ‘+’ is at 0, then i was incorrect, and
if it is at 1, agent i was correct in that round.
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Fig. 2. Results from one run of the experiment (see the text for explanation)
4.3 Discussion
Before we turn to more systematic exploration of these different methods, we
have to realize, and can analyze in advance, that the different methods have
strong and weak points; in particular, each will work best under particular cir-
cumstances. Any numerical investigation can then be tuned to such circum-
stances, so that different settings believed to be representative of particular
empirical situations can be distinguished, and conclusions can be drawn ap-
propriately. In this section, we consider each method in turn, and analyze the
circumstances in which each is expected (not) to perform.
Versatile Approach to Combining Trust Values for Making Binary Decisions 213
Majority. This method does not use trust at all. If there are more observerswith
a low capability than with a high capability, the majority method is expected
not to work well, since it will follow the majority who will be wrong in this case.
In fact, in multiple replications of a randomized setup where different observers’
capabilities change randomly, this method will perform like random choice, on
average.
Evidence. This method estimates the average capability in each of the groups
having observed each of the 2 possible values of the random variable A, by setting
up a beta distribution based on the aggregated positive and negative experiences
with all agents in each group, and calculating and comparing the expected values
of both distributions. To the extent that positive and negative experiences with
different observers accurately represent those observers’ capabilities (which we
can assume), this method is expected not to perform well if there isn’t at least
one agent with relatively high capability present. If all agents are moderately ca-
pable, then this method is unable to distinguish between them, because in each
given round, they are all correct in their observation with the same probability,
and since this method functions like averaging, there is no way to incorporate a
comparison between the size of both groups, like the majority-method discussed
above does. If the capabilities are favorably assigned, the majority-method can
be expected to perform well. Its problem is just that it can not deal with low
capabilities, which the evidence- and the likelihood-methods can (by estimating
those and discounting observations using the estimated capability of the cor-
responding observer—basically by believing the opposite of what a low-trusted
agent claims to have observed).
Likelihood. This method is the best of both worlds, in the sense that groupsize
considerations are combined with estimation of capabilities. If all capabilities are
equal, they are assessed as such, and when differently sized groups claim different
values for A, groupsize is effectively incorporated in the likelihood calculation.
The value observed for A by a relatively large group of agents with low estimated
capabilities will in fact be less likely, even though the group is large, exactly
because the joint probability of all those agents being correct at the same time
is very small.
4.4 Further Experiments
Keeping different observers’ capabilities fixed for the moment (δ = 0), we now
focus on investigating the consequences of the analysis in Section 4.3. The main
thrust of this work is the realization that any methods proposed for combin-
ing trust values should not be investigated in a randomized environment, as
is often done. Rather, the methods’ performance in distinct environmental set-
tings should be compared, which should be set up so as to resemble real-world
scenarios these agents might encounter. In general, for example, in many real
world multi-agent systems, agents will not have randomly assigned and randomly
changing capabilities. Moreover, randomized change will yield many experimen-
tal situations which are not representative of the state of the multi-agent system
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as it develops through adaptation to its environment. Agents in real-world multi-
agent systems operate in a particular setting, and not in a random setting, so
although performance in a random environment may be low, the randomly oc-
curing parameter settings that degrade performance may occur infrequently in
reality, rendering them over-represented in a random simulation experiment.
To illustrate this point, we first assign J = 7 observing agents j = 1, . . . , 7
random capability 0 ≤ θj ≤ 1. The results are shown in Figure 3, where each
line is the average across 1000 replications. There are actually 3 lines at the
bottom, which show the average absolute error between agent i’s estimation of
each of the observers’ capabilities and their actual capabilities. As mentioned
above, these capabilities are fixed in these experiments, so in the long run, a
reasonably good approximation can be made (average absolute error is about
0.02). Also, the way in which this approximation is made, is independent of the
method used for combining them, which is why the lines are pratically on top
of each other. The other lines depict the performance in each round, averaged
across 1000 replications. The majority-method performs equivalently to random
choice, on average, as discussed above: when capabilities are high, the majority-
method performs well, but when they are low, then, unable to use any additional
information, this method suffers. The two lines near the top of the graph are
the lines for the other two methods, evidence and likelihood, where the likeli-
hood method can be seen to be slightly better than the evidence method. Since
capabilities are assinged randomly in each run of the experiment, and will typ-
ically vary quite a lot between different observers, both methods are perfectly
capable of distinguishing between any two groups of observers. The likelihood
method does slightly better, because, where necessary, it is even able to make a
distinction based on groupsize, unlike the evidence-method (see the discussion
in Section 4.3 above).
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Fig. 3. Capabilities are assigned randomly
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As argued above, these kinds of randomized setups are not very informative
about the relative effectiveness of the methods specified here, or, more generally,
about many other solutions proposed elsewhere. Figures 4 and 5 show some more
detail of the relative efficacy of these methods in certain settings. All observers’
capabilities are fixed at 0.4 (Fig. 4(a)), and then one observer’s capability is
increased to 0.45 (Fig. 4(b)), 0.65 (Fig. 4(c)), and 0.85 (Fig. 4(d)). Let’s first
consider the influence on the performance of the majority-method (the lowest
plot in all graphs). It is barely influenced in Fig. 4(b), but starts to increase more
strongly in the two lower graphs (4(c) and 4(d)). It may be expected that the
group of J = 6 observers with their capability fixed at 0.4 typically (on average)
splits in two groups of 3, each observing a different value for the random variable
A. As one agent’s capability starts to increase, it will join the (randomly) correct
group more and more often, giving it a majority and leading to that group’s
observation being selected by agent i. This effect is more pronounced as the
expert’s capability increases more strongly, and above a value of 0.5.
When all observers’ capabilities are equal to 0.4, the evidence method per-
forms slightly better than random, since there is a pattern to be discerned in
the observations of the observers: they are more often wrong than right, and
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(a) 7 agents: θj = 0.4
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θ θ(b) 6 agents: θj = 0.4, 1 agent: θj = 0.45
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(c) 6 agents: θj = 0.4, 1 agent: θj = 0.65
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(d) 6 agents: θj = 0.4, 1 agent: θj = 0.85
Fig. 4. Most capabilities are fixed at a relatively low level, and 1 agent’s capability is
increased in steps
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(a) 7 agents: θj = 0.6
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(b) 6 agents: θj = 0.6, 1 agent: θj = 0.65
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(c) 6 agents: θj = 0.6, 1 agent: θj = 0.75
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(d) 6 agents: θj = 0.6, 1 agent: θj = 0.85
Fig. 5. Most capabilities are fixed at a relatively high level, and 1 agent’s capability is
increased in steps
this information can be used to discount their reports, but the evidence method
still has trouble distinguishing which group is correct and which is not, because
they are basically equally reliable. Only when one agent’s reports become more
trustworthy, that one agent can drag the others along with him, in convincing
the evidence method.
The likelihood method initially performs the best, even when all agents’
capabilities are equal and quite low. This is because, as discussed above, the
likelihood method can take into account groupsize, unlike the evidence-method:
the larger group is more likely to be incorrect, simply because it’s a large group
and capabilities are smaller than 0.5. (This effect is reversed in the next experi-
ment, where all agents’ capabilities are initialized at 0.6: there, the larger group
is—correctly—inferred to be correct by the likelihood method.) In Fig. 4(d), the
relative advantage of the likelihood method decreases to the point where the two
methods’ performance is equal: the incorporation of groupsize is not necessary
anymore.
Figure 5 shows what happens when all observers’ capabilities are fixed at
0.6 (Fig. 5(a)), and when subsequently, one observer’s capability is increased
to 0.65 (Fig. 5(b)), 0.75 (Fig. 5(c)), and 0.85 (Fig. 5(d)). The majority method
does relatively well here, because all agents’ capabilities are higher than 0.5. The
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difference between the likelihood and evidence methods starts out the same as
in Figure 4, and they again become equal, with both surpassing the majority
method in performance as the expert agent’s capability increases to 0.85.
4.5 A Versatile Approach
So, even though the initial experiment with randomized assignment showed the
evidence and likelihood methods to almost perform equally well, there is obvi-
ously more going on. Different classes of parameter settings can and should be
distinguished. For the agents involved, what matters is what class they are in,
and not what the various methods’ performance in random situations would be,
or how those methods perform on average, when tested in a wide variety of ran-
domly generated settings. In this section, we will start exploring such different
classes of circumstances.
Consider Fig. 6, which compares the three methods in situations where
all observers are equally capable, at different levels, ranging from θ = 0.05 in
Figure 6(a), via 0.35 and 0.65 in Figures 6(b) and 6(c), respectively, to θ = 0.95
in Fig. 6(d). In all settings, the likelihood method performs the best, or almost
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(a) 7 agents: θj = 0.05
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(b) 7 agents: θj = 0.35
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(c) 7 agents: θj = 0.65
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(d) 7 agents: θj = 0.95
Fig. 6. Examination of the sensitivity of the different methods’ performance to varia-
tions in the observers’ capabilities
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Fig. 7. Overall results
the best. Only the majority method is superior, but only when the observers’
capabilities are very high, while the likelihood method is also able to attain good
performance when observers’ capabilities are low, in which case the majority
method breaks down. This is also clear from the overall results in Figure 7, which
shows the average across the last 500 rounds of the values per round in Figure 7,
which are themselves averages across 1000 replications of each run. Especially in
situations where all observers’ capabilities are near 0.5 does the evidence method
suffer, as compared to settings where observers’ behavior is more pronounced.
Overall, of course, an agent does not know in which environment it currently
resides, so a sensible approach is clearly to go with the likelihood method, since
it gives relatively good performance across a range of circumstances.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a variety of methods for combining an agent’s trust in dif-
ferent agents, who provide information about the value of a random variable,
which might be a certain state of the environment, or the behavior of yet an-
other agent in a reputation system. We argue for systematic analysis of different
methods’ characteristics, and for an investigation of these methods’ expected
performance in different circumstances. At the same time, randomized simula-
tion environments for testing competing methods are considered inappropriate,
since real-world agents do not inhabit random environments, but will typically
find themselves in certain classes of circumstances. We suggest the use of com-
puter simulations to investigate such classes of circumstances and illustrate this
approach by systematically varying one dimension of the situation. From these
experiments, we conclude that, even though an individual agent typically does
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not know in which circumstances it exists, the likelihood method provides a
method which seems robust against changes across a wide range of values for
the agents’ capabilities.
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Abstract. In this paper we present the design, implementation, and
evaluation of Jiminy: a framework for explicitly rewarding users who
participate in reputation management systems by submitting ratings.
To defend against participants who submit random or malicious ratings
in order to accumulate rewards, Jiminy facilitates a probabilistic mech-
anism to detect dishonesty and halt rewards accordingly.
Jiminy’s reward model and honesty detection algorithm are presented
and its cluster-based implementation is described. The proposed frame-
work is evaluated using a large sample of real-world user ratings in order
to demonstrate its effectiveness. Jiminy’s performance and scalability are
analysed through experimental evaluation. The system is shown to scale
linearly with the on-demand addition of slave machines to the Jiminy
cluster, allowing it to successfully process large problem spaces.
1 Introduction
Reputation management systems (RMSs) allow participants to report their expe-
riences with respect to past interactions with other participants. RMSs are often
provided by retailer web sites, on-line movie review databases, auction systems,
and trading communities. However, as identified in [12], information within such
systems may not always be reliable. Many participants opt not to submit ratings,
as there is little incentive for them to spend time performing the rating task —
especially if interactions are frequent and participants expect utility standards
of service. Furthermore, participants tend to report mostly exceptionally good
or exceptionally bad experiences as a form of reward or revenge respectively.
Additionally, ratings are often reciprocal, as underlined by the observation that
a seller tends to rate a buyer after the buyer rates the seller [17].
In our previous work we proposed Pinocchio [12], an incentive model where
participants are explicitly rewarded for submitting ratings, and are debited when
they query the RMS. Providing explicit incentives a) increases the quantity of
ratings submitted and b) reduces the bias of ratings by removing implicit or hid-
den rewards, such as revenge or reciprocal ratings. To prevent participants from
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submitting arbitrary or dishonest feedback with the purpose of accumulating re-
wards, Pinocchio features the credible threat of halting rewards for participants
who are deemed dishonest by its probabilistic honesty estimator.
In this paper we present Jiminy, a distributed architecture that employs the
Pinocchio model to build a scalable system for providing participation incentives.
This work makes the following contributions:
– It presents the design, implementation, and cluster deployment of Jiminy, in-
cluding an algorithmic implementation of the Pinocchio mathematical
model, suitable for a clustered architecture.
– It analyses a large data set (from the GroupLens1 project) of one million
movie ratings submitted by human users. It does so in order to verify the
validity of the assumptions based on which our model is designed, regarding
the distribution of our honesty estimator and the independence of ratings.
– It demonstrates the effectiveness of the Jiminy honesty assessment algorithm
by showing that it can detect four different types of dishonest users injected
into the GroupLens data set.
– It demonstrates experimentally that the Jiminy cluster can scale to process
large problem spaces — i.e., large numbers of participants and ratings —
at run-time, as the cluster’s performance increases almost linearly with the
addition of more slave machines.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. A brief outline of the Pinocchio
reward and honesty assessment scheme is provided in Section 2. The design, im-
plementation, and deployment of Jiminy in a cluster — including an algorithmic
realisation of the Pinocchio model and extensions for its efficient implementation
in a distributed environment — is described in Section 3. The effectiveness of
the Jiminy algorithms and the scalability of the clustered system is evaluated in
Section 4. Related work in trust management and incentive schemes is presented
in Section 5. Finally, our conclusions and future work are discussed in Section 6.
2 Background
The Pinocchio model provides a mechanism for the assessment of the quality
of ratings that are submitted by users2 of a reputation management system
(RMS). It defines an honesty metric that quantifies in a probabilistic sense how
honest a participant is in her ratings, and outlines a reward model that provides
incentives for participants to submit honest ratings. In this section we provide
brief background information on the Pinocchio model — a detailed description
is provided in [12].
2.1 Honesty Metric
The honestymetric in the Pinocchiomodel is used to discourage participants from
submitting random ratings in an attempt to accumulate rewards. Moreover, it
1 http://www.grouplens.org
2 We use the terms user and participant as equivalent throughout this paper.
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detects participants who always submit average ratings, which convey little use-
ful information to other users of the reputation management system. The entities
that are reviewed by participants are referred to as subjects. When participants
interact with a subject they form opinions about it and report these opinions to
the RMS through a numeric score, or rating. The opined-about subjects comprise
the set R. Sufficient number of ratings by different participants on a specific sub-
ject can be used to fit a probability distribution that corresponds to the ratings
of all participants for that subject. This probability distribution can then be used
to check the credibility of ratings submitted by participants for that subject.
Suppose participant u reported a rating value Qs for subject s. We compute
the log-probability of likelihood Ls of Qs based upon the probability distribution
of all ratings available for subject s. The more unlikely a rating value on a
subject, the more negative Ls becomes:
Ls = ln (Pr(Qs)) (1)
We define a subset B, B ⊆ R, which contains all subjects rated by a given
participant u. Summing over all subjects (elements of B) about which u has
reported reviews, we obtain Tu:
Tu =
∑
s∈B
ln (Pr(Qs)) (2)
These values alone are not sufficient for estimating honesty; they would be
biased towards users who are continually submitting ratings with a high prob-
ability, i.e., the average opinion of the community. It is necessary to protect
against this, thus the honesty estimator measures the deviation Z of random
variable Tu from its mean value T¯ (considering all participants), and standard
deviation σˆ:
Z =
(Tu − T¯ )
σˆ
(3)
|Z| is used as the estimator, and is referred to as the nose-length of the
participant in the Pinocchio model.
The calculation of the nose-length |Z| of a participant from Equation 3 re-
quires the scaling of her Tu value according to the total number of rating sub-
missions the participant has made. Without the scaling process, all users are
expected to provide same number of ratings, placing a limitation on the appli-
cability of the model to real-world data sets. In Jiminy this aspect is taken into
account in the definition of honesty metric, as discussed in the following section.
2.2 Reward Model
Participants are encouraged to submit their experiences on subjects by being
provided with a reward for each experience that they report. A credit balance
is kept for each participant, which is credited with a reward for each rating that
she contributes, and debited for each query that she makes.
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Rewarding a participant for the ratings she makes is also subject to whether
she is deemed honest or not. When her nose-length rises above a certain threshold
(dishonesty threshold), she is deemed dishonest and rewards for further ratings
that she submits to the RMS are halted. For her rewards to be resumed, her
honesty metric has to fall below the honesty threshold, and remain so for a specific
period of time (probationary period). Pinocchio seeks to ensure that there is a
substantial penalty for recurring dishonest behaviour, and, at the same time
avoid being too strict to first-time cheaters. To achieve this, an exponential
back-off scheme is followed for the value of the probationary period, which is
doubled each time a participant is considered as being dishonest.
3 Design and Implementation
In this section we present the design and implementation of Jiminy. We describe
the main components and operations of the system, and discuss the approach
that we followed to realise its deployment in a distributed environment. The
latter is necessary in order for Jiminy to scale to a large number of participants,
each of which requires computationally intensive operations and increases the
system load considerably.
Jiminy is a multiprocess, multithreaded application written in Java, which in-
teracts with a MySQL backend database for storage and retrieval of system/user
data. Figure 1 shows the main components of the system, along with their inter-
action with the RMS. The architecture of Jiminy follows the master-slave model
for server design. The goal is to distribute the processing load that is involved
in the calculation of the nose-lengths |Z| of participants to multiple machines,
and parallelise the operation so that it scales with the number of participants
and ratings. The more slave machines are added to the system, the higher the
possibility of bulk processing of user honesty updates.
Without limiting the applicability of Jiminy, we assume the RMS to be dis-
tributed, running a node on each Jiminy slave. This RMS architecture is similar
to that of BambooTrust [13].
Master. Upon initialisation of the system, the main process on the master node
starts a new thread that listens for incoming registration requests from slave
nodes — operation 1 in Figure 1. Once several slaves have registered their pres-
ence with the master node, the latter assigns to each one of them a distinct subset
of all users that participate in the ratings system, which is used to populate each
slave’s local database — operation 2. The user subsets that are assigned to the
slave machines are disjoint to eliminate contention for any given user profile on
the master, minimise the load from queries on participant information submitted
by slave machines to the master node, and also reduce network traffic.
Additionally, when the master node receives a query from the RMS regarding
the trustworthiness of a user — operation 3, it acts as a dispatcher and forwards
the request to the appropriate slave machine for retrieving the respective value —
operation 4. Queries are encoded in XML format to allow interoperability with a
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Fig. 1. An overview of the Jiminy clustered architecture
variety of reputation management systems. Dispatching of queries is also handled
by a separate thread to allow the main process to maintain an acceptable level
of responsiveness of the system to user input. Lastly, the master also provides a
graphical user interface, through which users of the system can perform queries
on the honesty of participants, and set the system parameters such as honesty
and dishonesty thresholds.
Slave. The main process (Slave i, i = 1..N in Figure 1) that runs on a slave
node initially registers itself with the master — operation 1, and receives the
subset of participants this slave will be responsible for, as well as system-wide
variables — operation 2. It then listens for incoming query requests from the
master. Queries are of several types such as requests for the credit balance of a
user, notifications of a new rating to the RMS, requests for a trust value, etc.
They are parsed and processed by a pool of threads that is started by the main
slave process — operation 4.
Slave nodes also update the honesty metrics for their assigned participants,
and calculate a user’s position with respect to the reward model. This is per-
formed by a separate thread that runs periodically on the slave, connects to the
RMS node to receive aggregate information on the ratings for use in honesty
calculations, and updates the honesty values of all participants who have in the
past evaluated subjects that received a new rating — operation 5.
The Jiminy system makes use of persistent storage for storing intermediate
results and general statistics on the participants and the subjects that are rated.
The aim is to avoid costly re-calculations upon system crash, and perform only
incremental updates on the Tu values as new ratings are submitted to the RMS.
System information such as honesty threshold, length of probationary period,
mean and standard deviation of the Tu values, as well as histogram statistics
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for the rated subjects are stored in the local MySQL database on each slave
machine.
3.1 Implementation Details
At the heart of Jiminy lies the algorithm that periodically updates the Tu values
and the nose-lengths |Z| of the participants. The probability distribution Pr(Qs)
of the ratings available for a given subject s (Equation 2) is estimated using the
following formula for every rating ρ:
Pr(Qs) =
# participants who assigned rating ρ to s
# participants who rated s
As stated in previous section, the calculation of the nose-length |Z| of a par-
ticipant from Equation 3 requires the scaling of her Tu value. Without this
adjustment, a participant’s Tu value is proportional to the number of her sub-
missions, and in case it is different from the average number of ratings submitted
per user she is deemed more dishonest. This is also intuitive in the sense that
a participant with many ratings is more likely to have made dishonest ratings,
however Jiminy is interested in the rate of disagreement, not the total number
of its occurrences. To account for this fact, Equation 3 is modified as follows:
Z =
Tu
# ratings made by u − T¯
σˆ
(4)
The pseudocode for the calculation of Tu values is shown in Algorithm 1.
As new ratings get submitted to the reputation management system, users
who have reviewed subjects that are rated by the new ratings need to have
their Tu values updated (variable AffectedUsers of Algorithm 1). For each
one of these users, the algorithm finds the ratings that affect her Tu value and
accordingly adjusts it based on whether the user rated the subject with the same
rating as the one carried in the new rating (lines 11–15 of Algorithm 1). Since Tu
values do not change dramatically from one rating to another, the algorithm runs
periodically to reduce processing overhead, and waits for several new ratings to
accumulate in the RMS. New ratings are determined using a timestamp that is
associated with each rating that is received.
Each slave machine updates the nose-lengths of the users that have been as-
signed to it. To better distribute the user space to the group of slaves, the master
assigns new and existing users to slaves according to the formula: slave number
= (userid % n), when n is the number of slaves present. Failure of slave machines
is handled by the master using the Java exception handling facility, however a
more robust fail-over mechanism still remains part of our future work.
Last, the calculation of nose-lengths |Z| requires the mean T¯ and standard
deviation σˆ of the Tu values of all the N participants. From the formulas for the
mean and standard deviation we have:
T¯ =
1
N
N∑
u=1
Tu (5)
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Algorithm 1. UpdateTuValues()
Require: New ratings added to RMS since last update
1: AffectedUsers ← Find users that have rated subjects that appear in new ratings
2: for (each user u in AffectedUsers) do
3: UserSubjects ← Find subjects rated by user u
4: NewUserRatings ← Find new ratings about UserSubjects
5: for (each new user rating i in NewUserRatings) do
6: Subject ← Subject rated by i
7: UserRating ← Rating about Subject by user u
8: NumberSame ← Number of ratings about Subject equal to UserRating
9: TotalSubjectRatings ← Number of ratings that rate Subject
10: Tu ← Tu − (log(NumberSame)− log(TotalSubjectRatings))
11: if (UserRating = rating of rating i) then
12: Tu ← Tu + (log(NumberSame + 1) − log(TotalSubjectRatings+ 1))
13: else
14: Tu ← Tu + (log(NumberSame) − log(TotalSubjectRatings + 1))
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
and
σˆ =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
u=1
(
Tu − T¯
)2 (6)
By substituting (5) into (6) and after simple algebraic manipulations, we get:
σˆ =
√√√√√ 1
N(N − 1)
⎛⎝N N∑
u=1
T 2u −
(
N∑
u=1
Tu
)2⎞⎠ (7)
Each slave transmits the sum and the sum-of-squares of Tu values for its par-
ticipant set to the master — operation 6 in Figure 1. The master then calculates
the mean and standard deviation for all the participants, and disseminates the
results back to the slaves for further use in estimating |Z| — operation 7.
4 Evaluation
In this section we present a three-fold evaluation of our architecture. We first
analyse the GroupLens data-set to ensure that the assumptions made by our
model about the distribution of nose-lengths and independence of ratings hold.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that our algorithm can successfully detect dishon-
esty. Finally, we show by means of experimental evaluation that Jiminy can scale
on-demand to accommodate increasing numbers of participants and subjects.
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4.1 Analysis of the Data Set
Nose-Length Distribution. The ability to judge, given a set of participant ratings,
whether a participant is likely to be honest is a crucial element of the system. In
[12] we simulated the behavior of nose-length values for different users, for various
subjects. We predicted that nose-length would have the form of a Gaussian
random variable, with a small number of potentially dishonest users being at
the far left or right parts of the distribution.
We analysed the GroupLens movie ratings data set to determine the real
distribution of nose-length values inside the set, for the users it contains. The
nose-length value was plotted against its frequency of occurrence. The result
of this analysis is shown in Figure 2; the nose-length distribution does indeed
fit the theoretically anticipated Gaussian distribution. This provides a strong
indication about a relationship between one’s relative frequency of disagreement
and his or her probability of being honest. Section 4.2 demonstrates that this
relationship holds, and that Jiminy is able to exploit it to detect dishonesty.
Distribution and Correlation of Ratings. As expected, our analysis of the chosen
data set revealed that ratings given by users to films did not always have a
normal distribution. Figure 3(a) shows three density plots of ratings for three
different movies namely, “Toy Story”, “Jumanji” and “Big Bully”.
Film ratings are highly subjective. Some participants are likely to be very
impressed by a film while others may consider it disappointing. This can lead
to ratings exhibiting a multi-modal distribution — for example, approximately
half of the participants may assign a rating of 1 or 2, and the other half a rating
of 4 or 5. This type of distribution could lead to a mean value which almost
no one has entered, and to a high standard deviation for ratings. Our analysis
showed that this potential problem does not appear to be severe; most films did
have a firm most common rating, although this value may not always be exactly
reflected on the mean.
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Fig. 3. a) Variation in distributions of ratings, and b) correlation among ratings for
three subjects: Toy Story, Jumanji and Big Bully
In addition to the distribution of ratings, the correlation of ratings in the
GroupLens set was also studied, as illustrated in Figure 3(b). Since the correla-
tion coefficients are very low, it can be safely assumed that the ratings provided
by a user are independent of the existing ratings, thus making the rating pro-
cess independent and identically distributed. This observation emphasises that
T¯ and σˆ of the distributions are appropriate to capture and characterise user
honesty.
4.2 Evaluation of the Algorithm
To evaluate the effectiveness of Jiminy with respect to assessing the honesty
of participants we conducted the following experiment. We injected the ratings
of four known dishonest users into the existing GroupLens data set, fed the
resulting data set into the Jiminy cluster, and monitored the nose-length values
that Jiminy assigned to the known dishonest users.
We created the following four users and subsequently injected their ratings
into the data set:
– Mr. Average. This user periodically queries the RMS to obtain the average
rating for each movie he wishes to rate, and subsequently submits the integer
rating closest in value to the average rating reported for the same movie. This
average rating reported is unlikely to continually be the most popular rating
because of the nature of the ratings’ distributions.
– Ms. Popular. This user periodically queries the RMS to establish the most
popular rating for each movie she wishes to rate, which she then submits for
the same movie.
– Mr. Disagree. This user periodically queries the RMS to obtain the average
rating for each movie he wishes to rate, and then reports a rating that is as
far from the average value as possible. For instance, he would report 1 if the
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Table 1. Tu and nose-length values (x10) of the four users in question
User Tu Z
Mr. Average -8.95 19.28
Ms. Popular -7.84 24.78
Mr. Disagree -39.35 -132.85
Ms. Random -20.31 -37.64
average rating was 5 and vice versa, and he would report 1 or 5 (at random)
if the average rating was 3.
– Ms. Random. This user periodically submits a random rating for each movie
she wishes to rate.
We selected a subset of 43 films from the RMS for these dishonest users to
rate, entered their corresponding ratings — one per movie per user, and used
Jiminy to assess their honesty values. The results of this experiment are shown
in Table 1.
The above shows that dishonest users do have a nose-length (Z value) quite
different from that of the honest users. Mr. Average and Ms. Popular have Z
values appearing at the far right side of the graph in Figure 2, as predicted.
Mr. Disagree and Ms. Random both appear to the left side, with Mr. Disagree
off the side of the graph. Interestingly, no users in the original data set dis-
agreed to this extent, but at the opposite end of the scale there were users who
agreed with a frequency similar to — though not quite as high as — that of
Ms. Popular.
This result demonstrates that the honesty metric is effective, being able to
spot our simulated dishonest users in a large data set of real ratings. It can also
be used to choose appropriate honesty and dishonesty threshold values, which is
discussed in the following section.
Discussion
Selection of Threshold Values. Choosing honesty and dishonesty thresholds
presents a trade-off: setting the dishonesty threshold too high may allow dis-
honest participants to be rewarded, while setting it too low may punish honest
participants who, owing to the subjective nature of the rating topic, vary in
opinion a little too frequently or too infrequently. At the same time, setting
the honesty threshold too low would make it difficult for a dishonest user to
be deemed honest again, while setting it too high would increase fluctuation
between the honest and dishonest states.
Jiminy allows for these parameters to be adjusted by the system administra-
tor. Suitable honesty and dishonesty thresholds can be devised through inspec-
tion of the nose-lengths of known dishonest users (such as the ones in the previous
section), the distribution of nose-lengths, and depending on the trustworthiness
of the environment in which the system is deployed. Tuning the thresholds ef-
fectively determines the tolerance (or harshness) of Jiminy.
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Table 2. Specifications and base time for machines in the Jiminy cluster
Machine Specs base time (s)
1 AMD Opteron 244, 1.8GHz, 2GB RAM 765.85
2 AMD Opteron 244, 1.8GHz, 2GB RAM 764.90
3 UltraSPARC-IIIi, 1.0GHz, 2GB RAM 1904.79
4 Intel Xeon, 3.06 GHz, 1GB RAM 2556.06
5 UltraSPARC-IIIi, 1.0GHz, 8GB RAM 1793.37
As an example, as Figure 2 shows, 89.6 % of participants are within the Z
(×10) range −14.5 to 14.5, and 93.34% are within the Z range −17 to 17. Setting
the honesty threshold at 14.5 and the dishonesty threshold at 17 would deem
6.66% of participants dishonest.
Rating Engineering. Let us consider a participant that submits a number of
honest ratings, enough to take her well above the dishonesty threshold. She then
submits a mixture of dishonest and honest ratings in varying proportions, and
tests whether she is still deemed honest. She keeps increasing the proportion of
dishonest ratings until she is deemed dishonest, and then reverses that trend.
At some point, the user may find an equilibrium where she can be partially
dishonest — but not enough for the system to halt her rewards. We term this
type of attack rating engineering.
Jiminy has a number of countermeasures against such attacks. First, it does
not make the threshold values publicly accessible. At the same time, it conceals
fine-grained nose-length values, providing only a binary honest/dishonest answer
when queried about a certain user. Additionally, the exponentially increasing
probationary period introduces a high cost for such attacks. As credits cannot be
traded for money, we believe that the incentive for determined rating engineering
is reasonably low. However, as part of our future work we plan to investigate the
design of an algorithm with more explicit defences against such attacks.
4.3 Scalability
Experimental Setup. To assess the performance and scalability of Jiminy we de-
ployed the system on a cluster composed of five machines, as shown in
Table 2. We deployed five slave instances, one on each machine. The master
node was run on machine number one, along with one slave instance. The base
value shown in the table represents the time needed by each machine (running
the entire Jiminy system on its own) to update the nose-length of each partic-
ipant in the GroupLens data set, when 5000 new ratings have been submitted.
We term new ratings the ones submitted after the latest periodic execution of
the algorithm.
The performance difference between the slaves, as indicated by the dispar-
ity of base time values, is due to both hardware differences and level of load.
For instance, slave number four has been relatively heavily used by third-party
applications during the time the experiments were undertaken.
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Fig. 4. a) Time taken by the periodic nose-length calculation on slave 1 for different
numbers of ratings and slaves present, and b) speedup observed by increasing the
number of slaves
Results. We measured the time needed by slave number one to finish the periodic
calculation of nose-lengths for 5000, 10000, 20000, 40000, and 80000 new ratings,
and while running in a cluster of one to five slaves. The results of this are shown in
Figure 4(a). We observe that the time required increases linearly with the number
of new ratings, and that adding slaves to the cluster significantly improves sys-
tem performance. As an example, for 5000 ratings, slave number one completed
its calculation in 161 seconds when five slaves were present, compared to 765 sec-
onds when running on its own. For 20000 ratings the same computation took 676
seconds in a cluster of five and 3110 seconds on slave number one alone.
We also measured the speedup, denoted as the ratio of time required when
a slave ran alone over the respective time when N slaves were participating in
the cluster, to perform the same calculation. We measured the speedup achieved
by each slave as new slaves were added to the cluster for 5000, 10000, 20000,
40000, and 80000 new ratings. The results of this experiment for 5000 ratings are
shown in Figure 4(b). Speedup results for experiments with more ratings look
nearly identical to these. As shown in the graph, each slave achieves a near-linear
performance improvement for every new slave that is added to the cluster. This
underlines that the cluster can be scaled on-demand to accommodate increas-
ing numbers of participants and subjects. The small deviation from a precise
linear performance increase is attributed to our user space partitioning scheme,
assigning slightly different parts of the user space to slaves.
Also, it is worth noting that the master node was not a bottleneck in the
system, presenting a very low CPU and memory utilisation compared to the
slaves. Additionally, our experiment demonstrates that the performance and
scalability of Jiminy allow it to be deployed in a realistic setting. By increasing
its performance linearly when slave machines are added to the cluster, Jiminy
can scale to calculate nose-length values at a rate equal to (or higher than)
the rate at which ratings are submitted. Our modest five-machine cluster — a
commercial deployment would be equipped with more and more capable high-
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end servers — can process approximately 31 new ratings per second, in a data
set of one million ratings in total.
5 Related Work
We identify two areas of research as relevant to the work presented in this paper:
reputation management systems, and incentive schemes.
Reputation Management Systems. RMSs are widely employed within a range of
systems and communities. In peer-to-peer systems [2, 15] they serve as a means of
reducing free-riding [3, 14] and selecting reliable peers. In ad-hoc networks, they
support detecting selfish nodes [6]. In auction sites3 and on-line marketplaces4[7]
they help buyers identify reliable sellers and vice versa.
We investigated the use of an RMS in public computing [10], and observed that
requirements are different in this environment [12]. To summarise, computing
resources are regarded as utility and users take good service for granted, thus
ratings would tend to only be exceptionally negative and (less frequently so)
exceptionally positive. Additionally, interactions happen more frequently and in
short timescales, increasing the overall overhead of submitting ratings.
Another observation we make is that there is a trade-off between the level of
anonymity of participants and their willingness to participate. Anonymity and the
lack of a sense of permanent identity act as disincentives for active participation.
This is part of the reason why files in file-sharing peer-to-peer systems are rarely
rated, as well as why peers are indifferent about their reputation— they can easily
escape bad ratings by re-registering using a different identity [9].
On the other hand, participants in auction sites care about their reputations
more than peers in peer-to-peer systems, due to the semi-permanent, pseudony-
mous nature of their identities. However, semi-permanent identities provide an
incentive for submitting biased information; submitting positive feedback about
others is often related to an expectation of reciprocity, while submitting negative
feedback is often due to a feeling of revenge [1].
Jiminy complements RMSs, facilitating explicit participation rewards and
providing information about the honesty of users. Its XML interface supports
interoperability with a variety of RMSs.
Incentive Schemes. Providing incentives for participation is a fairly general re-
search avenue. Recent studies have focused on incentives for cooperation
between nodes in wireless ad hoc networks [8]. Peer-to-peer systems such as
Kazaa5 often provide incentives for providing content by linking peer ratings
to download rates [4, 18, 19]. Bittorrent6 uses a ‘tit-for-tat’ approach to ensure
peer participation.
3 http://www.ebay.com, http://auctions.yahoo.com/
4 http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/tg/stores/static/-/marketplace/
welcome/
5 http://www.kazaa.com
6 http://bitconjurer.org/BitTorrent
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Social means for improving collaboration within communities have been ex-
amined [5, 11, 16], suggesting that interactions should carry a notion of visibility,
uniqueness, and benefit for the participant. In accordance to these findings, we
believe that the explicit incentives that Jiminy provides can help enhance the
feeling of a participant that she benefits from submitting ratings.
While incentive models have been proposed before, to the best of our knowl-
edge there is a need for an architecture that a) provides an honesty metric to
improve the quality of received feedback, and b) performs and scales well in
order to accommodate realistically large data sets.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented the design, implementation, and cluster deployment of
Jiminy, a distributed architecture for providing explicit incentives for partici-
pation in reputation systems. Jiminy features a reward mechanism and a prob-
abilistic honesty metric based on the Pinocchio [12] model to encourage the
submission of honest ratings.
The GroupLens data set of one million real movie ratings was employed to
verify our assumptions about the distribution of nose-length values (our honesty
estimator), and about the independence of ratings. Furthermore, the system’s
effectiveness was evaluated by showing that it is able to detect four typical types
of dishonest participants whose ratings we injected into the GroupLens data set.
Finally, experiments were conducted to demonstrate that Jiminy performs and
scales well, increasing its performance near-linearly as slaves are added to the
cluster, and being able to process ratings at run-time.
At the time of writing, we are evaluating Jiminy using different types of data
sets, where rating subjectivity is higher or lower. We also plan to investigate
algorithms with inherent resilience towards rating engineering, and mechanisms
for the dynamic repartitioning of computation according to the performance and
workload of individual slaves.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Prof. Sahin Albayrak, Silvan Kaiser, and the Technical
University of Berlin for providing support for our experiments. We would also
like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and
suggestions.
References
1. A. Abdul-Rahman and S. Hailes. Supporting Trust in Virtual Communities. In
Proc. Hawaii Intl Conf. on Sys. Sciences (HICSS), January 2000.
2. K. Aberer and Z. Despotovic. Managing Trust in a Peer-2-Peer Information Sys-
tem. In Proc. 10th Intl Conf. of Inf. and Knowledge Mgmt, 2001.
Jiminy: A Scalable Incentive-Based Architecture 235
3. E. Adar and B. Huberman. Free riding on gnutella. Technical report, Xerox PARC,
Aug. 2000.
4. K. Anagnostakis and M. Greenwald. Exchange-based incentive mechanisms for
peer-to-peer file sharing. In Proc. 24th Intl Conf. on Dist. Comp. Sys. (ICDCS
2004).
5. G. Beenen, K. Ling, X. Wang, K. Chang, D. Frankowski, P. Resnick, and R. E.
Kraut. Using social psychology to motivate contributions to online communities.
In Proc. ACM Conf. on Comp. supported Coop. work (CSCW ’04), 2004.
6. S. Buchegger and J. Y. L. Boudec. A robust reputation system for p2p and mo-
bile ad-hoc networks. In Proc. 2nd Workshop on the Econ. of Peer-to-Peer Sys.
(P2PEcon 2004), 2004.
7. A. Chavez and P. Maes. Kasbah: An agent marketplace for buying and selling
goods. In Proc. 1st Intl Conf. on the Practical App. of Int. Agents and Multi-
Agent Tech. (PAAM’96). Practical Application Company, 1996.
8. J. Crowcroft, R. Gibbens, F. Kelly, and S. Ostring. Modelling incentives for col-
laboration in mobile ad hoc networks. In Proc. of WiOpt’03, 2003.
9. J. R. Douceur. The Sybil Attack. In Proc. of the 1st Intl Workshop on Peer-to-Peer
Sys., March 2002.
10. B. Dragovic, S. Hand, T. Harris, E. Kotsovinos, and A. Twigg. Managing trust
and reputation in the XenoServer Open Platform. In Proc. 1st Intl Conf. on Trust
Mgmt, May 2003.
11. T. Erickson, C. Halverson, W. A. Kellogg, M. Laff, and T. Wolf. Social translu-
cence: designing social infrastructures that make collective activity visible. Com-
munications of the ACM, 45(4):40–44, 2002.
12. A. Fernandes, E. Kotsovinos, S. Ostring, and B. Dragovic. Pinocchio: Incentives
for honest participation in distributed trust management. In Proc. 2nd Intl Conf.
on Trust Management (iTrust 2004), Mar. 2004.
13. E. Kotsovinos and A. Williams. BambooTrust: Practical scalable trust manage-
ment for global public computing. In Proc. of the 21st Annual ACM Symp. on
App. Comp. (SAC), Apr. 2006.
14. R. Krishnan, M. D. Smith, and R. Telang. The economics of peer-to-peer networks.
Draft technical document, Carnegie Mellon University, 2002.
15. S. Lee, R. Sherwood, and B. Bhattacharjee. Cooperative Peer Groups in NICE. In
Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, 2003.
16. P. J. Ludford, D. Cosley, D. Frankowski, and L. Terveen. Think different: increasing
online community participation using uniqueness and group dissimilarity. In Proc.
SIGCHI Conf. on Human Factors in Comp. Sys. (CHI ’04), 2004.
17. P. Resnick and R. Zeckhauser. Trust among strangers in internet transactions:
Empirical analysis of ebay’s reputation system. In The Econ. Internet and E-
Comm., volume 11 of Advances in App. Microec. Elsevier Science, 2002.
18. Q. Sun and H. Garcia-Molina. Slic: A selfish link based incentive mechanism
for unstructured peer-to-peer networks. In Proc. Intl Conf. on Dist. Comp. Sys.
(ICDCS ’04).
19. B. Yang, T. Condie, S. Kamvar, and H. Garcia-Molina. Non-cooperation in com-
petitive p2p networks. In Proc. Intl Conf. on Dist. Comp. Sys. (ICDCS ’04).
Virtual Fingerprinting as a Foundation for
Reputation in Open Systems
Adam J. Lee and Marianne Winslett
Department of Computer Science,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
Urbana, IL, 61801 USA
{adamlee, winslett}@cs.uiuc.edu
Abstract. The lack of available identity information in attribute-based
trust management systems complicates the design of the audit and in-
cident response systems, anomaly detection algorithms, collusion detec-
tion/prevention mechanisms, and reputation systems taken for granted
in traditional distributed systems. In this paper, we show that as two
entities in an attribute-based trust management system interact, each
learns one of a limited number of virtual fingerprints describing their
communication partner. We show that these virtual fingerprints can be
disclosed to other entities in the open system without divulging any
attribute or absolute-identity information, thereby forming an opaque
pseudo-identity that can be used as the basis for the above-mentioned
types of services. We explore the use of virtual fingerprints as the basis of
Xiphos, a system that allows reputation establishment without requiring
explicit knowledge of entities’ civil identities. We discuss the trade-off be-
tween privacy and trust, examine the impacts of several attacks on the
Xiphos system, and discuss the performance of Xiphos in a simulated
grid computing system.
1 Introduction
Open systems are distributed computing systems in which resources are shared
across organizational boundaries. Common examples of open systems include
grid computing networks, corporate virtual organizations, disaster response net-
works, joint military task forces, and peer-to-peer systems. Open systems that
attempt to make access control decisions based on the identities of their par-
ticipants cannot be truly open, because they suffer from scalability limitations
as the number of authorized users increases. Recent research has addressed this
problem by proposing attribute-based trust management systems for use in these
environments (e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 15, 20, 22]). These types of systems provide
an effective and scalable means for making authorization decisions in truly open
systems, but depending on their deployment model, may have the side-effect of
virtually eliminating absolute identity information.
This lack of absolute identity can be a double-edged sword in that it increases
system scalability but also increases user anonymity; this may not be appropriate
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 236–251, 2006.
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in all application domains. In traditional distributed computing, user identity
forms the basis of audit and incident response systems, anomaly detection algo-
rithms, collusion detection and prevention mechanisms, and reputation systems.
As such, this functionality either does not exist or exists only in extremely lim-
ited forms in current attribute-based trust management systems. In this paper,
we take a first step towards addressing this problem by describing a method
for the linking and correlation of multiple identities used by the same entity in
attribute-based trust management systems. We then show how these identities
can be turned into virtual fingerprints which can be exchanged between entities
in the system without leaking sensitive attribute or civil-identity information.
Virtual fingerprints act much like fingerprints in the physical world in that they
allow multiple actions initiated by an entity to be linked without knowing the
civil identity of their owner, thereby forming a solid foundation upon which the
types of functionality previously described can be constructed.
To illustrate the promise of virtual fingerprinting, in this paper we show how
virtual fingerprints can form the basis of the Xiphos reputation system. Rep-
utation systems will be a necessary part of the open systems of the future, as
current research trends are beginning to embrace distributed theorem proving
approaches to access control [1, 23]. In these systems, proof fragments and ac-
cess hints are collected from various parties in the network and used to construct
proofs of authorization. Accepting these items from malicious entities could have
dire consequences, including unbounded searches for non-existent credentials and
the risk of being denied access to a resource which one is actually authorized to
access. We show how virtual fingerprinting can be used as the foundation of a
reputation system that will allow entities in an open system to gain confidence
in information provided by others (including proof hints) without compromising
each entity’s desire to protect his or her sensitive credentials or identity.
In Section 2, we describe how virtual fingerprints can be derived from the
information collected during interactions in attribute-based trust management
systems. Section 3 describes the design of a reputation system in which ratings
are aggregated by using the virtual fingerprinting mechanism described in Sec-
tion 2. We also discuss several deployment models for this reputation system,
each of which allows for a different balance of privacy and completeness of avail-
able information. In Section 4, we discuss the privacy implications of Xiphos,
examine the effects of several attacks against the system, summarize the results
of a performance study that we have undertaken, and comment on the general
applicability of virtual fingerprinting to reputation systems. We then overview
related work in Section 5 and present our conclusions and directions for future
work in Section 6.
2 Virtual Fingerprinting in Open Systems
Each entity, A, in an attribute-based trust management system has a finite
set of credentials, CA = {c1, . . . , cn}, which attest to her various attributes.
Although these credentials might never explicitly reference A’s civil identity (for
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example, they could be X.509 credentials that assert only that their owner has
a given attribute), we claim that in practice, CA completely describes A. In
trust management systems such as PolicyMaker [5], KeyNote [4], QCM [10],
Cassandra [2], and various trust negotiation proposals (e.g., [3, 13, 15, 22]),
each credential is issued to exactly one owner in order to avoid the group key
revocation problem. Thus, if an entity E can prove ownership of some c ∈ CA,
then necessarily E = A.
Since entities may consider some of their credentials to be private, CA is in
most cases not globally available as a basis of comparison for identity estab-
lishment. However, as entities in these systems interact, they collect valuable
information about one another even if no civil identity information is explicitly
disclosed. Specifically, as entities A and B interact, B learns DBA ⊆ CA. We will
call sets such as DBA descriptions.
Definition 1. A description is a subset of the credentials owned by one entity
which is learned by another entity in the system. We will use the notation DBA
to represent the description of A known by B. It is important to note that for
B to accept DBA as a description of A, A must demonstrate proof of ownership
of each credential c ∈ DBA to B.1 The collection of all such descriptions will be
denoted by D.
Over the course of multiple interactions, B can use previously obtained descrip-
tions to recognize when he is communicating with a familiar entity. For this to
be useful, however, the number of useful descriptions which an entity can use
must be small. We assert that this is indeed the case; even though an entity
can have an infinite number of self-issued or other low-value credentials, only
credentials issued by trusted third parties will be useful in gaining access to the
resources shared in an open system. It should not be possible to obtain an un-
limited number of such credentials (e.g., a user should not be able to obtain two
drivers licenses), which implies that the set of descriptions which can be learned
about an entity will necessarily be finite.
Although descriptions are useful for allowing one entity to recognize another
entity with whom she has interacted previously, privacy concerns restrict de-
scriptions from being shared between entities. This follows from the fact that
entities may consider some of their attributes to be sensitive: even though B
learns some credential c which belongs to A, this does not mean that any arbi-
trary entity in the system has the right to learn c. To allow certain information
contained within a description to be shared between entities, we introduce the
notion of virtual fingerprints.
Definition 2. The virtual fingerprint associated with a description DBA =
{c1, . . . , ck} is defined as FBA = {h(c1), . . . , h(ck)}, where h(·) is a cryptographic
hash function. The collection of all such fingerprints will be referred to as F.
1 The only exception to this rule occurs when c is a delegated credential. In this case,
DBA should contain both c and the long-term credential from which c was derived.
For obvious reasons, proof of ownership of the long-term credential is not required.
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The collision-resistance property of hash functions allows virtual fingerprints to
be used as pseudo-identifiers in the same way as descriptions. For instance, if
SHA-1 is used to derive virtual fingerprints, we expect that each person on earth
would need to hold 247 credentials before a collision would be found, given that
the current population is about 6.2 billion < 233 people. Therefore, if two virtual
fingerprints overlap, their corresponding descriptions overlap, and thus the two
virtual fingerprints both describe the same entity. Since virtual fingerprints mask
out the details of a user’s credentials, they are more likely candidates for allowing
inferred pseudo-identity information to be shared between entities. Note that an
entity may have multiple disjoint virtual fingerprints and thus even if two entities
have interacted with this entity, they may not be able to agree on this fact based
on virtual fingerprints alone. However, the limited number of virtual fingerprints
used by an entity, A, in the system (which follows directly from the limited
number of descriptions of A) implies that over time, factions of entities who
known A by each of her virtual fingerprints will form. Clearly, virtual fingerprints
can be used to link and correlate the actions of users in an open system without
revealing their private attribute data to entities who do not know it already.
It should be noted that virtual fingerprinting cannot be used in conjunction
with all types of trust management systems. For example, virtual fingerprints
cannot be derived in systems that use anonymous credentials (e.g., [8, 7]) or
hidden credentials [11], since the credentials belonging to an entity are never
fully disclosed. In addition, the systems discussed in [8, 7] were designed to
prevent actions taken at disparate points in an open system from being linked,
and thus prevent any form of distributed auditing. However, there are many
types of systems that could benefit from the scalability of attribute-based trust
management systems, but require the ability to audit transactions in the system
so that users can be held accountable for their actions. Examples include grid
computing systems, critical infrastructure management networks, joint military
task forces, and disaster management coordination centers. Virtual fingerprinting
can pave the way for the adoption of attribute-based trust management systems
in these types of high-assurance environments by increasing user accountability
and auditability. In the remainder of this paper, we substantiate this claim by
describing how virtual fingerprints can form the basis of a reputation system for
use in systems such as those described in [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 15, 20, 22].
3 The Xiphos Reputation System
In this section, we present Xiphos, a reputation system based on the virtual
fingerprints described in Section 2. The reputation update equations used by
Xiphos are similar to those used in other proposals and could easily be changed
as better reputation update mechanisms are proposed; in fact, many of the equa-
tions presented in this section are adaptations of those presented by Liu and Is-
sarny in [16] altered to work within our virtual fingerprint collection and analysis
framework. Thus, our primary contribution is not the reputation update equa-
tions themselves, but rather the framework though which entities can record,
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index, and exchange virtual fingerprints obtained during their interactions in a
privacy-preserving manner to formulate reputations for entities whose identities
may never be fully disclosed.
3.1 Local Information Collection
As entities in an attribute-based trust management system interact, they learn
valuable information regarding one another’s virtual fingerprints. Formally, as
entities interact, they store tuples of the form T = 〈F ∈ F, r ∈ R, τ ∈ T〉, where
F is a virtual fingerprint, r is a rating, and τ is the timestamp of the entity’s
most recent interaction with the entity described by virtual fingerprint F . We
assume that the set of all possible timestamps is T and that reputation ratings
come from some set R of possible values. To simplify our discussion, in this
paper we use R = [−1, 1]. However, in practice it will often be the case that
ratings are vector quantities (i.e., [−1, 1]n) that allow an entity to rate several
aspects of her interaction with another entity (e.g., both the service quality and
recommendation quality). All operations carried out on reputation ratings in this
paper can be carried out on vectors, so we use n = 1 without loss of generality.
Over time, it is possible that some entity B will learn several non-overlapping
virtual fingerprints describing another entity A. Thus, after a tuple 〈FBA , r, τ〉 is
inserted into B’s database, B must condense the set of all overlapping tuples.
That is, B will remove the set of all tuples T = {T | T.F ∩ FBA = ∅} from his
database and insert a single tuple T ′ which is defined as follows:
T ′ =
〈 ⋃
T∈T
T.F ,
∑
T∈T T.r ∗ ϕ(T.τ)∑
T∈T ϕ(T.τ)
, τnow
〉
(1)
In the above equation, τnow is the current timestamp and ϕ(·) is a function
which computes a factor in the interval [0, 1] which is used to scale the impact
of older ratings. One possible definition of ϕ(·) fades ratings linearly over some
duration d, though other definitions are certainly possible:
ϕ(t) =
{
1 − τnow−td when τnow − t > 0,
0 otherwise. (2)
Equations 1 and 2 form the basis of a local reputation system in which any
entity can track her interaction history with any other entity in the absence of
concrete identity information; this history can then be used as a predictor of
future success. In the following subsections, we describe three ways in which
entities can exchange portions of their local histories to form a system-wide
reputation system.
3.2 A Centrally Managed Reputation System
Information Collection. The simplest types of reputation systems to reason
about are systems in which a central server is responsible for storing and ag-
gregating reputation values, such as the eBay feedback system. In a centralized
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deployment of Xiphos, the server will store tuples of the form T = 〈FA ∈ F, lc ∈
[0, 1],FB ∈ F, r ∈ R, τ ∈ T〉 where FA is a virtual fingerprint of the entity re-
porting the rating, lc is the server’s linkability coefficient for the entity whose
virtual fingerprint is FA, FB is the virtual fingerprint of the entity being rated
(as observed by the rater), r is the rating, and τ is the timestamp at which this
rating was logged. Prior to discussing the calculation of reputation values based
on these tuples, we must first explain (1) how the server learns FA and (2) the
mechanism through which lc is calculated.
For several reasons discussed later in this paper, it is important that the server
records one of the rater’s virtual fingerprints along with each reputation rating
registered in the system. One way for this to occur is for the rater to simply
reveal several credentials to the server while reporting his reputation rating. Al-
ternatively, the rater could carry out an eager trust negotiation [21] with the
reputation server prior to submitting his reputation ratings. An eager trust ne-
gotiation begins by one party disclosing his public credentials to the other party.
Subsequent rounds of the negotiation involve one party disclosing any credentials
whose release policies were satisfied by the credentials that they received during
previous rounds of negotiation. This process continues until neither entity can
disclose more credentials to the other.
In Xiphos, linkability coefficients are used to weight the reputation rating
submitted by a particular entity based on how much the rater is willing to re-
veal about herself. To this end, the function γ : D → [0, 1] is used to establish
the linkability coefficient associated with a description (as defined in Section 2)
learned about an entity. The exact definition of γ(·) will necessarily be domain-
specific, but several important properties of γ(·) can be easily identified. First,
low-value (e.g., self-signed) credentials should not influence the linkability coef-
ficient associated with a description. This prevents an entity from establishing a
large number of descriptions that can be used with high confidence. Second, γ(·)
should be monotonic; that is, an entity should not be penalized for showing more
credentials, as doing so increases the ease with which her previous interaction
history can be traced. Third, to help prevent ballot-stuffing attacks, the sum of
the linkability coefficients derived from any partitioning of a description should
not be greater than the linkability coefficient derived from the entire descrip-
tion. More formally, given a description D ∈ D, ∀P = {p1 ⊆ D, . . . , pk ⊆ D}
such that ∩p∈P p = ∅, γ(D) ≥
∑
p∈P γ(p). We discuss and evaluate a particular
γ(·) function which meets these criteria in the technical report version of this
paper [14].
The linkability coefficient is a good metric by which to establish a “first im-
pression” of an entity, as a high linkability coefficient implies that an entity’s
previous interactions can be more easily tracked. This becomes especially mean-
ingful if the reputation system itself stores vector quantities and can look up a
“rating confidence” value for a particular user (such as the RRep value stored
in [16]). Entities with higher linkability coefficients are more likely to have many
meaningful rating confidence scores reported by other entities which could be
used to weight their contributions to the system.
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Given that the server stores tuples in the above mentioned format, we now
discuss how reputation ratings are updated. Assume that after interacting with
some entity, the server determines that the tuple T = 〈F , lc,F ′, r, τ〉 should be
inserted into the database. Prior to inserting this tuple, the database first purges
all prior reputation ratings reported by the entity described by F regarding the
entity described by F ′. That is, the set of tuples Told = {T | (T.FA ∩ F = ∅) ∧
(T.FB∩F ′ = ∅)} are deleted from the database.2 At this point, T can be inserted.
Note that user updates replace older reputation ratings rather than scaling them
since users locally time-scale their own ratings according to Equation 1.
Query Processing. Having discussed how information is stored at the reputa-
tion server, we now describe how queries are processed. If an entity is interested
in obtaining the reputation of some other entity whose virtual fingerprint is F ,
he submits a query of the form FQ ⊆ F to the reputation server. To compute
the reputation for the entity with the virtual fingerprint FQ, the server must
first select the set of relevant tuples TQ = {T | T.FB ∩ FQ = ∅}. If any subset
T AQ of the tuples in TQ have overlapping FA components, these tuples will be
removed from TQ and replaced with a summary tuple of the form:〈 ⋃
T∈T AQ
T.FA,max({T.lc | T ∈ T AQ }),
⋃
T∈T AQ
T.FB,
∑
T∈T AQ T.r ∗ ϕ(T.τ)∑
T∈T AQ ϕ(T.τ)
, τnow
〉
(3)
This duplicate elimination prevents the server from overcounting the rating of
a single entity A who knows the subject of the query by more than one disjoint
virtual fingerprint, each of which overlaps FQ. Let T ′Q denote the results of
performing this duplicate elimination process on TQ. Given T ′Q, the reputation
associated with the query FQ is defined by the following equation:
rQ =
∑
T∈T ′Q(T.lc ∗ ϕ(T.τ) ∗ T.r)∑
T∈T ′Q(T.lc ∗ ϕ(T.τ))
(4)
In short, the reputation returned by the server is the weighted average reputa-
tion rating of entities matching the virtual fingerprint FQ, where each reputation
rating is weighted based on both the linkability coefficient of the rater (which
acts as an estimator of her rating confidence value) and the age of the reputation
rating.
The curious reader might wonder why the set intersection operator is used to
define TQ = {Ti | Ti.FB ∩FQ = ∅} as the set of matching tuples for a query FQ
rather than the transitive closure of this operator. While in a network with only
honest participants, the transitive closure would give more accurate reputation
ratings, it would cause incorrect results to be calculated if cheaters are present
in the system. As an illustration, consider a system in which some entity E (with
virtual fingerprint FE) is known to have an excellent reputation. A malicious
2 Alternatively, these tuples could be saved for historical purposes, but marked as
expired.
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entity M (with virtual fingerprint FM ) could then inflate his reputation by
having some third party N (with virtual fingerprint FN) report a rating for the
“entity” whose virtual fingerprint is FE ∪ FM , thereby causing the tuple T =
〈FN , lcN ,FE∪FM , r, τ〉 to be inserted into the central database. If the transitive
closure of the set intersection operation was then used to define TQ, any searches
for M ’s reputation would then also include all ratings for E, thereby inflating
M ’s reputation. For this reason, we use only set intersection for query matching,
as entities can submit queries derived from virtual fingerprints which they have
verified to belong to another entity. This further justifies the use of the linkability
coefficient as a first impression of another entity, since as the linkability coefficient
increases towards 1.0, the information included in TQ approaches completeness.
3.3 A Fully Distributed Reputation System
We now describe a fully distributed deployment of Xiphos. In this model, en-
tities calculate reputation ratings for other entities by querying some subset of
the other entities in the system and aggregating the results from their local
databases. As in the centralized model, queries are of the form FQ ∈ F. Each
node queried selects from their local database all tuples which overlap FQ (i.e.,
T = {T | T.F ∩ FQ = ∅}) and then creates a summary tuple of the form
T = 〈rQ, τ〉 to return to the querier. If only a single tuple T ′ matches the query,
then its r and τ components are used to form T , otherwise Equation 1 is used
to generate a tuple whose r and τ components are used.
Upon receiving each of these summary tuples, the querier then augments
them by adding the linkability coefficient that she has associated with the entity
which sent the result. This linkability coefficient can either be cached from a
previous interaction, the result of an eager trust negotiation initiated by the
querier, or calculated from a set of credentials sent by the other entity along
with the summary tuple. Given this collection of augmented summary tuples,
TQ, the querier then computes the reputation rating of the entity whose virtual
fingerprint is characterized by FQ as follows:
rQ = ωlocal ∗ rlocalQ + (1 − ωlocal) ∗
∑
T∈TQ(T.lc ∗ ϕ(T.τ) ∗ T.r)∑
T∈TQ(T.lc ∗ ϕ(T.τ))
(5)
The term ωlocal ∈ [0, 1] represents a weighting factor which allows the querier
to determine how much of the reputation rating that she calculates should be
based on her previous interactions with the subject of a query (denoted by rlocalQ )
versus the reputation ratings reported by other entities in the system. In addition
to choosing the weight given to the reputations returned by others, users must
manually balance the time they spend querying other nodes with the accuracy
of the reputation rating that they hope to derive.
3.4 A Reputation System for Super-Peer Network Topologies
The final deployment model which we consider is a reputation system built on
top of a super-peer network. Super-peer networks are peer-to-peer networks that
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leverage the heterogeneity of nodes in the network by using nodes with higher
bandwidths and faster processors to act as intelligent routers which form the
backbone of the network. In these networks, a small number of so-called “super
nodes” act as gateways for a large number of standard peers.
In this model, each super node is assumed to have complete information re-
garding the virtual fingerprint to reputation bindings stored by each of its client
peers; that is, each super node acts as a centralized server as described in Sec-
tion 3.2. Given a query FQ, a super node then uses Equations 3 and 4 to compute
a local reputation rating, rSQ, based on the ratings provided by its client peers.
However, in addition to calculating this local reputation rating, the super node
can also include the reputations reported by other super nodes. After reissuing
the query to each other super node and obtaining TQ, the set of resulting sum-
mary tuples calculated using Equations 3 and 4, the super node computes the
aggregate reputation in response to the query FQ as follows:
rQ = ωS ∗ rSQ + (1 − ωS) ∗
∑
T∈TQ(T.lc ∗ ϕ(T.τ) ∗ T.r)∑
T∈TQ(T.lc ∗ ϕ(T.τ))
(6)
As in the fully distributed model, ωS is a weighting factor that determines how
much the reputation rating calculated from the super node’s local peer group
is weighted in comparison to the reputation ratings returned by all of the other
super nodes.
4 Discussion
In this section, we see that Xiphos is in fact a double-edged sword, and system ar-
chitects must make explicit choices regarding balancing privacy preservation and
completeness of available information when deciding which deployment model
to use. We then discuss several attacks on Xiphos, summarize the results of
an in-depth analysis of the Xiphos system, and comment on the use of virtual
fingerprints in conjunction with other reputation systems.
4.1 Privacy Considerations
Possible Privacy Violations. We have identified three types potential pri-
vacy violations which may occur as a result of the Xiphos system: leakage of
interaction history, discovery of groups of entities with similar attributes, and
inference of particular attribute information. Interaction history leaks occur in
the centralized and super-peer deployments of the Xiphos system any time that
one entity registers a reputation rating for another. This action allows the super
peer or central server to infer that the rater and the ratee have interacted in
the past. In the fully distributed deployment model, anytime that A answers a
query issued by B, B can infer that A has interacted with the subject of his
query. However, leakage of interaction history occurs in every other reputation
system that we are aware of, thus we do not discuss it further here.
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The second type of privacy violation occurs as a central server or super peer
collects large amounts of reputation tuples. Recall that these tuples are of the
form T = 〈FA, lc,FB, r, τ〉. After building a substantial database, a malicious
server can select all tuples whose FB component overlaps a given FQ exactly. We
now claim that the FA components of these matching tuples determine a set of
entities in the server’s view of the open system who have similar attributes. The
justification of this claim comes from the fact that each entity described by some
Ti.FA was able to determine the same virtual fingerprint for the entity matching
FQ. Thus, each of these entities was able to unlock each of the credentials used
to derive FQ, a feat which requires that each of these entities be able to satisfy
the same set of credential release policies. Because these release policies are not
always strict conjunctions, we cannot determine that each matching Ti.FA has
the same set of defining attributes, though we can claim that these entities are
similar in some respects. Note that the similarity of these entities is directly cor-
related with the restrictiveness of the release policies protecting the credentials
used to derive FQ; more restrictive policies lead to more related entities.
The third type of privacy violation allows certain entities in the system to
infer attributes possessed by another entity in the system. In the centralized
and super-peer models, this attack is an extension of the previously discussed
attack. Consider the case where a server S knows the description DSA of a node
A. Let us also assume that some c ∈ DSA is protected by a release policy, p, which
is also known to S (e.g., as a result of a previous interaction). S can then form a
query FQ = {h(c)} and process it using the technique described above, thereby
learning the virtual fingerprints of a group of entities who can satisfy p. Since
S knows p, he then knows not only that each entity that matched his query is
related somehow, but also that they satisfy p; that is, S can infer the attributes
which cause the similarities between the nodes which match his query.
A Balancing Act. To an extent, these attacks can be mitigated by choosing
an appropriate deployment model for the Xiphos system. The centralized model
makes these attacks easier to carry out, as the server has complete information
regarding the reputation tuples registered with the system. By using a super-peer
deployment, the information flow is restricted greatly. Both the group discovery
and attribute inference attacks are limited to occurring within a single peer
group, since super nodes do not have access to each others’ databases. Thus, if
client nodes restrict their information sharing to super nodes whom they can
trust (e.g., super nodes with Better Business Bureau memberships or TRUSTe-
issued privacy policies), then they can have some assurance that the super node
will not abuse their partial information to carry out these attacks. Limiting the
size of peer groups managed by each super node further restricts these attacks.
It should also be noted that using the super-peer deployment model does not
sacrifice the completeness of information available, as ratings registered by every
peer are still included as the contribution of each super node is folded into the
reputation rating calculated using Equation 6. However, unless each super node
has a roughly equivalent number of members, ratings may be biased towards
the opinions of entities at super nodes with fewer members. Additionally, unless
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super nodes coordinate to ensure that there is no overlap between their respective
peer groups, the accuracy of the reputation ratings calculated using this method
may suffer, as malicious peers could register ratings at multiple super nodes.
These attacks can be further limited by using the fully distributed deployment
model, as no entity in the system has any sort of complete information. Each
entity is restricted to querying a limited number of other entities in the system,
as querying each node in turn becomes inefficient as the size of the network
grows. Additionally, when issuing the query FQ, an entity A cannot be sure if the
responding entities have matched all of FQ or simply some F ′ ⊂ FQ. This implies
that A must carry out the group discovery or attribute inference attacks by
issuing queries FQ where |FQ| = 1 to ensure that all matches returned are total
matches. Note also, that A will most likely need to know c where FQ = {h(c)}, as
otherwise she is simply guessing that FQ is an “interesting” virtual fingerprint,
which may often be a difficult task. This implies that A is very likely to know
p, the release policy for c, as she satisfied p to learn c in the first place. In this
respect, the group discovery attack is eliminated, as A is forced to carry out the
stronger attribute inference attack. The attribute inference attack is itself no
more feasible than trying to determine whether the attribute a attested to by
c is possessed by each node in the network directly (e.g., by means of an eager
negotiation or another resource access request protocol), thus this attack is no
more feasible with Xiphos in place than it would have been without it. This
implies that attacks which cause the aforementioned privacy violations can be
virtually eliminated by using the fully distributed deployment model, though at
the cost of losing the completeness of reputation information.
In addition to choosing an appropriate deployment model, another possible
avenue for the prevention of privacy-related attacks involves the use of obliga-
tions. Obligations are requirements that can be attached to personal information
in certain types of trust management systems. For instance, the owner of a dig-
ital medical record might attach an obligation to that record requiring that her
health care provider send her an email any time this record is shared (e.g., while
filing a referral to another physician). In these types of systems, it would be pos-
sible for entities to attach obligations to their credentials which limit the ways
that other entities can disclose virtual fingerprints including hashes of these
credentials. For example, an entity could indicate that any virtual fingerprint
including a hash of her Department of Energy security clearance credential may
only be released to servers operated by the U.S. government. These types of
obligations allow users to reap the benefits of Xiphos while still maintaining
some control over their private information. We expect that most entities will
allow at least some “interesting” subset of their credential hashes to be included
in virtual fingerprints because they will likely interact with other entities who
require the ability to obtain their reputation rating prior to interaction.
4.2 Attacks and Defenses
One common attack against reputation systems is whitewashing, in which a
user sheds a bad reputation by establishing a new identity. In some cases, this
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is as simple as reconnecting to the network to obtain a new node identifier,
while in others it may involve establishing a new pseudonym (e.g., email ad-
dress) by which one is known. In Xiphos, nodes are identified by their virtual
fingerprints. As discussed in Section 2, users have a limited number of virtual
fingerprints, which are uniquely determined by the set of credentials that the
user possesses. Obtaining new identities thus reduces to establishing new vir-
tual fingerprints; this requires that a user obtain all new credentials, as any
overlap will link this entity to old ratings. If users are routinely required to use
multiple credentials, this process becomes time consuming and involves multi-
ple certificate authorities, thereby making whitewashing an impractical attack
for habitual cheaters.
In many reputation systems, it is possible for an entity to “stuff the ballot
box” by registering multiple ratings for a single entity. Xiphos limits this at-
tack because entities have only a finite number of disjoint virtual fingerprints
which can be used to register claims for a given entity. In addition to capping
the number of ratings that an entity can register, the virtual fingerprint sys-
tem also limits the benefits of registering multiple ratings. A properly designed
γ(·) function will assign lower linkability coefficients to ratings associated with
a small rater virtual fingerprint than it will to ratings associated with large
rater virtual fingerprints. This means that given a properly designed γ(·) func-
tion, an entity’s influence on the overall rating of another entity will be less
if she registers multiple ratings using a large number of small virtual finger-
prints than it would have been if she had registered only a single rating using
the union of each smaller virtual fingerprint. Such a γ(·) function is discussed
in [14].
One attack against Xiphos itself involves exploiting ϕ(·). Recall that ϕ(·) is
used to weight the contribution of a single tuple to the overall reputation cal-
culated for a query. In centralized or super-peer deployments, entities may try
to increase their influence by repeatedly updating their ratings for other entities
to keep them current. In the absence of certified transactions and synchronized
clocks, there is little that can be done to prevent this problem. However, this at-
tack will have little influence on the ratings calculated by a server if the majority
of the users remain honest. Nonetheless, investigating mechanisms for providing
certified timestamps is an important area of future work.
One last attack on which we comment occurs when a malicious party M is able
to steal some set of credentials C′A ⊆ CA from another entity A. If M then submits
a reputation rating for some entity B described by the virtual fingerprint FB
while posing as A (by using the stolen credentials C′A), this rating will overwrite
the rating previously stored by A. Though this attack is serious, it is possible in
any system in which one entity is able to effectively steal the identity of another.
Due to the fact that users in attribute-based trust management systems have
many identities (which we have referred to as descriptions in this paper), open
systems researchers must focus on making secure identity management easy for
users of their systems to prevent these types of attacks.
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4.3 Performance Evaluation
As mentioned in Section 3, Xiphos uses reputation update equations similar to
those whose convergence behavior was studied in [16]. Rather than studying
convergence, we focused on quantifying the effect of using virtual fingerprints
as the basis for a reputation system, instead of more traditional identities, in
a number of simulated grid computing environments. To this end, we studied
the growth rates of local databases over time, evaluated the effect of these more
complex local databases on query processing time, and designed and evaluated
the impact of a γ(·) function for our application domain. The complete results
of this study are presented in [14].
We found that when using a conservative tuple eviction policy, the average size
of a local reputation database in a network with 10,000 users was approximately
1,500 tuples after 5,000 days of simulated interactions. In a network of 70,000
users, the average local database contained 4,000 tuples after 5,000 simulated
days. When executing a prototype Xiphos implementation on a 1.6GHz laptop,
Xiphos could process queries on databases of these sizes at throughputs of 600
and 200 queries per second, respectively, without using indexes. The use of a
more aggressive, though still reasonable, tuple eviction policy resulted in query
throughputs of over 2,200 queries per second on both simulated networks; it
is unlikely that the network characteristics of actual grid computing systems
would even allow queries to arrive at such a high rate. We also verified that a
suitable γ(·) function can limit the damages caused by attackers in the system
by penalizing them for maliciously using multiple identities. These observations
indicate that virtual fingerprints can be used as a reasonable basis for reputation
in the open systems of the future.
4.4 Virtual Fingerprinting and Reputation
Virtual fingerprints provide a general notion of pseudo-identity that can be
bound to reputation scores in systems where explicit identity information may
not be present. Virtual fingerprints are also difficult to change, making white-
washing impractical and reducing the benefits of assuming multiple personalities.
In this paper, we described the use of virtual fingerprinting as the basis for one
particular reputation system. However, the reputation scores bound to virtual
fingerprints can be aggregated according to any reputation calculation method,
provided that the complications arising from the legitimate assumption of mul-
tiple identities (in the form of disjoint virtual fingerprints) are addressed.
In particular, systems need to mitigate the effects of malicious users assum-
ing multiple identities to over-influence the system. Additionally, the fact that
queries may overlap multiple tuples could lead to problems maintaining precom-
puted reputation scores at a naive server. In [14], we describe an ontology-based
definition of γ(·) that prevents malicious entities from over-influencing our sim-
ulated grid computing system; similar definitions are likely to be possible in
other domains. We also present a method for maintaining precomputed reputa-
tion estimates at a centralized server, though space limits prohibit its discussion
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here. Similar modifications could be made to other reputation systems (includ-
ing those not yet developed), thereby enabling them to use virtual fingerprints
and extending their applicability to attribute-based trust management systems.
5 Related Work
While the area is too broad to survey in general, papers such as [9, 12, 16, 19]
address the design of general-purpose reputation systems. These types of sys-
tems assume that entities have established identities in the system and many
times suffer from whitewashing and ballot-stuffing attacks. The authors of [17]
recommend designing systems which require non-repudiable evidence of a trans-
action be shown in order for a reputation rating to be registered; this certainly
prevents an entity from registering multiple claims, but requires that the un-
derlying system support certified transactions. In this paper, we introduced the
notion of virtual fingerprints and showed how they can be used as the basis of the
Xiphos reputation system. The nature of virtual fingerprints limits the effective-
ness of the aforementioned attacks without requiring non-repudiable transaction
support from the underlying system.
Other authors have also addressed the privacy versus trust trade-off discussed
in Section 4. Anonymous credential schemes (e.g., [8, 7]) assume that privacy is
more important than history-based mechanisms such as reputation systems and
allow a credential to be used under different pseudonyms; this prevents transac-
tions carried out by a single entity from ever being linked. In [18], the authors
discuss this trade-off in detail and show how entities can explicitly reveal linkages
between multiple identities to establish trust when needed. Xiphos allows sys-
tem designers to balance this trade-off by choosing an appropriate deployment
strategy. In addition, if Xiphos is used in systems supporting obligations, users
can further limit the dissemination of their personal information.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a method for the linking and correlation of multiple
identities in attribute-based trust management systems. We discussed how the
descriptions that one entity learns about another can be transformed into opaque
virtual fingerprints which can be used as the basis of the Xiphos reputation
system. We explored the privacy versus utility trade-off for three deployments of
Xiphos and examined the impacts of several attacks against the system. We also
highlighted the results of a performance evaluation study of Xiphos, the details
of which are available in the technical report version of this paper [14].
One interesting avenue for future work involves the development of index
structures for virtual fingerprints to increase the query throughput of the Xiphos
system. It is also likely that virtual fingerprinting can be used as the foundation
for other useful security services. To this end, we are investigating secure audit,
incident response, and collusion-detection systems based on virtual fingerprints.
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Abstract. In this paper we explore a mechanism for, and the limitations of, 
automation of assessment of trustworthiness of systems. We have implemented 
a system for checking trust constraints expressed within privacy policies as part 
of an integrated prototype developed within the EU Framework VI Privacy and 
Identity Management for Europe (PRIME) project [1]. Trusted computing 
information [2,3] may be taken into account as part of this analysis. This is the 
first stage of ongoing research and development within PRIME in this area. 
1   Introduction 
Trust is important to enable interactions on the Internet. People quite often have to 
trust e-commerce sites, service providers, online services and enterprises that they 
will perform as expected, provide agreed services and goods and will not exploit and 
misuse personal and confidential information.  
The trust that people have in enterprises can be built, reinforced or modified via a 
variety of means and tools, including personal experience, analysis of prior history, 
recommendations, certification and auditing by known authorities.  The behaviour of 
an enterprise, the fact that it will fulfil agreed tasks in due time and perform as 
predicted are all important aspects to shape its reputation and perception of 
trustworthiness. Related to this, the way an enterprise handles privacy aspects has also 
an important impact on trust.  
An open issue to address is how to provide people with more customisable and 
fine-grained mechanisms to allow them to make judgments about the trustworthiness 
and privacy compliance of the remote receiver of their Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) (i.e. data that can identify the end-user). For example, users might 
want to get some assurance of the capabilities of an enterprise, even before engaging 
in any interaction or transaction with this enterprise. This includes obtaining degrees 
of assurance that the enterprise can actually support specific privacy policies and 
obligations, that their data will be processed and managed securely, that enterprises’ 
web services, applications and data repositories are installed, run and patched 
according to security standards and good IT practices, and/or that secure and trusted 
platforms are used. 
This paper addresses this issue and, more specifically, focuses on describing 
automation of analysis of trust constraints – conditions about the trustworthiness of a 
(network of) computer system(s) – within such a system. This is part of a broader 
 Towards Automated Evaluation of Trust Constraints 253 
 
goal within the PRIME project [1] to use technology to automate delivery of privacy 
in enterprises in order to address increasing complexity and dynamism within service 
provision and to rely less on human processes (which are prone to failure, malicious 
attack and fraud). In addition, automation can be used to ensure that delivery of 
privacy is operating correctly by acting as a bridge between should happen and what 
is actually happening. Smart technology is needed, in the form of powerful trusted 
services as well as monitoring of these services, processes and resources. We have 
developed the first version of a component that is designed to do this. 
2   Motivation for Automation of Trust Assessment 
The strategic objective of the PRIME project [1] is to research and develop 
approaches and solutions for privacy-enhancing identity management that can 
empower European citizens to exercise their privacy rights, and thus enable them to 
gain trust and confidence in the Information Society. In order to increase user control 
over the release of their personal information, we wish to provide a mechanism to 
help the user to assess the trustworthiness of back end systems before releasing such 
information. This mechanism can also be used in order to allow the user to check the 
proof of properties contributing to trust (such as the validity of seals of approval), and 
not have to rely upon assertions by companies that could be deliberately or 
erroneously false or misleading. In addition, it can be used to help ‘good willing’ 
enterprises – that are aware of the importance of privacy as a driving factor to 
underpin trust, reputation and a business enabler – to ensure that their trust and 
security are operating as expected and to comply with legislation. The most basic 
starting point for building trust is just to check that the services side has a PRIME 
system that is operating correctly and via education enhance the user’s trust in the 
body certifying this system. More detailed justification of our approach in line with 
the approach taken by PRIME is given in Section 3.1 below. 
We recognise that the problem cannot be solved by deploying technologies alone: 
behaviour and implementation of correct process are very relevant. However, our 
objective is to build technical solutions that can help enterprises increase automation 
and give people additional support in making informed decisions about trust.  
2.1   Scenarios Considered  
As considered above, the main driver for this work is that it increases user trust and 
willingness to engage in e-commerce and e-government. Example scenarios include: 
• giving consumers the ability to determine whether unknown vendors on the Web 
are using IT systems and processes that can be trusted to execute their stated 
privacy policies, 
• trust-related information could be both more reliable and more open – for instance, 
compliance reports about enterprises could be accessible to the public, such as 
being available for viewing directly via a website. 
Let us consider in more detail the example where a user engages for the first time 
with an enterprise that implements aspects of our model (presented in Section 4). In 
addition to other aspects that might be supported by the enterprise (such as seals and 
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recommendations by other parties), users might require the enterprise to assure them 
about privacy practices, security and trustworthiness of their IT systems. Users might 
request the enterprise, by means of assurance policies, to provide them with fine-
grained statements about their security systems and business practices and 
declarations of which privacy policies they support, specifically about how their data 
will be handled. The user could go even further by directly checking the trustworthiness 
of some platforms, via TCG-enabled mechanisms [2,3] if supported.  The user can use 
their compliance checking system to verify enterprise statements and promises, 
remember their expectations and re-check them over time. If the user is satisfied by 
these initial statements, they might decide to engage in an interaction or transaction 
with the enterprise and potentially disclose their personal data.  
A further driver for our work relates to enterprise compliance with corporate 
governance legislation, enterprise policies and privacy legislation. Since this is not the 
main focus of this paper we will not give further details here. 
3   Privacy and Identity Management for Europe (PRIME) Project 
The PRIME project started in March 2004; its goals have been introduced above. 
Further details and its architecture may be found in [1,4]. 
In the PRIME model, end-users formulate their (individual) privacy preferences 
before interacting with an organisation, and can negotiate the proofs that need to be 
provided to an organisation. In some situations, zero knowledge techniques could be 
used and the end-user could remain anonymous, although in other situations PII may 
need to be transferred in order for the particular type of transaction to go ahead. This 
negotiation is automated, although input may be given by the user in complex 
situations. Following W3C recommendations [5], in order to encourage adoption of 
this approach by service-providers, it would probably be necessary to have the 
service-side start the negotiation process by transmitting an initial set of requirements 
and options to the end-user. Several different approaches and techniques are possible: 
• Anonymous checking of service side: End-users could check up-front the fulfilment 
of specified back-end (enterprise) properties or trust requirements (for example, 
whether the service side could support obligations or was providing a secure 
processing environment) before deciding whether or not to proceed with a 
transaction. 
• Negotiation of ‘sticky’ policies: End-users could be offered a choice of trust 
requirements by the service provider which would then be customisable; 
alternatively, end-users could add new trust requirements into the negotiation 
process (between the end-user and service side). The resultant negotiated policies 
can ‘stick’ to personal data and as it moves around the back end these policies will 
be enforced; these policies can include trust requirements. 
• Compliance checking by ‘good willing’ enterprises: The service side can automate 
checking of trust and assurance necessary conditions in access control policies. 
This model where end-users formulate their (individual) privacy policies before 
interacting with an organisation, and then have the organisation verify that it will 
comply with the end-user policy, is in contrast with much current practice where at 
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best an end-user looks at an organisation’s policy and decides if it is acceptable. 
Thereby, this model is supporting users to maintain control over their personal 
spheres and thus to technically enforce informational self-determination, and hence is 
in accordance with the philosophy and motivation of PRIME. Informational self-
determination is a core aspect of privacy and is in many countries acknowledged as a 
basic human or constitutional right. As an end-user it would be preferable to have the 
possibility (in case the user so desired) to dictate or customise some of the privacy 
policies, rather than passively accept whatever is dictated by the enterprise [6,7]. The 
desire for this is supported by various studies that highlight end-users’ concerns about 
privacy violations. For instance, according to a study by the UK Information 
Commissioner [8], 40% of the UK population are classified as "the Concerned" who 
have proactively protected PII through withholding it. They are less likely to purchase 
products if they have to give away too much information, and their attitudes towards 
organisations are likely to be influenced by a reputation for good information 
handling practices. This study also classifies 13% of the UK population as "the 
Proactive", who prefer working with companies that excel at good personal 
information management. 
Based on results of a meta-analysis of user surveys related to Internet privacy in 
Europe, social researchers within the PRIME project have derived the importance of 
trust assurance methods for (re)establishing trust in online relationships as an 
important social requirement for PRIME technologies. Besides this, the meta-analysis 
also indicates a preference of many users to have more transparency and better user 
control over the use of their online behavioural data [9]. Also, usability tests 
conducted on PRIME early prototypes and user interface mock-ups of identity 
management systems showed that many users distrusted the tested systems [10,11] 
and were also pointing out the users’ need for trust assurance methods.  
Turner has carried out various studies to assess factors that affect the perception of 
security and privacy of e-commerce web sites [12,13,14]. He concludes that 
consumers depended on recommendations from independent third parties to ensure 
security [12]. This supports our view that end users would find it helpful to be able to 
be given enterprise assurance details provided by third parties, such as privacy seals. 
Note that it is not necessary for people to have to author policies, because default 
policies can be provided which they could use, preferably vouched for by entities that 
they trust (for example, consumer organisations). 
3.1   The System Policy Compliance Checker (SPCC) Component 
A compliance checker component has been developed as part of the PRIME 
architecture [4], which is used both on the services side and on the user side (as there 
is a mirrored design). The System Policy Compliance Check (SPCC) component in 
the PRIME architecture responds to requests about whether policies (and in particular 
trust constraints) are satisfied on the service side. Within PRIME this component is 
implemented as being separate from the Access Control Decision Function (ACDF) 
component, but it could in fact be implemented as part of ACDF and part of other 
components such as Identity Control (IC) (for checking trust constraints when access 
control is not invoked). An example of the latter case would be if someone wished to 
check the trustworthiness of a service-provider upfront in a ‘preamble’ phase before 
provision of any identity information (potentially in a fully anonymous manner). 
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4   Our Model 
In this section we define what we mean by trust constraints and present our approach 
and generic system architecture for evaluation of such constraints. 
4.1   Trust Constraints 
Trust constraints are part of a broader representation of constraints within policy 
languages. Figure 1 illustrates how – within the context of policies and preferences – 
they are a subset of a broader set of constraints about data processing: assurance 
constraints. 
 
Fig. 1. Trust and assurance constraints 
Assurance constraints may be contextual constraints, i.e. formulated by people to 
restrict the cases in which their data will be processed, according to parameters that 
may vary dynamically (such as time, location or platform state), and/or trust 
constraints.  Figure 1 shows how these can be related and provides some examples. 
To a greater or lesser degree, all assurance constraints could be regarded as trust 
constraints since something must ultimately be trusted to make the assertions (and 
indeed the policy compliance checker must be trusted to issue compliance 
statements), but for convenience we may distinguish those statements that directly 
involve trust-related information and for whose automated evaluation a compliance 
checker needs to take chains of trust into account. 
These constraints may be expressed within user-side preferences or policies. Such 
policies (‘assurance policies’) would then include a set of conditions and constraints 
formulated to obtain degrees of assurance from enterprises that their data will be 
processed according to peoples’ expectations, such as compliance to privacy, security 
and IT standards.  On the client side the SPCC can check their satisfaction (via 
information provided by the service-side SPCC) prior to disclosing any personal 
information or during the negotiation process (when SPCC provides input to both the 
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local user and service-side requester). It can also be desirable to check contextual 
constraints on the service side after information has been disclosed. This would be 
through the use of sticky policies, which are negotiated using the preferences and then 
associated with data as it travels around, perhaps just using a weak binding, although 
preferably this would use a strong binding provided by cryptographic mechanisms: 
see for example [15]. Furthermore, such constraints may be expressed within service-
side access control policies to help enterprises comply with privacy legislation, such 
that service side SPCC will not allow a transaction to be continued unless the 
constraints are fulfilled. 
To clarify exactly what we mean by assurance policies (or constraints), let us 
consider the W3C Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [5] and Enterprise Privacy 
Authorisation Language (EPAL) [16] schemas representation of privacy policy rules. 
These rules are formed of 6 elements, namely data user, data item, action, purpose, 
conditions and obligations. Assurance policies could be thought of as an extension to 
privacy policy rules in that they contain certain trust, contextual or assurance constraints 
which, if fulfilled, are not sufficient for the transaction to proceed: semantically, these 
constraints are necessary conditions. An example of an assurance policy which is an 
access control policy would be: subject with subjexp can action on object 
with objexp if condition onlyif assurance constraint.(Alternatively, 
such an assurance policy could be represented by conjoining the assurance constraint to 
each subcondition.) There can be other, similar, forms of assurance policy, such as a 
policy that is attached to data and that contains assurance constraints that must be 
satisfied before certain actions may be performed on the data. 
Assurance constraints (including trust constraints) can also be thought of in an 
orthogonal sense as breaking down into subconstraints, such that there can be 
functional decomposition of higher-level privacy and trust goals into one or more 
lower-level goals, and so on recursively until ‘facts’ about the knowledge base (e.g. 
checks about the value of constraint settings, the presence of software, the availability 
of services for a given minimum uptime, etc.) are invoked at the lowest level. This 
decomposition is captured by rules within our system that hook into the ontologies 
used so that the meaning can be agreed across multiple parties. For example, even a 
fairly low level trust constraint such as that the receiving party should use tamper-
resistant hardware to store key information must be defined in such as way as to make 
clear the manufacturers, version numbers and other ancilliary information such as 
degree of tamper resistance that would or alternatively would not be acceptable. In 
practice, a third party would define such rules in advance and then they would be 
viewable and/or customisable if desired at a later stage by users or administrators. 
4.2   Architecture for Evaluation of Trust Constraints  
This section gives an overview of our system within PRIME that handles privacy 
obligations and assurance policies in enterprises. This is currently being developed; 
although it is work in progress, an initial working version of this system is available. 
Figure 2 shows the core aspects of this model. 
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Fig. 2. Simplified architecture 
The model supports the following core interactions between users and an enterprise: 
• Users ask an enterprise to demonstrate their support and compliance to a set 
of policies (cf. 1 of Figure 2): This can be done by users before engaging in any 
interaction with the enterprise. The “policy compliance checker” module, within 
the enterprise, issues compliance statements and potentially it supports degrees of 
verifications made by users. For example, users could require that the enterprise 
will protect their data to a specified level of tamper resistance, that the enterprise is 
not running certain software that has known bugs without the requisite patches, 
that the enterprise can support obligation checking or that the enterprise has a 
certain type of privacy seal. The outcome is recorded and remembered by the 
“policy verification and checking system” on the user side for future reference and 
control. A similar mechanism can be deployed in enterprises in federated contexts 
where the enterprise needs to disclose data subjects’ personal data to other parties 
(during business interactions and transactions). 
• Users disclose their personal data along with their privacy obligations (cf. 3 of 
Figure 2): User can dictate the set of privacy obligations and constraints they want 
to be fulfilled on their personal data [17].  
• Users control and verify their expectations and compliance over time (cf. 2,4,7 
of Figure 2): The “policy verification and checking system”, at the user side, 
remembers commitments, obligations and promises made by an enterprise. It 
processes them against evidence and information provided by the enterprise and 
potential third parties in order to verify their consistency and compliance. This 
module provides users with intuitive visual clues that help them to make decisions 
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and influence their perceptions of the trustworthiness of an enterprise in executing 
what has been agreed.   
Figure 3 provides further technical details about the compliance checking system.  
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Fig. 3. High-level architecture of a policy compliance checker 
This system includes the following components: 
1. Policy interpreter and handler: The component that interprets an assurance 
policy and determines if it is well expressed and can be handled by the system.  
2. Compliance coordinator and checker: This component coordinates the 
collection of required information to provide support to tests/requirements 
expressed by a user via an assurance policy. It can potentially allow remote users 
to directly perform tests on service side platforms.  
3. Trusted platform checker: This interacts with and retrieves information about 
the status of critical platforms running enterprises’ services and applications and 
that store and handle personal data; it analyses this information to assess the 
trustworthiness of those platforms with respect to the current context. 
4. Aggregator: This component aggregates information collected from various 
enterprise systems, in order to provide a comprehensive result to the user; this may 
involve analysis to provide an overall trust assessment. 
5. Enterprise system and services topology: Database containing information about 
the topology of enterprise systems and services. 
6. Enterprise policies and practices: Database containing information about the 
policies and procedures supported by an enterprises. 
7. Signer: The component responsible for signing the statements made by the policy 
compliance checker for integrity and non-repudiation reasons; this could be done 
via a trusted hardware device such as a TPM [2]. 
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4.3   SPCC Functionality Within PRIME 
Within the PRIME architecture [4], the SPCC component is in charge of handling 
trust and assurance constraints that cannot be directly managed by the Identity 
Control (IC) and Access Control (AC) components. It performs the privacy policy 
compliance checking concept already described above.  
The SPCC may have a role in handling policies on client, server and third party 
sites. Within PRIME, we are most interested in the cases where the back end system 
that handles PII is to be evaluated, either locally or remotely. 
When evaluating trust constraints, the SPCC component might need to interact 
with other platforms (for example, servers running a specific service or dealing with 
the management of PII data) to gather trust information. It has a topology of the 
resources, interacts with the involved IT entities via their Platform Trust Management 
(PTM) component, gathers measures of trust, correlates information and provides an 
answer in the form of a statement that may be signed by IC. The resulting signed 
statement is sent to the requester. Evaluation of dynamic trust constraints needs to be 
triggered via access control in order to check that the trust constraint is satisfied in the 
current circumstances before personal information is accessible. 
In summary, the policy compliance checker we describe has a privacy focus. It can: 
model organisational resources such as database systems, firewalls, hosts, virus 
scanners and privacy seals; reason about system and application properties, for 
example host patching or TPM self test; reason about user provisioning and 
maintenance; check that IT controls are working as expected. 
5   An Implemented System 
The SPCC component has been implemented within the PRIME v1 integrated 
prototype. There is a component just for the services side that allows the services-side 
access control to check that access control policies that include trust constraints are 
met. In particular, this allows ‘good willing’ enterprises to check that the system is in 
a suitable state before the negotiation protocol is completed and personal information 
is transferred to the services side.  The same mechanism forms part of the solution for 
allowing users to express and check trust constraints related to the services side. 
As shown in Figure 4, which shows server-side interactions in PRIME directly 
involving the SPCC component, the SPCC component consists of internal 
subcomponents that handle incoming policies (or constraints), model the back-end 
topology, gather and aggregate service-side trust and assurance information 
(including trusted platform information, privacy seals and security certificates), and 
analyse whether the policies are currently satisfied. Analysing assurance information 
will often not be just a simple matter of syntax checking: not only assurance 
information, but also other external information including context and event 
information, needs to be analysed to decide whether the policies do comply with 
these. The Platform Trust Manager (PTM) component provides most of the trust input 
and support for analysis is given by the Reasoner component: this allows hierarchical 
and semantic web based inferences; special rules break down the semantics of the 
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assurance constraints and an assurance ontology is used to standardise interpretation 
of assurance information and allow querying over (a model of) available assurance 
data relating to the data processing environment(s). 
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Fig. 4. SPCC server-side interactions 
At present, the SPCC supports checking of the following initial list of constraints 
(or combinations thereof): the receiving platform must be able to protect secrets, must 
be a Trusted Platform, and/or must support obligations; the receiving platform’s 
Trusted Platform Module must be bona fide and working; if the receiving platform is 
running XP, it must have Service Pack 2 installed; the receiving party must have a 
valid privacy seal. 
5.1   Overview of the Architecture of the SPCC Component 
The SPCC component is a specific implementation of the generic system shown in 
Figure 3 and is comprised of the following modules, as shown in Figure 4: 
Policy Handler [PH]: This module is a policy interpreter; it parses an incoming 
policy, checks for its integrity and validity and dispatches it to the PCO module. It 
coordinates processes within the SPCC and acts as a single point of contact for other 
components to interact with SPCC (cf. Policy Interpreter and Handler, Fig. 3). 
Policy Compliance Orchestrator [PCO]: This module interprets and executes a 
compliance task as dictated by the policy. It orchestrates interactions with modules 
specialised in checking for specific compliance requirements. In v1 two kinds of 
compliance check are supported: trust compliance via the TA module and assurance 
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compliance via the Reasoner module to carry out inferences using SPCC rules that 
allow constraints to be analysed in terms of simpler components and references to 
ontologies and to locally stored models of assurance data (that allow the particular 
properties of the back end to be represented in a way that is consistent with the 
structure defined in the assurance ontologies) (cf. Compliance Coordinator and 
Checker, Fig. 3). 
Trust Aggregator [TA]: This module is in charge of interacting with relevant PTM 
modules to gather measures of trust; its core functionality is to aggregate trust 
information relating to the back end service, and in order to do this it needs to be able 
to model the back end infrastructure and key enterprise services running upon this (cf. 
Trusted Platform Checker and Aggregator, Fig. 3). 
Additional functionality shown in Figure 3 is contained in additional databases or 
distributed throughout the PRIME system. 
5.2   Assurance Ontologies 
Security certificates, seals of approval, trustmarks, etc. can be thought of as having 
certain properties in common, and even more informal methods of assurance could 
also be viewed as having similar properties, such as name, issuer, privacy/trust/ 
security features, expiry date, etc.: the meaning and relationships between these 
properties can be captured in an assurance ontology. To our knowledge, this has not 
been attempted before. In PRIME IP v1, we created an OWL-based assurance 
ontology and associated models of certificate information. We also provided a basic 
extension of our privacy ontologies to include trust information, and we are currently 
improving this aspect. 
5.3   Use of Trusted Platforms 
The implemented system allows information provided by trusted computing to be 
taken into account within the evaluation of trust constraints. A Trusted Platform (TP) 
is designed to create a foundation of trust for software processes; the Trusted 
Computing Group (TCG) has specified how it must be constructed [2,3]. Allied 
technologies are currently being developed [18]. Trusted computing information can 
be useful in assessing trust because a TP will either operate in the expected manner 
for a particular purpose, or else can be relied upon to signal clearly if it does not. 
Other mechanisms for making judgments are also required, including higher level 
integrity mechanisms at the OS level, vouching mechanisms provided by trusted third 
parties and recommendation systems. It is also possible to create trust domains that 
are based on multiple TPs [19].  
Information about a particular TP is provided by the PTM: this could include various 
types of trust information including reputation information and trusted computing 
feedback. The SPCC component will collate and aggregate such information, and 
analyse it with respect to its models about the resources deployed within the system and 
about functional decomposition of privacy and trust information to decide whether the 
trust constraints are met within the current circumstances. 
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6   Comparison with Related Work 
Our research is novel in several aspects in comparison with prior work in this area. 
Steps towards the provision of more assurance to people on privacy have been made 
by various privacy seals providers and verifiers [20]. This approach provides users 
with general purpose information about the conformance of a service provider or an 
enterprise with certified, privacy compliant processes when handling and managing 
PII data. However these approaches do not take into account specific, fine-grained 
requirements, needs and constraints dictated by individuals. 
The usage of recommendation mechanisms [21,22] – based on people sharing 
evaluations of enterprises’ behaviour – is another well-explored approach for dealing 
with trust matters. These mechanisms can also be used to evaluate enterprises’ 
compliance to privacy and, as a side effect, have an impact on the perception of the 
trustworthiness of an organization. This approach is complementary to the problems 
the author wants to address. Related complementary work includes [23], which 
describes how a trust index of a CA may be computed. 
As already discussed in Section 4 above, in our work we employ privacy practices 
that can be deduced from the W3C EPAL [16] and P3P [5] specifications and that 
implement the philosophy of recent privacy legislation. P3P specifications allow 
people to describe their privacy expectations and match them against the level of 
privacy supported by an enterprise. This helps shape people’s trust in enterprises. 
However P3P only checks if their expectations are matched against promises made by 
the enterprise, and does not provide mechanisms to check and prove upfront 
compliance with fine-grained constraints. 
KeyNote [24], PolicyMaker [25] and REFEREE [26] all suggest a programming 
language to define a policy based on certificates and an engine to decide access 
control regarding the holder of certificates, and the Trust Policy Language (TPL) [27] 
allows rule definition for becoming a group member. Other policy definition 
languages, schemes and verification tools include Trust-X (an XML-based framework 
for peer-to-peer trust negotiation) [28], OASIS XACML [29], and Ponder [30]. We 
can leverage aspects of this work, in particular [15] to provide a stronger association 
of assurance policies to confidential data, but we use the PRIME policy framework. 
There is prior work in developing trust ontologies (see for example [31,32,33]), but 
these are not well-developed and do not immediately suit the PRIME context.  
In terms of policy compliance checking, we are not aware of products or solutions 
providing flexible, model-driven assurance and compliance verifications. Products 
such as Synomos [34] and SenSage [35] hardcode their compliance checking process 
and cannot model privacy processes and IT components. 
In summary, our work differs from related work in particular in that it exploits 
much richer policy definitions including trust constraints, provides the user with 
feedback about the fulfilment of these policies, provides evidence for assurance 
claims and measures the trustworthiness of the service provider.  
7   Current Status 
The work presented in this paper describes providing organisations with an 
infrastructure for interpreting requests for checking trust-related constraints, executing 
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the relevant checks and providing an answer to users. The current status is that a 
compliance check component and associated protocols have been integrated within 
PRIME v1 integrated prototype and associated tests are complete; this involved usage 
of trusted computing information. In addition, we integrated a compliance check plug-
in that is able to evaluate certain trust constraints in a similar manner within an audit-
focused compliance auditing and reporting system. We are currently carrying out 
further research and implementation for v2 of PRIME integrated prototype.  
To date, we have implemented compliance checking of the constraints shown in 
Figure 1 by ‘good willing’ enterprises. However, this is a very rich research area and 
many interesting issues have been raised during the course of this work. Our next 
steps focus around addressing some of the following key issues: 
• Only partial automation is possible. For example, manual processes currently 
used to check the validity e.g. of privacy seals are difficult to automate. However, 
we can automatically generate websites to request information for which manual 
process entries are necessary. 
• Complexity of back end infrastructure and of how trust constraints can be 
functionally decomposed. To address this, we plan to extend the model to include 
justification meta-data and weighting, and to highlight areas of concern in a report 
to the user or the administrator, as appropriate. 
• There is some missing infrastructure at present making automation limited. In 
particular, there is a need to standardise a meta-data format for machine-readable 
certificates: our assurance ontology could be a starting point for this. 
There is an additional issue relating to the lack of a trusted infrastructure around 
the provision of evidence that is assessed when evaluating trust constraints. The 
problem is that malicious layered services could operate unknown to (our) monitoring 
services - there is a risk of employees compromising the system and also a risk when 
checking external topologies. This issue is not completely solved yet, but we plan to 
address this in future versions of our system. Note that this problem is generally faced 
by compliance monitoring and reporting systems. Approaches to solve this include: 
− Authentication between components (which may be enhanced by using trusted 
hardware to protect private keys) 
− Next generation trusted computing and infrastructure, e.g. TCG integrity checking 
[2,3], NGSCB [18], agents isolated in trusted compartments, etc. 
Finally, whether trust constraints are satisfied or not is in general not a black and 
white issue – we need to provide suitable feedback to the user in order to help the user 
decide. We are currently in the process of iteratively defining and testing appropriate 
user interfaces to enable users to define trust constraints and receive feedback about 
results that can be ‘drilled down’ to a desired level of detail. 
8   Conclusions 
Currently, people disclose their PII to service providers, organisations (or other 
people) based on the assumption that the receivers will process this information in a 
suitable way, according to basic privacy requirements dictated by law and/or personal 
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agreements. Today this approach is mainly based on trust: people make their 
decisions based on promises made by the receivers of their PII data, previous 
experience in interacting with them, recommendations by known people or just faith. 
We aim to provide a better basis for trust via automation and provision of evidence 
related to third party certification, configurations and status of IT resources.  
To this end, we have developed a prototype that allows automated checking of trust 
constraints. In the short term, we have shown it is possible to automatically check 
basic system properties and use these in order to evaluate trust-related conditions 
expressed within policies. These properties include the presence, availability and 
properties of services, security hardware, etc. and configuration (e.g. patching). This 
is work in progress: in the longer term, we plan to improve the HCI associated with 
feedback to the user, cross check audit logs against the expected enforcement of 
trusted systems and use a trusted infrastructure to protect the information gathering 
process.  
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Abstract. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has developed specifications 
for computing platforms that create a foundation of trust for software processes, 
based on a small amount of extra hardware [1,2]. Several million commercial 
desktop and laptop products have been shipped based upon this technology, and 
there is increasing interest in deploying further products. This paper presents a 
mechanism for using trusted computing in the context of identity management 
to deal with the problem of providing migration of identity and confidential 
information across users’ personal systems and multiple enterprise IT back-end 
systems in a safe and trusted way.  
1   Introduction 
Current identity management solutions (that enable either users or enterprises to handle 
identities, profiles and credentials), allow identity information to freely move across 
(organisational) boundaries, with consequent loss of control by the user on how this data 
is used. Furthermore, there might be little certification and trust in such identity 
information, making it hard to detect if data is changed when crossing such boundaries. 
A similar issue is present in dynamic systems (adaptive enterprise, distributed data 
centers, etc.), when identity credentials are associated to systems and services running 
on platforms that might be dynamically set-up or torn-down.  
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) identity mechanisms [1,2] can address the 
problems of certification, anonymity and ‘stickiness’ of credentials to a trusted system. 
However, it is hard to move and modify managed identities. Moreover, current forms of 
retail trust-related credit are tied to specific accounts or individuals, and transfer of such 
credit neither involves trusted identities nor allows the owners to remain anonymous.  
This paper describes a secure identity management approach and solution that 
leverages the benefits of trusted computing to enhance privacy of managed identities 
and their migration across platforms.  
2   Problem Statement 
The central problem addressed in this paper is how to allow a secure, trusted and 
privacy-aware migration of credentials (stored within platforms and used by services 
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and applications) in cases where services are dynamically reconfigured and reallo-
cated to new platforms. Specifically, we focus on how to leverage the benefits of 
trusted computing to address this problem.  
Trusted Computing identity mechanisms can address the problems of certification, 
anonymity and ‘stickiness’ (i.e. binding) of credentials to a trusted system. However, it 
is hard to move such identities around or to modify them in legitimate ways according 
to the demands of the environment.  Within enterprises’ back-end infrastructure, there is 
a need to migrate confidential information between machines or storage devices on 
demand, and yet it will not necessarily be known in advance which exact machines 
would be selected even though only certain machines should be trusted to hold 
confidential information.  
3   Addressed Scenarios 
In this section we briefly describe some scenarios where our solution adds value. 
Users wishing to migrate trust credits between different accounts. A likely future 
development of trusted commerce is that users will prefer to have several identities 
that they use in different situations, with sensitive or credit-related information being 
exposed to more trusted environments only. For example, a user could use one 
identity when dealing with a bank, another identity when buying goods and yet 
another identity when posting opinions to a newsgroup - at present people often use 
different email accounts specifically set up to do this. A trusted identity that is used in 
e-commerce may gain ‘credits’ in the eyes of retailers of two main types: 
1. copyable, such as security clearance rating, financial credit rating, “frequent flyer” 
status (e.g. ‘gold tier’), etc. 
2. non-copyable, such as outstanding balances on accounts, vouchers, loyalty points 
(e.g. number of air-miles), insurance no-claims bonuses. 
A user may wish to set up a new identity that hides links with other identities to the 
retailer and yet may wish to adopt those credits from them. Alternatively, he or she 
may wish to transfer credits within existing identities. This has to be done in a way 
that is understood, accepted and trusted by all parties.  
Different contexts and infrastructures. There may be a need to create an alternative 
representation for an identity, or an amended form of that identity in an alternative 
form that is more suitable for use in different circumstances or in a different 
environment. This might be particularly the case in a mobile environment when the 
same person is moving between different infrastructures that use different forms of 
certificate. For example, conversion between Brands’ credentials [3] and X.509 
certificates, or for secure email or PGP [4]. All this may need to be carried out in such 
a way that the different identities cannot be correlated and identified with the user, 
thus allowing a profile to be built up. It is likely that consumers in general will 
become increasingly reluctant to divulge information that may be gathered, collated 
and analysed without their permission, or sold. Trust management technologies such 
as this may be used to give consumers more control and ownership over their own 
spending patterns and digital profiles.  
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Dynamic allocation of resources within data centres spread across geographic 
locations. In this scenario resources (e.g. servers) are dynamically allocated to run 
applications and services to process data, for example, in dynamic and distributed 
enterprises. Workloads are spread based on the availability of such resources, to 
optimise their usage. However, there are privacy issues because computational 
resources that belong to different geographical locations, organisational boundaries 
and administration domains, etc. can be subject to different privacy policies. So, the 
“location” of the resources is an essential input to decisions about resource allocation 
and privacy management.  
Dynamic allocation of resources over time in Consolidated Client Infrastructures 
(CCIs). In such infrastructures, each user is assigned different blades/resources 
dynamically, based on factors like security and trust requirements, time of day, 
department/company usage (in shared data centers), etc. , and migration of credentials 
is a critical issue. 
Mobile employees. Employees can be dynamic, both in the sense of travelling around 
and using different mobile resources (devices and enterprise tools including laptops, 
PDAs, mobile phones, etc.) to process different types of confidential or private data 
used in daily work activities (such as confidential e-mails and documents, medical 
data, access private databases, etc).  It could be desirable to ensure that such sensitive 
data would only be processed within well defined locations and potentially well 
defined types of devices (e.g. a certified laptop but not a cellular/smart phone or 
PDA). This is increasingly the case as ubiquitous computing spreads. Here, privacy 
policies could describe constraints not only on location but also type of device or 
resource. 
4   Useful Terminology 
In this section we draw a distinction between various key terms that we will use in 
this paper/ 
Identity.  This is defined as “any subset of attributes of an individual which identifies 
this individual within any set of individuals” [5]. 
Identity certificate. A certificate containing one or more identity attributes. It bears a 
digital signature of a Certification Authority (CA) and provides assurance regarding 
the binding of a public key to another pseudonym.  
Credential. This term is broadly used to relate to information that can demonstrate a 
property or properties of a subject. Thus, it could be an authorization token, a non-
certified set of attributes, or a certified set of attributes that can be produced in 
accordance with a standard: for example X.509 certificate [6,7], SPKI certificate  [8] 
or digitally signed XML [9].  
TCG migratable key. This is a key which is not bound to a specific trusted hardware 
device that serves as a root of trust within a trusted platform (this is called the Trusted 
Platform Module, or TPM) and which, with suitable authorisation, can be used 
outside a TPM or moved to another TPM. 
270 S. Pearson and M. Casassa Mont 
Digital pseudonym. This is a bit string which is unique as an identity (at least with 
very high probability) and which can authenticate the holder (e.g. a person, a system, 
etc.). A digital pseudonym could be realised as a public key to test digital signatures 
where the holder of the pseudonym can prove holdership by forming a digital 
signature which is created using the corresponding private key.  
TCG identity credential. TCG describes mechanisms [1,2] for creating for each 
computer platform a TPM endorsement certificate (shipped with the platform and 
certifying that the TPM operates correctly), a platform certificate (generated by the 
platform manufacturer – referring to the TPM endorsement certificate and certifying 
that the platform is a genuine trusted platform) and multiple platform identity 
certificates (that can be used as platform identities, each with a different pseudonym). 
These TCG credentials are bound to the associated platform. 
5   Trusted Computing Technology 
TCG technology [1,2] provides mechanisms and tools to check the integrity of 
computer programs while providing protected storage and pseudonymous attestation 
identities (see above). Although the technology is at least initially targeted at 
corporate environments, the introduction of trusted computing has been the focus for 
an open debate about whether or not this technology will be beneficial for ordinary 
people – for discussion of some of the issues, see [10,11] as further consideration of 
that issue is out of the scope of this paper. 
TCG currently supports key migration between platforms for certain types of 
TPM-protected keys, but not the migration of user credentials. Both are needed: this 
paper focuses on how to use TCG technology to protect user credentials, manage 
them and migrate them across platforms. 
Transfers of any type of credential fundamentally requires integrity, validation of 
target properties and (in some cases) confidentiality. Standard security techniques of 
certification, cryptographic hashing and encryption can help provide such properties. 
Trusted computing can provide additional value: for example, hardware protection of 
keys and cryptographic functionality is provided, and TCG platform identity and 
software integrity checking mechanisms can be used within the decision making 
process about whether or not to migrate and subsequently allow use of such 
information. In essence, by leveraging TCG technology we can decrease the potential 
threats of having unsecured access to secret material during migration (using 
encryption keys and secured protocols) and before and after migration by providing 
hardware-based protection of the migratable keys; and in addition, greater trust can be 
provided in the integrity of both the migration service and the involved platforms, and 
in the platform identities. 
6   Our Solution 
Figure 1 illustrates how groups of machines (for example within an enterprise) – 
where a given identity is known – can form ‘identity trust domains’ in which 
credentials can be created, issued and shared (processes illustrated by the arrows in 
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the diagram). Such scenarios can be persistent (for example, between an employee’s 
laptop and office desktop machines), mobile (for example, between fixed machines 
temporarily used such as a server, printer and computer in roaming user 
environments) or shared (for example, across enterprises when subcontracting work 
to a partner where this involves shared access to machines).  
 
Fig. 1. Identity trust domains within enterprises 
Our solution aims at allowing these scenarios by addressing the migration of “high-
level” user credentials between platforms, and leveraging TCG technology. TCG 
technology currently supports the migration of TCG keys [12]. So, Figure 1 can be 
implemented right now but only for the case of TCG key migration. To do this, an 
identity manager on the user’s TCG-compliant Trusted Platform (TP) can control the 
migration of these keys. TCG protocols are available that can be used to directly 
migrate keys between platforms, or alternatively via an intermediary [12].  
However we want to enable the scenario shown in Figure 1 for migration of high-
level credentials. This is where we focus in our solution. To implement it we leverage 
TCG key migration capabilities. Our solution involves having a Platform Identity 
Manager (PIM) on each trusted platform (TP), that is able to provide a local TCG 
migration service and is also extended to deal with other types of credential 
management. We also introduce the notion of a Trusted Credential Management 
Service (TCMS) – a Certification Authority (CA) offering ‘classic’ CA functionalities 
along with extra functionalities, such as platform validation – that performs the role of 
the TCG Migration Authority (MA) and/or the TCG Migration Selection Authority 
(MSA) (the intermediaries involved in TCG key migration) [12], as well as 
potentially other types of credential management as discussed further below. A 
variety of entities may function as the TCMS: for example, the IT Organisation within 
enterprises, or recognised and trusted service providers in the consumer market.  
We can leverage this TCG key migration in order to migrate user credentials. At 
the identity management level, we are interested in higher level information  
272 S. Pearson and M. Casassa Mont 
structures that need to be signed, encrypted and sent across the network. These 
structures would include attribute and identity certificates. For example, these would 
be public key certificates that bear the digital signature of the TCMS and provide 
assurance regarding the binding of a public key to a pseudonym that relates to a user. 
The public key could be the public key corresponding to the private key migrated 
during a TCG key migration. In this case, the user credential migration procedure 
needs to include creation of credentials associated to the migrated TCG keys. Using 
TPM keys and encrypting data using migratable keys can provide a higher degree of 
confidentiality and integrity. 
We now discuss further how the role of the involved parties and the underlying 
model can be extended to allow management and migration of user credentials. 
6.1   Platform Identity Manager (PIM) 
As mentioned above, the identity manager (PIM) on a trusted platform (TP) may 
govern peer-to-peer migration of TCG migratable keys. Even for this restricted type 
of credential, our solution extends the TCG specifications by using the PIM to give 
automatic enforcement of restrictions (for example, to ensure that a migratable TPM 
key object is copied to a TP, and to restrict the number of duplicate copies of any 
given TPM key object): to do this, it needs to be able to recognise TPMs, interpret 
credentials, and trust a CA. Furthermore, we use the PIM not just to constrain 
migration of TCG credentials but also to manage and create identities in a broader 
sense. The PIM can control modification of existing trusted identities, help create new 
identities and constrain migration of user credentials. PIMs may work together in a 
peer-to-peer manner, or else in conjunction with a TCMS as considered further in 
Section 6.2. The trustworthiness of the PIM can be assessed using Trusted Computing 
Group (TCG) software verification [1,2]. Further details follow. 
The PIM allows a user to control a combination or subset of personal credentials 
associated with different trusted identities of the user to create a new identity that may 
be used by the user to entitle him or her to access or obtain a third party service. Trust 
values (such as bank balances or loyalty points) can be copied/transferred and certificate 
format changed without requiring underlying CAs to know the real identity of the user, 
nor be able to derive it. As considered further in Subsection 6.3, policies can be 
associated to credentials, governing how these may be utilised within a given domain. 
The architecture of the system is shown in Figure 2. The PIM acts as a trusted 
component accessible by different applications, such as web browsing, e-commerce 
and tasks related to e-government. The PIM deployed on a client system creates or 
modifies credentials and associated policies on behalf of the user that are then 
presented to a relying party (RP), which could for example be an e-commerce site, an 
e-government server, an application service provider or even another user. Optionally, 
those parts of the credential modification service carried out within the client PIM 
could instead be provided by a third party specified by the user. Analogous 
mechanisms within the RP’s PIM can allow administrators to manipulate identities. 
The user selects via the PIM an appropriate type of credential to be created (for 
instance, reflecting a desired level of anonymity), and specifies how that credential 
may be exported to other machines. The RP then makes a (business) decision based 
 Provision of Trusted Identity Management Using Trust Credentials 273 
on the credentials, typically whether or not to allow a request or access. In order to do 
this, the RP will have a PIM to authenticate the user and provide the properties 
needed for the transaction, etc.  
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Fig. 2.  Our architectural model for e-commerce 
Whenever a new identity is to be created on the client machine, the PIM instructs 
the TPM to create a new public key pair based on random sources comprising a new 
public key and a new private key. For security, the private key is never revealed 
outside the TPM, and the PIM will request the TPM to form any operations involving 
it. Depending upon the circumstances, either the PIM or a CA (or other third party 
with enhanced CA functionality) creates an attribute certificate that certifies that the 
holder has certain attributes (or is authorised to perform certain specified actions). 
This attribute certificate includes the new public key. The CA will then need to send 
the attribute certificate to the user’s TP, in which case the TP may decrypt messages 
using the new private key as evidence that it has received the certificate legitimately. 
Preferably this process would be a direct extension of one of the TCG identity 
creation protocols; if desired, a protocol may be used to generate identity certificates 
via a CA such that neither the CA nor other external parties need be able to correlate 
identities issued [2].  By analogous means it is possible to use a previously certified 
identity to create another representation of that identity, possibly with additional 
attribute values, for use in different circumstances. See [13] for details of different 
certificate options. An alternative solution for this is described in [14].  
Key features of such trusted identity management within a TP include: 
• The capabilities of the PIM module to issue or translate credentials would be 
certified by an external party such as a competent organisation within the 
enterprise. 
• Secret trust management-related information could be protected via the TPM, 
such that the credentials will not be revealed if the machine is tampered with. 
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If modification just involves application of logical rules (e.g. copying or 
subdividing information, or changing representational form) rather than finding and 
incorporating new information, the PIM itself could form new credentials or modify 
existing ones based on these; otherwise, the PIM could use outside identities or 
credentials to form new credentials. For many credentials, the digital signature of a 
TPM is sufficient to convince a third party of its authenticity (if desired, information 
about the software state of the platform could be included together with this signed 
data to further validate the trustworthiness of the credentials); however, in certain 
circumstances third parties may regard the resulting certificates or credentials as being 
more trustworthy if produced by an established CA. 
Although certificates are usually signed and not modifiable, modification of 
credentials would be possible if desired: Corporate IT would revoke current credential 
and issue a new one. However, if multiple parties are involved in issuing credentials, 
it may be useful to amend a credential issued by another party by attaching an 
amendment to the original credential, linking this amendment to the original 
credential in a unique way and signing the result. Of course the entity that consumes 
these “augmented” credentials needs to understand the overall semantic and trust all 
the issuers involved in the chain. An alternative approach is to create new amended 
credentials from older ones and preserve the integrity by referring to the unique 
identity of the older credentials. The older credentials will however be invalidated. 
The PIM module in Figure 2 can be implemented as a module at the kernel level or 
can sit on top of the kernel and provide an API for communication. The credential 
manager contains a credential verifier (for judging who the other party is and whether 
they can be trusted – this may involve carrying out TCG integrity checking and 
analysis of the results) as well as a credential modifier, which will take into account 
appropriate policies and context before carrying out any credential issuance, 
modification or transfer. For example, certain trust properties are non-copyable.  
 Moreover, if a user has multiple platforms (e.g. a work PC, a PDA and a home 
PC) and wants to transfer trust credits across the identities he or she uses on these 
machines, this same mechanism used in conjunction with authentication between the 
TPMs within each client platform can allow the user to do so. 
In the following section we consider an alternative model in which a Trusted 
Credential Management Service (TCMS) works in conjunction with the PIM and the 
TPM. 
6.1.1   Example: Peer-to-Peer Migration of Personal Credentials 
In this case, a person wishes to migrate a personal credential from his/her laptop to a 
mobile phone. The PIMs on both devices are involved in providing this service in an 
appropriate manner. Up-front, this person must define various policies that are 
associated with their credentials to avoid disclosure of certain types of data. In 
particular, the person has specified a policy never to decrypt their credit card data in a 
mobile phone. The credential is an identity that would authorise usage of the credit 
card data together with certain other personal information associated to the user. 
However, if the personal credential is migrated to the mobile phone then the PIM 
running on the mobile phone will ensure that the encrypted credit card information 
may not be decrypted and used on that platform. 
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6.2   Trusted Credential Management Service (TCMS) 
We can have a Trusted Credential Management Service (TCMS) fulfill the role of the 
TCG intermediary for the type of TCG migration involving an intermediary, and also 
perform a broader range of functionalities as considered further below. This is an 
example of the “Third Party Services” shown in Figure 2. The advantage of using a 
TCMS rather than the direct method considered above would be that the TCMS could 
backup credentials if they were to be deleted from the initial machine, and generally it 
would be more suitable in a very dynamic environment in which credentials were 
moved between multiple machines. It would also allow centralised accountability and 
control over user credentials, and help maintain confidentiality where appropriate 
since the TCMS cannot obtain the plain-text contents of a migrated key object without 
the help of the key object’s owner. In addition, the platform owner must authorise 
migration of keys to begin with, so delegating to a service that is trusted is a good 
solution. 
Migration requires external software support, not only to organise and manage the 
wrapped objects, but also to associate additional data such as Platform Configuration 
Register (PCR) values (that indicates desired software state) with these objects. This 
external data minimises TPM complexity by enabling actions to be performed outside 
the TPM when those actions do not need to be trusted. Such functionality could either 
be provided by the PIM or by the TCMS, dependent upon the desired model for a 
given scenario. 
6.2.1   Enterprise Scenarios 
In an enterprise scenario, we may put corporate IT ultimately in control of generating 
the original user credentials, by asking the TPM to create a key pair, the public part of 
which is then sent to the TCMS (probably part of the enterprise itself) to create a 
credential in the form of a certificate binding the public key to time expiry and 
possibly additional attributes and then signed by the TCMS, which can then be used 
for user authentication.  
In practice, corporate IT should store in a directory some user credentials together 
with other information such as machine serial numbers and user identity. To enhance 
the privacy of such a system, access would be restricted to this information based on 
need. Furthermore, in certain cases, users may be able to create other credentials that 
they may use pseudonymously, conformant to company policy. To address certificate 
revocation, time-dependent information could be included within the credentials and 
corporate IT could list Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) in a directory and identity 
managers (PIMs) on the local machines could link in and check for credential validity 
before usage. 
6.3   Associating Policies to Credentials 
We can strengthen this approach by associating policies to credentials to govern their 
use. In general, the policies specify conditions on the usage and migration of identity 
information, and thereby over access to services and resources. They could require the 
involvement of third parties, for example in order to provide mechanisms to refine, 
deploy and enforce such policies at the right level of abstraction. 
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Potentially, policies could be associated to various different types of credential. For 
example, a credential could be bound to a policy governing how that credential may 
be migrated and used subsequently, (encrypted) data could be bound to a policy 
governing its use (with reference to a credential that authorises its use), and so on. 
Note that the data could be accessed in some other way and need not be encrypted by 
the credential and bound to a policy to form a package that is then transferred, but that 
is one approach. Policies could also be applied to migratable keys. 
To make sense of the attached policies, we need an engine that can interpret them: 
the TPM alone cannot do this as this is an additional logical level. The protocols that 
are required would vary depending on whether trusted third parties are used or not. 
For example, an extended PIM could be used to manage credentials, interpret policies 
and enforce control, or else an external entity such as a Database Controller, 
Corporate IT or outsourced service provider could do this. 
When migration of credentials is needed, the PIM (or TCMS, depending upon 
whether local or centralised authorization is preferred) must ensure the policy is 
satisfied before allowing migration. For example, the policy could specify that 
credentials may only be migrated within a given set of platforms and authentication 
required before release, or within a given network (when the query would expect a 
specific network access key). The data (encrypted by another symmetric key) and that 
symmetric key (encrypted by a migratable key) can be moved or stored separately as 
they are in a protected form, and it is rather the transfer of the migratable key itself 
here that needs to be restricted. In the case of a more dynamic environment, the check 
could be made by a third party agent within the system (for example, within the 
controller of a virtual IT environment or by a service provided by corporate IT).  
This technique could be used for resource allocation and also for hot-desking and 
other forms of user roaming. If combined with checks to remotely verify the software 
state and identify the target platform as a TP belonging to a known partner, it can be 
applied to platforms not under a company’s direct control, such as within a public 
area or on a partner site.  
6.3.1   Binding Privacy Policies to Credentials 
Cryptographic mechanisms based on public key cryptography could be used to bind 
privacy policies to credentials. For example, PIM could use the TPM to encrypt a 
migratable key with a public key bound to a destination trusted platform via TCG 
migration functionality, and then wrap the output (using a convenient public key) with 
an external layer containing a symmetric key; in addition, the policy would be hashed 
and encrypted with the symmetric key.  
As an alternative, Identifier Based Encryption (IBE) technology [15,16] could be 
used to ensure that privacy policies “stick” to the credentials (and/or data) as it is 
transferred. In the case of IBE, the policies could be used directly as IBE encryption 
keys to encrypt the transferred material. To achieve this we exploit the following core 
properties of IBE technology: ability to use any kind of string (i.e., sequence of bytes) 
as an IBE encryption key (publicly available); possibility to postpone in time the 
generation of IBE decryption key; reliance on at least a trusted third party, called in 
this approach a trust authority (TA), for the generation of IBE decryption keys. In our 
case, it is likely that the TA would be the same entity as the TCMS. 
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6.3.2   Example: Migration of Credentials Between Resources 
In this example trusted software operating in conjunction with the TPM on each TP 
interacts with a centralised Identity Management service (the TCMS). 
As shown in Figure 3, a PIM, installed on resources, manages credentials locally 
and is aware of local contextual information: it is a trusted software layer that 
interacts with the local TPM.  
 
Fig. 3. Trusted Credential Management Service 
When credentials (possibly together with confidential data) need to be moved (or a 
copy transmitted) from one resource to another, the confidential data is obfuscated 
and strictly associated to a policy referring to the credential or some subpart of the 
credential, by using traditional cryptographic techniques like RSA public key 
cryptography or IBE. The policy is enforced based on a variety of contextual 
information–for example the type of platform. This controls how credentials can be 
migrated and how the confidential data can be used on a given resource. 
Resources require access to data and need to interact with one or more TCMSs (via 
their PIM) in order to access the content of the obfuscated confidential data, or to allow 
credential migration to other resources. The TCMS is a secured Web Service that 
checks for policy compliance and audit interactions. Resources are equipped with TPMs 
to provide higher assurance and trust about the contextual statements. The “third party” 
component, the TCMS, mainly interacts with resources to grant or deny them access to 
data (via disclosing decryption keys) based on their compliance to policies associated to 
data. As shown above, resources’ TPMs are directly involved in this process. 
6.4   Verification of Attributes 
Verification allows an enquirer to place a relatively high degree of trust in the 
accuracy of the attribute.  Two key ways in which this can happen are: 
1. Attributes may already be certified in existing certificates; a TCMS can create 
new identities or update existing identities based on this information. Alterna-
tively, in certain circumstances this can be done by trusted software within the 
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user’s platform that can directly certify information that it has generated as a 
logical consequence from existing information it knows to be correct and there is 
no need for an external TTP to do this, so long as the trust chain is clear within 
the resulting representation. 
2. Other types of attribute can be verified by a TTP (for example, a local 
registration authority or the TCMS). The TTP, if satisfied with the accuracy of 
the characteristic, provides an endorsement that is associated with a characteristic 
value to form a verified characteristic, which may or may not be in the form of a 
standardised digital certificate. The endorsement is suitably generated 
cryptographically, such as from a private key known only to the TTP and is 
verifiable using a public key made widely available by the TTP. 
6.5   Context-Dependant Disclosure of Attributes 
To enhance this model, the PIM or TCMS could test each enquirer by issuing a TCG 
integrity challenge before sending the credentials to that platform and engaging in 
further communication with it. Depending on whether the platform was a TP or not, 
and also on the degree of trust in the TP (for example, whether its software state was 
known to be compromised and whether this state was conformant to the user’s 
policy), an appropriate credential could be constructed. The appropriateness of the 
identity would depend upon particular fields only of private or sensitive data being 
included, perhaps also subject to an according degree of generalisation. The TPM 
could certify such ranges and generalizations within the identity. In addition, 
associated policies could be altered or customised dependent upon the results of the 
integrity check. 
7   Comparison with Related Work 
For the time being trusted platforms are mainly used to protect keys and other 
platform secrets and to execute secure cryptography operations, via the TPM; Wave 
Systems also currently sell a product for migration of TPM keys [17]. Allied 
protected computing environments under development by certain manufacturers and 
open source operating systems such as Linux can support TCG facilities further: 
Intel’s Vanderpool Technology (VT), LaGrande (LT) hardware and chipset 
modifications [18]; Microsoft’s Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) 
[19] and leverage of TPMs within their forthcoming Vista and Longhorn OSs.  
Emerging standards that are relevant to our work include Liberty Alliance’s [20] 
and signed and encrypted XML [21]. Policy specification, modelling and verification 
tools include EPAL [22], OASIS XACML [23], W3C P3P [24] and Ponder [25]. 
Association of policies to data is considered in [26].  
Work on management of attribute credentials linked to identity certificates has 
been done by the IETF PKIX Working Group [7], but that solution is complex in 
terms of reliance on multiple trusted third parties without fully addressing privacy and 
anonymity issues. Conversion of credentials has already been considered in [27]. 
Various anonymous credential schemes have been proposed, most notably those of 
Chaum and Brands [3,28]. Chaum’s credentials [29] are digitally signed random 
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messages that do not include a public key. Reconstruction of the user attributes needs 
to be carried out by mathematical analysis and with reference to published 
information giving correspondence between numeric values and attribute values. 
They are therefore particularly appropriate for less complex attribute or credential 
structures, such as a single issue number for a pseudonymous electronic payment 
credit or demonstration of a small number of attributes. In particular, the approach 
described in Section 5 includes an alternative to Chaum’s method for subdividing 
credentials [30]; it lends itself well to utilizing current standardization initiatives 
and/or if the protocols and business scenarios are likely to involve complex 
representational structures.  
TCG attestation certificates will not be usable if the TPM is tampered with, since 
the TPM is designed to zero keys in that case and authentication using these 
certificates would fail. The problem of revocation of attribute certificates based on 
these certificates (and particularly involving a chain of trust) is still an open question 
that has not been addressed in this paper. This method therefore needs more work to 
equal the applicability of systems such as Lsysanskaya’s [31] that have provided a 
solution to this problem. 
Our approach is complementary to many other approaches in the area of trust 
management (in particular PolicyMaker [32] and Herzberg and Mass’s Credential 
Manager [14]) and federated identity management environments. In [32] improved 
certificate formats are suggested, and policy based tools for the RP to make a decision 
based upon the certificates. Herzberg and Mass [14] describe a Credential Manager 
that provides all credential management functions. Their approach could be viewed as 
complementary to our work in that they focus on the RP’s PIM, and the mechanisms 
within this for converting different types of credentials into a common interface 
format (which is neither a certificate nor signed). We are unique in focusing on 
trusted mechanisms within an IDM for creating credentials and defining how these 
may be migrated under users’ control; our approach uses trusted hardware to ensure 
and certify that this process is carried out correctly while providing privacy for users’ 
credentials across trust boundaries.  
8   Current Status 
At HP Labs we have already implemented key sub-system modules and components 
that underpin the construction of our overall solution. For example, a proof of concept 
that encrypted data can be associated to policies has been provided by our exploitation 
of Identifier-based Encryption (IBE) schemas [33,34]. In addition, TPMs and HP 
ProtectTools already support aspects of migratable keys that we might extend with 
such a sticky policy capability.  
We are currently collaboratively developing an identity management system within 
the EU Framework VI project PRIME (Privacy and Identity Management for Europe) 
[35]. We plan to use this as a test bed for the techniques described above. We are 
currently exploring extending an existing Credential Management system to provide 
users with greater control over creation of pseudonyms and the circumstances in 
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which their credentials may be shared (i.e. defining the credential trust domain). We 
are also looking at extensions to the role of a Controller System within the adaptive 
enterprise - preferably that uses a hardware security module - to provide a mediation 
service that checks constraints associated with credentials so that data are migrated 
within groups of servers, storage devices, blades, etc. only within an appropriate 
identity trust domain.  
9   Conclusions 
The problem of enhancing trust in e-commerce while maintaining privacy is an 
important one, not least because lack of such trust is a key inhibitor to the growth of 
e-commerce. This paper has suggested trustworthy mechanisms for trusted credit 
transference, credential combination and subdivision and certificate structure change 
that can be carried out without infringement of user privacy. These methods are 
particularly appropriate if X.509 certificates or text-based credential representations 
rather than single numeric representations of credentials are preferred and if a Trusted 
Computing infrastructure is already available, and so may be readily exploited. This 
may be the case even in the short term. 
Our method provides security and flexibility whilst enhancing privacy. Trust 
domains may be created via users and/or corporate IT using such mechanisms. In 
addition we can strengthen this approach by associating policies to credentials to 
govern their use. Our mechanisms can be applied in a variety of domains including 
within enterprises and for electronic business (for which identity management has 
become a key enabler).  
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Abstract. Social aspects of security of information systems are often
discussed in terms of “actual security” and “perceived security”. This may
lead to the hypothesis that e-voting is controversial because in paper
voting, actual and perceived security coincide, whereas they do not in
electronic systems. In this paper, we argue that the distinction between
actual and perceived security is problematic from a philosophical perspec-
tive, and we develop an alternative approach, based on the notion of trust.
We investigate the different meanings of this notion in computer science,
and link these to the philosophical work of Luhmann, who distinguishes
between familiarity, confidence and trust. This analysis yields several use-
ful distinctions for discussing trust relations with respect to information
technology. We apply our framework to electronic voting, and propose
some hypotheses that can possibly explain the smooth introduction of
electronic voting machines in the Netherlands in the early nineties.
1 Introduction
Electronic voting is one of the most interesting examples of the application
of security-sensitive information technology in society. Democracy is one of
the foundations on which western culture is built, and it is no wonder that
the introduction of new technology into this domain has raised a considerable
amount of discussion. Controversies are strengthened by the media coverage
of security leaks and viruses in many different information technology appli-
cations, and by the advent of Internet voting as the future election platform.
Many scientific papers have appeared covering the security of e-voting systems
[1, 4, 10, 12, 13, 15, 27], but yet, there is no consensus over which aspects to take
into account in such an analysis.
There is some agreement, however, about the fact that both technical and so-
cial aspects of security should be covered [8, 21, 22, 25, 30]. The social aspects are
then often labelled “trust”, and the implementation of these aspects in concrete
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systems is delegated to user interface experts and communication departments.
They are assigned the task of transforming “trustworthiness”, created by the
technical experts, into “trust”.
Although the distinction between the trustworthiness established by the
technical experts and the trust established by the user interface and market-
ing experts seems a very business-oriented way to think about these matters,
the scientific literature – to the best of our knowledge – takes this distinction
for granted as well. In fact, all of the papers that we consulted about social
aspects of security reflect this view by using a distinction between “actual se-
curity” and “perceived security” in their analyses of security-sensitive systems
[8, 21, 22, 25, 30].
In this paper, we provide an alternative analysis of the issue of trust in infor-
mation systems, with emphasis on the case of electronic voting. First of all, we
explain why we are not satisfied with the prevailing distinction between actual
and perceived security. Then, we develop a new model of trust, based on litera-
ture in both computer science and philosophy. In section 4, we describe the role
of technology in the trust relation, focused on information technology. In the
final section, we combine the results in an analysis of trust in electronic voting.
The paper ends with conclusions.
2 Actual and Perceived Security
In the prevailing approach to social aspects of information system security, the
notions of “actual security” and “perceived security” are used. “Actual security”
can be assessed by technical experts, and “perceived security” is a more or less
distorted version of this in the mind of a member of the non-technical community.
From this point of view, trust is based on “perceived security”, as opposed to
“actual security”. It can easily be determined to be either justified or unjustified
depending on the agreement between the perceived and actual security of the
system.
This distinction can also be applied to election systems. Xenakis and Macin-
tosh [30] argue that “[s]ince procedural security is evident and understandable
to voters, it has a comparative advantage when it comes to developing and sup-
porting the social acceptance for the new e-processes” [our italics]. In the case
of procedural security (as opposed to technical security), the actual security of
the system can apparently be perceived by the voters, such that trust can eas-
ily be established and justified.1 This yields the hypothesis that resistance to
electronic voting is explained by the fact that the paper system is evident and
understandable to voters and electronic systems are not.
1 There is a remarkable resemblance here to Descartes conceiving certain ideas as
“clear and distinct”. It is supposed, in both cases, that there are certain things that
are understandable by just common sense, as opposed to derived or expert knowl-
edge. These things can be directly extracted from experience, such that “perceived”
and “actual” coincide. However, many researchers after Descartes’ time have con-
firmed that there is much more “constructed” about our experience of even common
sense issues than people in the Enlightenment age would have admitted. The appar-
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We have two main objections against this approach. First of all, the idea
that some people have access to the actual security of a system and others do
not is problematic. Science and technology studies have been showing for a long
time that scientific research and technological development are full of matters
of perception and acceptance themselves,2 and we think that it is essential for
understanding the issues to provide a more integrated perspective.
Moreover, the “actual security” of a system is often verified in terms of a
model of security that has its own limitations. It is well known in the field of
information security that even small security protocols may contain major flaws
that go unnoticed for decades, precisely because verification is done using a
limited model of security.3 Also, security assessment of systems involves looking
into the future, trying to guess what attackers will be up to. Thus, the tools
available for assessing “actual security” are inherently fallible.
Next to the general objections, we also think that this approach does not
reach the core of the matter in the case of electronic elections. Although there
is a difference in degree of complexity between the paper system and electronic
systems, that does not mean that, in the paper case, everyone just knows what
is happening and what the risks are. The paper system is complex enough in
itself to reach beyond the understanding of the average citizen, and not to be
“evident and understandable”. Instead, the security sensitivities of the tradi-
tional procedural voting system have been “black-boxed”4 in our experience of
democracy. Only when something goes wrong in an election, the black box of
the “evident and understandable” paper election system is opened, and risks
are exposed. Meanwhile, electronic election systems have not been black-boxed
yet, and their vulnerabilities are out there for everyone to discuss. The whole
phenomenon of the traditional system being black-boxed, and therefore being
“evident and understandable”, is already based on trust. Trust is not a deriva-
tive of “actual security” here, but it defines “actual security”. And this actual
security is perceived as well.
These are the main arguments supporting our view that there is no meaningful
distinction between “actual security” and “perceived security”. Security is always
perceived security. Of course, the perception of the security of a system, and
the reasons why the system is believed to be or not to be secure, may differ
from person to person based on the tools5 of analysis that are available, which
are different for an expert than for a layman. However, there is no such thing
ent clear-and-distinctness of certain things is nothing more than our self-initiated
reduction of complexity.
2 Cf. [14], p. 7: “Modern technology studies have opened up the “black box” of tech-
nological development and revealed the intimate intertwinement of technology and
society. Both scientific facts and technological artifacts appear to be the outcome of
negotiations, in which many diverse actors are involved.”
3 For example, the Needham-Schroeder protocol was thought to be correct for 17 years,
until it was eventually broken [16].
4 Cf. the actor-network theory of Bruno Latour, as explained in [29]: ch. 6.
5 Tools are meant in a pragmatist way here; these include all that people have at their
disposal for problem solving purposes.
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as “actual security” to be considered apart from the tools that were used to
determine it. Just as “actual intelligence” is not an objective property measured
by an IQ-test, but rather defined in terms of the test, security is defined in terms
of the available tools for analysis.
As philosophers, we conclude that the distinction between actual and per-
ceived security gives a too naive realist account of the matter.6 Instead, we start
from the observation that people experience an environment as more or less se-
cure. This can be seen as a phenomenological approach to the issue [11, 29]. Based
on this perspective, we argue that trust is the primary factor in the relations
between humans and systems when it comes to security, and not a derivative
of an objective kind of security. We will develop this approach further in the
following sections.
3 Trust
First of all, we need to make sure that the reader is familiar with the distinc-
tion between safety and security. Safety refers to limited effects of the possible
failure of a system under normal circumstances. Security refers to limited effects
of an attacker deliberately trying to make the system fail in the worst possible
way. In scientific research into technological systems, the first property is esti-
mated by verifying the correctness of the design. Security is assessed by verifying
the tamper-resistance of the design. In computer science, these two branches of
research can be distinguished easily.7
In society, trust relations with respect to systems are characterised by being
concerned with either safety or security. In the first case, the trust relation
involves trust in the limited effects of failure; in the second case, it involves
trust in the limited effects of attack. For example, trust in a nuclear power plant
is composed of trust in the safety of the plant (e.g. it does not explode under
normal circumstances) and trust in the security of the plant (e.g. it does not
explode under terrorist bombing).
A second distinction that we wish to draw here is connected to the scope
of the effects of failure or attack. These effects may be either private or public.
When I drive a car, I trust in the limited effects of failure of the car for my own
health. When I vote, I trust in the limited effects of failure of the election system
for the whole country. The same holds for the effects of attack: an attack on a
nuclear power plant may have private effects (if I or some of my friends live near
it) and public effects (changes in politics due to the attack).
Having set this general background, we now investigate the concept of trust
itself a bit further. One of the most confusing things that emerges from the lit-
6 Recent attempts to derive a taxonomy for dependability and security of information
systems suggest a realist view as well [2]. We do not doubt the value of such ap-
proaches as a tool for analysis. We do think, however, that a philosophical approach
may shed more light on the origin of the concepts used in such a taxonomy.
7 Note that we do not consider correctness and tamper-resistance as objective prop-
erties apart from the (scientific) tools that were used to determine them.
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erature is the existence of two different conceptions of trust. On occasion, they
even appear in the same article [8]. Although the analysis of trust in voting sys-
tems that is presented there covers many concrete risks involved in using these
systems, the conception of trust that is used is apparently not completely coher-
ent. In a section named “Increasing trust” [our italics], the following sentence
is found: “One way to decrease the trust voters must place in voting machine
software is to let voters physically verify that their intent is recorded correctly.”
[our italics] But was the intent not to increase trust? Do we want to increase
and decrease trust at the same time? What is happening here?
Apparently, computer scientists stem from a tradition in which minimising
trust is the standard. “In computer security literature in general, the term is
used to denote that something must be trusted [...]. That is, something trusted
is something that the users are necessarily dependent on.” [21] Because we must
trust certain parts of the system for the whole system to be verifiably correct
according to the computer science models, we want to minimise the size of the
parts we have to trust, thus minimising trust itself. However, from a psychological
perspective, or even a marketing perspective, it is desirable that users trust the
whole system. Maximising trust seems to lead to more fluent interaction between
the user and the system, and is therefore desirable. In [20], Matt Blaze says:
“I’ve always wanted trust, as a security person, to be a very simple thing: I
trust something if it’s allowed to violate my security; something that’s trusted is
something that I don’t have to worry about and if it is broken, I am broken. So I
want as little trust in the system as possible, and so security people are worried
about minimising trust and now suddenly we have this new set of semantics that
are concerned with maximising trust, and I’m terribly confused.”
In the following, we try to alleviate this confusion by explicating the as-
sumptions found in both approaches to trust, and placing them within a larger
(philosophical) context. Apparently, two different definitions of trust have to be
distinguished (cf. [21]):
– trust as something that is bad, something that people establish because they
have to, not because the system is trustworthy;
– trust as something that is good, something that people establish because
they want to, because the system is trustworthy.
How can we conceptualise this difference? In political science, there is a well-
known distinction between negative freedom and positive freedom. Negative free-
dom means the absence of interference by others; positive freedom means the
opportunity for people to pursue their own goals in a meaningful way.8 We see a
parallel here with two possible concepts of safety and security, namely a negative
and a positive one:
– negative safety/security: absence of everything that is unsafe/insecure;
– positive safety/security: opportunity to engage in meaningful trust relations.
8 Cf. [6], pp. 36-39. The notion was originally introduced by Isaiah Berlin [3].
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When people use a negative concept of security, trust has to be minimised,
since it denotes a dependence on (possibly) insecure systems. By removing ev-
erything that is insecure, trust defined in this way can indeed be minimised. In
a setting where security is defined positively, however, trust suddenly forms an
essential precondition for security, because security then requires the possibility
to engage in trust relations. This is precisely the approach that comes from psy-
chology, as opposed to the dominantly negative approach of computer science
(remove all insecurities).
We will label these two conceptions of trust bad trust and good trust, respec-
tively. We deliberately avoid the terms negative and positive in our distinction
of trust, because these are used in the definitions of both freedom and security
as indicators of how the concepts are defined (certain things not being there
vs. certain things being there), not of their desirability. Bad and good instead
indicate whether we should try to minimise or maximise the associated appear-
ance of trust. Thus, we linked the two different interpretations of trust to two
different conceptions of security. Bad trust is linked to a negative conception
of safety and security, and good trust to a positive conception. In philosophy,
distinctions between different modes of trust have been drawn before. We will
use such a distinction to further clarify the differences.
Luhmann [17] provides an extensive model of trust, based on the view of
systems theory. According to Luhmann, trust is a mechanism that helps us to
reduce social complexity.9 Without reducing complexity, we cannot properly
function in a complex social environment. Luhmann distinguishes several types
of trust relations. First of all, he distinguishes between familiarity and trust.
Familiarity reduces complexity by an orientation towards the past. Things that
we see as familiar, because “it has always been like that”, are accepted – we do
engage in relations with those – and things that we see as unfamiliar are rejected
– we do not engage in relations with those. For example, especially elderly people
often refuse to use ATM’s or ticket vending machines, precisely because they are
not used to them.10
Trust, on the contrary, has an orientation towards the future: it involves
expectations. We trust in something because we expect something. For example,
we use ATM’s because we expect these machines to provide us with money faster
than a bank employee behind the counter. Luhmann distinguishes personal trust,
i.e. trust in interpersonal relations, from system trust, i.e. trust in the general
functioning of a non-personal system. We may expect something from a person,
or we may expect something from society as a whole or from a machine. Since we
are interested in technological systems here, trust in this paper is always system
trust.
9 The function of trust as a means for reduction of complexity seems to be known in
computer science. For example, Nikander and Karvonen [21] mention this aspect.
However, this paper does not refer to the work on trust by Luhmann.
10 One may argue instead that the reason is not that they are not used to them, but
rather the fact that it is harder for them to learn new things. Yet this is precisely
one of the conditions that invites relying on familiarity rather than trust.
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In later work [18], Luhmann also draws a distinction between trust and con-
fidence. Both confidence and trust involve the formation of expectations with
respect to contingent events. But there is a difference. According to Luhmann,
trust is always based on assessment of risks, and a decision whether or not to
accept those. Confidence differs from trust in the sense that it does not pre-
suppose a situation of risk. Confidence, instead, neglects the possibility of dis-
appointment, not only because this case is rare, but also because there is not
really a choice. Examples of confidence that Luhmann gives are expectations
about politicians trying to avoid war, and of cars not suddenly breaking down
and hitting you. In these cases, you cannot decide for yourself whether or not to
take the risk.
When there is a choice, trust takes over the function of confidence. Here, the
risky situation is evaluated, and a decision is made about whether or not to
take the risk: “If you do not consider alternatives [...] you are in a situation of
confidence. If you choose one action in preference to others [...], you define the
situation as one of trust.” [18] If you choose to drive a car by evaluating the risks
and accepting them, this is a form of trust.
Apparently, Luhmann ascribes the same negative characteristics to confidence
that are ascribed to bad trust from a computer science perspective, in the sense
that people do not have a choice. People have to have confidence in “trusted”
parts of the system. Moreover, what Luhmann calls trust has the positive con-
notation of our good trust, in the sense that people can decide for themselves
whether they want to trust something. Trust is then necessary for a system to be
successful. We have to note, however, that Luhmann does not regard confidence
as a bad thing in general; it is even necessary for society to function. Still, with
respect to information systems, confidence means accepting a system without
knowing its risks, and computer scientists are generally not willing to do this.
Thus, Luhmann distinguishes between two kinds of relations of self-assurance,
based on whether people engage in these relations because they have to or be-
cause they want to. Luhmann calls these two relations confidence and trust,
respectively. These observations also cover the situation we described in com-
puter science. This means that the distinction we made is not something that
characterises social aspects of security in information systems only, but some-
thing that can be considered a general characteristic of trust relations.
From now on, we will use relations of self-assurance as a general notion.
Confidence and trust will only be used in Luhmann’s sense. We describe relations
of self-assurance based on three distinctions:
– self-assurance with respect to safety vs. self-assurance with respect to secu-
rity;
– self-assurance with respect to private effects vs. self-assurance with respect
to public effects;
– confidence vs. trust.
Computer scientists generally try to replace confidence with trust, i.e. ex-
change unconscious dependence on a system for explicit evaluation of the risks,
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and minimising the parts in which we still have to have confidence.11 Philoso-
phers (and social scientists), instead, recognise the positive aspects of confidence,
and may evaluate positively people having a relation of self-assurance with the
system without exactly knowing its risks (i.e. confidence). Our point of view in
this discussion is that, because society is too complex for everyone to understand
all the risks, there should be a balance between the trust experts have in the
system, based on their analysis of the risks, and the confidence the users have in
the system. This ensures that there is knowledge of the detailed workings and
risks of the system within the social system in which it is embedded, but there is
no need for everyone in the social system to know exactly what these risks are,
precisely because there is a relation between expert trust and public confidence.
How to establish such a relation is a question that we do not discuss further
here.
Based on the distinctions we discussed in this section, we will now turn our
attention to trust in technology.
4 Trust in Technology
When discussing security aspects of technology, reliability and trustworthiness
are often mentioned. First of all, we propose a distinction between reliability and
trustworthiness. A system acquires confidence if it is reliable, and it acquires trust
if it is trustworthy.12 A reliable system is a system that people can use confidently
without having to worry about the details. A trustworthy system is a system
that people can assess the risks of and that they still want to use.
There is a fairly subtle relation between reliability and trustworthiness. On
the one hand, trustworthiness is a stronger notion than reliability. Before they
give their trust to a system, people will perform a risk analysis. People who
establish confidence in a system do not do this. In this sense, it is harder for a
system to acquire trust than to acquire confidence. However, maintaining trust is
easier than maintaining confidence. When people trust a certain system, they are
already conscious of the risks and decide to use it anyway. This means that trust
is not necessarily broken if something fails. In the case of reliability, however,
people have put their confidence in a system because they do not see alternatives,
and they will probably not accept any failures. Trustworthiness is therefore the
stronger notion for the short term, and reliability is the stronger notion for the
long term.
How are reliability and trustworthiness established? As we have made clear
in the introduction, we argue that they are not objective properties of a sys-
tem that are reflected in subjective confidence and trust. Instead, we take a
phenomenological point of view, i.e. we conceive the relation between persons
11 This general approach is not without exceptions; cf. [20].
12 Reliability is used in the more limited sense of continuity of correct service in [2]. Our
notion of reliability roughly corresponds to the “alternate definition of dependability”
in their taxonomy, whereas trustworthiness corresponds to the “original definition
of dependability”.
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and a system as primary to the objective and subjective aspects [11, 29]. The
objective aspects of reliability and trustworthiness and the subjective aspects of
confidence and trust emerge from the relation between people and the system.
The way in which they are established depends on the analytic tools that are
available to the person. If a person is just using the system, the outcome will
probably be different than in case an expert performs a full security audit based
on her expertise.
The relations that different people have with the system make the objective
aspects of reliability and trustworthiness converge into different images of the
system. These images then become “objective” properties of the system. The
relations that experts have with the system determine what is often called the
“actual” security of the system, but this “actual” security is still based on per-
ception and relations of self-assurance, and therefore we rather avoid the term
“actual”.
How does this analysis of trust in technology apply to computer systems?
Computer systems can be characterised as congealed procedures. Such proce-
dures are typically more rigid than human-managed procedures. They are less
easy to circumvent, but also less robust. Humans are easy to persuade to aban-
don the rules, computers are not. Humans can easily find solutions for problems
that do not exactly match the rules, computers cannot. Because computers are
not flexible, congealed procedures must be specified in more detail than human
procedures. Every possible situation should be covered. This, and the fact that
most people do not have expert knowledge about computers, makes congealed
procedures hard to understand.
As we have seen before, trust in a system requires understanding of the risks
involved in using a system. This is usually relatively easy to achieve in human
procedures, not necessarily because the systems are less complex, but because we
have a good understanding (or at least we think we have a good understanding)
of how humans function. Understanding the risks of using a computer system is
typically much harder. On the other hand, precisely because congealed proce-
dures are more rigid, the associated systems are generally more reliable, in the
sense that they produce fewer errors. This makes them more suitable for being
reliable and acquiring confidence, while less suitable for being trustworthy and
acquiring trust. Thus, automation implies a transition from public trust to pub-
lic confidence. This makes it all the more important that a balance is established
between expert trust and public confidence, in order to have public confidence
still reflect a risk analysis in some way.
Luhmann observes the same tendency of replacing trust by confidence in func-
tional differentiation of society. Because people in a functionally differentiated
environment have knowledge of only a very small part of the complex structures
that surround them, establishing trust is hard, and confidence is extremely im-
portant. This also requires procedures to be increasingly rigid, precisely because
they need to maintain confidence. This may be seen as a first step in the freez-
ing of procedures; automation is then a continuation of this process, by entering
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these semi-frozen procedures into machines, and thereby fixing all the details
even further.13
The concepts of reliability and trustworthiness extend the conceptual frame-
work we introduced in the previous section. We will now investigate whether this
framework yields new results when we apply it to voting technology.
5 Trust in Voting Systems
Voting is a way to surrender oneself to a representational body in a democracy.
It is at the same time a reconfirmation of the social contract between the rulers
and the ruled, and a reconfirmation of the autonomous individual that engages in
this contract. In this act, the Enlightenment ideals are established over and over
again. The reconfirmation of the social contract and the autonomous individual
has the character of a ritual. The associated relation of self-assurance is primarily
based on familiarity, for a ritual always has an orientation towards the past.
But this ritual dimension is not the only relation of self-assurance in demo-
cratic politics. There are also expectations involved about the functionality of
the political system, for example the expectation that the desires of the public
are accurately represented in policy by this system. Engaging in political ac-
tivities such as voting requires confidence or trust that these expectations will
be fulfilled. Finally, there is also a need for trust and confidence in the present
government, which represents the people based on expectations not about the
political system in general, but about the current policy.
Thus, elections involve at least three different relations of self-assurance: the
familiarity with democracy that is established by means of a ritual, the confi-
dence or trust that people have in the government and confidence or trust in the
political system.14
However, trust and confidence in the election procedures themselves are also
necessary. These in turn co-evolve with the relation of self-assurance that people
have with the government and the political system. This means that a lack of
trust or confidence in election procedures may reduce trust or confidence in the
government or the political system, but also the other way around. The specific
13 Interestingly, this transformation of trust in human procedures into confidence in
congealed procedures goes against the tendency that Luhmann observes in liberal-
ism. According to Luhmann, “liberalism focuses on the individual responsibility for
deciding between trust and distrust [...]. And it neglects the problems of attribution
and the large amount of confidence required for participation in the system” [18].
From this point of view, either information technology is a threat to liberalism, or
liberalism should revise its goals.
14 Generally, people have confidence with regard to politics rather than trust, in Luh-
mann’s sense. It is precisely the phenomenon of elections that may turn political
confidence into trust: “A relation of confidence may turn into one of trust if it be-
comes possible (or is seen to be possible) to avoid that relation. Thus elections may
to some extent convert political confidence into political trust, at least if your party
wins. Conversely, trust can revert to mere confidence when the opinion spreads that
you cannot really influence political behaviour through the ballot.” [18].
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characteristics of this relation are a topic for further research. In this section,
we will focus on trust and confidence in the election system. We will primarily
discuss the differences that can be observed from this point of view between the
traditional paper systems and electronic variants.
Why do we want electronic voting? The rigidness of technology is often an
argument. Errors with paper ballots, as in the Florida presidential elections in
2000, may be a reason to switch to the supposedly more reliable Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) machines. Indeed, electronic machines may be more reliable
and trustworthy with respect to safety than paper systems are, because possi-
bilities for error, both in casting and in counting, are reduced.
However, reliability and trustworthiness with respect to security are not as
straightforward, especially when there is little transparency in the design, e.g.
when the source code is kept secret. Acquiring trust in security, as opposed to
trust in safety, is hard when things are secret. Insider attacks against security,
e.g. an employee of the manufacturer changing something in the software, are
indeed pretty easy in such a case, and experts evaluating the risks will at some
point notice this. This not only includes possibilities for altering the results, but
also the possibility to deduce a relation between a voter and a vote.15 This lack
of transparency may make it hard as well to maintain public confidence in the
long run, since this confidence is often influenced by expert trust.
Besides the distinction between security and safety, we also proposed a dis-
tinction between private effects and public effects. Self-assurance with respect
to private effects in voting amounts to trust or confidence that one’s own vote
is handled correctly, e.g. kept confidential. Self-assurance with respect to public
effects means trust or confidence that the results are calculated correctly. Both
kinds need to be acquired by an election system. People may have confidence
in electronic systems in the sense that they calculate the results correctly in
general, but if they are not sure what happens to their own vote – e.g. doubt
the secrecy of their vote – the whole system may not acquire confidence anyway.
In the previous section, we argued that congealed procedures are more suit-
able for confidence, whereas human procedures are more suitable for trust. Still,
because the paper system has been the only option for a long time, the rela-
tion of self-assurance people had with the paper system was largely based on
confidence. Confidence in the election system, confidence in the government and
confidence in the political system supported each other. Now, what happens
when electronic voting comes into play?
First of all, electronic voting systems may be seen as alternatives to the exist-
ing system. Whether this is indeed the case depends on the situation. If they are
seen as alternatives, people suddenly get the option to choose a voting system.
This invites actively assessing the risks of the different systems, and basing the
decision on an analysis of these risks. This means that trust now becomes the
dominant form of self-assurance, as opposed to confidence. This has as a conse-
quence that voting systems are required to be trustworthy rather than reliable
15 We do not discuss vote buying and vote coercion in this paper; see e.g. [23] for
discussions on this issue for the case of Internet elections.
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only. This, again, leads to the traditional paper system becoming more attrac-
tive, because it is based on human procedures, and human procedures more
easily acquire trust than congealed procedures. On the other hand, if the new
technologies are not seen as an alternative, but as an improvement of existing
procedures, electronic devices are more attractive, because they are more reliable
and thus more easily acquire confidence.
If various alternatives are available, and citizens cannot assess the risks them-
selves, it can be desirable to establish a balance between expert trust and public
confidence, in order to establish a relation of self-assurance between citizens and
the election system again. This is important for maintaining people’s confidence
in the government and the political system. However, if people do not see these
options as alternatives, risk analysis may instead break their confidence in the
existing system by exposing the risks, and thereby destroy confidence. Thus, the
role of the expert in these matters is extremely important. This role will be a
topic of ongoing research.
As an example of the value of our approach for the analysis of concrete de-
velopments, we propose some hypotheses as explanations for the fact that in
the Netherlands, electronic voting machines have been introduced in the early
nineties without much discussion about their security. It was not regarded a
serious problem that the design was secret, and only the independent voting
system licenser TNO knew the details. Most of the concern was about whether
all citizens would be able to operate the machines. Possible hypotheses for the
smooth and uncontroversial introduction are:
– the ritual of going to the polling station, identifying oneself and casting
a vote remained fairly stable (as opposed to online voting), maintaining
familiarity;16 also, the Dutch machines have a layout that is very similar to
the paper ballots used before;17
– confidence in the government was relatively high, which led to confidence in
the election systems proposed by the government as well;
– trust and confidence in information systems were more related to safety
than to security at the time; people knew that calculators were reliable, and
probably no one had ever attacked a calculator;
– voters paid more attention to the election outcome (public effects) than to
what happened to their own vote (private effects); they knew that com-
puters were able to calculate reliably, and therefore had confidence in the
computers with respect to the public effects; focusing instead on the private
effects of a machine “stealing” or revealing one’s vote will expose the lack of
transparency and probably undermine confidence;
16 In relatively new democracies, such as Estonia, tradition (and thus familiarity) are
less important. This may explain why Estonia already implemented Internet voting.
See e.g. http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-145735-16&type=News,
consulted November 17, 2005.
17 This means, among other things, that all candidates have their own button on the
machine, as opposed to PC software in which one first chooses a party and then a
candidate.
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– the electronic systems were not seen as alternatives to the existing proce-
dures, but rather as automated versions of existing procedures; this made it
easy to transfer confidence to the new systems; nowadays, trust is an issue
in other countries: e-voting is really seen as an alternative, instead of just
automating a known process;
– risk evaluation of computer systems was not as mature at the time as it is
now; this made it harder for computer scientists to transform confidence into
trust by making explicit the risks involved.
Each of these possible causes, which are based on the philosophical analysis in
this paper, can serve as a hypothesis for empirical research. Also, the fact that
voting machines are now under discussion in the Netherlands as well may be
explained by a change in situation with respect to these hypotheses. For exam-
ple, international developments may have changed the image of voting machines
from a simple automation of existing procedures to a real alternative. These
hypotheses show the relevance of our conceptual framework for voting system
sciences in general. Of course, some of them are related, and further research,
both theoretical and empirical, would be useful to determine these interdepen-
dencies.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we described a framework for discussing trust in relation to vot-
ing procedures. Instead of distinguishing between actual and perceived security,
we took a more phenomenological approach, in which subjective and objective
aspects of security are seen as constituted from the relation between the people
and systems involved. The main concepts were discussed both from a computer
science point of view and from a philosophical perspective. Luhmann was the
primary source for the latter.
Based on the theory of Luhmann, we distinguished between familiarity, confi-
dence and trust. Luhmann understands these concepts as means for the reduction
of social complexity. Familiarity has an orientation towards the past, whereas
confidence and trust are based on expectations and thus oriented towards the
future. People trust because they want to, based on risk evaluation. People have
confidence because they have to, not because they understand the risks. The con-
cepts of confidence and trust are related to the different views on trust that can
be found in the computer science literature, namely bad and good trust. These
are again related to negative and positive conceptions of security, respectively.
Computer scientists generally try to replace confidence with trust by making
explicit the risks involved in using the system. This, again, allows the public to
base their confidence on expert trust.
The “objective” aspects related to the “subjective” aspects of confidence and
trust were labelled reliability and trustworthiness. Human procedures are typi-
cally good at being trustworthy (and thus at acquiring trust), whereas the con-
gealed procedures of computers are good at being reliable (and thus at acquiring
confidence).
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In elections, the traditional election system, whatever it may be, always invites
confidence, precisely because it is the established system, and people are not
conscious of alternatives. When new technologies for elections are presented,
these may be seen as alternatives. Then, election systems suddenly have to be
trustworthy instead of reliable only. This is one of the reasons why the demands
posed on new election technologies are often more severe than those posed on
existing systems. However, the fact that alternatives are now available may also
undermine confidence in the existing system, and require this system to earn
trust as well.
In this situation, an interdisciplinary approach to matters of trust in election
systems is indispensable. The hypotheses we offered for the smooth introduction
of voting machines in the Netherlands serve as a modest attempt at illustrat-
ing possible results. We hope to have justified trust in the benefits of such an
approach here.
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Abstract. Without trust, pervasive devices cannot collaborate effectively, and
without collaboration, the pervasive computing vision cannot be made a reality.
Distributed trust frameworks may support trust and thus foster collaboration in an
hostile pervasive computing environment. Existing frameworks deal with foun-
dational properties of computational trust. We here propose a distributed trust
framework that satisfies a broader range of properties. Our framework: (i) evolves
trust based on a Bayesian formalization, whose trust metric is expressive, yet
tractable; (ii) is lightweight; (iii) protects user anonymity, whilst being resistant
to “Sybil attacks” (and enhancing detection of two collusion attacks); (iv) inte-
grates a risk-aware decision module. We evaluate the framework through four
experiments.
1 Introduction
Significant commercial benefits are predicted from the deployment of new services that
pervasive computing will enable. These benefits are, however, theoretical in the absence
of appropriate security. Fundamental to the creation of security are mechanisms for
assigning trust to different pervasive devices. Also, it is in the nature of such devices
that security mechanisms must be automatic - they must operate without the need for
users to intervene. To make commercial benefits true, distributed trust frameworks may
be employed as they provide security by automatically managing trust among pervasive
devices.
To design a general distributed trust framework, one needs to identify its desir-
able properties first. From literature (e.g., see work by Liu and Issarny [9], and by
Suryanarayana and Taylo [17]), those properties are: (i) be distributed; (ii) protect
user anonymity, whilst providing accountability; (iii) be lightweight in terms of both
required storage and scalability; (iv) minimize bandwidth demand; (v) be robust to
common attacks; (vi) evolve (social) trust as humans do (e.g., trust evolves based on
reputation information); (vii) support both types of recommendations (good and bad
ones); (viii) incorporate the three classical dimensions of computational trust: context,
subjectiveness, and time; (ix) be integrated with a decision module; (x) have a trust
metric that is expressive, yet tractable.
A common limitation to many existing trust frameworks is that they deal with only a
very narrow subsets of these properties. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [1] were the first to
propose the use of recommendations. Carbone et al. [5] then integrated more advanced
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 298–312, 2006.
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aspects in a formal trust model. More recently, Liu and Issarny [9] focused on designing
a (reputation-based) trust framework that integrates additional trust aspects, including
robustness to some attacks.
Our contribution lies in designing and evaluating a distributed trust framework with
the above ten properties in mind. Our framework: (i) uses a generic n-level discrete trust
metric that is expressive (more than existing 2-level Bayesian solutions), yet tractable;
(ii) incorporates the trust dimensions of subjectiveness, time and context; (iii) is light-
weight in terms of required storage and bandwidth: as the number of its peering devices
increases, its data structures grow linearly, and the computation and bandwidth demand
remain flat; (iv) supports anonymous authentication, whilst being resistant to “Sybil at-
tacks” [7]; (v) enhances detection of two collusion attacks; (vi) evolves trust embedding
social aspects, in that : trust evolves from both direct experiences and (positive and neg-
ative) recommendations; evaluation of recommendations depends on their originator’s
trustworthiness and ontology view; finally, the trust metric embeds the distinction be-
tween trust levels and trust confidence; (vii) integrates a well-founded decision module.
We have evaluated the framework through four experiments.
We structure the paper as follows. Section 2 introduces existing research and how
our framework enhances it. As our trust evolution process is based on reputation in-
formation, section 3 defines trust and reputation. Section 4 then dwells on describ-
ing the whole trust management framework. Section 5 presents an experimental study.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Work
The body of work in distributed computational trust is littered with frameworks that
are often based on social (human) considerations, sometimes attack-resistant, rarely
integrated with well-founded decision modules.
Foundational distributed trust frameworks were already based on social trust consid-
erations, in that they evolved trust based on direct experiences and recommendations,
and they integrated the classical trust dimensions of context, subjectiveness, and (only
later) time. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes first proposed the use of recommendations for
managing context-dependent and subjective trust [1]. Although foundational, the previ-
ous approach suffered from, for example, the lack of a process for trust evolution. To fill
the gap, Mui et al. [10] proposed a Bayesian formalization for a distributed rating pro-
cess. However, two issues remained unsolved: they considered only binary ratings and
did not discount them over time. Buchegger and Le Boudec [4] tackled the latter issue,
but not the former: they proposed a Bayesian reputation mechanism in which each node
isolates malicious nodes, ages its reputation data (i.e., weights past reputation less), but
can only evaluate encounters with a binary value (i.e., encounters are either good or
bad). Using a generic n-level discrete trust metric, our Bayesian framework addresses
the issue. Furthermore, it discounts its trust beliefs over time (i.e., it decreases the con-
fidence level it has in its trust beliefs). This avoids excessive capitalization on past good
behavior and allows discarding old reputation information (contributing to make the
framework lightweight).
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Recent frameworks account for advanced social trust aspects. For example,
Carbone et al. [5] have proposed a formal model for trust formation, evolution, and
propagation based on a policy language. They also have thrown light on a previously
unexplored aspect: the distinction between trust levels and trust confidence. We regard
such distinction as fundamental and, thus, preserve it in our Bayesian formalization
of trust evolution.
The design of frameworks resistant to attacks is not a common occurrence in litera-
ture. The most felicitous example we find in Liu and Issarny’s work [9]. They proposed
a model robust to both defamation and collusion attacks. Although foundational, their
work suffers from other attacks, such as privacy breaching (the lack of user anonymity
protection). Of the relatively small body of academic work published in anonymity
protection, Seigneur and Jensen [16] proposed the use of disposable pseudonyms. Such
approach facilitate anonymity, yet hinder cooperation in the absence of a central author-
ity due to “Sybil-attacks” [7] (attacks resulting from users who maliciously use multiple
identities). Our framework enhances the detection of defamation and collusion attacks,
and it tackles “Sybil attacks” (we will name the first two attacks as bad mouthing and
ballot stuffing collusion attacks, respectively).
Trust frameworks’ integration with decision-making mechanisms, though fundamen-
tal, is rare. Within the SECURE project, a trust model’s output feeds a decision-making
mechanism [6]. More recently, Quercia and Hailes [11, 12] proposed a decision model
for trust-informed interactions that, on input of trust assessments, estimates the prob-
ability of potential risks associated with an action, based on which it decides whether
to carry out the action. Our framework combines trust assessments in a way that such
model is easily integrable.
3 Trust Definition, Trust Properties, and Reputation
We now define the concept of trust and highlight some of its properties. We will then
stress trust dependence on reputation. Let us first define trust with a commonly accepted
definition [8]: “ [Trust] (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjec-
tive probability with which an agent will perform a particular action, both before [we]
can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity of ever be able to monitor it)
and in a context in which it affects [our] own action”.
From this definition, three properties of trust emerge: subjectiveness, context-
dependence, and dynamism. The same behavior may lead to different trust levels in
different trusting entities, hence subjectiveness qualifies trust. As trust (e.g., in giving
good advices) in one context (e.g., academia) does not necessarily transfer to another
context (e.g., industry), we add context-dependence to the list of trust properties. Fi-
nally, the fact that trust increases after successful observations, while it decays over
time exemplifies its dynamism. As a result, trust evolution must embed the notion of
time.
Reputation relates to trust, as the following definition suggests [10]: “Reputation
[is the] perception that an agent creates through past actions about its intentions and
norms”. Actions build up reputation (the perception about intensions and norms). Di-
rect experiences and recommendations about one entity describe the entity’s past actions,
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which, thus, create the entity’s reputation (i.e., the perception about entity’s intentions
and norms).
Reputation is not to be confused with trust: the former only partly affects the latter.
Other factors affect trust, and they include disposition to rely more on personal experi-
ences rather than on recommendations, disposition to forget past experiences, risk, and
motivation.
4 Trust Management Framework
We now present our distributed trust management framework. We first provide a gen-
eral overview. We discuss authentication support. We then introduce the data structures
containing reputation information. After that, we describe the processes of trust evolu-
tion (i.e., updating the reputation data structures), trust formation (i.e., trustworthiness
assessment), and trust decision (i.e., contemplating whether to carry out an action based
on the trust formation process and on local policies).
4.1 General Description of the Framework
Here, we describe our framework’s main processes: trust formation and trust evolution.
In so doing, we resort to an abstract situation: a trustor px (trusting peer) interacts with
both a trustee py (trusted peer) and a recommender pr. We finally describe our trust
metric.
First, px forms its trust in py by: (i) assessing the part of trust, also called direct trust,
stemming from evaluations of its past direct experiences with py ; (ii) assessing the part
of trust, also called recommended trust, from others’ recommendations about py; (iii)
combining the previous assessments to obtain the overall trust. We keep separated direct
trust and recommended trust so that two types of collusion attacks can be detected, as
we will describe in this section. Note that when px assesses trust (as it does in the first
two steps), it just retrieves reputation data and process it.
Second, px evolves its trust in py upon obtaining new reputation information, which
consists of direct experience’s evaluations and recommendations. After a direct expe-
rience with py , px evaluates the corresponding outcome, and consequently evolves its
direct trust in py . After receiving a recommendation about py from pr, px assesses rec-
ommendation reliability, and it consequently evolves its recommended trust in py .
Finally, consider our trust metric. The random variables of direct trust, direct expe-
rience evaluation, recommendation and recommended trust are discrete: they can as-
sume any of the following n levels {l1, ..., ln}. For example, with four levels (n = 4),
we may have the following semantics for the different levels: l1 means ‘very untrust-
worthy’, l2 means ‘untrustworthy’, l3 means ‘trustworthy’ , and l4 means ‘very trust-
worthy’. Since the random variables describing direct trust, recommended trust, and
overall trust are discrete (i.e., they assume one of n discrete values {l1, . . . , ln}), our
framework has numerous advantages: (i) the random variable distributions emerge as
a consequence of updates and are not fixed a priori, as existing models impose; (ii) a
generic n-level metric is more fine-grained than a binary metric (for which an entity is
either completely trustworthy or completely untrustworthy), as existing models impose;
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(iii) discrete metrics are more computationally tractable than continuous metrics (e.g.,
they do not involve the computation of integrals).
Throughout this section, we will use the following notation. DTx,y is a random vari-
able expressing px’s direct trust in py ((DTx,y = lα) is the event ‘px deems py deserves
a level lα of direct trust’). DEx,y is a random variable expressing px’s evaluations of
direct experiences with py ((DEx,y = lβ) is the event ‘px evaluates the direct ex-
perience with py at a lβ satisfaction level’). RTx,y is a variable expressing px’s rec-
ommended trust in py ((RTx,y = lα) is the event ‘px deems py deserves level lα of
recommended trust’). Finally, SRr,x is a variable expressing the recommendations pr
sent px ((SRr,x = lβ) is the event ‘pr sent px a recommendation whose level is lβ’).
4.2 Authentication Support
We consider that peers using our framework authenticate themselves by means of once
in a lifetime anonymous pseudonyms.
To support anonymous authentication resistant to Sybil attacks, we propose the use
of distributed blind threshold signature. Consider the situation in which px has to au-
thenticate py. To protect py’s user anonymity, the piece of information used to authenti-
cate py has to be anonymous. Generally, such piece is a public key randomly generated
by py . However, to protect against Sybil attacks, py has to have the limitation of pos-
sessing one and only one valid public key. We enforce such a limitation with public key
certification that is both distributed (to match the distributed nature of our framework)
and blinded (to protect anonymity). We propose a detailed scheme in [14].
4.3 Reputation Data Structures
The peer px stores reputation evidences locally: px solely relies on its local data struc-
tures to produce subjective trust assessments, thus being suitable for pervasive com-
puting environments, in which peers frequently enter, leave, or simply disconnect from
network domains. px maintains reputation-related evidence in the following sets:
C = (c1, . . . , cq) is the set of contexts known to px.
P = (pa, . . . , pz) is the set of peers that px has interacted with.
Direct Trust Set (DTS) stores direct trust levels. It contains px’s direct trust levels in
other peers. For each context ck and peer py , an n-tuple d = (d1, · · · , dn) exists,
where dj is the probability that px has a lj direct trust level in py (i.e., p(DTx,y) =
lj). The relation DTS is defined as DTS ⊆ C×P×D, where D = {(d1, · · · , dn)}.
Direct Experience Set (DES) stores data from which px assesses one of its direct trust
prior beliefs. From it, px computes the probability p(DEx,y = lβ|DTx,y = lα) for
all β = 1, . . . , n and α = (1, . . . , n), as Subsection 4.5 will discuss. DES is
defined as DES ⊆ C × P × EC, where EC = {(EC1, . . . ,ECn)}. For each
context ck and peer py, n ordered sets of n−tuple exist: ECβ = (ec1β , . . . , ecnβ).
To see what a single member ecαβ means, consider px deciding whether to interact
with py. px has direct trust in py exclusively at level lα; it decides to interact; it
then evaluates the just completed direct experience with py at level lβ ; it records
such an experience by just increasing one of the member in EC: as it acted upon a
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lα direct trust level and then experienced a level lβ , px increases the counter ecαβ .
Therefore, after each interaction with py , px does not store the interaction outcome,
but it simply increases one of the counter associated with py . For example, if n = 4,
px aggregates into 16 counters all the direct experiences with py.
Recommended Trust Set (RTS) stores recommended trust levels. This contains trust
levels solely based on other peers’ recommendations. For each context ck and peer
py , an n-tuple r = (r1, · · · , rn) exists, where rj is the probability that px has
lj recommended trust in py (i.e., p(RTx,y = lj)). RTS ⊆ C × P × R, where
R = {(r1, · · · , rn)}.
Sent Recommendation Set (SRS) stores data from which px assesses one of its rec-
ommended trust prior beliefs. From it, px computes the probability p(SRr,x =
lβ |RTx,y = lα), as subsection 4.5 on trust evolution will discuss. SRS ⊆ C ×P ×
RC , where RC = {(RC1, . . . , RCn)}. For each context ck and recommender peer
pr, n ordered sets of n−tuple exist: RCβ = (rc1β , . . . , rcnβ). To clarify the mean-
ing of a single member rcαβ , consider that px has built up a recommended trust in
py at level lα from all the recommendations received. It then receives an additional
recommendation about py from pr, which recommends a trust level lβ . px records
how far pr’s recommendation is from other peers’ recommendations by increasing
one member in RC: as it had a lα recommended trust level and received a lβ recom-
mendation level, px increases rcαβ . Thus, after receiving a recommendation from
pr, px does not store it, but increases one of the n counters corresponding to pr.
The data structure design minimizes the overhead imposed on px, thus leading to a
lightweight framework. All of these data structures increase linearly with the number
of peers with which px has interacted with or with the number of contexts px has expe-
rienced. We thus do not require large amounts of data to be processed as we aggregate
reputation-related information each time px either carries out a new direct experience
or processes a new recommendation.
Data Structure Bootstrapping. If peer px meets py for the first time, px’s beliefs
about py distributes uniformly. That is, for the peer py and the context ck, px has: D =
( 1n , . . . ,
1
n ); R = (
1
n , . . . ,
1
n ); ecαβ = Δd, for α ∈ [1, n] and β ∈ [1, n]; and rcαβ =
Δr, for α ∈ [1, n] and β ∈ [1, n]. In other words, to express maximum uncertainty in
the initialization phase, px’s prior beliefs equal a uniform distribution. The counter of
direct experiences (recommendations) equals a constant Δd (Δr). The choice for the
constant should consider that the greater its value is, the more the bootstrapping phase
persist over time.
4.4 Trust Formation
Whenever the trustor px contemplates whether to interact with a trustee, it has to assess
the trustee’s trustworthiness, i.e., it has to carry out the process of trust formation. As
our model considers three types of trust, px carries trust formation out in three steps: (i)
direct trust formation; (ii) recommended trust formation; (iii) overall trust formation.
Direct Trust Formation. To determine its direct trust in py in the context ck, px ob-
tains the relation (ck, py, d) from DTS. The jth member of d = (d1, . . . , dn) is
the probability that px has a lj direct trust level in py: p(DTx,y = lj) = dj .
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The tuple d describes the distribution of px’s direct trust in py in context ck. For
example, assuming both n = 4 and the semantics in subsection 4.1 on trust metric,
a tuple d = (0.8, 0.2, 0, 0) suggests that px deems py ‘very untrustworthy’, whereas
with a tuple d = (0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.6), px places more trust in py .
As a trustor can only have a partial knowledge about a trustee, trustor’s assess-
ments contain a level of uncertainty and have, consequently, a confidence level. In
particular, the confidence level that px places in its direct trust assessment equals d’s
variance: dtcx,y =
n
j=1(dj−μ)2
n−1 , where the mean μ =
n
j=1 dj
n . As
∑n
j=1 dj = 1
(i.e., the probabilities sum up to 1), then μ = 1n . The confidence level ranges from
0 to (1 − 1n ). Note that we compute the confidence level (the variance) dividing by
(n − 1) (and not by n) because the variance we are estimating is of an unknown
distribution (and not of a known one) - in general, dividing by (n − 1) provides an
unbiased estimation of the variance of an unknown distribution.
As d’s variance decreases, direct trust levels tend to become equally probable, and
px hence places less and less confidence in its direct trust assessment. For example,
assuming n = 4, the uncertainty of d = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) is maximum, its
variance zero, and, thus, the associated confidence level has to be minimum.
Recommended Trust Formation. To determine its recommended trust in py in con-
text ck, px first obtains the relation (ck, py, r) from RTS. The jth member of
r = (r1, . . . , rn) represents the probability px has a lj recommended trust level
in py: p(RTx,y = lj) = dj .
For instance, assuming both n = 4 and the semantics in subsection 4.1 on trust
metric, r = (0, 0, 0, 1) suggests that the recommenders (that px considered so far)
deem py totally trustworthy.
Similarly to direct trust, px associates a confidence level with its recommended
trust: rtcx,y =
n
j=1(rj−μ)2
n−1 , where the mean μ =
1
n and the confidence level
ranges from 0 to (1 − 1n ).
Overall Trust Formation. The overall trust combines direct trust and recommended
trust. For example, the probability px totals its overall trust in py at a level lj is
the weighted sum of the probabilities that px values both its direct trust and recom-
mended trust in py at a level lj .
Hence, to determine its overall trust in py in context ck, px obtains both the
relation (ck, py, d) from DTS and the relation (ck, py, r) from RTS, where d =
(d1, . . . , dn) and r = (r1, . . . , rn). It then computes ∀j ∈ [1, n] : p(Tx,y = lj) =
σ · dj + (1 − σ) · rj , where the weighting factor σ holds the importance px places
on direct experiences over others’ recommendations. This increases as two factors
increase: (i) the confidence level dtcx,y over rtcx,y; (ii) px’s subjective reliance on
its own personal experiences rather than on on others’ recommendations.
Similarly to direct and recommended trust, the confidence level px associates
with its overall trust is: tclx,y =
n
j=1(p(Tx,y=lj)−μ)2
n−1 , where μ =
1
n and the confi-
dence level ranges from 0 to (1 − 1n ).
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4.5 Trust Evolution
The process of trust evolution updates both direct trust and recommended trust. In so
doing, it incorporates social aspects of trust. Recommended trust evolves based on both
good and bad recommendations that are weighted according to recommenders’ trust-
worthiness and recommenders’ subjective opinion - to account for honest and dishonest
recommenders and to resolve the different ontological views of the world honestly held
by different peers. Both direct and recommended trust evolutions: (i) incorporate the
time dimension both to prevent peers from capitalizing excessively on good past be-
havior and to discard old reputation from data structures; (ii) and are based on Bayes’
theorem which has “far-reaching ... implications about scientific inference and how
people process information” [2].
Trust Evolution Through Direct Experience Evaluation. Consider px contemplat-
ing whether to have a direct experience with py in context ck. Before the direct
experience, px has the following prior beliefs (probabilities):
1. px has a direct trust belief in py . For context ck and peer py , px finds the
relation (ck, py, d) from DTS, where d = (d1, . . . , dn) expresses px’s direct
trust belief distribution;
2. px has a belief that a direct experience will show a certain level of satisfaction.
More formally, for context ck and peer py, px finds the relation (ck, py,EC)
from DES, where EC = (EC1, . . . ,ECn).
From ECβ =(ec1β, . . . , ecαβ, . . . , ecnβ), px computes, for all β=1, . . . , n,
the probability which the first row of figure 1 shows.
After interacting, px evaluates the direct experience with a, say, lβ satisfaction level.
Based on that:
1. px updates its Direct Experience Set (DES). It updates ECβ (i.e., the experi-
ence counter of a lβ direct experience level) as follows: ∀α ∈ [1, n] : ecαβ =
ecαβ + dα;
2. px evolves its direct trust according to Bayes’ Theorem as the second row of
figure 1 shows.
p(DEx,y = lβ|DTx,y = lα)= #events DEx,y = lβ given DTx,y = lα took place#events DTx,y = lα =
ecαβ
n
γ=1 ecαγ
dtα =
d
(t−1)
α · p(DEx,y = lβ|DTx,y = lα)
n
γ=1 d
(t−1)
γ · p(DEx,y = lβ|DTx,y = lγ)
p(SRr,x= lβ|RTx,y = lα)= #events SRr,x = lβ given RTx,y = lα took place#events RTx,y = lα =
rcαβ
n
γ=1 rcαγ
rtα =
r
(t−1)
α · p(SRr,x = lβ|RTx,y = lα)
n
γ=1 r
(t−1)
γ · p(SRr,x = lβ|RTx,y = lγ)
Fig. 1. Formulae that evolve prior and posterior beliefs about both direct trust and recommended
trust
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Trust Evolution Through Recommendation Evaluation. Consider now that px gets
a recommendation from pr about a peer py in context ck and that the recommen-
dation level is lβ . Before receiving the recommendation, px has the following prior
beliefs (probabilities):
1. px has a recommended trust belief in py . For context ck and peer py, px finds
the relation (ck, py, r) from RTS, where r = (r1, . . . , rn) and expresses px’s
recommended trust belief distribution;
2. px has beliefs that pr will send certain recommendation levels. More formally,
for context ck and recommender peer pr, px finds the relation (c, pr, RC) from
SRS, where RC = (RC1, . . . , RCn).
From RCβ = (rc1β , . . . , rcαβ , . . . , rcnβ), px computes, for all β = (1, . . . ,
n), the probability which the third row of figure 1 shows.
After receiving a recommendation whose level is lβ :
1. px updates its Sent Recommendation Set (SRS). It updates RCβ (i.e., the rec-
ommendation counter associated with a recommendation level equal to lβ) as
follows: ∀α ∈ [1, n] : rcαβ = rcαβ + rα;
2. px evolves its recommended trust according to Bayes’ Theorem as the forth
row of figure 1 shows.
In the forth row, the portion p(SRr,x = lβ |RTx,y = lγ) weights pr’s recommenda-
tions according to either pr’s reliability as recommender or pr’s ontological view.
Trust Evolution Over Time. As time goes by, direct trust’ and recommended trust’
confidence levels decrease.
Let us first see how direct trust evolves over time. As we said, the tuple d =
(d1, . . . , dn) shows px’s direct trust in py . Let t be the time elapsed from the last
d’s update. If t → ∞ (i.e., a very long time goes by before a new update), d
converges to a uniform distribution (i.e., to its bootstrapping values). To age its
direct trust values, px decreases some of d’s members while it increases others over
time, so that all members sum to 1. In particular, it increases the members below
1
n (d’s mean when uniformly distributed), whilst increasing the members above.
More formally, let I be the indicator function, nd = I(dα > μ) be the number
of members px decreases, and ni = I(dα < μ) be the number of members px
increases. If dα < μ, dα = (dα + δ). If dα > μ, dα = dα − (nd·δni ).
Same considerations apply for recommended trust. The tuple r = (r1, . . . , rn)
represents px’s recommended trust in py . To age its information, px increases some
of r’s members (those below 1n ), while decreasing others (those above 1n ).
If some tuples, as a consequence of evolution over time, converge to the boot-
strapping value, then we delete them. This saves storage space without any reputa-
tion information loss.
Trust Evolution and Attack Detection. We here expose how our framework protects
against two types of collusion in certain cases, whilst enhancing their detection in
the rest of the cases.
Let us first describe the two types of collusion. The first is the bad mouthing
collusion attack. A collection of attackers colludes in that each of them spreads
negative recommendations about the same benevolent entity. After evaluating those
unanimous recommendations, recipients build a negative trust in the benevolent en-
tity. Hence, the attackers lower the benevolent entity’s reputation without harming
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their own. For example, some peers decide to team up against peer py: they start
spreading negative recommendations about py (e.g., py is a bad packet forwarder)
so to damage its reputation. The second type of attack is the ballot stuffing collu-
sion attack. Here we have a collection of colluding attackers: some offer services
and others increase the remaining attackers’ reputations as recommenders. The last
subset of attackers (the good recommenders) send positive recommendations about
those in the subset of service providers. Based on the positive opinions, a victim
selects the providers. They then offer a low quality of service. The victim lowers its
trust level in the abusing service providers only, whereas it still deems trustworthy
the remaining attackers. To clarify, consider a peer py boosting its own reputation
by means of colluding with three other peers pc1, pc2, and pc3. pc1 sends positive
recommendations about pc2’s and pc3’s trustworthiness as recommenders. pc2 and
pc3 then send positive recommendations about py . Based on those, the victim (px)
chooses as packet forwarder py , which drops all the packets.
The rule for re-evaluating trust assessments based on recommendations protects
against both collusion types. To clarify, let us see how px evolves its recommended
trust in py from a set of recommendations. px uses a Bayesian evolution rule
that weights similar recommendations more, whilst filtering out extreme ones. If
the number of false recommendations (i.e., those received from any of the collu-
sions above) are less than honest recommendations, then the evolution rule protects
against those collusion attacks.
However, if px receives recommendations mainly from colluding sources, the
evolution rule is no more collusion-resistant.
In such cases, separating direct trust from recommended trust helps detecting
both collusion attacks. In the presence of either collusion, px’s direct trust in py
significantly differs from its recommended trust in py. In particular, direct trust de-
picts a more trustworthy py than does recommended trust in case of bad-mouthing
(py offers good direct experiences and is just subject to bad mouthing), whereas
the reverse is true in case of ballot stuffing (py offers bad experiences, even though
colluding recommenders assures px to the contrary).
4.6 Trust Decision
To take better-informed decisions, a peer has to be able to integrate a well-founded
decision module with its distributed trust framework. The trust framework produces
trust assessments. px then uses such assessments to decide the best action to be carried
out (e.g., to decide whether to forward a packet). We thus integrate our framework with
a decision module that Quercia and Hailes recently proposed [12]. Such a model, local
to a peer px, selects an action that maximizes px’s utility. User-specified local policies
influence px’s utility.
For integration purposes, any trust framework has to adapt its output to what the
decision module takes on input. Quercia and Hailes’s module takes on input a single
trust value and the value’s confidence. On the other hand, the trust framework produces
a single confidence value, but not a single trust value: it produces a distribution of trust
levels (represented with the random variable T ). We thus extract one single value from
the distribution by means of a weighted sum of the values of each trust levels. Weighting
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factors increase as the corresponding trust levels increase. The condensed trust value
tx,y (that px has in py) hence takes the form: tx,y = (
∑
j∈[1,n] p(Tx,y = lj) · jn ). For
example, with n = 4, the weighting factor for level l1 (very untrustworthy) is 14 , while
the factor for level l4 (very trustworthy) is 1.
5 Experiments
We here describe the experimental setup and the four experiments we have conducted.
Goal: The objective of this set of experiments is to determine the impact of our trust
management framework on successful packet delivery in a network configuration
where part of the peers act maliciously. Such a configuration refers to a scenario in
which a set of peers pool their resources so to share their Internet connectivity [13].
Benevolent peers share their connectivity, whereas malevolent ones exploit others’
connectivity without actually sharing their own.
Simulated Configuration: As we are interested in analyzing the local impact of our
framework at a peer level, we simulate a configuration consisting of a peer px and
a set of corresponding next-hops. These are connected directly to Internet. We con-
sider px forwarding packets to its next-hops, which make available their connectiv-
ity. px selects a next-hop either randomly or through two types of trust-informed
decisions (discussed later). The next-hop acts according to the behavioral model to
which it belongs.
Next-Hop Behavioral Models: A next-hop belongs to one of the following four be-
havioral models: fully malicious, malicious, benevolent, and fully benevolent. De-
pending on its behavioral model, a next-hop offers the following packet loss ratios
if it was selected for the whole simulation duration: 100% for a fully malicious
next-hop, 70% for a malicious one, 30% for a benevolent one, and 15% for a fully
benevolent one. Both fully malicious and malicious next-hops drop packets ran-
domly, whereas both benevolent and fully benevolent do it according to a Gilbert
model [3]. To understand why, consider that the next-hops are connected directly
to Internet. As a consequence, packet losses through (fully) benevolent next-hops
depend on Internet congestion, which is bursty. A Gilbert model reproduces such
burstiness. We have thus implemented the model whose parameters varied accord-
ing to packet loss ratios it simulated (either 30% or 15%).
Next-Hop Selection Methods: A peer px chooses its next-hops in three different
ways. The first is random selection, i.e., it selects each of its next-hops with equal
probability. The second is pure trust-informed selection, i.e., it selects the most
trustworthy next-hop. The third is probabilistic trust-informed selection, i.e., px
selects its next-hop py with a probability Py that is directly proportional to px’s
trust in py: Py = tx,y
j tx,j
, where j represents each of px’s next-hops. As we will
see, we introduce the latter selection method as a better load balancing alternative
to the pure trust-informed method.
Simulation Execution: A simulation consists of several executions of an experiment.
An experiment duration is of 100 time units. At each time unit, px selects one of
its next-hops and sends it a stream whose size is 10 packets. Based on the number
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of packet losses, px computes its satisfaction and consequently evolves its trust.
We collect the overall number of packet losses at each time unit. We run each
experiment 10 times and the results of all runs are averaged.
Experiment Metrics: We consider two metrics. The first is px’s average fraction of
successfully sent packets. The second is the load distribution among px’s next-hops.
We now describe four different experiments. For each, we describe goal, setup, and
results.
Experiment A.
Goal: To understand whether a more-fine grained trust metric gives a greater average
fraction of successfully sent packets.
Setup: We simulate px with four next-hops, one for each next-hop behavioral model.
px first uses a framework whose trust metric is binary (n = 2). It then uses a
more fine-grained metric, i.e., n = 4. The next-hop selection method is pure trust-
informed.
Results: Switching from the binary trust metric (n = 2) to one that is more fine-
grained (n = 4), px improves its average fraction of successfully sent packets from
67% to 83%. Figure 2 shows that the more fine-grained trust metric outperforms
the binomial one.
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Fig. 2. Experiment A. Fraction of successfully sent packets in the case of px using a framework
based on pure trust-informed selection with a binomial trust metric n = 2 (continuous line) and
with a more fine-grained one n = 4 (dashed line).
Experiment B.
Goal: To understand whether pure trust-informed selection gives a greater average
fraction of successfully sent packets than random selection.
Setup: We simulate a peer px with four next-hops, one for each next-hop behavioral
model. We first consider px using random next-hop selection. We then consider px
using pure trust-informed selection. For both cases, n = 4.
Results: When using pure trust-informed selection, px successfully sent 84% of the
packets on average, in contrast to 42% when using random selection.
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Experiment C.
Goal: To understand whether probabilistic trust-informed selection gives a better load
distribution than pure trust-informed selection, whilst showing a greater fraction of
successfully sent packets than random selection.
Setup: We simulate a peer px with five next-hops, one for each next-hop behavioral
model plus an additional benevolent next-hop. The additional next-hop may lead
to more interesting results for the discussion about load balancing. With a constant
n = 4, px applies in turn the three next-hop selection methods.
Results: From figure 3, we note that (i) pure trust-informed selection shows an unbal-
anced load share: the fully benevolent next-hop (fb) has a 96% of such a share; (ii)
probabilistic trust-informed selection shows a better load share, whilst penalizing
malicious next-hops: the fully malicious (fm) one has received 9% of the traffic in
contrast to 29% of a fully benevolent (fb). However, probabilistic selection leads
to an average fraction of successfully sent packets of 60%, that is worse than pure
trust-informed selection (83%), but better than random selection (47%).
Fig. 3. Experiment C. Load share among px’s next-hops, which include: one fully malicious (fm),
one malicious (m), two benevolents (b), and one fully benevolent (fb). px uses both pure trust-
informed (filled bars) and probabilistic trust-informed (empty bars) selections.
Experiment D.
Goal: To understand which factors have an effect on the average fraction of success-
fully sent packets. We consider two factors, each with two extreme levels. The first
factor is n whose levels are 2 and 4. The second factor is the next-hop selection
method px uses: its levels are probabilistic and pure trust-informed.
Setup: We simulate a peer px with four next-hops, one for each next-hop behavioral
model. We set n = 2. We first consider px using random selection. We then con-
sider px using pure trust-informed selection. We then set n = 4 and repeat what we
did before after setting n = 2.
Results: Figure 4 shows that the change of trust metric (from n=2 to n=4) has a positive
impact (16%) on the average fraction of successfully sent packets. It also confirms
the intuition that the use of the trust framework has the most significant impact
(68%).
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Fig. 4. Experiment D. The impact on the average fraction of successfully sent packets of: (i) the
change of trust metric (factor A); (ii) whether the trust framework is used (factor B); (iii) the
combination of both (factor AB).
6 Conclusion
We have presented a distributed framework that produces trust assessments based on di-
rect experience evaluations and on (both good and bad) recommendations. All of this is
based on a Bayesian formalization, whose generic n-level trust metric improves on ex-
isting Bayesian solutions (which use binary metrics). The framework is lightweight and
integrates a well-founded decision module. Furthermore, it supports user anonymity by
means of pseudonyms, whilst being robust to “Sybil attacks”. It also enhances detection
of two types of collusion attacks. Finally, we have conducted four experiments which
shows that the use of our framework and a more fine-grained trust metric have a con-
siderable positive impact on packet delivery in a network where part of the peers act
maliciously.
As part of future work, we plan to design mechanisms for trust bootstrapping (i.e.,
how to set the initial trust in an unknown entity).
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Abstract. Mobile devices may share resources even in the presence of untrust-
worthy devices. To do so, each device may use a computational model that on
input of reputation information produces trust assessments. Based on such assess-
ments, the device then decides with whom to share: it will likely end up sharing
only with the most trustworthy devices, thus isolating the untrustworthy ones.
All of this is, however, theoretical in the absence of a general and distributed
authentication mechanism. Currently, distributed trust frameworks do not offer
an authentication mechanism that supports user privacy, whilst being resistant to
“Sybil attacks”. To fill the gap, we first analyze the general attack space that re-
lates to anonymous authentication as it applies to distributed trust models. We
then put forward a scheme that is based on blinded threshold signature: collec-
tions of devices certify pseudonyms without seeing them and without relying on
a central authority. We finally discuss how the scheme tackles the authentication
attacks.
1 Introduction
To produce reliable assessments, distributed trust frameworks must be able uniquely
to authenticate their users. To see why, consider the following example. Samantha’s
and Cathy’s devices exchange recommendations about shops in their local area. After
the exchange, as they know (have authenticated) each other, Samantha’s device values
Cathy’s recommendations based on Cathy’s reputation as recommender (i.e., whether
her past recommendations have been useful), and vice versa. If it was able to easily gen-
erate a new pseudonym, Cathy’s device could produce fake recommendations without
being traceable. In general, to trace past misbehavior, users should not be able easily to
change their pseudonyms - ideally, each user should have one and only one pseudonym.
On the other hand, to protect their privacy, users should anonymously authenticate
each other, i.e., authenticate without revealing real identities. For example, Samantha
may wish to buy kinky boots. She thus uses her mobile device to collect the most use-
ful recommendations from the most trustworthy sources. The recommendation sharing
service requires devices to use trust models that, in turn, require users to authenticate.
Thus, Samantha’s device has to authenticate in order to ask for recommendations; as
the subject (kinky boots) is sensitive, the device authenticates itself without revealing
Samantha’s identity (anonymously).
Existing research in distributed reputation-based trust models does not offer any gen-
eral solution for unique and anonymous authentication without relying on a central
authority. Some distributed trust models [1] allow the use of anonymous pseudonyms
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that, however, suffer from “Sybil attacks” [7]. Others tackle such attacks, but mostly
with either centralized solutions [15] or approaches that only apply to limited scenar-
ios [11] [12] [13] [17].
Our contribution lies in: firstly, systematically analyzing the general attack space
that relates to anonymous authentication as it applies to distributed trust models; sec-
ondly, proposing a scheme that is decentralized, yet general enough to be applied to
most of the existing trust models. More specifically, the scheme meets appropriate se-
curity requirements and supports desirable features. Security requirements include: (i)
anonymity to prevent privacy breaches; (ii) non-repudiation to prevent false accusa-
tion; (iii) unique identification to avoid attacks caused by disposable pseudonyms; (iv)
pseudonym revocation to cope with stolen pseudonyms. Desirable features include: (i)
general applicability, in that our scheme is general-purpose so that any reputation-based
system benefits from it; (ii) off-line authentication between two users without relying
on anyone else; (iii) distributed pseudonym issuing, in that valid pseudonyms are issued
without relying on a central authority.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related work.
Section 3 introduces a scenario that we will use to exemplify our model. Section 4 de-
scribes the attacks that relate to anonymous authentication. Starting from both those
attacks and the general problem space, section 5 draws security requirements and de-
sirable features for a protection scheme. Section 6 details our proposition and section 7
critically analyzes how it meets the security requirements and supports the desirable
features. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Work
Over the course of nearly five years, cooperation and authentication have begun to di-
verge: authentication has relied on central authorities, while cooperation has migrated
to decentralized solutions. Only recently, authentication for cooperative mechanisms
started to be decentralized.
Disposable pseudonyms facilitate anonymity, yet hinder cooperation in the absence
of a central authority. To see why, consider a collection of actors cooperating. If each
actor authenticates himself with an anonymous pseudonym, then he does not have to
disclose his real identity and, thus, he can remain anonymous. However, an actor may
profit from ease of creating pseudonyms. For example, an actor may authenticate him-
self with a pseudonym, misbehave, create a new pseudonym, authenticate himself with
the new pseudonym (pretending to be new actor), and misbehave again. As a result,
the actor misbehaves without being traceable. Resnick and Friedman [15] formally laid
down such a problem, presenting a game theoretical model for analyzing the social cost
of allowing actors to freely change identities. They concluded that, if actors generate
pseudonyms by themselves, all unknown actors should be regarded as malicious. To
avoid mistreating all unknown actors, they proposed the use of free but unreplaceable
(once in a lifetime) pseudonyms, which a central authority certifies through blind sig-
nature. A couple of years later, Doucer put similar ideas to test in P2P networks. He
discussed the attacks resulting from P2P users who could use multiple identities and
named them “Sybil attacks” [7]. He concluded with a critical take on decentralized au-
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thentication support: in the absence of a trusted central identification authority, Sybil
attacks undermine trust relationships and, thus, cooperation.
At the same time as centralized solutions were used to support authentication, dis-
tributed trust models were aiming at promoting cooperation in the absence of a central
authority, whilst supporting users’ anonymity. For example, EigenTrust [9] is a dis-
tributed trust model that suffers from “Sybil attacks” in the absence of a central entity.
It uses reputation to decrease the number of downloads of inauthentic files in a P2P file
sharing network. In such a network, pseudonyms are used to authenticate peers, thus
enabling both peer anonymity and, at the same time, Sybil attacks. EigenTrust partly
tackles such attacks, but assumes the presence of a central entity: to get a new identity,
a user must perform an entry test (e.g., must read a text off a JPEG) and must send the
result to a central authority. As such, it will be costly for a simple adversary to create
thousands of users.
Recently, doubts about central authentication solutions for decentralized trust mod-
els have surfaced. The SECURE [5] project marks the introduction of a decentralized
trust management model with a fully decentralized anonymity support. Within that
project, Nielsen et al. [6] presented a formal decentralized trust model, and Seigneur and
Jensen [16] proposed the use of context-dependent pseudonyms: a user can have more
than one pseudonym depending on his/her context of interaction. However, their ap-
proach suffers from “Sybil attacks”. They thus recently enhanced the original trust
model so that trust updates internalize the costs of Sybil attacks [17]. However, such a
solution applies only to a specific representation of trust values (as counts of outcomes).
More recently, Bussard et al. [4] proposed a general distributed privacy-enhancing
scheme for trust establishment. However, their work focuses on making users’ recom-
mendations anonymous and untraceable.
We propose a general-purpose scheme based on threshold blind signatures. A user is
free to choose his own pseudonym depending on the context he interacts in, although he
has only one pseudonym per context. Pseudonyms are certified in a distributed fashion
through threshold signatures, thus tackling “Sybil attacks”. Furthermore, during the
certification process, the threshold signature is blinded to ensure anonymity.
3 Scenario of Mobile Recommenders
Here, we introduce an application scenario that we will use throughout the paper to
illustrate our scheme.
The scenario features electronic communities of mobile recommenders. A group of
people found a community around the shops in Oxford Street: their breakthrough idea
consists of customers sharing their shopping experiences through their mobile devices.
The initial community starts to grow and lead to the creation of several communities
around different shop types such as “bookshops”, “beauty shops”, and “music shops”.
Recommendation sharing is automatic and distributed, that is, customers store ex-
periences on their mobile devices that they will then automatically share in the form of
recommendations, without relying on a central server.
As an incentive for contributions, recommenders remain anonymous so that both
their shopping behavior is not associated with their identities and they do not fear retal-
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iation from poorly-rated shops. As such, a unique and anonymous pseudonym authen-
ticates each recommender.
To distinguish good recommendations from bad ones, each mobile device uses a trust
model: it weights contributions from highly trusted recommenders more than those from
untrustworthy recommenders. Most of the distributed trust models (e.g., [1], [10], and
[14]) may be used for that. They generally evaluate a recommendation depending on
the quality of its originator’s past recommendations. Such quality varies: for example, it
may be low because the recommender misbehaves (i.e., sends false recommendations).
All of this recommendation sharing service aims to improve and speed up shopping
experience: based on the recommendations that their devices have collected, customers
may better short-list the most useful shops for their current needs.
4 Attacker Model
In order to devise a robust protocol scheme, we must identify possible attacks first. In
this section we focus on the possible attacks from which we wish to protect ourselves.
Privacy breaching: A user (attacker) knows the identity of a victim and keeps track of
all her interactions. As such, the attacker infers the victim’s habits (privacy breach-
ing). For example, the server at a corner shop may log recommendation exchanges
among people happening to be in a certain area. Based on these logs, the server
may profile people’s habits (and, eventually, spending behavior).
False accusation: A user unjustly accuses another user of misbehaving. In our sce-
nario, Cathy’s device requests a recommendation Samantha’s. The latter device
sends the recommendation. The protocol for exchanging recommendations now
requires that Cathy’s device pays a fee. However, Cathy’s device unjustly denies
having either requested or received the recommendation.
Sybil-like attacks: A user can manage a set of pseudonyms and, thus, can carry out
masquerading attacks (i.e., he masquerades as different entities through its
pseudonyms). We categorize such attacks based on whether the attacked target is a
single entity or a group of entities:
1. Attacks against a single entity. We can identify the following cases:
Self collusion for ballot stuffing: Here we have a collection of colluding
pseudonyms that the same attacker owns. These pseudonyms can be
grouped into three categories: pseudonyms used to offer services;
pseudonyms used to increase the remaining pseudonyms’ reputations as
recommenders; pseudonyms used to send positive recommendations about
those in the subset of service providers. The attack unfolds as follows.
A victim selects service providers based on faked positive opinions. The
service providers then offer a low quality of service. The victim lowers its
trust level in the abusing service providers. The attacker, which has orches-
trated all of this, will never again use the service providers’ pseudonyms
because it can create other pseudonyms at will. As a consequence, the vic-
tim has been deceived and the attacker has profited without repercussions.
Transposing this situation into our scenario, it may happen that Cathy’s
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device (the victim) gets and pays for fake opinions coming from Saman-
tha’s. Consider that Samantha’s device manages three pseudonyms:S1, S2,
and S3. S1 says to Cathy’s device: “S2 is good at suggesting good recom-
menders”. Cathy’s device queries S2’s, which says: “S3 is good at sharing
opinions about shops”. Cathy’s device then pays S3’s for its opinions. S3’s
device shares fake opinions while gaining money. At that point, Samanan-
tha will never again use her pseudonym S3; she will instead replace it with
a newly created pseudonym, S4.
Self collusion for bad mouthing: A collection of pseudonyms corresponding
to the same attacker colludes in that each of them spreads negative recom-
mendations about the same benevolent user. After evaluating those unan-
imous recommendations, recipients build negative trust in the benevolent
user. Hence, the attacker lowers the benevolent user’s reputation without
harming his own. For example, Samantha does not like Cathy and, thus,
her device bad mouths Cathy under the pseudonyms S1, S2, and S3. Upon
receiving such opinions, other devices wrongly deduce that four other dif-
ferent devices (persons) dislike Cathy.
2. Attacks against a group of entities. We can identify the following cases:
Insider attack: The attacker chooses one pseudonym under which he joins the
target group. It then externally misbehaves towards users of other groups.
They consequently lower the trust in the target group. As such, the attacker
lowers the target group’s reputation at the price of lowering the reputation
of his pseudonym, which he will never use again. For example, some mem-
bers of the “bookshops” community and others from the “music shops”
community look for recommendations about good beauty shops. Being a
member of the “beauty shops” community, Samantha’s device (under the
pseudonym S1) provides them recommendations about those shops, but
fake ones. After experiencing the suggested beauty shops, the recommen-
dation recipients lower the reputation both of S1 and of the “beauty shops”
community (to a certain extent). Samantha’s device drops S1 and will thus
not suffer any repercussion in the future.
Outsider attack: Under one pseudonym, the attacker joins some groups other
than the target group. Within each joint group, it builds up a good reputa-
tion in being a reliable recommender and, once reaching the planned rep-
utation level, starts spreading negative recommendations about the target
group. As a consequence, the attacker lowers the target group’s reputa-
tion without harming its own. For instance, Samantha’s device joins both
“bookshops” and “music shops” communities under one pseudonym. It
builds up a good reputation as recommender and then starts to bad mouth
about the “beauty shops” community.
Stolen pseudonyms: A user (attacker) steals a victim’s pseudonym so as to be able
to use it in future interactions. For example, Samantha’s device steals Cathy’s
pseudonym. It then misbehaves under the new pseudonym. Cathy will unjustly suf-
fer from such a theft.
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5 Security Requirements and Desirable Features
In the previous section, we described some attacks. As we aim at designing a scheme
robust to those attacks, we now infer from them the security requirements that our
scheme should meet: anonymity (a pseudonym does not reveal any information about
the real identity of its owner thus preventing privacy breaching); non-repudiation (in
a reputation-based interaction, each user is prevented from denying previous commit-
ments or actions, thus avoiding false accusation); unique identification (a user possesses
a unique, valid identifier thus hindering attacks caused by disposable pseudonyms); and
revocation (once a pseudonym gets stolen, its owner should get a new one at the price
of revoking the old one).
Our scheme should also support the following desirable features: general applica-
bility (any type of distributed reputation systems benefits from the proposed scheme);
off-line authentication (users authenticate each other without needing to involve any-
one else); distributed issuing of pseudonyms (issuing of pseudonyms does not rely on a
central authority).
6 The 2-Protocol Scheme
The scheme consists of two protocols: an induction protocol and an authentication pro-
tocol. During a one-shot induction protocol, a user obtains his pseudonym (i.e., a public
key (anonymous) and corresponding signature). Each time two users wish to authenti-
cate each other, they run through an authentication protocol, i.e., they exchange their
pseudonyms and then verify their validity. After that, they will use the public key in each
other’s pseudonyms to encrypt their communication (thus avoiding main-in-the-middle
and false accusation attacks).
In this section, we describe these protocols. We first briefly introduce the blind
threshold primitives we will use. We then show the bootstrapping procedure. Finally,
we describe the protocols in details.
6.1 Blind Threshold Signature Algorithms and Protocols
The scheme borrows the protocols and algorithms below from the blind threshold sig-
nature literature (see [2] [8] [18]). Blind (t, n) threshold signatures allow n parties to
share the ability to blindly sign messages (i.e., sign messages without seeing them), so
that any t parties can generate signatures jointly, whereas it is infeasible for at most
(t − 1) parties to do so.
SETUP: A protocol that generates a public key KC and n secrets.
Blinding : An algorithm that on input of a message, a random blinding factor r, and
the public key KC , produces a blinded version of the message.
DISTRSIGN: A protocol used by any subset of t parties that on input of t secrets, t
randomizing factors, a blinded message and the public key KC , produces the blind
signature of the message.
Unblinding: An algorithm that on input of a blinded message and the random blinding
factor r, extracts the message (i.e., removes the blinding factor).
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Verify: An algorithm that on input of a message and corresponding signature, deter-
mines whether the signature is valid for the message.
PARTIAL: A protocol used by any subset of t parties that on input of t secrets produces
t partial secrets.
Secret: An algorithm that on input of t partial secrets determines one single secret.
REFRESHING: A protocol used by n′ parties that on input of n′ old secrets produces
n′ new secrets.
6.2 Community Bootstrapping
The authentication scheme is based on pseudonyms and on threshold signature. When it
is issued, each pseudonym needs to be certified, and when it is used, it has to be verified
(i.e., its certification needs to be checked). This is to ensure that each user has only one
pseudonym. Certifying a pseudonym means signing it: in a (t, n)-threshold scheme, the
private key used for signatures is built up from t secrets, each owned each by a different
party. Verifying a pseudonym means checking its signature; in a threshold scheme, there
is a shared and unique public key for such a purpose. Therefore, to certify and verify
a pseudonym, a collection of parties (community) needs jointly to create a common
public key and a secret for each party. This is done in what we call the community
bootstrapping phase.
To clarify, consider n community members (potential signers) and denote them by
the set (signer1, . . . , signern). Each ith member signeri chooses a random string
rsi. All members submit their strings to the SETUP protocol. This produces both the
community public key KUC as public output to all members, plus a secreti as private
output to each member.
6.3 The Induction Protocol
To avoid attacks caused by disposable pseudonyms, each community member must
have no more than one pseudonym. To achieve this, pseudonyms are issued only for
prospective community members (and not for already certified ones).
A prospective community member has to run through a 5-step induction protocol, af-
ter which he obtains his pseudonym (to anonymously authenticate himself) and his own
secret (to take part in future inductions). To tackle replay and interleaving attacks, each
of the following messages includes a timestamp and a signature, which the recipient
checks.
Step 1. The prospective member P broadcasts an induction request, that includes the
prospective member’s certificate CertP (i.e., the certified pair of his identity IDP
and public key KUP ). The recipients must know IDP to verify whether it corre-
sponds to an already certified member or to someone new. Furthermore, to ensure
that the request has been generated by a member with that identity, P signs the
request (SignatureKRP ) with his public key KUP . The use of public key certifi-
cates is limited to the induction protocol and does not require to contact any central
authority as the certification authority’s public key is available in the community.
P →: {CertP , T imestampP , SignatureKRP }
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Step 2. Each member who wishes to participate in the induction (denoted by signerj)
sends a positive response. The response contains the member’s public key KUj and
the threshold t because, to reply back, the prospective member has to know both
the public key of the responder and the current t (number of members needed to
proceed with an induction; note that t may change as the community size changes).
The response also contains a hash value of a randomizing factor h(rfj) and the
community public key KUC because, after selecting the responses, the prospective
member has to generate a public key and blind it, and to do so, it needs KUC and a
set of hash values of randomizing factors. The response is then encrypted with the
prospective member’s public key.
signerj → P : KUP{KUj, t, h(rfj),KUC , T imestampj, SignatureKRj}
Step 3. Once enough responses (at least t) have been collected, a quorum of t members
must have decided to admit the prospective member. At this point, the prospective
member chooses t responders and sends them a blinded pseudonym (a blinded
public key) and a list containing the chosen responders’ public keys and identi-
ties. From the list, all the selected responders will know each other’s identities and
will thus be able jointly to sign the blinded public key. Let us now focus on the
composition of the message for this step. Without loss of generality, we indicate
the t members with the set (signer1, . . . , signert). The prospective member ran-
domly creates a key pair (public key AKUP and private key AKRP ) and submits
that public key together with a random number r (blinding factor), the community
public key KUC , and the set (h(rf1), . . . , h(rfk)) to the Blinding algorithm. From
that, it obtains the blinded anonymous public key AKU ′P , encrypts it along with the
list with each responder’s public key, and sends the encrypted bits to the respective
responders. For j ∈ [1, t]:
P → signerj : KUj {AKU ′P , (KU1, ID1, . . . ,KUt, IDt), T imestampP ,
SignatureKRP }
Step 4. At the end of the induction, the prospective member has to obtain the signature
of its anonymous public key and a secret (to participate in future inductions). Thus,
in this second-last step, the t-group of members jointly computes and sends the sig-
nature of the anonymous public key and a set of partial secrets (from which a secret
can be computed). The group does so only if the requesting member has never re-
ceived a pseudonym before (i.e., if he is actually a new community member and not
an old one). More specifically, from the list of responders that the prospective mem-
ber sent, a group forms. From the initial prospective member’s request (step 1), the
just-formed group knows the prospective member’s identity. It thus checks with up
to (n − 2t + 1) community members (external to the group) whether they already
released a pseudonym for that identity. If not, the prospective member is entitled to
receive its pseudonym and additional information to generate a secret. The group
submits AKU ′P , their secrets (secret1, . . . , secrett) and their randomizing factors
(rf1, . . . , rft) to the distributed signing protocol DISTRSIGN. This produces the
blinded signature s′P of AKU ′P . As the anonymous public key is blinded, the group
signed without seeing it. Using the PARTIAL protocol, the group then computes a
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set of partial secrets (secretP1 , . . . , secretPt ) from which the prospective member
will be able to compute its own secret. Each group member (signerj) encrypts and
sends both s′P and secretPj to the prospective member. For j ∈ [1, t] :
signerj → P : KUP {s′P , secretPj , T imestampj, SignatureKRj}
Step 5. The prospective member first removes from s′P the random blinding string
r through the Unblinding algorithm (sP = Unblinding(s′P , r)). It then submits
the received partial secrets to the Secret algorithm that computes the single secret
secretP.
Now the member has its own valid pseudonym, which consists of its anonymous
public key (no one knows it) along with corresponding signature, and its secret so that
it can participate in future inductions.
6.4 The Authentication Protocol
To decide whether to interact, two community members have to authenticate each other
(running the authentication protocol) first, then retrieve reputation information associ-
ated with each other’s pseudonyms and finally evaluate whether each other’s reputations
are promising enough for embarking on an interaction.
During the authentication protocol, two members send their anonymous public keys
and associated signatures, verify whether the counterpart’s pseudonym is valid and, if
so, use the counterpart’s anonymous public key (part of the pseudonym) to retrieve
reputation information. To clarify, consider that Cathy’s device wishes to interact with
Samantha’s. It thus sends Samantha’s device its pseudonym (its anonymous public key
and corresponding signature), and so does Samantha’s device. They then check the
validity of each other’s pseudonyms through the Verify algorithm. More specifically,
Samantha’s device submits Cathy’s anonymous public key AKUCa, the corresponding
signature sCa, and the community public key KUC to the Verify algorithm. This returns
true if sCa is a valid signature for the anonymous public key (i.e., if a group of at least
t members generated it). Cathy’s device does the same.
If both verifications run positively, the members involved have each other’s valid
anonymous public keys and use them to encrypt their subsequent communication, thus
avoiding man-in-the-middle attacks and false accusation.
Periodically, a community needs to refresh its members’ secrets as some of them
may get compromised or the community size changes. To do so, n′ members team up
(n′ < n) and submit their secrets to the REFRESHING protocol, which generates n′
new secrets. Note that the community public key does not change.
7 Analysis of the Security Requirements and Desirable Features
Having presented our scheme, we now discuss how it meets the security requirements
and the desirable features previously pointed out.
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Anonymity: A user pseudonym includes an anonymous public key, i.e., a public key
that a group of users certified while knowing the corresponding user identity, but
without seeing the key itself. Thus, users are authenticated through their
pseudonyms, which do not link to real users’ identities.
Non-repudiation: After authenticating, two users encrypt their communication with
each other public keys, which are part of their corresponding pseudonyms. As
they encrypt the communication, the users cannot repudiate any of the message
exchanged.
Unique identification: As we use a (t, n) threshold scheme, we can only have one
pseudonym for each context, unless we collude with more than t devices. By prop-
erly setting t, we have increased the probability that this will not happen.
Revocation: A user can revoke its pseudonym, e.g., if it is stolen. For that, the user
should broadcast its anonymous public and private keys so that he can run the in-
duction protocol once again.
Off-line authentication: A user locally verifies the pseudonyms of his interacting par-
ties through a community public key. As he stores such key, he does not need to
contact anyone else for authentication purpose.
Distributed pseudonym issuing: We conceived pseudonym certification to be highly
available in that it does not rely on the availability of a unique identification author-
ity, but rather just needs that any t users team up.
General applicability: Most of the existing distributed trust frameworks perform the
same steps, i.e., they: authenticate the interacting party, retrieve reputation informa-
tion about that party, compute trust assessments from the reputation information,
make a decision whether to interact and eventually interact. Our scheme is gen-
eral as it applies to these steps. More precisely, it enhances the first and the last
steps: it ensures off-line, anonymous, unique authentication; and it then provides
non-repudiation support when interacting.
8 Conclusion
We have proposed a general and distributed authentication scheme (as opposed to ex-
isting solutions that rely either on a central entity or on a specific trust framework). The
scheme supports user anonymity, whilst being resistant to a wide range of attacks, in-
cluding “Sybil-like” ones. Most of the existing distributed trust frameworks could make
use of it to offer flexible (off-line) authentication without relying on a central service.
The scheme shows one relevant limitation though: that of weak identification. If a
new person joins (a new anonymous identity appears), and that is the only recent join-
ing, one can link the anonymous identity with the real one. As part of future work, we
will investigate whether introducing delays into the scheme will address the problem,
whilst not affecting usability.
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Abstract. “Trust is a fashionable but overloaded term with lots of intertwined 
meanings” [1] and it has therefore been argued that trust is bad for security. We 
have designed, developed and evaluated a rich, semantic, human-centric model 
of trust that can handle the myriad of terms and intertwined meanings that 
defining trust has. This model of trust can be personalised on a per user basis 
and specialised on per domain basis. In this paper we present this model with 
accompanying experimental evaluation to support it and introduce a mechanism 
for the generation of personalised models of trust. Furthermore, we describe 
how this model has been utilised through the combination of a policy and trust 
sharing mechanism to empower trust based access control. 
1   Introduction 
Trust is a difficult issue to define and contemplate as it is a human idea with a myriad 
of general meanings, uses, and associated issues such as risk and privacy. In defining 
trust many synonyms of trust or trust inspiring terms such as “Belief” [2], “Credibility 
or Reliability” [3], “Confidence or Faith” [4], “Reputation” [5], and “Competence and 
Honesty” [6] are often quoted. These definitions generally try to convey that trust has 
a quantitative value associated with it, that trust is multidirectional, and that trust can 
be made specific (e.g. to medical procedures). We believe that trust is not just a 
single, easily definable idea but it is a dynamic entity that is dependent on a point of 
view and relates multiple trust characteristics to determine an overall idea of trust. 
Therefore, for our purpose, trust is a combination of the above definitions, or trust 
concepts, encoded in a rich ontology and bound together with varying relationships, 
personalised on a per user basis. Ontologies are suited for our purpose as they 
endeavour to encode conceptual models, such as a user’s conceptual model of trust, in 
a format that is usable by software applications. This approach can be related, or 
specialised, towards multiple domains such as Web Services [7] or Instant Messaging 
(IM) [8].  
In calculating trust values much research [3], [9], [10] concentrates on calculations 
that render a simple single trust value; we too aim for simplicity to allow for easy 
comparison and decision making by applications. However, we arrive at this trust 
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value via a personalised model of trust combined with trust evidence and/or trust 
opinion collected on a collaborative basis. 
In this paper, section 2 explores related research work. Section 3 presents our model 
of trust and what it means to specialise that model. In section 4 we report an experiment 
that evaluated the model of trust in terms of its trust concepts, relationships, and 
requirement for personalisation. Section 5 introduces a mechanism to generate 
personalised models of trust and illustrates how trust calculations are rendered using it. 
In section 6 we describe an application that utilises the model of trust and supporting 
framework. Section 7 provides a summary and future work. 
2   Related Work 
The related work section is scoped into two broad areas; semantic representation of 
trust and systems that utilise trust. 
There are a limited number of ontologies that are already defined for trust, and 
reputation, a sub-element of trust. In [5] an extension is made to the Friend-Of-A-
Friend [11] ontology that allows for the assignment of a reputation value to a person. 
This extension to allow for the reputation value is similar to Golbeck’s earlier work 
[3] where the value assigned was for trust. Both [3] and [5] describe how 
trust/reputation relationships can be applied to a person for a specific subject area by 
such a degree. The levels of trust used by Golbeck are defined in [12] where the trust 
values are measured on a scale from one to ten, one being absolute distrust and ten 
being absolute trust. Golbeck’s ontology does not currently describe the myriad of 
properties, relationships, relationships and concepts that the domain of trust can 
provide. In our model of trust the final value uses a similar range format to Golbeck’s 
but the calculation used to arrive at the final value uses the semantic richness of the 
properties and relationships found in the model of trust. 
The TRELLIS [13] project enables users to express their trust in a source so that 
many individual trust values can be combined into an overall assessment of trust. It is 
presented as an information analysis tool that enables users to annotate how they 
analyse and use information when making some decision. In our research we also 
enable such expressions of trust through the use of a personalised model of trust and 
the ability to annotate a source with trust data. This annotation data can be shared on a 
collaborative basis in order to calculate what Marsh refers to as general trust in [14]. 
OpenPrivacy [15] allows a trustor to describe their trust in a trustee by use of a real 
value held within a certificate along with a confidence value for the trustor. Our 
research has the ability to weight specific sources of trust information to enable that 
source to have a greater say in the determination of a final trust value. 
The Advogato [9] project automatically calculates trust using group assertions. 
Interestingly, the Advogato metric for calculating trust is highly attack resistant. This 
allows the system to cut out portions of the network that are subsequently identified 
as ‘bad’ or disingenuous. Our research can calculate trust values using trust data 
collaboratively provided by a group of individuals and it is possible to block/remove 
untrustworthy collaborators. 
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SULTAN’s [10] logical approach enables the user to designate an action and trust 
condition to a trustee by a trustor. The policy approach in this research enables us to 
create such event, condition, action rules that can be used by a trustor to represent 
trust based conditions that a trustee must meet before an action can proceed. 
We enable users to share trust data without the need for a central or infrastructure 
based approach. This is done in a collaborative, peer to peer manner that is similar to 
PGP’s [16] Web of Trust approach. 
3   Semantic Model of Trust 
The semantic model of trust that we present aims to reflect the individual user’s ideas 
of trust. It can be used at runtime by applications to determine the trustworthiness of 
resources with which the user, or application acting on the user’s behalf, would like to 
interact with. The model can be specialised on a per domain basis, and personalised 
on a per user basis. Specialisation refers to the ability of a general upper ontology to 
be applied to domain specific models of trust, such as Web Services and Instant 
Messaging. This paper only explains specialisation and provides examples to illustrate 
the point. Please see [7], [17], and [18] for more information on specialisation. Personal-
isation refers to a flexible and dynamic model of trust with the ability to capture an 
individual’s ideas of trust and the relationships that may exist. We represent our 
model of trust as a rich semantic model that has the ability to provide this necessary 
functionality. To our knowledge there is as yet no other research published which 
relates to personalised and flexible models of trust. This paper focuses on personalisation 
in its illustration, evaluation, generation, and use. 
We have used the Web Ontology Language (OWL) [19] as the representation 
format for the model of trust as it provides extendibility, reusability, mapping, and 
semantics. An ontological approach provides an accurate reflection of the trust 
concepts and relationships in a sharable, reasonable, and understandable format. We 
believe that an ontological approach therefore provides the support needed to realise 
the model of trust. However, an ontological approach is only one format in which this 
model can be realised. 
We now present a detailed overview of the model of trust including how it is 
specialised and personalised. 
3.1   Model of Trust Overview 
Our model of trust mirrors the complex myriad of human notions of trust and its 
relationships. Our approach to modelling trust can be viewed as having four levels;  
(i) Meta-model, 
(ii) Upper ontology, 
(iii) Domain specific model, 
(iv) Personalised model of trust. 
(i) Different strength relationships exist between trust concepts as it is our 
hypothesis that people have different ideas as to how strongly one trust concept 
leverages another trust concept when determining trust. This is why we created 
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three different strength relationships to link concepts. As per figure 1 the 
relationships are derivedFrom, informedBy, and affectedBy. The strongest 
relationship is derivedFrom and implies a measured bond between concrete 
concepts only. The second strongest relationship is informedBy and it can be 
formed between any abstract and concrete concept.  The weakest relationship is 
affectedBy and it provides a less tangible relationship between abstract concepts. 
We created the relationships system in an effort to ensure that influences that the 
user assigns between various concepts are more accurately represented.  
 
Fig. 1. Meta-model 
(ii) The OWL based upper ontology, figure 2, is made up of trust concepts and trust 
relationships. The trust concepts are split into two groups; concrete (full line 
circles) and abstract (dot-dashed circles). It is a generic and reusable ontology 
that forms the basis for the generation of personalised models of trust and for the 
creation of generations of disparate domain specific models. In section 4 we 
present experimental evaluation to support it. 
 
Fig. 2. Upper Ontology 
(iii) In our initial work, [7], we created a domain specific model that described each 
trust concept in terms of domain specific classes and properties. As per figure 3, 
reliability is made up of the following classes; assurance, availability, 
performance, and msgDelivery. These are in turn made up of a set of properties. 
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For example, availability has a set of properties that includes downtime and 
meanTimeBetweenFailure. The selection criteria for these classes and attributes 
were based on a rapid prototyping of a specialised service and are by no means 
empirical. Each of the trust concepts is engineered in this way, which enables 
the set of eight trust concepts to be aligned with a personalised model of trust. 
More recently, we have developed a domain specific model that is applicable to 
modelling trust in the domain of Instant Messaging [8]. 
 
Fig. 3. Service Specific Model (Reliability Only) 
(iv) In figure 4, we provide an example of how all the concepts of trust can be 
related to create a personalised model of trust. Competency is chosen as the 
example to illustrate that a trust concept is comprised of other classes and 
properties. Different strength relationships exist between concepts as it is our 
belief that people have different ideas as to how strongly one trust concept 
leverages another trust concept when determining trust. The trust concepts are 
split into two groups; concrete (full line circles) and abstract (dot-dashed 
circles). The concrete trust concepts are credibility, reliability, reputation, 
competence, and honesty. The abstract trust concepts are belief, confidence and 
faith. For more information on the abstract and concrete separation see [17, 18].  
In essence, personalisation enables the generation of personalised models, based on 
the upper ontology, to suit the individual needs of the user. As per figure 4, 
personalisation can allow one user to assert that the concept reputation is influenced 
by honesty, or that belief is influenced by reliability, and so on. This can be repeated 
in order to build up a model of trust that suits the user’s requirement and to reflects 
their individual idea of trust. 
We used Stanford’s Protégé Ontology Editor [20] and OWL plug-in to create the 
upper ontology. Personalised models of trust are instances of the upper ontology. The 
ontology itself is encoded in OWL Description-Logic (OWL-DL), a sub-language of 
OWL. It provides the maximum expressiveness of OWL while also retaining 
computational completeness (all conclusions are guaranteed to be computed) and 
decidability (all computations will finish in finite time). 
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Fig. 4. Personalised Model of Trust 
An application utilises the personalised model of trust in conjunction with the 
domain specific models. For example, when the Web Services application developed 
in [7] attempts to recommend a trustworthy service the application requests the user’s 
personalised model of trust and the service specific domain model. The application 
will then use the personalised model with respect to the domain model. This is 
partially illustrated in figure 3, where we presented the reliability concept from 
figure 4 in terms of reliability’s service classes (i.e. availability) and properties (i.e. 
meanTimeBetweenFailure).  
Section 5 presents a mechanism for generating personalised models of trust and 
illustrates how calculations can render personalised trust values.  
4   Experiment Based Evaluation 
The goals for the evaluation were to (i) evaluate the upper ontology, (ii) evaluate the 
meta-model, (iii) evaluate the need for personalisation, and (iv) examine whether 
individual personalised models of trust alter as context changes, and if so how it 
changes over varying contexts. 
4.1   Hypotheses 
We had several hypotheses that directly related to each of the evaluation goals. From 
the first goal it was our hypothesis that the trust concepts found in the upper ontology 
were (a) useful to subjects and (b) that subsets of these concepts were either abstract 
or concrete. From goal two the hypothesis to be tested was that the model of trust had 
different strength relationships that linked, and interlinked, abstract and concrete 
concepts. From goal three and four we wanted to investigate our hypothesis that 
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personalisation is required when modelling trust, and that an individual’s model of 
trust alters as context (risk) changes. 
4.2   Experiment Overview 
We designed a questionnaire in association with Dr. Deirdre Bonini, Psychology 
Department, Trinity College Dublin. The questionnaire was comprised of three simple 
scenarios in which the subject was asked to rate a set of characteristics that related to 
trust. Each characteristic was rated on the basis of how useful the subject thought the 
concept was when determining a level of trust specific to each scenario. Scenario one 
presented a low risk scenario in which the subject was buying an item online for $10, 
scenario two was medium risk at $100, and scenario three was high risk at $1000. The 
only difference between each scenario was the level of risk involved. The subjects 
were informed that no credit card fraud was involved. For each scenario the subject 
was asked to complete three stages. Firstly, we asked the subject to scale each of the 
trust concepts in terms of usefulness from one to five on a Likert scale; one representing 
very low, two low, three no opinion, four high, and five very high. Secondly, we presented 
the full set of trust concepts and the subject was asked to rank the three concepts they 
considered most important in relation to determining how much the subject trusted the 
seller. Finally, the subject was asked to choose a trust concept that most influenced 
each of their chosen top three concepts. 
The subjects were offered the opportunity to take part in a competition to win 
tickets to a U2 concert in Dublin, Ireland. We advertised via email to a wide range of 
faculties within Trinity College Dublin, including Computer Science, Psychology, 
Dentistry, Zoology, and Arts at undergraduate, postgraduate, and staff levels. We also 
emailed Ericsson Research Group in Dublin, Ireland, and posted notes on forums such 
as trustcomp.org and U2.com. We received 279 fully completed questionnaires, 
which we analysed with the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). 
4.3   Results and Analysis 
When evaluating the upper ontology we found that, as per figure 5, 78.5% of the 
subjects viewed these trust concepts as no opinion, high, or very high in terms of 
usefulness in determining trust in the $10 scenario. However, when the risk increased 
to $100 this figure rose to almost 89%, and at $1000 the figure rose even further to 
91%. This is significant evidence to support the usefulness of the trust concepts of the 
upper ontology to the user, and illustrates how the model alters as risk changes. 
Furthermore, from the analysis of the data we found the following observations 
that are key to evaluating the meta-model.  
(i) The concepts with the lowest frequencies across all three ranking scores are 
faith (3.7%), confidence (7%), and belief (8.8%), 
(ii) The concepts with the highest amount of very low and low Likert scores 
across all three scenarios are belief (19%) and faith (16.5%), and 
(iii) The least influential concepts at every risk level are faith (3.8%), belief 
(7.2%), and confidence (7.9%). 
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Fig. 5.  Likert Scales for all Concepts for Scenario One and Scenario Two 
These observations regarding the rankings, Likert scores, and influence scores can be 
explained by the use of the terms ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’. We believe that the subjects 
do not see abstract concepts as well-defined and measured and they therefore attribute 
low scale scores, low ranking, and low influence to them. Conversely, concrete 
concepts, such as reputation, reliability, and credibility scored highest in rank, 
influence, and on the Likert scale. This supports our original meta-model hypothesis. 
The influence of abstract concepts (3.8%, 7.2%, and 7.9%) falls far below the random 
influence average (12.5%), whereas concrete concepts meet, or surpass, this average. 
This significant data result combined with the high Likert-scales received for the 
usefulness of concrete concepts leads us to conclude that concrete concepts have a 
greater impact on overall trust than abstract concepts. 
With regards evaluating personalisation we found that 55% of subjects altered their 
view of the usefulness of the trust concepts as the risk increased. The (i) differences in 
weight that an individual assigns to certain trust concepts, (ii) range of various model of 
trust that can exist, and (iii) statistical probability of a user altering their personalised 
model as risk increases supports the hypothesis that personalisation is required. 
An SPSS analysis of the data found a positive correlation, 0.318 at the 0.01 level of 
significance, between increasing risk and the increasing Likert values the subjects 
provided for the trust concepts. From this it can be said, with confidence, that the data 
suggests that as risk increases so too does the subjects reliance on the trust concepts 
rise. This is evident in figure 5, where (i) the trend for low Likert scores reduces as 
risk rises and (ii) where the peak scales shift from high to very high as risk increases. 
Further detail of the results and analysis from this experiment is the subject of another 
paper which is under preparation. 
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5   Personalised Model Generation 
To generate a personalised model of trust we designed and developed a user 
interaction process to garner sufficient information from the user in order to generate 
the personalised model of trust.  
5.1   User Interaction Process 
In the questionnaire we got a smaller subset of a user’s personalised model; only three 
trust concepts and not the core of eight concepts. However, we believe that extending 
the questionnaire’s methodology to generate a fully personalised model of trust would 
be quite time consuming, inefficient, and repetitive to the point that the user may not 
engage to affect the maximum benefit. 
Therefore, in this process the user is only presented with each trust concept and 
then asked to state whether or not any of the other trust concepts influence it. This is 
in line with our core hypothesis that trust is a rich set of trust concepts that relate to 
each other. Kleinberg’s ‘Hypertext Induced Topic Selection’ (HITS) [21] was chosen 
as the personalisation algorithm as the notions of ‘hub’ and ‘authority’ that it presents 
are applicable to our trust concepts. In our model of trust a concept can be viewed as 
an authority if it influences many other concepts, and a hub if it is influenced by other 
concepts. The system can apply the HITS algorithm to a users influence data to rank 
and weight the individual concepts in respect to each other.  
5.2   Personalised Model Example 
In figure 7 a user has provided what she believes the influences are between trust 
concepts. We have taken this data and used the HITS algorithm to calculate the 
weights (illustrated at the centre of each concept in figure 7). The algorithm assigns a 
weight to the outgoing relationships that each concept has. A concept that is an 
authority (see credibility) will have greater weight assigned to its relationships than  
 
 
Fig. 6. Personalised Model of trust with HITS Algorithm Calculated Weights 
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the relationship weights found in hub concepts (see honesty). We have implemented a 
process whereby each concept then receives its final weight value when the weights 
of the relationships that apply to it are summed. It is important to state that a user can 
state that no relationships exist between the various concepts. In this case the 
algorithm assigns equal final weight values to each concept. 
In figure 7, credibility is influential to many other concepts, whereas honesty is 
only influenced by many other concepts. It is for these reasons that the algorithm has 
issued credibility with a relatively high score and honesty a relatively low score. 
The user interaction process that generates the personalised models of trust is 
available via a web page, but it could also be integrated in an application or as part of 
an interview process. The final weights provide us with an introspective weighting 
between the models that enable us to rank all the concepts and scale them relative to 
each other. This personalised model can be used in conjunction with collaboratively 
received trust data in order to calculate trust values as shown in the next section. 
 
Fig. 7. Semantic Annotation GUI 
6   Application Utilisation 
We have applied the model of trust to two distinct domains; Web Services and Instant 
Messaging (IM). In the first instance [7] the model of trust was used in conjunction 
with trust data and provided the user with service recommendations based on trust. In 
our more recent work we have developed an IM application [8] that is trust enabled. 
The IM application has most of the basic functions of a commercial IM system such 
as Microsoft Corporation’s Instant Messenger; add and remove contacts and chat 
online. However, we have added the ability to annotate other users with opinion based 
trust data. The user is also empowered with the ability to create specific policies that 
allow the user to regulate access to location information that has been embedded in 
the IM application. The combination of personalised trust model, trust data, 
calculations, and policies provides a flexible form of trust based access control. 
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6.1   Semantic Annotation & Policy Specification 
Once a user has added another user to her list of contacts, also known as the ‘buddy 
list’, the user can provide trust data for that user. This is done via a graphical user 
interface as per figure 8. The user can set a desired default level that can be applied to 
every member of the buddy list when they are first added. The user can then alter this 
default set as necessary. In figure 8, austinkenny@hotmail.com has been annotated 
with trust information, which has been persistently stored.  
The policy specification GUI, as illustrated in figure 9, enables the user to create 
event, condition, action policy specification. The condition is a minimum overall trust 
requirement; very low, low, high, or very high. However, it is possible to add 
minimum trust requirements for specific trust concepts. In figure 9, the user has 
specified that she will allow access (the action) to her location information (the 
event), so long as the requesting user has a minimum overall trust value of very high 
(the condition). In addition, she has stated that the requestor must also have very high 
reputation and belief values. 
The policy GUI data is stored in a MySQL database, which is automatically 
converted to OWL instances within a policy specific OWL ontology. Therefore, the 
data is open, portable, and can be reasoned about with JENA [22] technology. 
   
Fig. 8. Policy Specification GUI 
 
Fig. 9. Example Trust Data 
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6.2   Calculating Trust 
By way of explanation we have created three users in an IM scenario; Karl, Dave, and 
Austin. As per figure 10 the ‘userSource’ (Karl) has integer data for each trust 
concept for the ‘userDestination’ (Dave and Austin). The integer data representation 
spans from 1 to 4 where 1 is very low, 2 is low, 3 is high, and is four is very high. In 
this instance the data is considered primary data as it originates from the user herself. 
It is possible for the users within the IM network to collaboratively share their trust 
data when queried; the resulting data is considered secondary data. 
Trust calculations are methodologies that are used in conjunction with the 
personalised model of trust (figure 7) and the trust data (figure 10) in order to render a 
final trust value. We designed the methodology described below but it is possible to 
substitute different methodologies to render final trust values.   
In the IM scenario we place the average weight of the top three concepts in to a 
‘gold band’, the average weight of the concepts ranked four to six into a ‘silver band’, 
and the average weight of the bottom two concepts into a ‘bronze band’. This renders 
a gold band value of ~13, a silver band value of ~8, and a bronze band value of ~5 for 
the concepts in figure 2. 
We now average the trust data for Dave based on the three bands. As per figure 2 
the gold band has credibility, reputation, and reliability each of which has a trust 
value of 4. Therefore, the average value, 4, is assigned to the gold band. We do the 
same for the concepts in the silver and bronze bands, which assigns 3.66 to the silver 
band and 4 to the bronze. 
As per figure 11 we can see that the gold band has significantly more weight in 
relation to the silver band, and in turn the silver band has significantly more weight 
that the bronze band. The band value in the highly weighted gold band will be used as 
the final, overall, trust value. Therefore, we can say that Dave is very highly trusted. 
In this example Dave meets the policies minimum overall trust requirement and also 
the concept specific policy requirements (reputation and belief are very high). 
Band 
Band 
Weight Band Value 
Gold 13 4 
Silver 8 3.66 
Bronze 5 4 
Fig. 10. Dave’s Band Weights and Values 
Band 
Band 
Weight Band Value 
Gold 13 3.3 
Silver 8 3.66 
Bronze 5 4 
Fig. 11. Austin’s Band Weights and Values 
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Austin’s values are shown in figure 12. The three bands have the same weight as 
the same personalised model is used. However, the band values now reflect the trust 
data associated with Austin. The gold band value for Austin is rounded to 3, or highly 
trusted. In this example Austin does not meet the policies minimum overall trust 
requirement. In addition Austin does not meet the concept specific requirements. 
It may be suggested that sharing trust data (therefore secondary data) is highly 
susceptible to subjective conditions. There may be a semantic difference between 
what people say and what other people think that they say. This difference has been 
handled in [7] by implementing the Abdul-Rahman-Hailes [23] algorithm. This 
algorithm has the effect of weighting secondary information with respect to the 
requestor’s previous encounters with the secondary data provider. 
7   Summary and Future Work 
In this paper we have presented our semantically rich, flexible model of trust and have 
provided evidence that has been gathered through experimentation, which supports 
our view that our model has the characteristics necessary to support the generation of 
personalised trust models. This experimental evaluation found that (i) the trust 
concepts were considered useful by people, (ii) captured the relationships between the 
concepts appropriately, and (iii) confirmed the need for personalisation of the trust 
model on a per user basis. In addition, through our initial application of the trust 
models in different domains, we have found that the ontological approach taken 
provides the support necessary to realise personalised and specialised models of trust.  
Furthermore, we introduced a mechanism for generating personalised models of 
trust based on Kleinber’s HITS algorithm and have shown how a calculation 
methodology can render final trust values that can be used to make trust comparisons 
and decisions. We plan to evaluate the HITS algorithm as a tool for generating 
personalised models of trust. The model of trust was integrated into an Instant 
Messaging application that enables users to annotate resources with trust data and to 
create policies that impose their will on the systems that they use.  
Our future research will concentrate on producing several evaluation experiments. 
We need to assess the true value of a personalised approach versus a non-personalised 
approach. This requires the HITS approach to generating personalised models of trust 
to be explicitly evaluated. It will also require the research and development of a wide 
range of calculation methodologies. These methodologies will be analysed in order to 
find the approaches that yield the best results for the user. The model and supporting 
framework was developed for sharing trust data with scalability in mind. However, 
we will need to critically analyse and evaluate its operation on larger scales. We 
believe that this future evaluation will reinforce our belief in personalised models of 
trust. 
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Abstract. The human component is a determining factor in the success of the 
security subsystem. While security policies dictate the set of permissible actions 
of a user, best practices dictate the efficient mode of execution for these actions. 
Unfortunately, this efficient mode of execution is not always the easiest to carry 
out. Users, unaware of the implications of their actions, seek to carry out the 
easier mode of execution rather than the efficient one, thereby introducing a 
certain level of uncertainty unacceptable in high assurance information systems. 
In this paper, we present a dynamic trust assignment model that evaluates the 
system’s trust on user actions over time. We first discuss the interpretation of 
trust in the context of the statement “the system trusts the users’ actions” as op-
posed to “the system trusts the user.” We then derive the intuition of our trust 
assignment framework from a game-theoretic model, where trust updates are 
performed through “compensatory transfer.” For each efficient action by a user, 
we assign a trust value equal to the “best claim for compensation”, defined as 
the maximum difference between the benefits of an alternate action and the se-
lected efficient action by the user. The users’ initial trust and recent actions are 
both taken into account and the user is appropriately rewarded or penalized 
through trust updates. The utility of such a model is two-fold: It helps the sys-
tem to identify and educate users who consistently avoid (or are unaware of) 
implementing the organization’s best practices and secondly, in the face of an 
action whose conformance to the organizational policies is contentious, it pro-
vides the system or a monitoring agent with a basis, viz. the trust level, to allow 
or disallow the action. Finally we demonstrate the application of this model in a 
Document Management System. 
Keywords: Compensatory Transfers, Document Management Systems, Trust 
Metrics. 
1   Introduction 
In recent times, it has been observed that human factor is a critical aspect to the suc-
cess of a security system in any architecture. Any system, with its requirements and 
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corresponding security schemes, is often besotted with its own set of unique problems 
that, more often than not, require and rely on human intervention. Right from the act 
of choosing strong passwords to the application of the latest security patches, the hu-
man in the security loop is often the determining component in the success of the se-
curity system. Security policies are a first step towards defining the set of permissible 
actions by the user in a given role. Among these permissible actions, there is an effi-
cient mode of execution and an easy mode, e.g., choosing a strong password that is 
difficult to remember vs. choosing a weak password that is easy to remember [14]. If 
the user adheres to the best practices stipulated by the organization, (and even adapts 
them depending on the situation), there is a higher probability of the system remain-
ing secure and resistant against most attacks. However, determining if the actions of 
the user are in conformance with the systems overall functioning is a difficult task, 
particularly since not all user actions over time are black-and-white as choosing a 
strong password vs. a weak one. Additionally, actions initiated by users can be evalu-
ated differently depending on the current security state at which the system resides. 
Since each system has its own problems, user actions are usually varied and as a re-
sult, it is not always possible for a monitoring mechanism to decide if the action taken 
by the user is in the interests of the system.  
In this work, we present a system independent trust model called the Compensa-
tory Trust Model (CTM) to dynamically evaluate the trust level of users based on 
their actions. This measure is representative of the systems trust in the users’ actions. 
This Trust Model can be applied to evaluate the trustworthiness of users and the effi-
ciency of their actions towards maintaining the security level of the system. The pa-
rameters can be assigned such that the trust level updates are as granular or as coarse 
as required by the system. This model evaluates the users’ actions continuously and 
provides the monitoring mechanism with a basis to allow or disallow an action, 
which, while permitted by the security policies in the system, is not clearly favorable 
or detrimental to the system. To illustrate our point, consider the scenario: A security 
patch has been released for protection against a virus that propagates on the Internet 
through port 4444. However, the system administrator for some system finds that in-
stallation of the patch cripples the core business engine necessary for the survival of 
the organization. Until the issue has been resolved with the vendors, the administrator 
decides to block all incoming connections on port 4444 through an external firewall 
and delays the application of the security patch. Such compound actions have a cause 
and effect relationship that is not immediately apparent to the monitoring engine. The 
question arises: Should the administrator be allowed to delay the installation of the 
patch? Should an alarm be raised so that another system administrator can audit this 
action? In such situations, we argue that the monitoring mechanism is at an advantage 
by making a decision based on the users trust level. On a parallel track, the trust 
model progressively lowers the trust level of the user so that periodic peer reviews 
can determine individual users’ adherence to the organizational best policies, and 
educate/reprimand them or even update the best practices. One such example in the 
real world is the delayed application of Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2 in 
some organizations due to VPN connectivity problems. These organizations applied 
the Service pack after Microsoft released an update [1] to address the issue. 
Traditionally, trust metrics [4],[10],[6] have been developed for systems where the 
delegation of certain rights on a system to an (un)known third-party is thought 
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necessary for proper functioning or in situations where certain actions need to be 
taken based on a unverifiable statement by a third party. These models have found 
great utility in architectures like Recommender Systems (RS) where the trust of a 
subject is evaluated based on past history [12]. Still other approaches to trust 
assignment involve public-key certification chains [5] with provisions for incorpora-
ting revocation status [9] in the trust metrics. The work by Kemal et al. [9] gives a 
good overview of Trust Metrics. Most of the systems where these trust assignment 
models are applied are distributed systems or virtual organizations [13], where some 
form of extranet can be said to exist. These models are not appropriate for situations 
(nor were they designed to be) where trust assignments are based on user actions and 
need to be dynamic. The work in this paper is significantly different from all these 
aforementioned works in that the primary utility of the trust model is to evaluate and 
judge the efficacy of the human factor in the security system. We derive the intuition 
for our framework from a game-theoretic model by Green [7] called “Compensatory 
Transfers.” The user in our scenario is authenticated and assumed to be under 
continuous monitoring.  
The important question from a research perspective is how we can improve the 
human factor in the security subsystem in a continuous and technically meaningful 
manner (as opposed to only educating users about best practices in the system). The 
line of reasoning of this paper is that we can approach such a goal by constantly 
monitoring the users’ actions and assigning a measure to the user which is representa-
tive of the systems trust in the users’ actions (as opposed to the systems trust on the 
users). At periodic intervals, the system can derive and generate a trust report from 
the model that states the trust level of the user and the reason for the same. Over a pe-
riod of time, users with low trust levels can review these trust reports and through 
peer-review sessions, learn the unintended consequences of their actions on the sys-
tem. In this manner the system can better judge and allow/disallow user actions and 
users are constantly cautioned about the effects of their actions on the system. 
The contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) We present a dynamic trust as-
signment and evaluation model that is used to evaluate the adherence of users actions 
to system policies and best practices. (2) We argue how this model helps in improving 
the human factor component in information systems by generating trust reports that 
provide a feedback to users on their actions. (3) We present the application of this 
model in a Document Management System that is adequately representative of a typi-
cal application scenario, viz. a system with a unique set of problems, with an inbuilt 
monitoring mechanism that has a need to evaluate the users’ actions at each step. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Compensatory Trust 
Assignment model. Section 3 addresses the issues involved in the translation of the 
model to a feasible implementation. Section 4 describes the application of our model 
on a Document Management System. We discuss some technical aspects of the model 
in Section 5. Finally, we summarize and present concluding remarks in Section 6.  
2   Compensatory Trust Model (CTM) 
We derive the intuition for our trust-assignment framework from a game-theoretic 
formulation by Green [7] where the user and the system are modeled as playing a 
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virtual game. Each user is assigned an initial trust score which is updated dynamically 
on every action. The initial trust scores are assigned depending on the context of the 
application domain. Trust updates are performed through a model called “compensa-
tory transfer” where for each efficient action by a user, we assign a trust value equal 
to the “best claim for compensation” [7]. A claim of compensation is the difference 
between the benefits of the alternate action and the selected efficient action by the 
user. The users’ initial trust and his recent actions are both taken into consideration 
and the user is appropriately rewarded or penalized. We demonstrate the application 
of this model in a Document Management System. 
2.1   Interpretation of Trust 
Before we progress towards the trust model, we first discuss the interpretation of trust 
in this work. Trust, according to [16] is interpreted differently in different contexts. It 
is usually a process, with the final trust value representing the current state of the 
process. Reconciling trust with security, however, is not a straightforward task. Recall 
the basic assumption for this model, viz. the user is authenticated and assumed to be 
under constant monitoring, even when he is deemed as completely trustworthy. In that 
sense, the view of trust in this work may be construed as somewhat cynical. It may 
usually be expected that when a user is trusted, not only is the user allowed to perform 
any action, but is subjected to lesser or practically zero surveillance. That is usually 
the essence of trust. But this reasoning does not fit in with the security side of things, 
particularly in this work, where the central goal is to improve the human factor by 
monitoring actions. In this context it is instructive to consider the view of Nissenbaum 
[11] who argues that the level of security does not affect trust; instead, she says it ex-
ists only to reduce risk and not increase trustworthiness. As a counterargument, Pear-
son et al., [16] think that security may increase, decrease or maintain the trust level, 
depending on the system. We argue that increased security reduces risk and hence in-
creases trust. And in the context in which this work is applicable, this reduced risk is 
extracted by addressing the weak human factor. There is an additional notion in this 
paper of what exactly we are trusting; it is the users’ actions, not the user, that we are 
trusting. Effectively, the question we attempt to answer is, “Are the users’ actions 
conforming to the best practices of the system?” and not, “Is the user a malicious 
user?” which is another area by itself. Hence the well known trust paradigms like 
“Trust is gained slowly and lost swiftly” may not always apply; such philosophies can 
be applied in this model depending on the system under consideration – they effec-
tively depend on the context in which this model is applied. 
2.2   Preliminaries 
First we define some general terms and symbols that are required for the development 
of the model.  
U  : The set of all users in a system where ui ∈ U 
A  : The set of all actions in the system where ak ∈ A 
R  : The set of all resources in the system where rj ∈ R 
ui→(ak,rj) : User ui performs an action ak on the resource rj 
α(ui)  : The initial trust level of the user ui 
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Ĳ(ui)  : The current trust level of the user ui ; Ĳk(ui) represents the 
value of Ĳ(ui) for the kth iteration 
t  : A Trust update parameter; ti represents the value of t for the 
ith iteration 
A(rj,ui)  : The set of permissible actions on the resource rj by the user 
ui. By permissible actions, we mean those actions that are al-
lowed by the security policy that is in place. 
Pu(ak,rj)  : The payoff for user u performing action ak on resource rj : ak 
∈ A(rj,u) 
The payoff is representative of the efficiency level of the users’ action. Note that 
the definition of A(rj,ui) is set to implicitly cover the security policies in the system, 
thereby eliminating the need to factor in security policies in the model. We can ex-
plicitly include the notion of security policies and their satisfiability in the model if 
the system is expected to derive a feedback from this model to change the policies 
themselves. However, in this paper, we limit our discussion to a system with well de-
fined policies and best practices.  
2.3   Trust Update 
We describe the trust update process for this model as follows. For a given system 
state, a user u is assigned an initial trust level given by α(u). The user performs some 
action ak on a resource rj, i.e., u→(ak,rj), where ak ∈ A(rj,u). This action ak has a pay-
off that is given by Pu(ak,rj). Now for all possible actions in A(rj,u), compute the 
maximum payoff difference between each action in A(rj,u) and the selected action, 
normalize the difference and update the trust level according to the parameter t. The 
intuition behind this model is that this updated trust value is the ‘compensation’ that 
the user receives (or pays) for choosing the action. The model proposed by Green [7]  
 
 
Fig. 1. Compensatory Trust Model Algorithm 
1. Fix α(u) and Start the Session 
2. Assign Ĳ0(u)=α(u) 
/* Ĳi(u) is Ĳ(u) for the ith iteration */ 
3. Start Actions by user u 
4. Let the user choose an action ak for some re-
source rj ∈ R: ak ∈ A(rj,u) 
5. u→(ak,rj) 
6. For all am ∈ A(rj,u): am  ak compute the user’s 
compensation c: 
( ) ( )
[ ( ) - ( )] ( )
u k j u m j
u k j u m j
u k j
P a , r - P a , r
c = sign P a , r P a , r max
P a , r
 
7. Update the current trust value 
if ((Ĳ(i-1)(u) < 1) || (c < 0)) 
then Ĳi(u)= Ĳ(i-1)(u)+ct 
8. Perform User Action – GOTO Step 4 
9. End Session 
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involves a notion of a combined payoff for two players which we ignore, since the 
other player (the system in our case) is completely trusted. The model is described in 
Figure 1. The compensatory trust model, when implemented, needs the payoff values 
for the actions (on different resources) as input. Typically, Ĳ(ui) ∈ [0,1]. The trust up-
date parameter t should also be dynamically updated so that Ĳ(ui) approaches 1 slowly. 
The updates increment will stop if Ĳ(ui) = 1. Lastly there is an issue of updating t. 
Trust models follow different paradigms while assigning and updating trust. They 
adopt either a pessimistic approach where trust is assigned slowly and dropped at a 
faster rate or an optimistic approach where every subject is assigned complete trust to 
start with, and a corresponding (negative) update rate. Hence the parameter t can be 
constant, or decreasing slowly as Ĳ(ui) increases, or updated according to the system 
update policy. 
3   Implementation Issues 
In this section, we catalog the steps for translating the model to a feasible implemen-
tation.  We also bring out some implementation specific issues for the trust model. 
For clarity, we would like to emphasize that the application of the model will involve 
an extensive knowledge of the system internals and a deep insight into the actions that 
are (a) critical to the functioning of the system and, (b) have the potential to cause a 
slow, but eventual destabilizing effect on the security level of the system. Understand-
ing the Threat Model for which the system has been designed is crucial to identifying 
the actions and assigning their payoffs. Broadly, the steps for implementing this 
model are as follows: 
• The first step is to list the resources in the organization. Resources can mean any-
thing from computers, mobile devices, printers, file servers or documents contain-
ing information (proprietary or otherwise). 
• For each user ui ∈ U, list the permissible actions A(rj,ui) for all resources rj ∈ R. 
• For each of these actions, either assign a payoff Pu(ak,rj) or calculate the payoffs 
depending on the system state.  
The important issue to note during implementation is the scope for a state explo-
sion. The number of users in an organization may be very high. Still, since each user 
is assigned a computation device, monitoring users’ actions may not be an issue. But 
setting a payoff for each of the permissible actions on a resource may be difficult due 
to two reasons. First, the number of actions possible on all resources may be hard to 
enumerate. Secondly, even if they were enumerated and payoffs assigned to them, 
calculating c in step 6 would be computationally intensive, especially since this com-
putation is performed for every alternate action of the user.  This is equivalent to the 
statement that the value of: 
( )
∀ ∈
¦ i
r R
A r, u  (1) 
for a particular user ui would be very large. To circumvent this, only the important ac-
tions on a resource could be enumerated, thereby reducing the number of payoff func-
tions. Finally, deciding the important actions is a system dependent task. We wish to 
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point out that although all actions of a user may not be enumerable, it is still possible 
to implement this model by enumerating only those actions that are critical. Setting 
appropriate payoff values for actions, however, is a system specific issue that may re-
quire extensive manual input. It is a one time process that must be performed before 
the deployment of the model. Finally, the trust update parameter t can be updated for 
every n actions depending on the paradigm (pessimistic or optimistic updates) or a 
system dependent policy. 
A Sample Update Policy. We illustrate a sample update policy for t updated for 
every action (n = 1). This update policy relies heavily on the first few actions per-
formed by the user, but can be modified depending on the system under consideration. 
The policy, while simple, has two desired characteristics: First, this strategy ensures 
that the trust update rate is self limiting. Secondly, it ensures that users gain trust 
slowly and also lose it slowly. While this may run contrary to the maxim “Trust is 
hard to gain and easy to lose”, this approach is appropriate for our purpose, since this 
model is intended to measure the users’ conformance to the best practices of the or-
ganization (which can also be interpreted as the extent of user cooperation with the 
security mechanism), not whether the user is malicious or not (in which case we 
should stop trusting the user even if a single malicious action was observed). We have 
mentioned and discussed this in detail in the section titled “Interpretation of Trust”. 
The update policy may also be changed if the system requirements are different. We 
initialize and update t as follows: 
• t1 = 0.1 
• ti = | Ĳ(i-1)(u) – Ĳ(i-2)(u) | ∀ i  2 
A Sample Trust Update Policy
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Fig. 2. A Sample Update Policy for t 
Note that Ĳ0(u) = α(u) and Ĳ1(u) is evaluated from t1 and c. The graph in Figure 2 
shows the trend of the trust levels in the face of consistent and random actions that are 
efficient (and inefficient respectively). We arbitrarily chose α(u) = 0.5 and c = 0.8 for 
consistently efficient actions (and -0.4 for consistently inefficient actions). We 
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observe in Figure 2 that a user with consistently efficient actions slowly approaches a 
trust level of 1 (0.9 in the graph), whereas a user with randomly efficient actions (c = 
0.9 to 0.1), although above the initial trust level, is stagnant at a level below 0.6. 
Similar trends are observed for inefficient actions. For this particular update policy, 
the trust levels are heavily dependent on the initial values and actions and will 
stabilize very soon. 
After a peer-review session, the core trust evaluation engine must be started again 
with α(u) = Ĳ(u) and t1 = 0.1. Users with a higher gradient/value of Ĳ(u) (as the action 
number goes high) must be suitably rewarded with a greater t1 value. Having fixed 
initial values of the model and the update policy, an organization can correlate the 
trust levels to the types of users it represents. Table 1 lists the effective actions al-
lowed for a user with a given range of Ĳ(u).  
Table 1. Effective actions allowed for a user based on Ĳ(u) 
Ĳ(u) Effective Actions Allowed 
Between 0.8 – 1 Trustworthy – allow user to perform any action 
Between 0.7 – 0.8 Trustworthy – allow user to perform any action; Reduce Ĳ(u) in next 
iteration if action is not efficient 
Between 0.6 – 0.7 Trustworthy – allow user to perform certain actions; Reduce Ĳ(u) in 
next iteration if action is not efficient and reset t = 0.1 
Between 0.5 – 0.6 Allow only efficient actions 
Below 0.5 Depends on system. Can either disallow all actions until peer-review 
or allow only efficient and safe actions with some restrictions 
Over a period of time, peer-review sessions could be held for users with a low trust 
level, while users with a high trust level can be safely expected (and allowed) to per-
form actions in the interest of the systems security.  
4   Document Management System 
A Document Management System (DMS) is a proprietary system that enables an 
organization to create, store and work with documents in a secure manner. The main 
resource in a DMS is digital documents; they can contain proprietary information like 
organizational blueprints or financial information or can even be emails and public 
memos. Documents in a DMS have two levels of protection: The first level of 
protection is document encryption so that mere compromise of the file server or 
possession of the digital file cannot reveal the contents of the file. The second level of 
protection involves the application of Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology 
to documents. Each protected document can be opened by a viewer that is specific to 
the format of the document. For example, files with .doc extension can be opened by 
Microsoft Word. These viewers, apart from word editing functionalities, have 
additional capabilities built into them that allow for the authentication of users and 
enforcement of security policies on the document. These policies dictate the rights of 
a user on a document. For example, for a document MergerDetails.doc, a developer 
would have no access, a secretary of the CEO might have read and write permissions, 
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while a Board Member would have complete permissions, viz. read, write and print 
permissions. These policies are enforced by the document viewers/editors. The basic 
architecture of a DMS with the constituent action sequence is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Document Management System Architecture 
Some implementation specific differences between vendors do exist. For example, 
the File Server and Policy Server may be merged into one single unit and in some 
cases, the document policies may be embedded into the documents themselves. The 
whitepaper [2] by Microsoft presents an overview of the threat model and the 
solutions in a DMS. Although their solution of “Information Rights Management” is 
specific to the Office 2003 product line, the basic architecture, as shown in Figure 3, 
is the same for all vendors. 
4.1   The BLP Policy Model 
All documents in a DMS are classified. The classification labels depend on the 
organizations. For example, an IT organization may have the labels Software 
Documentation, Blueprints, Patents, Email, Public Memos, Financial Accounts, etc., while a 
military organization may classify documents as Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, Top-
Secret, etc. Security policy models are constructed based on these labels and 
organizational requirements. In this paper, we will restrict our attention to the Bell-La 
Padula [3] policy model, although any other policy model can be used. The Bell-La 
Padula (BLP) model was originally designed for the military. The idea behind the 
model was that officers were allowed to contribute information only to other officers 
at the same level or above, and they were allowed to assimilate information from 
officers of the same level or below. By ‘officers of the same level’, we mean officers 
with the same level of security clearance. This is formalized by a ‘write-up’ rule and a 
‘read-down’ rule where information can be transferred, for example, from an 
Unclassified document to any level above (Confidential, Secret, Top-Secret), but 
information from a Secret document cannot be transferred to any document of a lower 
classification (Unclassified, Confidential). The equivalent of information transfer in a 
DMS is a cut/copy and paste operation from one document to another. This model 
assumes that users with a lower security clearance will not introduce inaccurate 
information into the system, i.e., it does not assure information integrity. Further 
information about the BLP model can be found in [3] in greater depth.  
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4.2   The DMS Policy Problem 
Consider a DMS in a commercial organization with a set of document classifiers. 
Commercial organizations do not have a strict ordering of the classifications which is 
required for the BLP model and for enforcing the write-up and read-down rules. 
While the policy dictating the access a user has on documents is strict, there are no 
clear rules relating to information transfer. Thus the user is trusted not to leak infor-
mation (intentionally or otherwise) from, say a Financial Document to a Public Memo, 
given that he has access to both. However, such transfers cannot always be construed 
as an information leak. Depending on the situation and the organizational require-
ments, they may be required for the proper functioning of the organization. For exam-
ple, a summary from a Financial document may be emailed to an external financial 
consultant (information transfer from a Financial Document to Email). This goes to 
show that best practices in any organization are just a guideline, which is what sepa-
rates them from policies. But consistent transfers, depending on their severity, may 
eventually lead to unintended consequences. For this situation, we show how the ap-
plication of the Compensatory Trust Model can help evaluate users in a DMS on a 
constant basis, and assign appropriate trust levels based on their actions. A sample of 
the trust report that can be generated by our implementation is also shown. 
4.3   Application of the CTM 
In this section, we follow the basic steps outlined in Section 3. For purposes of this 
illustration, we regard only the digital documents in a DMS as the primary resource 
for protection. Every user, depending on his role (or group), is assigned rights on 
different document classifications. For example, a Developer will have complete 
access to Software Documentation a read-only access to Blueprints, while the Project 
Manager will have read, write and print permissions on Blueprints. Neither of them will 
have any access to Financial Documents, while Board members will have complete access 
on Financial Documents. Thus the security policy defines the list of permissible actions of 
a user on a document. This is enforced by the document viewer, like Microsoft Word, 
Adobe Acrobat, etc. Next we describe the intuition for setting payoffs for the actions. 
Let us impose a partial ordering on the document classifications and the actions on 
them. For example, Email can be placed very high on the list since information transfer 
occurs to someone outside the organization. Financial documents, Blueprints and patents 
can be placed next. Similarly, a read action is innocuous while an editing action is rated 
higher and a print action still higher. We now define payoffs as follows: Payoffs for 
information transfer between two documents with the same classification are rated 
highest. Payoffs for information transfer between two documents of different 
classifications are rated proportionately, depending on the partial ordering of the 
document classifications. We formalize this as below: 
C  : The set of document classifiers where ci ∈ C 
D  : The set of documents, where dci ∈ D represents a document 
with classification ci 
 
 A Trust Assignment Model Based on Alternate Actions Payoff 349 
L  : The set of user levels (or user roles) where lj ∈ L. l(u) repre-
sents the level of user u. 
A  : The set of actions in the system – read, edit, transfer-edit and print 
{r,e,te,p} 
A(dci,u) : The set of permissible actions (decided by the security policy) 
Although word editors like Microsoft Word provides a rich set of functionalities, the 
set of actions has been limited for this illustration. We define a transfer-edit operation as 
a compound action of cut or copy from one document and a paste in another document. 
Finally, the payoff function is defined as: 
 
l(u)·ak·ci                if ak  te Pu(ak,dci)    = l(u)·ak·[min(ci,cj)]2/ max(ci,cj)     if ak = te 
(2) 
where ci and cj are the classifications of the two documents involved in the transfer-
edit operation. In this manner, the payoffs (and the trust level) can be calculated 
dynamically for every action performed by the user. Since the document viewer in a 
DMS knows the user credentials and the document classification when the document 
is loaded, evaluating the payoffs and the trust levels are not computationally 
intensive. Further, defining payoffs in a functional manner based on a lumped metric  
(the document classification) reduces the search space for evaluating c in step 6  
(in Figure 1), since only ak and cj are the variables in Eq. (2). 
4.4   Implementation of the DMS Prototype 
To validate our model, we developed a plug-in for Microsoft Word [18] that is 
capable of creating and enforcing custom policies and monitoring the user’s actions 
on Microsoft Word 2003. The plug-in, built on the .NET platform and written in C#, 
records all editing actions including information transfers from one document to 
another, in the form of any object (text, pictures, ClipArt’s, etc.) and dynamically 
updates the users trust levels. It can be downloaded and installed from http://www. 
cse.buffalo.edu/DRM/prototype/Secure%20Viewer.htm. Using the plug-in, we 
created documents with custom policies and classifications. Our first observation was 
that the plug-in did not introduce any performance degradation in Microsoft Word. It 
was also able to dynamically update the users trust level and record the information 
transfers. With this information, we were able to generate trust reports that listed the 
users’ history of information transfers and the systems opinion on them.  
We now present an overview of the steps to generate a trust report. The compo-
nents of the trust report are also described here. After installing the plug-in and creat-
ing sample documents, we classified and set custom policies on them using the “UB 
Document Control” Menu bar. More details on these custom policies can be found in 
[17]. After starting Trust Monitoring, we transferred information between different 
document types (and security levels). Finally, we generated a trust report that lists the 
following information: 
1. Date and Time of Information Transfers 
2. The Document Type (Financial, Merger, Public Memo, etc.) and the security level 
(Low, Medium or High Priority) 
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3. Critical: If the information transfer was from a high security level to a lower 
security level document, the transfer was deemed to be critical; otherwise the 
transfer was not critical 
4. Advised: If the information transfer was between the same document types, it is 
advised, else it was deemed inadvisable to affect such transfers. 
 
Fig. 4. A Sample Trust Report 
A sample trust report for the Administrator is shown in Figure 4. For illustration 
purposes, the role and user name have been merged as “Administrators”. The user is 
assumed to have unrestricted access to all documents in the DMS. The highlighted 
row in Figure 4, for example, shows a transfer from an Internal Memo to a Merger 
Document. Since the transfer is from a Medium Priority to a High Priority document, 
it is not deemed critical. But it is also not deemed advisable since the document types 
are different. The decision on criticality and advisability of information transfers is 
based on the ad-hoc policy (shown in 3 and 4 above) formulated for illustration 
purposes. The actual decision on whether an information transfer is Advised or Critical 
will depend on the organizational policies and best practices. We are currently 
working towards an automated suggestion engine which will present an alternate 
action for users with low trust levels. For example, if the user decides to transfer 
information from dci to dcj where ci >> cj, it will prompt the user to create a new 
document with level ci and merge the relevant information. In this manner, an 
organization that has a Document Management System is benefited in two ways. The 
first benefit, one of immediate consequence, is the utility of this model in increasing 
the security level of a DMS by detecting and eventually preventing accidental 
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information leak across documents of different categories and security levels. The 
second benefit is broad and has far reaching consequences. We hope that the periodic 
peer reviews of the users with low trust levels, with an explanation of the same 
through trust reports, will instill a ‘culture of security’ [8] in users. This is the final 
goal that will strengthen the weak human factor.   
5   Discussion 
The greatest risk in any information system, according to Schneier [15] is the very 
interaction between users and the system. This interaction is also the lowest common 
denominator for all systems, including advanced information systems. The trust 
model proposed in this paper attempts to quantify this system-user interaction and 
eventually improve the weak human factor inherent in it. In this section, we attempt to 
address the similarities of the model with the game structure and explain the basis for 
our intuition. Firstly, game theory usually has an information structure. The 
information structure in our model corresponds to the payoffs and the choices 
available to the users in terms of choosing the actions corresponding to the payoffs. 
These payoffs are not predefined, nor are their corresponding actions known before 
the application domain (context) is fixed. As a consequence, no strategies, or 
equilibrium analysis is possible here as in regular game theory. Secondly, there is an 
issue of rationality in game-theory, i.e., players in a game are assumed to be rational 
and choose their strategies in a rational manner. Since all users are not always fully 
trusted (which translates to their implementation of inefficient actions), this begs the 
question in our model: “Why are users irrational?” The answer to this question lies in 
the nature of the human factor. Indeed, it is the human factor that is irrational, that 
makes mistakes as simple as choosing easy passwords, or delays applying critical 
security patches, either due to inherent laziness or due to ignorance, or more often due 
to a combination of both. Lastly there is an issue of assigning initial trust values. 
While the sample update policy has used an arbitrary value, the initial values have to 
be decided based on the application domain. For example, in the Document 
Management System, administrators and developers can be assigned high trust values, 
for they may be expected to know the systems functioning and hence act according to 
the best practices, while secretaries may be assigned low initial trust values. However, 
we would like to stress that such ad-hoc initial assignments are highly subjective and 
depend on the context where the model is applied. 
6   Summary and Conclusion 
The central theme of this paper has been to improve the weak human factor in 
systems. Educating users on the best practices of a system is a first step towards 
achieving this goal. The trust evaluation model presented in this paper goes a step 
further by constantly monitoring the users’ actions and assigning a trust level based 
on those actions. Our task has been compounded by the fact that not all actions of the 
user have a straightforward cause and effect relationship and hence, at times when the 
effects of an action is not determinable, the system monitoring agent uses the trust 
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level to make a decision whether to allow the action to proceed or not. Over a given 
pre-determined time period, the system can generate trust reports that states the trust 
level of a user as well as the actions that were not in the interests of the systems 
security. Peer review process based on these trust reports can help in educating users 
about the best practices of the organization and in some cases, may even update 
obsolete best practices and erroneous policies. In this manner, users whose actions do 
not conform to the organizational best practices are made aware of the unintended 
consequences of their actions. The application of this model is extremely system 
dependent and context specific, as the interpretation of trust in this paper is somewhat 
cynical and is more in tune with the security side of trust rather than the ‘human’ 
interpretation. Our future work will concentrate on gathering user feedback on the 
performance of this model under controlled situations in our lab. We also intend to 
investigate the application of this model in wireless ad-hoc domains, where 
continuous monitoring and authentication are not always assured.  
According to Hassell and Wiedenbeck [8], users of advanced information systems 
need to “adopt a culture of security” for any security scheme to be effective. The goal 
is to eventually inculcate a culture of security in users so that the weak link in the 
chain, viz. the human factor, can be strengthened. Whether the application of this 
model will really instill a culture of security is debatable, but we hope the selective 
reviews of users with a low trust level will go a long way towards improving the hu-
man factor in the security loop. 
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Abstract. The present contribution analyses the connection between
privacy and trust, with regard to data protection. In particular, it shows
how the need to facilitate trust-based relationships may justify some
limitations of privacy (in the sense of a right to self-determination over
personal data), but may also provide some grounds for the protection of
privacy.
1 Privacy as Self-determination Over One’s Personal
Data
It has often been remarked that the right to privacy has greatly changed in the
last decades, in connection with the development of information technologies:
information privacy1 can no longer be viewed as a legal barrier protecting the
intimate space from unwanted intrusions; it has become a power of decision over
one’s own information (personal data),2 the right to informational self-determi-
nation.3 Such a right to informational self-determination seems to include one’s
power to:
– determine whether a personal datum can be collected (control over data
collection);
– determine whether the datum can be transmitted (control over data circu-
lation);
– determine the ways in which the datum can be used (control over data
usage).
1 I shall limit my analysis to information privacy, namely, privacy concerning personal
information, without addressing the broader and much controversial idea of privacy
as freedom of action in the private sphere, an idea which can be found in some US
judicial decisions (like the famous abortion case Roe v. Wade, of 1973).
2 For our purposes, we do not need to distinguish between information and data
(though this distinction is important in some domains, like knowledge management).
We shall rather use these terms interchangeably, as loosely synonymous.
3 Informationelle Selbstbestimmung, in the words used by the German Constitutional
Court in a famous decision of 1983, which upheld this right with regard to informa-
tion gathered and processed by government agencies for a national census.
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 354–366, 2006.
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Moreover, even after agreeing to the treatment of one’s own information, one
has the power to:
– view the data (right of access);
– obtain the rectification of an incorrect datum or the integration of an incom-
plete datum (control over the adequacy of the data);
– obtain the deletion of a datum (control over the persistence of the data, right
to oblivion).
Obviously, the regulation of data protection is not limited to the statement of
the powers just listed. First of all, the right to informational self-determination
is limited by legal provisions establishing that certain kinds of personal data
can legitimately be processed—by certain subjects and for certain purposes—
even without the consent of the person concerned.4 Moreover, certain forms
or contents may be required for consent to be legally valid (for instance, the
declaration of consent may need to be in writing, or to concern a sufficiently
delimited domain and purpose). Finally, even consent may be insufficient to
make processing permissible, under certain conditions, for certain types of data,
or for certain types of uses (for instance, an official authorisation may be required
for processing sensitive data, and such processing may in any case be limited to
specific aims).5
However, for our purposes it is useful to abstract from such limitations and
qualifications—as well from the many issues concerning the foundations and the
characterisation of the right to privacy in the information society6— and present
the right to privacy as an absolute right, with regard to both its counterparts
(as a right towards any other subject) and its content (as a right concerning any
type of personal data). On the basis of an absolute protection of the right to
informational self-determination, any treatment (collection, processing, commu-
nication, etc.) of a personal datum would be allowed only under the condition
that the concerned person freely consents to the treatment.
2 Trust
By trust in a very generic sense, we usually mean one’s expectation that
another will act in a way that is advantageous to oneself, supplemented by
4 As indicated in art. 8, par. 2, of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
5 See art. 8, par. 2 (a), of Directive 95/46/EC, which enables national states to es-
tablish that the prohibition to process sensitive data may not be lifted by the data
subject’s consent.
6 To do that we would need to examine the evolution of the debate on data protection,
in connection with technological development, from the beginnings of informatisation
(see for instance Westin [1]), to the diffusion of personal computing (see for instance
Bing [2]), to the Internet age (see for instance Lessig [3, Chap. 13]).
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one’s availability to act upon such expectation, accepting the correspon-
ding risks.7
In the last years attention has been devoted to the notion of trust, and its
importance has often been stressed with regard to the conditions of the informa-
tion society. Trust appears indeed to be the precondition of many social relations:
without trust one would not enter into any risky relationship (namely, any re-
lationship such that the potential risks are greater that the possible gains), and
thus one would avoid most meaningful social contacts, both in the economical
and in the personal dimension. How could we face social life if we did not trust
our fellows, if we did not expect, up to a certain extent, that they will behave
properly, in line with our expectations (that doctors will cure us, that sellers
will deliver their merchandise, and so on). Similarly, we would not make use of
technological systems and of the corresponding socio-technical infrastructures
unless we had some trust in their proper functioning, and in the correctness and
loyalty of their administrators.8
For our purposes it is useful to refer to the distinction, originally proposed
by Luhmann [10], between two species of trust, which we may call confiding
and active trust.9 According to Luhmann, confiding is a merely passive attitude
7 Many different notions of trust exist in the literature, but we do not need to commit
ourselves to any one of such notions. Some authors have proposed strong concepts
of trust, like Fukuyama [4, 26], according to whom: “Trust is the expectation that
arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on
commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the community.” A norma-
tive concept of trust is also defended, for instance, by Herzberg[5, 319], according to
whom “unlike reliance, the grammar of trust involves a perspective of justice: trust
can only concern that which one person can rightfully demand of another.” The idea
that trust relationship have a component which is irreducible to rational expectation
is also developed by Baier [6], who views trust (as opposed to mere reliance) as based
upon the (truster’s belief in the) trustee’s good will towards the truster. Others have
proposed more neutral ideas. For instance, a notion of trust as encapsulated interest
is proposed by Harding [7] (who views the truster’s expectation as being based upon
the assumption that it is in the trustee’s interest to take care of the truster’s interest,
such trustee’s interest not necessarily having a moral or altruistic nature). Another
non-normative view of trust is developed by Castelfranchi and Falcone [8], according
to whom there is trust whenever all of the following conditions obtain: (a) the truster
has a certain goal, (b) the truster believes that the trustee is both capable and will-
ing to achieve this goal, (c) the truster depends upon the trustee for the achievement
of the goal, and (d) the truster believes that the goal will be achieved thanks to the
cooperation of the trustee. For instance, according to the latter view, I trust my
contractual counterpart when I believe that he or she is capable and available to
perform, I depend on him or her for such performance (after the execution of the
contract, making a new one, with a different partner, would be difficult and costly),
and finally I believe that the counterpart will actually accomplish the performance.
8 For an interdisciplinary discussion of trust, see Gambetta [9].
9 To distinguish these two attitudes, Luhmann uses the words “confidence” and “trust”
tout court. We speak of active trust to denote the second attitude, in order to avoid
terminological confusion, while continuing to use term “trust” to subsume both ideas.
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(we conduct our lives in the expectation that certain negative events will not
take place: that a certain level of public security will be maintained, that the
judiciary will decide cases with some rationality and impartiality, that money
will not suddenly loose all its worth). Active trust, instead, presupposes a deci-
sion, namely, the choice to expose oneself to a risk toward the counterpart, in
the expectation that the counterpart will not profit of the situation.10 Such a
choice happens for instance when a client enters a contract (in the expectation
that the chosen provider will perform) or when partners establish a commercial
company (each one expecting that each other will be both able and willing to
contribute to the company, having a loyal and cooperative attitude), but also
when one enters into a friendly or even an affectionate relationship, or when
one confers (or contributes to confer) political representation. The preservation
of confidence is certainly an important objective: confidence is the psycholog-
ical counterpart of security and a necessary precondition of well being within
any social framework. However, active trust (in the sense just specified) is even
more important, since the decision to rely upon is an necessary precondition of
many kinds of cooperative social action.11 If we were to abstain from relying on
others, we would need to renounce many social contacts: economical exchanges,
communications, social relationships would dwindle.
It has been observed that trust can emerge in various ways: it may depend
on the special history of one’s interaction with one’s counterpart, it may be
connected to the fact that such a counterpart plays a certain professional role
10 Luhmann [10] characterises as follows the distinction between confidence and active
trust: “The normal case is that of confidence. You are confident that your expecta-
tions will not be disappointed: that politicians will try to avoid war, that cars will not
break down or suddenly leave the street and hit you on your Sunday afternoon walk.
You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to contingent events and
you have to neglect, more or less, the possibility of disappointment. . . . Trust, on the
other hand, requires a previous engagement on your part. It presupposes a situation
of risk. You may or may not buy a used car which turns out to be a ‘lemon’. . . . You
can avoid taking the risk, but only if you are willing to waive the associated advan-
tages. . . . The distinction between confidence and trust thus depends on perception
and attribution. If you do not consider alternatives (every morning you leave the
house without a weapon!), you are in a situation of confidence. If you choose one
action in preference to others in spite of the possibility of being disappointed by the
action of others, you define the situation as one of trust. . . .Moreover, trust is only
possible in a situation where the possible damage may be greater than the advantage
you seek . . . . Trust is only required if a bad outcome would make you regret your
action.”
11 Loss of confidence and loss of trust are distinguished as follows by Luhmann [10]:
“The lack of confidence will lead to feelings of alienation, and eventually to retreat
into smaller worlds of purely local importance to new forms of “ethnogenesis”, to a
fashionable longing for an independent if modest living, to fundamentalist attitudes
or other forms of retotalizing milieux and “life-worlds”. . . . The lack of trust, on
the other hand, simply withdraws activities. It reduces the range of possibilities for
rational action. It prevents, for example, early medication. It prevents, above all,
capital investment under conditions of uncertainty and risk.”
358 G. Sartor
(consider for instance trust toward a doctor, a lawyer, or an accountant), that
he or she belongs to a particular group or organisation. In any case, trusted
expectations must not be disappointed too much: those who are too often let
down, with consequences too negative, will less likely give trust in the future.
In this regard the connection between law and reliance becomes particularly
relevant (see Memmo, Sartor and Quadri [11]), a connection which can take
different shapes. Sometimes the law can provide an alternative to trust: legal
protection is required because trust is lacking, there being no chance of obtain-
ing spontaneous cooperation.12 Moreover a heavily regulated environment may
hinder the formation of trust-based relationships: I (being, for instance, a con-
tractor, or a client of a public administration) do not expect that you (the other
contractor, or the public official) will provide an adequate solution to my prob-
lem, taking into account my interests and needs; I know that I cannot delegate to
you the care of such interests and needs, since you are focused only on complying
with a set of detailed regulations, and I cannot expect anything more from you.
However, the thesis that there is a necessary conflict between law and trust can
be contested by considering that in various circumstances the law can provide
us with reasons for relying upon others (whatever further reasons, moral or not,
we have for such a reliance). In fact, even if we endorsed a strongly normative
notion of trust—namely, if we required, for an expectation to be qualified as
trust, that it have a moral component, or that it assume an altruistic attitude
by the trustee—it would remain true that the truster must also: (a) predict
that the trustee will behave according to truster’s expectation and (b) accept
the risk of being disappointed. In both regards, the law can contribute to the
rational formation of a trust attitude. On the one hand, legal penalties increases
the chance that the trustee behave according to the truster’s expectations (by
adding the threat of punishment to the internal motivations of the trustee and
possibly also by appealing to an additional internal motivation of hers, namely,
her endorsement of the obligation to comply with the law). On the other hand the
law may diminish the expected losses of the disappointed truster (for instance, by
providing the truster with compensation, or by enabling him to withdraw from
a contract, as is the case in on-line sales, or by ensuring him the same result
which he would have obtained if the trusted-to-happn situation had obtained).
In conclusion, the law can facilitate the choice to rely on one’s counterpart,
both by increasing the chance that reliance-based expectations are complied with
and by diminishing the negative consequences of the violation of such expecta-
tions: by protecting the truster’s expectations the law favours reliance (and thus
it facilitates the formation of trust-based interactions).
12 For the thesis that trust and law are mutually alternative, see for instance Fukuyama
[4], 27, according to whom in invidualistic societies the legal system—that is, “a
system of formal rules and regulations, which have to be negotiated, agreed to,
litigated, and enforced, sometimes by coercive means”—substitutes trust, but this
substitution entails high “transaction costs” (like the cost of drafting very detailed
contracts, and of litigating them).
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3 Reputation
Though trust can be based upon many different sources (social conventions, le-
gal rules, professional ethics, the history of personal relationships, and so on),
such sources are often unable to provide sufficient warrant: social rules are weak,
especially between parties who are distant in space and culture (as in Internet
contracts); legal proceedings are uncertain and costly, and they can entail neg-
ative consequences for those who start them; professional ethics give dubious
indications, which are not always complied with; personal contacts may be su-
perficial and unlikely to be repeated. In such cases rational reliance seems to
require information about the individual counterpart one is interacting with,
and in particular it may require reference to his or her social consideration, that
is, to reputation. Such information may be useful, for instance, when we have to
make an important purchase, of objects which are not familiar to us (a car, a
financial product . . . ), to entrust a professional (a doctor, a lawyer . . . ) with a
difficult and risky task, or to choose the counterpart with whom to execute an
important contract.
By reputation we mean both the evaluative opinion that people (the public in
general or certain sections of it) have of a particular person, and the social mech-
anism which produces such an opinion. One’s reputation usually refers to specific
attitudes and capacities, which may concern both one’s capacity to adequately
perform certain actions (for instance, the technical competence of a professional)
and one’s propensity to act thus, and to do so in an appropriate way (through
cooperation, reciprocity, respect of existing conventions and of other people’s
interests). Reputation results from shared beliefs, which spread in a society as a
consequence of complex social interactions: individuals form opinions concerning
a certain person (on the basis of personal experience or of certain indexes), they
convey such opinions (person X is . . . ) or their beliefs about others’ opinions (it
is said that person X is . . . ), these opinions and beliefs are adopted by others
and further conveyed (see for instance Conte and Paolucci [12]).
The mechanism of reputation has a double social relevance.
Firstly, it provides a cognitive basis for our decisions to trust: we often choose
to rely upon a certain person (and thus to face the risks which are entailed by our
reliance and by our subsequent determinations), based on the positive reputation
of this person. To the extent that reputation provides useful indications (to the
extent that people having a good reputation actually tend to behave competently
and properly), it appears to be an important mechanism of social cognition: as
the invisible hand of the market assigns prices to things (beyond the usage-value
they have for particular individuals), so the invisible judge of reputation confers
its evaluation upon persons (beyond the view that the concerned person has of
himself or herself, and beyond the opinion that any specific individual has of
that person). The link between reputation and trust is particularly important
in the global space of the Internet: in deciding whether to trust, for example,
commercial partners with whom we never had contacts in the past (and with
whom we are unlikely to have contacts in the future), we cannot rely on personal
experience, but we must count on other people’s experience or on the reputation
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which our partners enjoy. And we can perceive reputation through the judgments
and evaluations of others, but also though computer technologies combining such
judgments and evaluations. For instance, many e-commerce sites not only allow
individual buyers to express their evaluations on products and vendors, but also
combine individual evaluations in global ratings.
The second function of reputation we need to mention here is its ability
to elicit certain actions, namely, those actions whose perception (by others)
may determine the kind of reputation one desires (obviously, this my only hap-
pen when such actions can be detected by others, and when such detection,
or the conclusions which are derived from it, can be communicated). In
particular, a person having a positive reputation can be the object of others’
reliance, and thus can be invited to enter those relationships (for instance,
contracts) which are based upon reliance, and can obtain the benefits which
ensue from such relationships. Thus one, in order to foster one’s own positive
reputation—namely, the reputation of being a subject capable and willing to be-
have in appropriate ways—may be induced to behave in such ways, and to do so
consistently.
4 Privacy Versus Reputation-Based Trust
Privacy, as self-determination over one’s own personal data, seems to conflict
with reliance based upon reputation. In fact, an absolute right to self-determi-
nation over one’s own data—enabling one to determine, according to one’s own
interests and choices, what information others can collect and process—seems
to impair the correct formation of reputation: if one is the master of one’s own
personal information, one can block the circulation of all negative information
regarding oneself. And if reliable reputation is not available, others will tend not
to develop trust in the individuals concerned.13
The consideration of the connection between privacy, reliance, and reputation
has led some authors to a very negative view of privacy. For instance, Richard
Posner has affirmed that privacy does not deserve a specific legal protection:
All that privacy means in the information context . . . is that people want
to control what is known about them by other people. They want to
conceal facts about themselves that are embarrassing or discreditable
. . .Often this involves concealing information that would cause potential
13 Enabling the circulation of relevant information not only is in the interest of candi-
date trusters, but is also in the interest of candidate trustees, since potential trusters
will be more likely to trust when they believe to have sufficient information about
their counterparts. Thus, allowing candidate trusters to access adequate information
(or at least putatively adequate information) about candidate trustees is an advan-
tage for all candidate trustees beforehand, as a prerequisite for being trusted upon,
and thus as a prerequisite for doing business, though this can determine a disadvan-
tage for some of them in retrospect, when a piece of negative personal information
is propagated.
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transacting partners to refuse to transact with them or to demand better
terms as a condition of doing so. Such concealment is a species of fraud
(Posner’s blog 8 may 2005, see also Posner [13]).
According to this view, privacy—and in particular, the right to informational
self-determination—gives a legal protection to deception (through selective dis-
closure). Non only is one allowed to abstain from communicating relevant facts
about oneself (at least up to the point where silence violates good faith), but
data protection prohibits others from collecting, processing and communicating
such data, even if the data were obtained without the activity of the person con-
cerned. Thus, privacy gives one the possibility to manipulate one’s social image
and consequently one’s reputation, by blocking the circulation of negative data,
even when such data are true.
The subject of the connection between privacy, deception and reputation is
viewed in a similar way by Nock [14], who observes that trust is often based
upon reputation, and that privacy impedes the formation of trust since it makes
it more difficult to know the reputation of others, which is a precondition for
relying upon strangers.14
On the view just presented, the right to information self-determination would
impair the formation of a reliable reputation, and thus would impair the forma-
tion of reputation-based trust. Moreover, the legal protection of privacy would
represent a paternalistic intervention which (as public intervention in the mar-
kets) threatens to impair the autonomous functioning of an impersonal social
mechanism. Thus, privacy protection would have a double noxious effect: on the
one had it would enable the individual to manipulate his or her social image, and
on the other hand it would impede the autonomous formation of social opinions,
on the basis of all available data.
The views which we have just presented can be countered with various objec-
tions (as presented, for instance, by Solove [16]).
First of all, as many authors have observed (like Rodota` [17]), privacy pro-
tection contributes to certain important legal values, which can outweigh the
need to favour reliance: protecting freedom, intimacy, and dignity; ensuring the
possibility to change and improve; preventing discriminations, and so on.
Secondly, we need to consider that the mechanism of reputation, despite hav-
ing in principle a cognitive value, does not always work correctly. The legal
issues we need to address with regard to the function of reputation are similar
to the legal issues we have to face with regard to markets (and different lawyers
will take very different attitudes according to their ideology and personal opin-
ions): how to ensure the best functioning of a fundamental instrument of social
cognition,15 while avoiding that this mechanism, abandoned to itself, endangers
individuals and communities, and also calls into question its own functioning.
14 For further considerations on the costs of privacy, see for instance Walker [15].
15 The market can indeed be viewed as a cognitive mechanism clustering into prices
information about needs and production costs, thus ensuring an efficient deployment
of resources (see for example Hayek [18]).
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Just as monopolies, but also fraud and information distortion can impair the
functioning of markets, so monopolies on the provision and circulation of infor-
mation (for instance, in the media), but also the manipulation of information,
can disturb the functioning of reputation.16
Moreover, reputation can often result from irrational attitudes. This hap-
pens when prejudice (stigmatisation) is present: from certain features of a per-
son (belonging to an ethnic or racial group, having certain sexual orientations,
having had certain diseases, holding certain religious or political views) we er-
roneously draw certain negative conclusions concerning other aspects of that
person (capacity to work, competence, honesty, and so on), and thus we make
choices which damage that person (for instance, denying him or her a job).
Negative evaluations, then, spread in society exactly according to the
mechanism of reputation (given that others have a negative opinion about a
certain person, I too adopt such a negative opinion, and thus I contribute
to creating the basis for other people to form a negative opinion about the
same person). When prejudice and stigmatisation are present, reputation can
fail as a cognitive mechanism. To prevent such failure or to diminish its im-
pact, legal limitations on the free circulation of personal information may be
opportune.
Also when prejudice is not at issue, the rationality of reputation can be en-
dangered by the scarcity of the available time and by the necessity of forming
opinions on the basis of limited data. The right to control one’s personal data
enables one to prevent misunderstandings that can be determined by access to
partial information about oneself: one can limit access to one’s data to those
people who are able to put such data in context, thanks to a sufficient knowl-
edge of oneself, or one can impose adequate ways of providing context for the
data.
This problem is particularly pressing today, in the era of the so-called infor-
mation overload.17 Being unable to process all the information that is accessible
to us, we end up evaluating others according to a casual or even biased selection
of such information, for instance, according to a few top ranked documents we
retrieve through a search engine. This may lead us to negative judgments (and
consequent decisions) which would be unjustified on the basis of a larger body
16 Posner’s unconditioned acceptance of the mechanism of reputation is indeed related
to his faith in the market. He rebuts the argument that the communication of cer-
tain private information (for instance, about ethnicity, political opinions, or sexual
preferences) may determine odious discrimination, by observing that “in a diverse,
decentralised and competitive society, irrational shunning will be weeded out over
time” (Posner [13, 235]). This can be expected to happen because when one (for in-
stance, an employer) discriminates one’s counterpart (a potential employee) on the
basis of aspects which are irrelevant to the counterpart’s performance, one would
sustain higher costs than one’s competitors and would be pushed out of the market.
For similar observations, see Von Mises [19].
17 This aspect is emphasised by Rosen [20], who says that “[p]rivacy protects us from
being misdefined and judged out of context in a world of short attention spans, a
world in which information can easily be confused with knowledge.”
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of information.18 Moreover, our inability to check the correctness of most of the
information we retrieve may lead us to form our judgments on a certain person
on the basis of erroneous or outdated information.
Thus, in some cases here is no conflict, but rather a useful synergy between
informational self-determination and correct formation of reputation: the data
subject—by correcting his or her data, supplementing them with further infor-
mation, requiring an adequate form for their communication, or even excluding
those who would be unable to understand the data (by putting the data in
context)—can contribute to the correctness of his or her social image, and thus
to the cognitive function of the process through which reputation is formed. In
these cases, the individual interest in a positive reputation converges with the
social interest in a reputation corresponding to fact.
However, in other cases, the individual interest in a positive reputation and
the social interest in a cognitively correct reputation do not coincide: one tries
to obtain positive reputation by giving false or partial information about one-
self and by blocking the circulation of true information which would
impair one’s social image. Under such circumstances, the balancing of the con-
flicting interests can lead us to subordinate the individual interest to the so-
cial one (or rather to subordinate the interest of the data subject to the
individual interests of his or her counterparts). In particular, the need to en-
able the correct formation of a reputation so as to favour reputation-based
reliance plays a fundamental role both in the economy (when we need to rely
on contractual counterparts) and in politics (where we need to rely on the per-
sons who are entrusted with public tasks, and in particular on our political
representatives).
Accordingly, the circulation of personal information has a significance that
goes beyond those who need particular pieces of information, being involved in
specific economic transactions or political debates. For instance, the circulation
of information about politicians also advantages people who do not directly take
part in debates and are unaware of specific facts, but only perceive the aggregate
results (the reputation) that are associated with a certain politician. The same
holds in the economic domain, with regard to professional abilities or financial
conditions. Thus, there is a justification for collecting and circulating certain
18 The Italian data-protection Authority (Garante per la la protezione dei dati) has
recently decided a case related to information overload (see Newsletter 21-27 march
2005). The Italian Authority on competition and on markets (Autorita` garante della
concorrenza e del mercato) had made accessible on the Internet (where it was indexed
by search engines) two old decisions where a particular company was punished for
misleading advertising. That company claimed that its reputation had seriously,
and unduly, been damaged, since such decisions were the first documents to come
up whenever one made an Internet search using the name of the company. The
data-protection Authority recognised that claim, ordering that old decisions of the
Authority for competition and markets should be made publicly accessibly only
through queries initiated within the site of that authority (not through general search
engines).
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kinds of personal data (besides concerns for freedom of speech),19 namely, the
need that informed evaluations be accomplished, and that a widespread social
opinion (a reputation) emerge. The emergence of such an opinion can support
reliance by individuals, but also may elicit the competent and correct behaviour
of the person concerned, so as to prevent the formation of a negative reputation.
Obviously, our arguments supporting the circulation of certain personal data
only apply to data which are relevant for determining whether to rely upon some-
body in a specific domain, namely, data which are relevant for the assessment
of the risks inhering in a particular relationship (information on the competence
and financial solidity of a businessperson, the prudence and the honesty of a
politician, and so on); such arguments cannot be extended to personal informa-
tion having no possible impact on such risks.20
In other domains of human life, like those pertaining to affective relationship,
sexual preferences, ethnic origins, political opinions (of a person who does not
have, nor aims to have any public function) the protection of personal data is not
limited by the need to enable the formation of reliance based upon reputation
(or in any case based upon the knowledge of personal information which was
not provided by the concerned person, nor directly obtained through interaction
with such person or with people belonging to his or her milieu). In such domains,
the right to informational self-determination can find a broader recognition and
restrain others from processing, communicating and distributing one’s personal
data (at least when such operations take place in the framework of professional
activities, or anyway in a large scale, for instance, through publication on a web
site).
It seems that considerations pertaining to reputation and trust can contribute
to provide a rationale for some aspects of data protection, offering some indica-
tions on how to explain, justify, and circumscribe the limitations of the right to
informational self-determination.
No man is an island (as the poet John Donne said): on the one hand one
interacts with the others, and decides whom to rely upon according to one’s own
personal experience, but also according to the social image and reputation of
the others; on the other hand one develops one’s own personality and morality
by confronting one’s social image, by matching one’s actions with shared rules
19 For reasons of space, and in order to focus on the idea of trust, I shall not address
here the very important issue of the conflict between privacy and freedom of speech.
This has the advantage of allowing me to avoid addressing the vast literature on
freedom of speech (see for instance Sadurski [21]).
20 According to Nagel [22], privacy protection should also include people having a public
role, in particular through active involvement in politics. The fact that the public
“feels entitled to know the most intimate details of the life of any public figure”
impairs participation in the public sphere, since “[m]any people cannot take that
kind of exposure”: the fear of exposure to the public can induce a person having the
best skills and qualities for a public office, but having held in the past some minor
deviant behaviour (or even just presenting some eccentric trait), to withdraw in the
private sphere, renouncing to engage in active politics. For a discussion of this thesis,
and for bibliographical reference, see Solove [16, par. 4].
Privacy, Reputation, and Trust 365
and judgments, and by linking one’s views of oneself with one’s reputation.21
This is, however, a very delicate dialectical interaction between individual and
community, an interaction that usually works properly only within the restricted
circle of the persons having frequent and direct contacts with the individual in
question. Within this circle one can effectively contribute to the formation of
one’s social image, though not having the power of unilaterally determining it
(not even by imposing silence over the aspects of one’s personality which could
have a negative impact on one’s reputation): the person in question by correcting
possible misunderstanding, or offering his or her reasons, has a fair chance to
induce his or her partners to reconsider their opinions. Beyond such circle, on
the contrary, the burden to take care of one’s social image, in all its aspects, even
the most intimate ones, risks becoming unbearable, especially when one does not
have the means for intervening efficaciously. Such a burden is much heavier today,
when each personal datum can be eternally preserved in electronic memories and
can be made accessible to everybody over the World Wide Web.
Finally, we need to observe that informational self-determination, while being
an obstacle to reputation-based trust, can favour reliance in a different respect,
that is, by diminishing the risks which are related to certain social contacts. If
one has no control over one’s personal data, one must add to the risks inherent in
a certain social relationship (for instance, the risk that a physician should behave
negligently or incompetently) a further risk: the possible damage deriving from
the improper use or transmission of personal data. An effective protection of
privacy reduces such risks and thus facilitates reliance by the person who must
provide personal data in order to start a certain interaction. Consequently, it may
facilitate the choice to establish such an interaction (for instance, the choice to
let oneself be cured for a illness which carries a serious social stigma).
5 Conclusion
In the present paper I have only sketched some provisional ideas on the connec-
tion between privacy (as informational self-determination). on the one hand, and
trust and reputation, on the other hand. It seems to me that this line of inquiry
deserves to be developed further, in order that we can better understand the
impact of data protection on social relationships, and can provide legal solutions
duly taking into account all the interests at stake.
21 From this viewpoint, gossip seems to play a positive social function (though indi-
vidual freedom may be impaired by social sanctions against deviating behaviour,
an aspect stressed already by Mill [23]). More generally, gossip may be beneficial
to individual autonomy since it provides us with information on the “experiments
of living” of others (to use an expression of Mill [23]), from which we can draw in-
dications for our own choices. For some considerations on the value of gossip, see
Zimmerman[24], who argues against upholding the “public disclosure” tort in US
law, a tort, which, following the suggestion of [25], gives one a cause of action when
another widely discloses one’s private matter that is “highly offensive to a reasonable
person” and “is not of legitimate concern to the public.” On the merit of gossip, as
pertaining to the exercise of freedom of speech, see recently [26].
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Abstract. The secure transmission of messages via computer networks
is, in many scenarios, considered to be a solved problem. However, a
related problem, being almost as crucial, has been widely ignored: To
whom to entrust information? We argue that confidentiality modeling is
a question of trust. Therefore, the article at hand addresses this problem
based on a reputation system. We consider a Peer-to-Peer network whose
participants decide on whether or not to make information available to
other nodes based on the author’s trust relationships. Documents are
only forwarded to another node if, according to the sender’s local view,
the recipient is considered to be sufficiently trustworthy. In contrast to
most existing reputation systems, trust relationships are considered only
with respect to a specific domain. Privacy is preserved by limiting the
revelation of trust relationships.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-Peer networks are widely used for the exchange of all kinds of informa-
tion. In networks like Gnutella [17] and Kazaa [13], every user can potentially
access any file or document available. Even without security mechanisms in the
P2P network, it is still possible to distribute documents securely, i.e. to make
them accessible for their authorized readers only by simply encrypting the doc-
uments themselves.
In general, we can assume this problem—securely transmitting information
to a known entity—to be solved by cryptography. A different problem, however,
remains: How does Alice know which information she wants to entrust to Bob?
This is not a problem of security, but of trust. There is a number of scenarios
in which the answer is not obvious. For example, Alice wants to ask for advice
about an illness she has, but she does not want her boss to know about this
illness. Or Alice might be looking for a restaurant recommendation, which could
be greatly improved if she provided information about her food preferences. But
she might not be willing to provide that information to everyone. She has to
trust the person she gives the information to.
In peer-to-peer networks, the situation can get even worse. Alice may submit
a document to the network without even knowing who the recipient will be. At
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 367–381, 2006.
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the time someone wants to access the information, Alice may not be connected to
the network. Therefore, other (trusted) entities must be able to decide on Alice’s
behalf. This article gives a model that could facilitate this decision, while preserv-
ing the privacy of Alice’s trust relationships when possible. We call the resulting
approach the Rebcon (Reputation-Based Confidentiality Modeling) system.
1.1 Trust and Reputation Systems
Trust has been defined as a “generalized expectation that an advance effort
is not exploited” [5, p. 73. Translation by the author.]. Trust is a three place
relationship: A(lice) trusts B(ob) to do Z. [10, p. 15918] This means that trust
depends on the kind of the “advance effort”, or, speaking more generally, on the
domain1 of the relationship. You might, for example, trust your doctor with
respect to health questions, but not financial issues.
Trust is established over time; in case of a one-time or first-time contact,
there is (at first glance) no reason to trust. Reputation can solve this problem by
allowing the interpersonal transfer of trust. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [2] define
reputation as “an expectation about an agent’s behaviour based on information
about or observations of its past behaviour.” These observations can be made
by the person considering to establish a trust relationship or (considered in the
following) by third parties.
A common way of establishing trust on the internet is to use reputation sys-
tems. They can be defined as systems which provide information used to enable
the assessment of an entity’s trustworthiness, or reputation. By sharing views on
a person’s reputation, reputation systems enable the transfer of trust in a decen-
tralized manner. The term “decentralized” only refers to the trust model (there
is not just one single trust anchor). The storage and management of reputation
can still be done on a central server.
Resnick et al. [16] state that “a reputation system collects, distributes, and
aggregates feedback about participants’ past behavior.” In summary, reputation
systems serve to the creation of trust in their participants and other entities,
based on the asumption that entities who behaved well in the past will also do
so in the future.
While most reputation systems try to compute a global reputation value for
each entity, this would be inappropriate for the task at hand: The decision with
whom to share information is highly personal and subjective. Even if a large
part of the community believes someone to be trustworthy, you may have good
reasons not to do so. While this is not a problem e.g. in the file-sharing scenario,
in which most people agree on the properties desirable for a transaction partner,
you may not want to give someone an information because many other people
(most of which you do not know) trust that person. Moreover, the decision is
domain-dependent: Though you may be willing to share your reading preferences
with your bookseller, you might not want to entrust him medical information
about yourself.
1 Also referred to as context.
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Why could you be willing to entrust information to someone else? Firstly,
you could have own experience with that other person. Secondly, you may have
friends (i.e. persons you trust) who have told you that they trust that person.
Systems that model these properties of trust already exist, the most prominent
one being the PGP web of trust [1]. Its scope is, however, quite limited: The
purpose is to create trust in the authenticity of public keys.
This article suggests to use a reputation system based on the web of trust as
a confidentiality model. In comparison to the PGP web of trust, several adap-
tations are necessary to model the domain-dependence of trust. Additionally,
transitivity of trust (which is defined in the PGP trust model, but hardly used
in practice) is modeled differently.
1.2 The Need for Privacy
The aim of data privacy regulations worldwide is the protection of informational
self-determination. This term is especially used referring to German constitu-
tional law, in which informational self-determination is a base right; however,
the concept is a general one. It has been described in [20]: “Privacy is the claim
of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”.
In other words, privacy means that an individual can decide which information
he or she is willing to reveal to others, and who these others are. The Rebcon
system gives technical support for this decision by implementing a simple trust
model.
1.3 Outline
The next section gives an overview on related work. Measurements of trust
and confidentiality, being a precondition for the proposed system, are briefly
discussed in section 3. Section 4 describes the basic idea of a confidentiality-
modeling reputation system, including requirements and assumptions needed
for the system to work. In section 5, the system design is presented. Section 6
analyzes to what extent the requirements are fulfilled. The article is concluded
in section 7.
2 Related Work
While peer-to-peer reputation systems have only been discussed in the recent
years, the topic of trust is older. From a sociological perspective, it has been
discussed (among others) in [6]. In [14], the formalization of trust is dealt with
from a computer science point of view.
Existing reputation systems, including their flaws, have been described in
a number of articles. Good introductions to the topic are given in [16] and,
including a survey on other factors influencing trust, in [3].
Systems like the eBay reputation system [15] are based on a central server
that manages the trust ratings given by their users. Yet, the centralized approach
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is vulnerable to manipulation by the server’s operator, and it is less robust than
a decentralized system can potentially be.
The different quality of contents distributed in peer-to-peer networks has been
a major motivation for systems enabling distributed reputation management.
The Credence system [19] is an example of such a system, specifically designed
for filesharing networks. [11] describes the EigenTrust algorithm used to securely
compute a unique global trust value for an entity in a distributed fashion. Sim-
ilarly, [9] suggests an architecture for a partially distributed reputation system.
Most reputation systems do not model transitive trust.2 Limited transitive
trust has, however, been implemented in the PGP web of trust [1]. Yet, the scope
of the PGP system is restricted to one application: It is only used to establish
the authenticity of a public key used in asymmetric cryptography. Attempts to
generalize the web of trust idea, using transitive trust in reputation systems, can
be found in [8] and [2].
Only few reputation systems do, however, attempt to model the domain-
dependence of trust, among them [2]. [21], too, describes a reputation system
whose scope is not limited to a single domain like file-sharing or electronic com-
merce, but does not model domain-dependence explicitly.
While a number of applications for peer-to-peer reputation systems have been
discussed in literature, the authors are not aware of an approach that uses trust
or reputation for confidentiality modeling in peer-to-peer systems, as it is done
in this article.
3 Measurements of Trust and Confidentiality
In order to assign trust values to other entities, some kind of trust measurement
is required. However, measuring trust is not a trivial task. One approach is to use
a monetary measurement: The level of trust you have in a person is given by the
amount of money you are willing to entrust to that person. This measurement
has been used in empirical research [7]. However, monetary equivalents cannot
be used in all trust domains, as their determination will often be difficult.
An alternative is to use a trust scale without a concrete meaning or real-world
equivalent. This approach has been used in the PGP trust model: A person
can be trusted “fully” or “marginally” or considered “untrustworthy”, but no
explicit meaning is assigned to these terms [1]. The same is true for a number
of reputation systems, often using a scale from 0 to 1 [12], [11]. This approach
does not seem to be satisfactory, as the semantics of a certain trust assessment
may differ between users. However, there is no better solution available. The
problem may be reduced by assigning labels to certain values of the numerical
range. For example, the label “completely untrusted” may be assigned to 0 ; 0.3
might mean “only unimportant information may be entrusted to this person”,
and so forth. This approach provides an orientation for assigning trust values.
In [14, section 2.3], the use of numerical values as a trust scale is discussed in
greater depth.
2 Still, transitive trust can exist implicitly.
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For the article at hand, the relationship of trust and confidentiality plays an
important role: We focus on determining who should have access to certain types
of confidential information. In other words, we define a model that helps to decide
whether to entrust confidential information to others, based on a measurement
of confidentiality. But is there such a measurement?
In the network security community, confidentiality has been defined as “the
protection of transmitted data from passive attacks” [18]. This definition does not
leave room for a measurement of confidentiality. However, such a measurement
is necessary: There is information that you would not give to anybody. But
there is also information that you entrust to some close friends—or even to your
colleagues at work. Still, the information can be confidential, as you would not
like to read it in a newspaper. To explain this differentiation, a notion of “more
confidential” or “less confidential” can be helpful. The concept of trust can help
to come to such a notion: Entrusting information to someone usually means
that you trust this person—there are exceptions (you may be forced to give the
information away, or may feel obliged to do so), but in general, that relation
between trust and confidentiality holds. The more confidential an information
is, the more trust in the recipient must the author have if he or she entrusts that
information to the recipient.
The confidentiality level of a piece of information can therefore be defined
as the extent of trust the author must have in another person before willing to
entrust the information to that person. This way, confidentiality can be measured
on the same scale as trust.
4 Basic Idea of a Confidentiality-Modeling Reputation
System
The aim of Rebcon system is to protect the confidentiality of information (rep-
resented in documents); only persons who are sufficiently trustworthy should be
able to access a document. For this purpose, each user classifies his documents
into distinct domains (this can be done semi-automatically) and rates their con-
fidentiality. Similarly to the PGP web of trust, the reputation system requires a
user to perform two trust assessments with respect to at least one other person.
A user A has to decide to which degree he or she trusts another user B both
with respect to a certain domain, i.e. up to which confidentiality level he or she
is willing to send documents to B, and as a trust introducer (transitive trust).
4.1 Terminology and Concepts Used
The following notation is used to describe the local view on a trust relationship.
The term node instead of user is used in order to clarify that decisions are made
by a network participant, but not necessarily by a human user:
TDA (B,C) Node B’s trust in node C with respect to domain D, as seen by node A.
ID(B,C) Node B’s trust in node C as a trust introducer, i.e. the extent to which
B trusts C to assess other users’ trustworthiness, in the domain D.
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Conf(Z) Confidentiality level of document Z. Each document belongs to a cer-
tain domain D.
All values T , I, and Conf must be in the interval [0; 1].
Depending on the confidentiality level of a document Z and the trust its
author has in a potential recipient B, each participant can decide whether or not
to send the document Z to B.
Assigning different trust introducer ratings for each domain may be a complex
task for a user. As a simplification, node B could assign a general trust introducer
rating I(B,C) to node C. The domain-specific value ID(B,C) would then be
computed by multiplying the general trust introducer rating with the domain-
specific trust in C: ID(B,C) = I(B,C) · TDB (B,C). However, this is a local
decision, and B could choose to determine trust introducer ratings in a different
way.
Note that the confidentiality of a document is not modeled as being domain-
dependent. As a consequence, a piece of information may only be assigned one
domain. In reality, information can belong to several domains. For example, the
amount of money you spend on pharmaceuticals is an information that belongs
to the financial as well as the medical domain. Maybe you are reluctant to give
this information to your financial advisors (high confidentiality rating in the
finance domain), but do not care whether your doctor gets the information (low
confidentiality rating in the medical domain). The Rebcon system could easily
be extended to allow for information that belongs to multiple domains. Yet, in
the interest of a clear presentation of the protocol, we omit this extension.
The idea of the Rebcon system is to give each node in the network as much
information on trust relationships as necessary in order to decide whether it
can forward a piece of information (i.e. whether the author of the information
trusts the intended recipient sufficiently). Forwarding a document belonging to
a domain D is only allowed if the document’s confidentiality rating is below the
author’s trust in the intended recipient. The author is not necessarily available
for this decision; therefore, a trust model must allow other nodes to decide for
him or her. However, information about the author’s (and other nodes’) trust
relationships should not be revealed unless necessary for this decision. Section 5
explains in greater detail how this is done.
4.2 Requirements
Taking the basic idea (pointed out above) as a starting point, we have identified
a number of requirements:
– (R1) A document may only be forwarded to a node B, if (from the forward-
ing node A’s point of view) the trust of the document’s author C in B (with
respect to the domain D of the document Z) is at least equal to the confiden-
tiality rating of the document: TDA (C,B) ≥ Conf(Z).
The first requirement describes the foundation of the protocol.
– (R2) For privacy reasons, it should not be possible to find out to what extent
other people trust a node without prior contact to that node.
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In most existing reputation systems and related approaches, including
the PGP web of trust, trust relations are visible to the public. Therefore,
one might argue that hiding trust relations is unnecessary. However, in a
protocol whose main target is to preserve privacy, it makes sense to also
hide this information, when possible. For example, you may not want your
boss to find out that you trust your co-workers more than her.
– (R3) A node M cannot choose TDM (B,C) higher than allowed by B without
being detected.
Otherwise, a malicious node M could forward B’s documents to the not
sufficiently trusted node C and also convince other (even obedient) nodes to
do so without having to fear any sanctions.
– (R4) Multiple identities do not lead to an advantage for a malicious node.
This means the system is immune to the Sybil attack (the increase of a
reputation value by creating multiple identities [4]).
– (R5) A node can change its trust assessments with respect to other nodes at
any time.
Trust relations change over time; particularly, trust may be lost quickly.
– (R6) The system should not require constant availability of its participants.
In typical Peer-to-Peer networks, it is not realistic to assume all nodes to
be available at all times.
With these requirements, we have focused on privacy and security aspects. Other
properties may be desirable, but are not the focus of this work. The list of
requirements should not be considered to be complete; instead, it represents the
aspects considered most relevant by the authors.
4.3 Assumptions
The Rebcon system relies on several assumptions:
– (A1) Indirect trust relationships are built upon direct ones. This requires at
least a certain extent of transitive trust.
– (A2) There must be a way to create the above-mentioned direct trust re-
lationships. This requires long-living identities of the system participants.
These identities need not be mapped to real-world identities.
– (A3) No positive direct trust values may be assigned to newcomers in the
system, or it must be difficult to create new identities (e.g. by mapping them
to real-world identities using pseudonyms that can be uncovered by a trusted
entity). This means that there is no direct trust in new participants at all,
or they have to make an effort to gain trust. This assumption is necessary
to fulfill requirement R4.
– (A4) A public key infrastructure is needed to enable asymmetric encryption
of documents. The design of this public key infrastructure may also be the
basis for fulfilling the assumptions A2 and A3.
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5 System Design
We begin our explanation of the Rebcon system by giving a simple example
of (transitive) trust relationships. Afterwards, the protocol is described in more
detail.
5.1 Example
This section gives an example of the results of trust assessments in the Rebcon
system (see figure 1).
Alice gives Bob a trust value of 0.3 in the domain “nutrition” (N) and a general
trust introducer rating of 0.7. From this, Alice computes a domain-specific trust
introducer rating of 0.21 for Bob.
Fig. 1. A simple example of transitive trust
IN (A,B) = 0.21
Bob gives Charlie a trust value of 0.5 in the domain “nutrition”.
TNB (B,C) = 0.5
From Bob’s point of view, this means that
TNB (A,C) = I
N (A,B) · TNB (B,C) = 0.21 · 0.5 = 0.105
In the next step, Alice gives Eve a trust value of 0.4 in the domain “nutrition”
(N) and a general trust introducer rating of 0.9, leading to a trust value of 0.36
as a trust introducer in the “nutrition” domain.
IN (A,E) = 0.36
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Eve trusts Charlie in the domain “nutrition” with 0.2.
TNE (E, C) = 0.2
That means that from Eve’s point of view, the following holds:
TNE (A,C) = I
N (A,E) · TNE (E, C) = 0.36 · 0.2 = 0.072
Therefore, Eve could forward a document in the “nutrition” domain created
by Alice to Charlie only if its confidentiality rating is below 0.072. Given Bob’s
assessment, the document could be forwarded to Charlie up to a confidential-
ity rating of 0.105. This could even be done by Eve, if she is aware of Bob’s
assessment.
The example makes clear that a precondition for the Rebcon system design
is the existence of some direct trust relationship among its participants. On the
one hand, this refers to the trust domain itself, on the other hand, it concerns
the trust in an entity as a trust introducer.
Whenever a document is sent to another node, the information about the
author’s trust relationships to other nodes—as depicted in the example—is at-
tached to it. The recipient gets to know his or her rating as a trust introducer
I. Any further information about trust assessments is encrypted with the public
key of the entities assessed. Therefore, the sender is not required to reveal more
about his trust relationships than necessary for checking whether a recipient
is sufficiently trusted; not even the node receiving the document can read the
information.
5.2 Trust Formation
As a first step, it is important for each node A to choose and locally save the
values TDA (A,B) and I
D(A,B) for at least one node B. There may be vari-
ous reasons for trusting a node. Personal acquaintances are not necessary. For
example, you may assign a positive initial trust value to all nodes whose IP ad-
dresses belong to the company you work at, or (using certificates) to all nodes
whose identity has been checked by a trusted third party. Moreover, an existing
reputation system can serve as a basis for assigning initial trust values.
5.3 Transmission of a Document
This section describes the protocol to be followed when transmitting a document.
At first, we consider the transmission by the author himself. As a second step,
we describe the determination of trust values by other entities forwarding a
document.
Submission by the Author. When creating a document Z, user A assesses
its confidentiality Conf(Z), with 0 ≤ Conf(Z) ≤ 1. Besides, he or she chooses a
domain D to which the document belongs.
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If a document created by A is to be sent by user A to another user B, node A
will check whether TDA (A,B) ≥ Conf(Z). If this is not the case, the transmission
must not take place.
If the transmission is possible, A sends the following information to B (EB(X)
means X, encrypted with B’s public key; SA(X) means X, signed by A. All
signatures include a timestamp; for clarity, timestamps are not listed separately
in the following sections.):
– SA(Z,Conf(Z))
i.e. the signed document and its confidentiality rating.
– SA(ID(A,B))
i.e. the extent to which A trusts B as a trust introducer. This enables A to
adjust the degree of transitivity of trust.
– For each user U, for whom TDA (A,U) ≥ Conf(Z) (this includes B) :
• EU (SA(TDA (A,U)))
Sending A’s trust relationships along allows other nodes to compute trust
levels on behalf of A. However, they are encrypted with the respective
trusted node’s public key. This means that B cannot reveal to what
extent A trusts another node without participation of that node: B can
only read one entry of this vector. Though sending this information along
causes considerable protocol overhead, we have chosen not to store it on
a central server, as this would violate the Peer-to-Peer paradigm and
introduce a single point of failure. Considering the typical number of
trust relations in other trust networks (like the PGP web of trust), it
seems reasonable to assume that A will have a few dozen trust relations
per domain at maximum. We believe the resulting message size to still
be tractable.
Additionally, all the information sent to B is encrypted with B’s public key.
Forwarding a Document: The Second Step. If B now wants to forward the
document Z to user F, he also has to check whether F is sufficiently trusted, i.e.
whether TDB (A,F ) ≥ Conf(Z). B determines TDB (A,F ) in one of the following
ways:
– The value may be cached from previous contacts.
– Given ID(A,B) and TDB (B,F ), B sets T
D
B (A,F ) = I
D(A,B) · TDB (B,F ).
– If B has information about trust assessments performed by other nodes, B
can compute a trust path from A to F, using the assumption that ∀X,Y, Z :
TDX (Y,Z) = I
D(Y,X) ·TDX (X,Z), i.e. X’s trust in Z is discounted due to Y’s
limited trust in X as a trust introducer. If more than one trust path is found,
the maximum trust value is used.
Querying for Higher Trust Values. However, if B does not yet trust F sufficiently,
i.e. if TDB (A,F ) < Conf(Z), B must first get to know whether part of the
encrypted trust information (not readable by him) he received justifies a different
assessment:
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B sends the vector (EU (SA(TDA (A,U)))) (where U represents the entities as-
sessed, who are not known to B) received by A to F prior to forwarding the
document Z.
If one of the entries can be decrypted with F’s private key (i.e. it contains a
trust assessment of F), F decrypts this entry SA(TDA (A,F )) and sends it back
to B, encrypted with B’s public key.3 This proves to what extent A trusts F.
B saves TDA (A,F ). B repeats the determination of T
D
B (A,F ). If this value is
now greater than Conf(Z), the further transmission can be done in the same
manner as if B had been able to establish the trust relationship to F himself.
Information Sent by B. Additional to his own trust assessments, B has to prove
that his possession of the document is justified: If it was not, F could uncover
B as a malicious node and forbear from distributing the document any further.
Therefore, B sends to F:
– SB(SA(Z,Conf(Z))
i.e. the signed document and its confidentiality rating.
– SB(SA(ID(A,B)))
i.e. A’s trust in B as a trust introducer.
– SB(SA(TDA (A,B)))
i.e. A’s trust in B with respect to the domain D.
– For each user U (with the exception of B), for whom B has received a trust
assessment from A:
• EU (SA(TDA (A,U)))
– For each user U for whom ID(A,B)·TDB (A,U) ≥ Conf(Z) (this includes F) :
• EU (SB(TDB (A,U)))
Additionally, all the information sent to F is encrypted with F’s public key.
The second and the third item make traceable why B is entitled to possess
and to forward the document Z.
Further Steps. Any further communication steps can be performed analo-
gously: Every time a document is supposed to be forwarded, the sender checks if
the trust information he or she has justifies that. If it does not, the sender asks
the recipient to decrypt encrypted trust information that possibly refers to the
recipient. In case the document can be sent, the sender also proves that his or
her own possession of the document was justified.
In general, each forwarding of a document by a user includes
– The document and its confidentiality assessment, signed by the original au-
thor.
– The chain of all trust introducer assessments from the original author to the
node forwarding the document, including the signatures of all nodes being
part of that chain.
3 Alternatively, F could choose not to answer, e.g. if F does not want to reveal to what
extent A trusts him.
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– The chain of all domain-specific trust assessments from the original author
to the node forwarding the document, including the signatures of all nodes
being part of that chain.
– All trust assessments received by the forwarding node, encrypted with the
assessed nodes’ public keys.
– The forwarding node’s own trust assessments, encrypted with the assessed
nodes’ public keys.
5.4 Changing Trust Assessments
If the trust by one node in another node changes or a pre-defined time span af-
ter their creation has passed, cached trust values have to be overwritten. When
the first document after the change is sent, message contents remain the same.
In the vector EU (SA(TDA (A,U))), as sent by node A, the respective entry is
marked as updated. The new trust value, however, will not be uncovered. All
trust assessments made by A are cleared from the cache of all users who re-
ceive the updated vector. If a node F receives the vector EU (SA(TDA (A,U))) and
is asked to uncover the trust value TDA (A,U), it may still reply with the old
value. However, as the signatures used include timestamps, this fraud can be
detected.
Note that this procedure will not securely prevent the further distribution of
old documents to now untrusted entities: There is a chance that the updated
trust information does not reach a node in time before it forwards a document.
6 Security Analysis and Fulfillment of Requirements
This section explains to what extent the requirements described in section 4.2
are fulfilled by the system.
– (R1) A document may only be forwarded to a node B, if (from the forward-
ing node A’s point of view) the trust of the document’s author C in B (with
respect to the domain D of the document Z) is at least equal to the confiden-
tiality rating of the document: TDA (C,B) ≥ Conf(Z).
If the forwarding node is obedient, the fulfillment of this requirement is
granted: The protocol makes all information available which is necessary
to check the condition. Depending on the application scenario, inadvertent
disclosure may occur—this is the case if the information is to be read by a
human user and not just to be processed by his computer system. User inter-
face design can help reminding a user of the confidentiality of an information;
e.g. the accidental creation of digital copies can be prevented.
If the forwarding node is malicious, the system can only make sure that
the recipient can detect the protocol violation. The recipient can check the
signature of the document’s confidentiality rating and reconstruct his or
her own trust rating. Yet, if a malicious node pretends to be the author
of the protected document, replacing the original signature with its own,
unauthorized forwarding cannot be detected. However, the existence of two
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identical documents from different authors may lead to uncovering of the
malicious behavior. Watermarking may also be helpful, but is not considered
in this article.
Note that one single node receiving a confidential document turns out
not to be trustworthy, the out-of-band disclosure of information cannot be
prevented; therefore, the underlying trust relations have to be reliable.
– (R2) For privacy reasons, it should not be possible to find out to what extent
other people trust a node without prior contact to that node.
This is achieved by encryption of the trust assessments; only the trusted
person can decrypt them. An attacker M could attempt to deceive the trusted
node C by requesting the decryption of trust assessments using the identity
of a different node B. However, C will encrypt these trust assessments with
B’s public key; therefore, even M’s active attack will fail.
– (R3) A node M cannot choose TDM (B,C) higher than allowed by B without
being detected.
To achieve this, M must make available to the recipient all (signed) infor-
mation which allow to reconstruct why he or she is entitled to possess the
document and to forward it to the recipient.
– (R4) Multiple identities do not lead to an advantage for a malicious node.
As long as no participant from outside the group generated by the mali-
cious node trusts a member of this group, no documents will be sent to the
group. Multiple identities allow for the creation of longer trust paths, and
of more trust paths. However, longer trust paths only lead to reduced trust;
additional trust paths have no effect, as only the one leading to maximal
trust will be considered. While the protocol design does not give users with
multiple identities an advantage concerning the transitive trust relations,
assumption A3 is needed to ensure the same for the underlying direct trust
relations.
– (R5) A node can change its trust assessments with respect to other nodes at
any time.
The procedure for the change of trust assessments is described in
section 5.4.
– (R6) The system should not require constant availability of its participants.
The system does not require longer-lasting communication connections
than necessary for the document distribution itself: All communication is
performed only directly prior to the transfer of a document.
7 Conclusion
This article describes the Rebcon system used for confidentiality modeling. It
allows users in a Peer-to-Peer network to limit the distribution of documents to
nodes considered trustworthy. The system cannot prevent trusted nodes from
distributing the documents over channels outside the systems. Even inside the
system, this unauthorized forwarding is detectable (as long as the original author
information is not removed), but cannot be prevented.
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However, the system can make information available that allows obedient
nodes to judge the trustworthiness of other nodes, and to decide whether the
creator of a document would agree to its distribution to certain nodes. Privacy
is preserved by revealing trust relationships only with the consent of the entities
whose trustworthiness is assessed.
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Abstract. We have developed a suite of algorithms to address two problems
confronting reputation systems for large peer-to-peer markets: data sparseness
and inaccurate feedback. To mitigate the effect of inaccurate feedback – par-
ticularly retaliatory negative feedback – we propose EM-trust, which uses a la-
tent variable statistical model of the feedback process. To handle sparse data,
we propose Bayesian versions of both EM-trust and the well-known Percent
Positive Feedback system. Using a marketplace simulator, we demonstrate that
these algorithms provide more accurate reputations than standard Percent Positive
Feedback.
1 Introduction
Reputation systems allow users of distributed and peer-to-peer systems to make trust
decisions regarding potential partners about which they are unlikely to have firsthand
knowledge. In the past several years, many novel reputation algorithms have been pro-
posed for applications such as email filtering [1], multi-agent and grid computing [2],
and electronic markets [3, 4], among others.
Large peer-to-peer online marketplaces present particular challenges for reputation
system research because the interaction patterns among their users prevent the use of
many existing algorithms. Users rarely interact more than once with a trading partner,
rendering ineffective algorithms that use past interactions to predict future performance.
Unlike pure peer-to-peer systems, trading partners in existing large markets are typically
matched via a global search facility, which yields an interaction graph that is unlikely
to have much “small world” structure, reducing the effectiveness of reputation systems
designed to exploit such information. Furthermore, information about user behavior in
these markets is typically very sparse: the 1.4 billion items listed last year on eBay
represents less than .00005% of the possible interactions between active users.
Reputation systems for large-scale markets must also be able to intelligently handle
inaccurate feedback. Of particular concern is retaliatory negative feedback, where a user
that receives a negative feedback responds with a negative, even if his or her partner did
nothing wrong aside from complain. It is difficult to ascertain which negative is accu-
rate, and should thus count against the user’s reputation, and which is merely retaliation
and should be ignored or discounted. A further effect of retaliatory negatives is the over-
all chilling effect they have on participation in the feedback process. A single negative
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feedback will have a large effect on the reputation of a user who has participated in only
a few transactions, while it will have scarcely any effect on users with long histories.
Experienced users exploit this asymmetry by rarely leaving feedback first and always
retaliating for received negatives, even ones that are justified. Users aware of this tactic
often will not leave negative feedback except in the case of outright fraud out of fear
of damage to their reputation. Negative feedback is thus discouraged and underreported
[5], a phenomenon that some researchers believe eBay ignores because a marketplace
with abundant positive feedback appears safer and more inviting to new customers [6].
In this report, we present several techniques for building reputation systems that are
robust with respect to the sparse and inaccurate data that will be encountered in real mar-
ketplaces. To mitigate the effect of retaliatory negative feedback, we propose EM-trust,
an algorithm that uses a latent variable model of the feedback process to estimate reputa-
tions using Expectation-Maximization. EM-trust essentially assumes away the problem
of retaliation by distributing fault for a failed transaction in a statistically fair manner.
To address the problem of data sparseness, we propose Bayesian variants of both EM-
trust and eBay’s Percent Positive Feedback (PPF). Since the prior distribution of user
reliability needed for a Bayesian estimator is not immediately available, we also demon-
strate how a workable prior distribution can be estimated on-line from feedback data.
Using a marketplace simulator, we show that EM-trust estimates users’ true reliabil-
ity more accurately than PPF, even in the absence of retaliatory negative feedbacks. We
further demonstrate that the relative performance of EM-trust improves at high rates
of retaliation. We also demonstrate the advantages of using Bayesian estimates in both
EM-trust and PPF in a realistically sparse dataset. The Bayesian EM-trust reputation
system, which effectively manages both missing and inaccurate feedback data, pro-
duces the most accurate estimates of users’ true reliability.
2 Related Work
Reputation systems grew out of earlier work on soft security, the problem of determin-
ing whether online services should be trusted [7]. The concept of reputation has been
studied in some depth by the economics community; for example, Kennes and Schiff
[8] present a theoretical analysis of the value of reputation, and Tadelis [9] models rep-
utation as an asset that can be traded. Marsh [10] is among the early work that combines
notions of trust and reputation from philosophy, psychology, and economics and applies
them to multi-agent systems.
Many existing reputation systems can be broadly divided into those that primarily
use one’s previous experience with a user to estimate its reliability [11] and those that
use small-world phenomena to build chains of acquaintance to find other users who
can vouch for the reputation of a potential trading partner [1, 12, 3]. Some systems,
like Kasbah’s Histos and Sporas system, use a combination of both mechanisms [4].
As mentioned above, we feel that these techniques have limited applicability to large
markets.
The problem of fraud in online markets and in the feedback system has recently
attracted considerable attention both from researchers and the mainstream press. Del-
larocas [13] discusses the problem of making robust evaluations of reputation despite
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unreliable feedback. The Pinocchio system [14] tries to detect and discourage inaccu-
rate feedback using a combination of economic incentives and fraud detection.
Online marketplaces, and particularly eBay, have been widely studied by the eco-
nomics and business communities. For example, Lucking-Reiley et al. [15] look at on-
line auctions of rare coins to determine what features drive pricing differences among
similar items on eBay. Bajari and Hortacsu [16] also look at pricing and compare eBay
users’ behavior to theoretically ideal auction behavior. Calkins [6] analyzes the eBay
reputation system from a legal standpoint and finds it lacking. Resnick and Zeckhauser
performed a major empirical study [5] of eBay user behavior, including participation
rates, bidding behavior and feedback. Resnick, Zeckhauser, and other collaborators also
authored a comparison of various reputation systems [17] that analyzed their strengths
and weakness.
3 Algorithm Design
We begin by defining a user i’s reliability, λi, as the probability that the user will per-
form acceptably in a transaction. As suggested by [18], we currently do not try to as-
sess motivation — poor performance caused by deception or malice is indistinguishable
from mere incompetence. Since the end result is the same, we do not think it is neces-
sary to treat the sources of unacceptable performance separately.
The job of the reputation system, then, is to accurately estimate λi from users’ (pos-
sibly unreliable) feedback. When user i interacts with user j in a transaction, we ob-
serve two feedback variables, Fij and Fji, indicating the feedback left by user i for user
j and vice versa. These variables are can take values from the set {−1, 1, 0} indicat-
ing negative, positive, and no feedback respectively. We do not currently model neutral
feedback, since it is both infrequently given and is considered by most to be merely a
weak negative.
Also associated with each transaction are two latent Bernoulli random variables, Tij
and Tji. Tij indicates whether user i performed acceptably in the transaction with user
j, and Tji represents user j’s performance in the same transaction. We assume indepen-
dence between transactions, so the distribution of these Bernoulli random variables is
characterized by the users’ reliability parameters, λi and λj .
In general, the feedback variables can depend on the individual performance vari-
ables as well as on each other. These dependencies are complex and difficult to quantify,
so we do not attempt to model them explicitly. However, we do make some assumptions
about the way rational users leave feedback. Our first assumption is that all transactions
are legitimate transactions between real users. While reputation fraud, such as ballot
stuffing and badmouthing, perpetrated by fake transactions and Sybil users is an inter-
esting problem in its own right, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
Second, we assume that positive feedback always indicates that the recipient behaved
acceptably in the transaction. While users may leave positive feedback despite small
faults (e.g. slow shipping) in the hope of encouraging a reciprocal positive, it seems un-
likely that a user would leave positive feedback for a grossly under-performing partner
just to get a positive in return. In any case, we cannot discern a false positive from a
true positive feedback, so we consider them all to be legitimate.
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Finally, we assume that a negative feedback by itself does not indicate poor perfor-
mance, unless the recipient of the negative feedback has left a positive for his or her
partner. We know that the process of retaliation creates false negatives, and we also hy-
pothesize that nefarious users may leave pre-emptive false negatives to try to disguise
bad behavior.
3.1 The EM-Trust Algorithm
If we could observe the Tij and Tji variables, estimating λi would be trivial. Since
these variables are latent, we proceed by using an Expectation-Maximization algorithm
to iteratively refine our estimates of these parameters. We start with initial estimates λ(0)i
for each user’s reliability parameter. These starting values do not have a great effect in
our application, so we start with λ(0)i = 0.5 for all i.
Expectation Step. For each transaction involving user i, we calculate the conditional
expectation that i performed acceptably given the observed feedback:1
E[Tij |Fij = 1, Fji = 1] = 1
E[Tij |Fij = 0, Fji = 1] = 1
E[Tij |Fij = −1, Fji = 1] = 1
E[Tij |Fij = 1, Fji = −1] = 0
E[Tij |Fij = 0, Fji = −1] = E[Tij |TijTji = 0]
E[Tij |Fij = −1, Fji = 0] = E[Tij |TijTji = 0]
E[Tij |Fij = −1, Fji = −1] = E[Tij |TijTji = 0]
We do not compute the expectation for the two unlisted cases (Fij = 1, Fji = 0 and
Fij = Fji = 0) and instead treat these transactions as missing data. The calculations
for E[Tji|Fij , Fji] are the same with the subscripts reversed.
When at least one negative and no positive feedback is given, all we know is that
someone behaved unacceptably. We cannot rely on the feedback being accurate in these
cases, so we use the more fundamental expectation E[Tij |TijTji = 0]. To compute this
expectation, we look at the joint distribution, P{TijTji, Tij , Tji}, marginalize over Tji,
condition on TijTji = 0, and take the expectation to obtain the expression:
E[Tij |TijTji = 0] =
λ
(t)
i − λ(t)i λ(t)j
1 − λ(t)i λ(t)j
(1)
1 We observe a slight increase in accuracy if we let E[Tij |Fij = 0, Fji = −1] = 0 and treat
E[Tij |Fij = −1, Fji = 0] as missing data. However, doing so creates an incentive for retali-
ation beyond the social incentives that already exist. Thus, rational users will always retaliate,
so performance with this modification should converge to that of the version presented in the
body of this report. Since our simulated users do not adapt to the system being tested, we
feel any performance gains from this modification are due to simulation biases rather than a
true improvement in accuracy. However, when deploying EM-trust in a real market, it may be
worthwhile to reconsider this modification.
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This estimation process is the key to the EM-trust algorithm. We assume that nega-
tive feedback is mostly unreliable and so we penalize both parties in such a transaction.
The amount of “blame” given to each is based on the current reputations of the two
parties in a transaction, with more blame given to the lower reputation user. The aim
of this technique is to render retaliatory feedback irrelevant. If a user has received a
negative feedback, it does not matter whether he or she leaves a retaliatory negative or
not: the reputations of both parties will be computed in the same fashion regardless of
whether the user retaliates.
The only way in which the recipient of a negative feedback can change the outcome
of the reputation process is by leaving a positive for its partner, which will have the
effect of shifting all blame for the transaction failure onto itself, lowering its reputation
even further. On its face, it is not desirable for the reputation system to discourage users
from leaving honest feedback. However, users rarely leave positive feedback for others
that gave them negative feedback, even when such behavior will not result in a lower
reputation: Resnick and Zeckhauser [5] report that none of the buyers and only 13% of
sellers who received negative feedback respond with a positive feedback. Therefore we
feel that making slightly more optimal the pre-existing strategy of not praising those
who criticize you is a worthwhile tradeoff for mitigating the effect of the far more
damaging tactic of retaliation.
Maximization Step. For the maximization step, we use the above conditional expected
values as the sufficient statistics needed to update estimates of the parameters λi. Let
〈Tij〉(t) = E[Tij |Fij , Fji] be the conditional expectation of user i’s behavior in a trans-
action with user j computed in the expectation step of iteration t. Let A be the set of
users with which user i has interacted and for whom we have computed 〈Tij〉(t). We
estimate the updated value of user i’s reliability parameter as
λ
(t+1)
i =
1
|A|
∑
j∈A
〈Tij〉(t) (2)
We then use these updated parameter estimates in the next estimation step and repeat
the whole process until convergence.
Currently, if a pair of users have had multiple transactions together, EM-trust be-
haves like PPF and only counts the most recent transaction, making it more difficult
for malicious users to create bogus reputations by leaving multiple positive feedbacks
for sales of non-existent items. If it should become desirable to include all transactions
between two users, the modifications to EM-trust would be trivial.
As an iterative algorithm, EM-trust is naturally more expensive to run than PPF.
Each iteration, though, is linear in the number of transactions, and convergence is fast
in practice. We are also developing an incremental version of EM-trust that recalculates
reputations only as needed for user queries that will permit scaling to realistically sized
marketplaces.
3.2 Bayesian Algorithms
To help manage data sparseness, we developed Bayesian versions of PPF and EM-
Trust that use a prior distribution of user behavior as well as the observed data to
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estimate the user’s actual behavior distribution. For a prior we use a mixture of Beta
distributions:
γBeta(α1, β1) + (1 − γ)Beta(α2, β2) (3)
where the α1 and β1 parameters describe the probability distribution of acceptable per-
formance among users that are mostly honest and competent (i.e., the reliable users) and
α2 and β2 describe the distribution of acceptable performance among mostly dishon-
est or incompetent (i.e. unreliable) users. The γ parameter describes the proportion of
reliable users in the market. As with all Bayesian methods, estimating these parameter
values is one of the main challenges for a successful implementation.
For EM-trust, the estimation step remains the same, but the maximization step re-
places the simple maximum likelihood estimate with the mean of the posterior
distribution:
λ
(t+1)
i = γ
′ α
′
1
α′1 + β′1
+ (1 − γ′) α
′
2
α′2 + β′2
(4)
where
γ′ = γB(α
′
1,β
′
1)B(α2,β2)
γB(α′1,β
′
1)B(α2,β2)+(1−γ)B(α′2,β′2)B(α1,β1)
α′1 = α1 +
∑
j∈A〈Tij〉(t) β′1 = β1 + |A| −
∑
j∈A〈Tij〉(t)
α′2 = α2 +
∑
j∈A〈Tij〉(t) β′2 = β2 + |A| −
∑
j∈A〈Tij〉(t)
(5)
and B(α, β) is the Beta function,
∫ 1
0 x
α−1(1 − x)β−1dx. This same formula is used
to create a Bayesian version of PPF. However, instead of the sufficient statistics, 〈Tij〉,
Bayesian PPF uses the observed feedbacks Fji directly.
3.3 Estimating the Bayesian Prior
The Bayesian versions of EM-trust and PPF realize all of their advantages by incor-
porating knowledge of the prior distribution of user reliability during the estimation
process. Without information about this prior distribution, these techniques are useless:
using a non-informative (uniform) prior resulted in lower performance than the non-
Bayesian versions of the algorithms.
We have developed a method for estimating the prior that uses nothing but the ob-
served feedback. This method exploits the fact that non-Bayesian EM-trust and PPF
both calculate acceptably accurate estimates of user reliability. We can use these es-
timates along with one of several well-known techniques to estimate the density of
the reliability distribution. Essentially, we bootstrap the Bayesian versions of EM-trust
and PPF by using the results of their non-Bayesian counterparts to estimate the prior
distribution. During simulation, we periodically (every 10,000–25,000 transactions) re-
estimate the prior by running the non-Bayesian reputation algorithm to generate relia-
bility values and fitting a density to this data.
4 Testing Methodology
Because testing reputation systems in a real market is not feasible, we developed a sim-
ulator to evaluate our algorithms. While simulated results are at best an approximation
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of what can be expected in a real marketplace, we believe it is a better demonstration
of a reputation system’s characteristics than the simple test cases or theoretical bounds
that are prevalent in the literature. Simulation also permits us to test algorithms in mul-
tiple markets with varied characteristics in order to examine robustness across a range
of plausible scenarios.
For simplicity, our simulator assumes that all users are trading in a single commodity
at a fixed price. Since none of the algorithms we test currently use price, commodity
type, or bidding behavior when calculating reputations, it was unnecessary to simulate
the full auction process.
Users created by our simulator have a number of parameters, including the frequency
with which they buy and sell, the probability of successfully completing a transaction
(reliability), the probability of leaving the first feedback, and conditions under which
they will leave positive and negative feedback. All of these parameters can be modified
in order to simulate different marketplace behaviors.
To simulate a single transaction, the simulator chooses a seller and a buyer accord-
ing to Poisson rate parameters that govern how often each user buys or sells. The seller
and buyer then decide whether they want to interact with each other based on their
reputations. The probability that a user will interact is given by applying a sigmoidal
function to its partner’s reputation. Two parameters, the interaction threshold and inter-
action width, control the location and steepness of the sigmoid’s inflection point. If a
user cannot find a partner willing to trade within a set period of time, the buy or sell
offer expires and the user has to try again later.
Once a buyer/seller pair agrees to interact, the simulator determines their perfor-
mance in the transaction according to the users’ reliability parameters (λi). They then
leave feedback for each other based on their performance in the transaction. The user
that leaves feedback second may also use the feedback he or she received to determine
what type of feedback to leave.
Both for efficiency reasons and because feedback is not usually left immediately
after completion of a transaction, we do not recalculate reputations after each trans-
action. Instead, the simulator pauses and recalculates the reputation of all users in the
system after a set number of transactions (the epoch, currently 1000 transactions). All
the simulations in this report were run for 500 epochs, or 500,000 transactions.
At the start of each epoch, users may find that their new reputation is low enough
that they will have a greater chance of interacting as a new user with no reputation than
with their current identity. These users will either discard their accounts and start anew
with a fresh identity or will leave the market. In addition, the simulator adds new users
in order to model marketplace growth over time.
We believe that the simulator achieves our desiderata: its assumptions appear to
us to be realistic, at least to a first approximation; it seems to model observed be-
havior well enough, and robustly enough, so that the results are plausible proxies for
what would happen in real marketplaces. Moreover, as far as we can tell, it does not
incorporate any biases designed to favor (or disfavor) our models. The robustness of
the simulation results suggests that further complications are unwarranted, at least
for our purposes. Of course, various improvements, such as more accurately and
automatically determining model parameters, are possible. We refer the interested
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reader to [19] for more detailed descriptions of the simulator and our methods of
choosing realistic simulation parameters.
4.1 Marketplace Characteristics
In order to demonstrate the effect of different marketplace characteristics on the repu-
tation systems we test, we developed two different simulated marketplaces. The param-
eters of our first marketplace — henceforth called Marketplace A — were chosen such
that certain statistics, such as the rates of different types of feedback and the distribution
of number of transactions per user, have values after 500,000 transactions that are close
to the values reported by [5] in their study of eBay. The market begins with 8000 buyers
and 1000 sellers. Of these users, 1% are “bad,” with a mean reliability of 0.01. The re-
maining 99% are “good” and have mean reliability 0.99. The overall mean reliability in
this market is thus 0.9802. New users are added at the rate of 1.15% per simulated day
and have the same reliability distribution as the original set of users. Users that leave
due to a low reputation return to the market 60% of the time, and their new user identity
keeps the reliability and other characteristics of their old identity.
While the reliability values in Marketplace A may seem remarkably high, they do
agree with observations that the vast majority of users at eBay behave correctly essen-
tially all the time. However, some researchers believe that the extremely high reliability
at eBay is due to systematic underreporting of minor faults in the Feedback Forum.
To show how the reputation systems perform in a market with less than perfect users,
we created Marketplace B. Marketplace B is slightly smaller (1350 sellers and 4000
buyers) and does not grow as fast (0.25% per day). However, the main difference is
the distribution of user reliability. In Marketplace B, 98% of the users are “good,” but
the mean of good user reliability is only 0.9. Likewise, the bad users’ mean reliability
is 0.1, so the overall user mean is 0.884. This market models users that have higher
variance around their mean behavior. By showing results in both of these marketplaces,
we obtain some indication of how sensitive various reputation systems might be to the
actual distribution of user reliability.
5 Experimental Results
In order to test EM-trust, we ran a series of simulations and used several metrics to com-
pare PPF, EM-trust, and their Bayesian variants. Our first test measures how accurately
the four reputation systems can estimate the true underlying performance parameters
for the users in a marketplace. In the second test, we evaluate how well the algorithms
detect and eliminate low performance users. The final test measures the influence they
have on the liquidity of the simulated market.
The Bayesian results presented in this section use priors estimated using the meth-
ods discussed in Sect. 3.3. We used an EM density estimation method with five random
restarts per run to avoid local maxima, a technique that had the best balance of accu-
racy and speed in our tests. The resulting distributions have a mean Kullback-Liebler
divergence from the true prior of 2.6 in Market A and 1.1 in Market B, while the non-
informative prior’s divergence from the true prior in these markets is 5.3 and 1.9, respec-
tively. As we show below, even this simple prior estimation method offers significant
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advantages over not using prior information. However, that there are still differences be-
tween the true priors and these estimates suggest that there are opportunities to further
improve reputation system performance by simply refining prior estimation techniques.
The performance when using the true prior gives an upper bound on these potential
gains of about 25-35% in Market A and 35-45% in Market B.
5.1 Predicting Reliability
Our first experiment measures the reputation systems’ abilities to learn the actual relia-
bility of a set of users. For each reputation system, we ran simulations at three different
levels of retaliation. The 0% level simulates a marketplace where all feedback is com-
pletely accurate. At the 50% level, good users leave retaliatory negative feedback for
about half of the negative feedbacks they receive, while bad users always retaliate. At
the 100% level, all users always retaliate for negative feedback. From the data in [5]
and assuming that simultaneous failure of both the buyer and seller is rare, the 50%
retaliation level represents our best estimate of the rate of retaliation at eBay.
After each epoch of 1000 transactions, we computed the mean absolute error be-
tween the reputations returned by the reputation systems and the known ground truth
reliability of the users in the system. The results of this test are shown in Fig. 1.
With no retaliation, PPF and EM-trust performed roughly equally. In Market B, EM-
trust was slightly more accurate, while in Market A, PPF was better, at least during the
early stages of simulation. However, the advantages of EM-trust become apparent as
the level of retaliation is increased. While both algorithms become less accurate with
more retaliation, PPF’s performance decreases more than EM-trust. This experiment
demonstrates that both EM-trust variants accomplish the goal we set for them: they
perform at least as well as PPF in the zero retaliation case, and are much less influenced
by inaccurate feedback data introduced by retaliatory negatives.
These results also demonstrate the power of incorporating prior information in the
estimation process. The worse of the two Bayesian algorithms outperformed both of the
non-Bayesian ones. The Bayesian algorithms were also less susceptible to errors caused
by retaliation than their non-Bayesian counterparts.
5.2 Classification Performance
While more accurate evaluations of users’ performance is certainly a desirable feature in
reputation systems, the fundamental problem they aim to solve is one of classification.
A participant in a peer-to-peer marketplace hopes to use the information returned by
the reputation system to make a choice about whether to interact or not with a potential
trading partner.
To test the algorithms’ ability to distinguish good users from bad ones, we looked at
two statistics: the transaction success rate and the precision of user deactivations. The
transaction success rate is simply the percentage of transactions where both parties be-
haved correctly. The deactivation precision is the percentage of deactivated users (users
who leave the system because of a low reputation) whose true reliability is less than the
overall mean reliability. In other words, deactivation precision is the percentage of users
removed from the system who actually deserved to be removed. The former statistic can
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Fig. 1. Reputation system mean absolute error with (a)(b) no retaliation, (c)(d) 50% retaliation,
and (e)(f) 100% retaliation in Marketplace A (a)(c)(e) and Marketplace B (b)(d)(e). Error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals.
be intuitively interpreted as a form of recall and the latter as type of precision. An ideal
reputation system would score 1.0 on both metrics. We also present an overall perfor-
mance metric that combines these two results by taking their harmonic mean.
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We evaluated the algorithms over a range of interaction thresholds to show how these
two statistics change with the selectivity of the marketplace’s participants. In Market-
place A, with a mean reliability of 0.9802, we vary the threshold from 0.9 to 1.0. For
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Fig. 2. Effect of the interaction threshold on the (a)(b) transaction success rate, (c)(d) deactivation
precision, and (e)(f) combined performance in Marketplaces A and B. Error bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals.
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Marketplace B, with a mean reliability of 0.884, we vary the threshold from 0.76 to
0.96. With thresholds higher than 0.96 in this market, users are so reluctant to interact
with all but a tiny subset of their peers that the simulation becomes impractically slow.
All tests were conducted with the retaliation rate set to 50% for good users and 100%
for bad users. The results are shown in Fig. 2.
In both marketplaces, PPF had the highest transaction success rate, followed by EM-
trust, then Bayesian PPF, and finally Bayesian EM-trust. By and large, the transaction
success rates are not greatly affected by the interaction threshold, with the notable ex-
ception of Bayesian PPF, whose performance in Marketplace B rises rapidly at very
high threshold values and exceeds EM-trust’s performance at 0.96.
That lower error rates should result in lower transaction success rates may seem
counterintuitive. However, we must keep in mind that the MAE metric aggregates both
over- and underestimates of users’ true performance. PPF, because it does not account
for retaliatory negatives, is pessimistic and tends to underestimate true performance.
Thus, it effectively detects bad behavior, but at the price of lower estimates for all users.
The other algorithms are significantly less pessimistic, but their more accurate estimates
fail to detect a small number of the bad transactions found by PPF. However, the dif-
ferences between the four algorithms on this test are very small: in Marketplace B, the
best performance is less than 5% better than the worst performance. In Marketplace
A, the algorithms are even closer in performance, with the observed differences being
practically insignificant.
In Marketplace A, the interaction threshold has little effect on the transaction success
rate. This is likely an artifact of the fact that the distribution of user reliability in this
market has a very high mean (0.9802) and very low variance (5 × 10−5). In such a
market, users are likely to be nearly always reliable or nearly always unreliable, so to
filter out the bad users, it really doesn’t matter whether the interaction threshold is set
to 90% or 99%.
The interaction threshold does affect all four algorithms to some degree in Market-
place B, with the greatest effect on Bayesian PPF and the least effect on EM-trust. The
non-Bayesian algorithms start to show a slightly increase in transaction success around
0.88, while the Bayesian algorithms are nearly unaffected by the interaction threshold
until around 0.9-0.91, at which point they start to rise more rapidly.
The deactivation precision reveals greater differences among the four systems in both
markets. The algorithms that do better in the transaction success rate test tend to be the
worse performers on this test, suggesting that there is a tradeoff between precision and
recall. In Marketplace A, all of the algorithms show a slight decrease in precision as the
interaction threshold increases, but the amount of change is not practically significant.
Bayesian EM-trust has the highest precision in this market, followed by Bayesian PPF,
then non-Bayesian EM-trust, and finally non-Bayesian PPF.
In Marketplace B, Bayesian PPF performs best at low interaction thresholds, but
drops off quickly as the interaction threshold increases. Next comes Bayesian EM-
trust, then standard EM-trust, neither of which is strongly affected by the interaction
threshold. Finally, non-Bayesian PPF performs the worst, with its precision declining
slightly more as the interaction threshold is increased.
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The ranking of algorithms and overall trends in the combined metric results look
very much like the precision results because of the much greater differences among
the algorithms’ precisions than among their transaction success rates. If we accept the
assumption that both precision and recall are equally important for this task, these re-
sults imply that EM-trust and the Bayesian algorithms provide significant improvements
to the reputation system precision while giving up only negligible transaction success
compared to the baseline PPF system. We also conjecture that this increased precision
may in fact have other benefits. Because users are less likely to get unfairly low repu-
tations, they may be more inclined to participate in the reputation system, thus further
increasing accuracy.
5.3 Market Liquidity
While preventing failed transactions is the obvious first priority of a reputation system,
it must be balanced against other marketplace concerns. One of a reputation system’s
ancillary effects is the influence it has on the liquidity of the market. A reputation system
that prevents all but the best users from buying and selling would likely be very safe,
but it would also create a market where it is very hard to find a buyer or seller willing
to trade.
To measure the effect of the reputation algorithms and the users’ interaction thresh-
olds on market liquidity, we look at the average number of transactions per user per
simulated day. A higher number of transactions per day indicate a market where it is
easier for a user to buy or sell his or her goods. These results are given in Fig. 3.
In both simulated markets, the liquidity results are similar to the deactivation preci-
sion results. This is not surprising, because a market that deactivates fewer good users
will likely have more buyers and sellers available at any given time. In Marketplace
A, all three of our algorithms have similar liquidity, with the Bayesian systems outper-
forming standard EM-trust by a small margin. All three are significantly better than the
baseline PPF rate.
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Fig. 3. Effect of the interaction threshold and reputation system choice on market liquidity in (a)
Marketplace A and (b) Marketplace B
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Once again, there are greater differences among the systems in Marketplace B.
Bayesian EM-trust gives the highest liquidity with Bayesian PPF having the next high-
est at low interaction thresholds. However, the liquidity of the market when using
Bayesian PPF drops off dramatically above 0.90 and by 0.96, it has the lowest liq-
uidity of the four. This sudden drop is the main reason we are only able to present
results through 0.96 for marketplace B: as the liquidity decreases the time needed to
run the simulation grows to the point where we cannot finish 500,000 transactions in
a reasonable length of time. Standard PPF has the lowest liquidity of the four systems,
with standard EM-trust roughly splitting the difference between PPF and Bayesian PPF.
6 Conclusion
Accurate reputation systems are a requirement for a successful peer-to-peer market-
place. If a reputation system does not provide accurate reputations, it will discourage
participation, running the risk of entering a vicious cycle where declining feedback rates
cause even less accurate reputations. This problem is particularly serious for reputation
systems that give unfairly poor reputations to reliable users, who we most likely expect
to provide accurate feedback.
The EM-trust and Bayesian algorithms we present in this report make improvements
to the simple eBay averaging approach that we believe will help make reputation sys-
tems more accurate and useful. All three of our algorithms estimated true user reliability
more accurately than the PPF algorithm used by eBay. While they did permit a negligi-
bly small increase in failed transactions, they gave many fewer good users unfairly poor
reputations. Additionally, the EM-trust algorithms are far less prone to errors caused
by retaliatory negative feedback than their PPF counterparts. We hope that by decreas-
ing the effect of retaliation, we can eliminate some of the hesitation users feel about
giving honest negative evaluations. Finally, under most circumstances, all three of our
algorithms result in a more liquid market, where users are more willing to trade.
In addition to the measurable benefits of these algorithms, we believe that their more
accurate reputations will encourage more users to trust and thus participate in the feed-
back process. It is our hope that this increased participation will further increase feed-
back accuracy, creating instead a virtuous cycle that improves both the participation in
and the accuracy of the reputation system.
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From Theory to Practice: Forgiveness as a
Mechanism to Repair Conflicts in CMC
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Abstract. In computer-mediated communication (CMC) online mem-
bers often behave in undesirable ways, therefore creating a need for
an active regulating force. Trust and reputation mechanisms have been
adopted to address this problem and in doing so have eliminated the
high costs of employing a human moderator. However, these systems
have emphasized the need to ‘punish’ a given offender, while neglecting
to account for alternative ways to repair the offence e.g. by forgiveness.
In this paper, we define a theoretical model of forgiveness which is op-
erationalized using a fuzzy logic inference system and then applied in a
particular scenario. It is argued that forgiveness in CMC may work as
a possible prosocial mechanism, which in the short-term can help resolve
a given conflict and in the long-term can add to an increasingly prosocial
and homeostatic environment.
1 Introduction
In human societies, when violating a norm, the offender is usually ‘punished’ both
emotionally (e.g. experiencing embarrassment) and practically (e.g. by prose-
cution). The threat of these two sanctions is persistently evoked by physical
markers, (e.g. people watching, the presence of law enforcement officials) and
works preventively so that a sense of general social order is maintained within
the community. Online societies differ from physical societies, in how both the
emotional and practical implications are perceived. To begin with, anonymity
and the absence of a physical self weaken the impact of the emotional conse-
quences (e.g. shame or embarrassment) that an offender experiences as a result
of his/her offence. To add to this, the presence of an active policing force is not
visible until the member’s behaviour has reached what is considered to be illegal
according to law. Therefore, one of the problems identified through these two
points is the need for an intermediate mechanism that will signal the offender
early on and that will also inform the community about milder offences where
punitive legal action against the offender is perhaps inappropriate.
Trust and reputation mechanisms have been widely adopted in addressing this
issue [15]. These mechanisms have empowered members of online communities
by allowing them to appraise and capture the granularity of their fellow mem-
bers’ actions (e.g. through ratings). However, in doing so, the designers of those
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 397–411, 2006.
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systems have placed emphasis and value on the quantitative appraisal that usu-
ally follows an offence while neglecting to account for the qualitative appraisal
that often makes repair between two members possible [19]. In human-human
interactions, a violation of norms is unavoidable but not necessarily unforgivable.
In this article, we address this issue by proposing forgiveness as a repair
mechanism that is instantiated during a given conflict, possibly facilitating a
resolution between online members. In previous work, we have described the con-
ceptual framework of the forgiveness proposal [19]. We now reify this proposal
by developing a stand-alone operational model of forgiveness that is straightfor-
ward to automate, and can be integrated into any platform or configured for any
application domain.
This article is divided into 5 main sections. Section 2 gives an overview of the
motivations for considering forgiveness in CMC. Section 3 presents a theoretical
model of human forgiveness collectively investigated in the field of psychology.
In Section 4, we describe the forgiveness model implemented as a fuzzy inference
system driven by the theory described in Section 3. Section 5 integrates the model
into a collaborative distance learning scenario. Finally, this paper concludes in
Section 6 with a summary and a discussion of further work.
2 Motivation
There are strong incentives for considering forgiveness as a possible reparative
mechanism in online communities. For example, issuing forgiveness is known to
stimulate the offender into voluntary actions of repair [7]. Moreover, punishing
the offender for an action they did not intentionally perform (e.g. bad ratings
for accidentally delivering the wrong product) often results in emotions of anger
and low-compliancy behaviors [7]. This could possibly motivate a member to
withdraw from the online community due to the unjust treatment. Even more,
one’s judgment can be sometimes misguided and construed on false information.
In this situation, a system that supports irreversible judgments is both unfair
and unethical. Finally, although forgiveness does not necessarily mean that trust
is automatically regained [3], it often provides closure, which may alleviate the
aggression created from a disrupted interaction. This point is further demon-
strated by the physical well-being of those who tend to issue forgiveness more
frequently [21].
To summarize, forgiveness promises short-term benefits in CMC such as giving
the offender an outlet through which to apologize or pacifying the victim of the
offence, so that both victim-offender can resolve the conflict. At the same time,
the short term benefits ultimately have the potential to increase the overall
equilibrium of the online community.
3 Theoretical Model
Forgiveness results from a number of prosocial motivational changes which re-
verse one’s initial desire to adopt negative strategies towards the offender
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(i.e. revenge, avoidance). In this sense, forgiveness replaces malevolent moti-
vations towards the offender with constructive and positive behaviors which
work to reverse the initial censure [10]. The forgiveness process, as described in
psychology, is further depicted in Figure 1, where the offender, member x, vio-
lates a rule with action A. Following victim y’s negative predisposition towards
offending action A, four positive motivations collectively add up to possibly for-
mulate forgiveness. The positive motivations we consider are empathy, actions of
repair, the beneficial historical relationship of victim-offender and an appraisal-
judgment of the offence.
The definition used here employs a degree of freedom in long-term relation-
ships as the victim may forgive a single offence without explicitly reversing their
attitude as a whole [10]. Likewise, while a certain violation may be forgiven, other
past behaviors may still impede one’s trust towards another. Despite popular def-
initions of forgiveness forgetting, condoning, trusting or removing accountability
are not necessarily considered to be a part of forgiveness [3].
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Fig. 1. A motivation-driven conceptualization of forgiveness where positive motivations
add up to increase forgiveness
On the basis of the forgiveness definition given here, we propose the following:
Premise 1 – x violates rule A. Initially y, the observer/victim of x’s of-
fence is inclined negatively towards x. y assesses all the factors surround-
ing x’s action-violation A and decides to issue forgiveness by applying a
series of (+) positive motivations to his initial (−) negative state.
Next, we discuss the four central positive motivations of the theoretical for-
giveness model which are the judgment of offence, actions of repair, beneficial
historical relationship and empathy. The four positive motivations are described
by eleven constituent parts which are the offence severity, offence frequency,
intent, apology, reparative actions, prior interactions, utility of benefits, and
frequency of benefits, visible acknowledgment, similarity and propensity to em-
barrassment.
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Judgment of Offence. Observers/victims of one’s offence make attributions
by accounting for a number of factors surrounding the offence. First, the severity
of the current act is assessed. More severe violations lead to harsher judgments
[1, 2]. Furthermore, a historical trail of one’s past behaviors is compared against
the current violation. Together, frequency and severity of past acts impact one’s
inclination to forgive [2]. Additionally, apparent intent leads towards more neg-
ative attributions with low intent actions supporting more positive attributions
[1, 8]. Given this, we state:
Premise 2 – y assesses x’s action by (severity) AND (frequency/severity
of x’s historical actions) AND (x’s intent)
Actions of Repair. A truthful apology or a good deed [2] that reverses the
offence can pacify the observer or victim of the offence. In fact, apology and
restitution, together constitute a strong partnership facilitating and even pre-
dicting forgiveness [20]. However, reversing one’s violation with a reparative ac-
tion brings up an important issue. Inevitably the weight of a good deed against
a severe and frequently performed violation will have to be formulated or ac-
counted for. As a result, we state:
Premise 3 – y issues forgiveness if x offers (an apology) AND (reparative
action B ≥ action A)
Beneficial Historical Relationship. Prior familiarity and a relationship of
commitment with the offender positively predispose the victim and increase the
likelihood of forgiveness [11]. Good friends or successful business partners rely on
a longer, richer and mutually-rewarding history fostering a propensity towards
forgiveness. Therefore:
Premise 4 – y will issue forgiveness if (the utility of x’s actions has been
high) AND (x has been frequently beneficial to y)
Empathy. Empathy, one’s emotional response towards another’s affect [5] is re-
garded as a mediator, appeasing the victim and facilitating forgiveness. Empathy
is evoked by offender’s apologies among others, is a predictor of forgiveness and
its intensity has been found to positively correlate to the extent of forgiveness
the victim issues for the offender [12]. Empathy also manifests in embarrassment
to form ‘empathic embarrassment’, a milder form of embarrassment ‘incurred’
by imagining oneself in another’s place. Empathic embarrassment has four deter-
minants. First, the salience of the offender’s embarrassment controls the degree
of felt empathic embarrassment. Visibly embarrassed offenders elicit more em-
pathic embarrassment from others. Second, the emotion intensifies when the
victim is somewhat familiar to the offender. Third, we foster stronger feelings
of empathy towards those who are most similar to us in terms of personality
or characteristics (e.g. a colleague or a cultural compatriot). Similarly, one will
be more empathic towards an offender with whom s/he shares a similar his-
tory of offences. Finally, the observer’s propensity to embarrassment determines
to a great degree the empathic embarrassment s/he may experience. A highly
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‘embarrasable’ observer will experience increased empathic embarrassment (see
[9, 13] for a detailed account. On the basis of the previous discussion we propose
the following:
Premise 5 – The extent of y’s forgiveness will vary by the (degrees of
empathy/empathic embarrassment y feels for x) which increases IF (x’s
embarrassment is visibly intense) AND (if y has some prior familiar-
ity with x) AND (if y shares similar characteristics with x) AND (if
y’s propensity to embarrassment is high) AND (if x apologises for the
offence)
This completes the theoretical basis for forgiveness as formulated in the field
of psychology and specified in [10]. We have extracted five premises encapsulating
the overall forgiveness decision and identified the four motivations for forgiveness,
composed of eleven constituent parts. The objective of Section 4 is to propose a
generic computational model built on the basis of this theory which can be then
implemented and adapted into any domain.
4 Computational Model of Forgiveness
In this section, we develop a computational model that reifies the theoretical
basis of forgiveness and is built using fuzzy inference systems (FIS). We first
justify our reasoning for using FIS and outline FIS. We then describe the im-
plementation of the decision maker. Finally, we give examples of the fuzzy rules
which are used by the decision maker to make its inference.
4.1 Fuzzy Inference Systems as the Operational Basis
The theoretical work we have discussed so far, with the exception of a study con-
ducted by Boon and Sulsky [1], has isolated and then measured the constituents
(e.g. intent) of each motivation (e.g. judgment of offence) separately. Boon and
Sulsky’s study clearly demonstrates the independent rater ‘disagreement’ on how
the different constituents weigh on the decision to forgive. Therefore, in oper-
ationalizing the theory, there is a need to define a more concrete model that
describes the ranges, weights and interactions of all four motivations and their
eleven constituent parts.
To address this issue we implemented the forgiveness decision maker by using
the Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy inference system (FIS) [17], as fuzzy logic satisfied these
three important aspects. (1) Ranges: FIS allowed for each motivation constituent
to be stored in ranges, from high to low, which was particularly important as
for example, an offence 1 may be considered 80% severe whereas an offence 2
is regarded as 20% severe. (2) Weights: The violation appraisal captured by the
judgment of the offence motivation is the most powerful motivation of forgive-
ness. FIS allowed us to attribute more weight to the judgment of the offence
over the remaining three motivations of actions of repair, beneficial historical
interactions and empathy. (3) Interactions: The decision maker closely followed
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the structure of the five premises so that each motivation was separately com-
puted on the basis of its own constituents and then passed onto the final decision
maker.
FIS Overview. Fuzzy Logic, as developed by Takagi-Sugeno [17] is a formal-
ism which facilitates reasoning about imprecise facts, uncertainties, and value
judgments – in other words, all the human factors that might inform a forgive-
ness decision. Fuzzy Logic is the basis of fuzzy inference systems, although there
are different types of fuzzy systems as there are various different ways in which
outputs can be determined.
In general, to build a fuzzy system, an engineer might start with a set of
application-dependent fuzzy rules as specified by a domain expert. In our case,
the fuzzy rules for the operational model are derived from the theoretical model
described in Section 3. Fuzzy rules are expressed in the form “if . . . then . . .”
that convert inputs to outputs, where both inputs and outputs are members of
fuzzy sets (a fuzzy set is a set in which objects are members to some degree).
So, for example, we might have a rule of the form:
If the offender apologizes and does not repair the offence
then the forgiveness value is increased by 10%
Similarly:
If the offender apologizes and repairs the offence
then the forgiveness value is increased by 30%
Given a set of such rules, it may be that a particular range of inputs fire (acti-
vate) any given subset of those rules. The rules which are fired then contribute
proportionally to the fuzzy output: this is calculated by applying the implication
method of fuzzy logic to the activated rules and aggregating all the results. The
process of defuzzification converts the aggregated output into a ‘crisp’ value (the
usual method is a centroid calculation, i.e. finding the centre of an area under a
curve).
This entire process, called fuzzy inference, thus converts quantitative inputs
into a precise output using qualitative statements: in our case, this precise output
is a yes-no decision on whether to forgive or not.
FIS of Forgiveness. The FIS decision maker that we implemented (see Fig. 2)
receives numerical values of the eleven constituent motivations as its input in
order to make a yes-no forgiveness decision (d) as its output.
The forgiveness decision maker goes into effect only when an offence occurs
i.e. a user has violated a norm. At that time, the eleven constituent motivation
signals of forgiveness are computed. They are then input into FIS2 through FIS5.
The outputs of FIS2 through FIS5 represent the weights of the four forgiveness
motivations which are input to FIS1 to compute a final output value d. FIS1 is
the operationalization of premise 1 in Section 3 and the final value d constitutes
the forgiveness recommendation (if d > 0.5, then forgiveness = true). We note
that the weight of the judgment of offence motivation on the overall forgiveness
decision (d) is 0.5 while actions of repair, beneficial historical relationship and
empathy are each weighted 0.166.
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Fig. 2. The Forgiveness Decision Maker
4.2 Examples of Fuzzy Rules of Forgiveness
The fuzzy inference systems FIS1-5 are based on a set of rules that follow the
structure, form and theory of premises 1 through 5 of Section 3. The full set of
rules can be found at [18]. Here, we give representative examples of two fuzzy
sets, the fuzzy set for judgment of offence and the fuzzy set for the overall
forgiveness decision.
The judgment of offence as expressed in premise 2 is reliant on the three
constituents of severity, frequency and intent. As each increases so does the
probability of a low forgiveness rating. An example of two rules follows that
demonstrates this difference in granularity:
If severity is low and frequency is low and intent is high
then the judgment of offence motivation is 0.4
In contrast:
If severity is low and frequency is high and intent is high
then the judgment of offence motivation is 0.2
Following the calculation of each individual motivation, its value is input in
the fifth FIS and a crisp value of forgiveness is computed on the basis of its own
rules. For example:
If judgment of offence is high and actions of repair is high
and beneficial historical interactions is low and empathy is high
then forgiveness is 0.83
5 Application Domain and Integration of the Model
In the previous section, our aim was to create a generic forgiveness model whose
integration and input values are ultimately determined by the domain it is fit
into. The objective of this section is to integrate the forgiveness model into a
specific CMC scenario.
Arguably, the mechanism could be integrated into an e-commerce platform
such as eBay where a seller may be unjustly rated due to unforeseen factors
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(e.g. slow post resulting in late delivery). Forgiveness could also be appropriate
in an e-health scenario in which the discussion of sensitive topics may often lead
to misinterpretations. Here we demonstrate how to fit the forgiveness mechanism
into an e-learning scenario. The computational model of forgiveness developed
in this paper has many quantitative as well as qualitative components. For ex-
ample, a user can reverse the offence with a quantitative action which may be
most appropriate in e-commerce or apologize with a qualitative statement, rele-
vant to an e-health forum. Collaborative distance learning relies on transactions
(e.g. assignments) but it also has a social capacity, i.e. students may use the
tools available to communicate before transacting. Therefore, the transactional
and social elements of e-learning permit us to test both the quantitative and
qualitative aspects of the forgiveness model.
In this section, we first outline a collaborative distance learning domain into
which we customized the forgiveness model. Next, we describe the collection and
then the computation of the eleven constituent parts of the four motivations
which as illustrated in the previous section, are used by the FIS as inputs (see
Figure 2). Finally, we demonstrate how the constituent motivations and decision
maker integrate into a complete comprehensive architecture.
5.1 Overview
The forgiveness tool is integrated in a collaborative distance-learning environ-
ment. The workflow of this environment supports two-party interactions at a
given time, where team tasks are broken down into segments and executed se-
quentially. The term ‘collaboration’ in this domain, constitutes the successful
delivery of an assignment and can be contingent on a number of factors such as
timeliness, good communication skills, quality of work etc.
When signing up to participate in the community, a member is requested to fill
out a short survey reporting two successful and two unsuccessful past teamwork
experiences. The first signifies a benefit gained as a result of the team collabora-
tion, while the second represents an offence executed during the collaboration.
These reports are in turn processed by a human moderator, who checks them
in terms of quality (e.g. grammar, clarity of articulation). The moderator then
posts the reports online so that the distance-learning community can collectively
rate them. The final output of this process is a list of successful and unsuccessful
collaboration incidents, each of which has a corresponding ‘utility’ or ‘severity’
rating derived from the mean of all ratings. These ratings represent an objective
measure of severity or utility. The collaboration reports and their corresponding
ratings are updated annually when new users sign up. This way the knowledge
base is constantly updated.
Upon collaborating with another member, a user selects the benefit or of-
fence which most closely characterizes his/her experience from the knowledge
base. This report is stored, and over time builds up a member’s history. In
the event of an offence report, two sequential events happen. At first, the of-
fender is offered reparative tools e.g. enabling him/her to reverse or apologize
for the action-violation. The intelligent component executed with fuzzy inference
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systems is instantiated and assesses whether the particular offender should be
granted forgiveness. The victim of the offence is then informed of this decision
and is presented via the interface with relevant-to-the offence information (e.g.
the offender’s past history and all the other factors used by the FIS to com-
pute value d). The act of forgiveness is ultimately the user’s decision as his/her
personal judgment may differ from the one inferred by the FIS.
5.2 Collection and Computation of the Constituent Motivation
Signals
Earlier, eleven forgiveness constituent motivations were mentioned, each of which
impact on one’s decision to forgive. In face-to-face interactions these constituents
may be collected by memory, perception or interaction. For example, the of-
fender’s visible acknowledgment is immediately perceived through his/her face.
Similarly, the offender has immediacy of contact, therefore making it possible
to apologize for an offence. In this forgiveness application, we constructed new
ways for collecting this kind of data. We now detail the computation and/or
collection method for each motivation individually.
j0: The severity of an offence is a value that is assigned to each type of offence
automatically and is measured from 0 to 0.5. Rating values higher than 0.5 are
classified as beneficial collaborations. As described in the previous section, the
severity value is the mean of ratings for each offence as given by users of the
community upon signing up.
j1: The frequency of a particular offence is computed by:
j1 =
(
noffencekind
noffences
+ noffencesncollaborations
)
2
(1)
where noffencekind denotes the number of the offender’s offences of the cur-
rent kind, noffences is the offender’s total number of offences across time and
ncollaborations is the offender’s total collaborations within the community. Two
aspects of frequency are encapsulated in this formula: the frequency of the cur-
rent offence is computed with the first division and the frequency of the offender’s
total past offences is computed with the second division. Among other possibili-
ties, this equation intends to capture the instances where a user has infrequently
violated a particular norm but at the same time frequently violates many others.
j2: A judgment on the offender’s intent is reported both by the offender
and the victim via a user interface which activates upon the offence. The report
values range from 0 to 1 (i.e. [0, 1]). Each user’s intent-report is given a different
weight depending on his/her credibility which is computed on the basis of past
offence frequency and severity. Specifically, a user’s credibility Cu is:
Cu =
∑n
i=1 Ri
n
(2)
where n is the number of the total collaborations that the user has had within the
community and Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is the rating of each collaboration. As previously
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mentioned, ratings between 0 and 0.5 are considered offences, whereas ratings
greater than 0.5 and less than 1 are categorized as benefits. The following formula
then encapsulates intent:
j2 =
(Io × Co) + (Iv × Cv)
2
(3)
In this formula Co denotes the offender’s credibility, Cv is the victim’s credibility,
and Io and Iv signify the offender’s and victim’s intent report rating.
j3: Apology from an offender is reported via a user interface and is then
offered to the victim of the offence. Ao is a binary value where 1 indicates
that the offender has apologised to the victim and 0 indicates the absence of
an apology offer. The credibility and honesty of the offender’s report is then
given a rating Av by the victim, ranging from 0 to 1. This rating is weighed
into the overall apology value. Similar to computing intent, the offender’s and
victim’s credibility Co and Cv are taken into account and weighted into the
overall apology value. Therefore, apology is given by:
j3 =
(Ao × Co) + (Av × Cv)
2
(4)
j4: The offender may offer a reparative action RAo to the victim by either
reversing the offence or by completing a new task. This process is facilitated
by a user interface. The value for RAo is binary. When the action of repair
has been completed, the victim rates it with RAv, ranging from 0 to 1. RAv is
then weighed into the total reparative action value. The offender’s and victim’s
credibility is also computed into the final reparative action value. The formula
for reparative action is:
j4 =
(RAo × Co) + (RAv × Cv)
2
(5)
j5: The utility of benefits is a value that is assigned to each type of benefit
automatically and is more than 0.5 and less than 1. As described in Section 5.1,
this value is the mean of ratings for each benefit as given by users of the com-
munity upon signing up.
j6: The value of benefits frequency between two members is calculated
by dividing the number of benefits nbenefits that the victim has experienced
while collaborating with the offender, by the total number of collaborations
between the victim and the offender ncollaborations . As such, beneficial historical
relationship is:
j6 =
nbenefits
ncollaborations
(6)
j7: The offender’s visible acknowledgement (e.g. the blush) value is con-
trolled by the degrees of the offence frequency formula j1. That is, if the offender
has rarely performed the action in question, the visible acknowledgment value
will be high and the victim of the offence will be signaled of the offender’s emo-
tional display.
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j8: Prior familiarity between two members is defined by the formula:
j8 = min
(
1,
|ncollaborations |t
f
)
(7)
where ncollaborations denotes the number of collaborations between victim and
offender in time interval t. Both t and f values are application specific. In our
scenario, is set to the 3-month academic quarter during which the student-users
will be using this system. We intuitively consider familiarity to be gained after
collaborating for at least 3 times, so that f equals 3. This formula then tracks
the number of total collaborations between the victim and offender during the
3-month time interval and considers familiarity to be achieved following three
or more collaborations.
j9: Similarity between two members is given by:
j9 = match(do,dv) (8)
where dv is the victim’s set of all past forgiveness decisions (d), each containing
the eleven constituent motivations j0 − j10. For each element of dv, the match
function finds the closest set of constituent signals to those of the offender’s in
the set of do. It then goes on to compare the final forgiveness decision (d) of
those sets. Similarity is the sum of all identical decisions divided by the victim’s
total number of forgiveness decisions.
j10: Finally, propensity to embarrassment is collected with a short self-
report questionnaire [14] that all members fill out when first signing up. The
propensity value is registered and stored in the input conversion layer hereafter.
5.3 System Architecture
The overall framework integrating both the eleven constituent motivations and
the forgiveness decision maker is depicted in Figure 3. It consists of two main
modules:
– An input conversion layer which stores and computes the values of the eleven
signals j0 − j10.
– The decision maker that outputs the final forgiveness decision (d).
The input conversion layer of the system, stores a member’s successful (ben-
eficial) or unsuccessful (offensive) collaborations as two separate objects. Those
objects are labeled the Collaboration Report object and the Offence Appraisal
object respectively. Following a collaboration with another member, a user re-
ports on his/her experience. If the experience was positive, then the user’s report
is stored in a Collaboration Report object. The Collaboration Report object cap-
tures the identity of the user, a timestamp, and a measure of the benefit of the
collaboration. In contrast, if the collaboration experience was negative, the user’s
report is stored into an Offence Appraisal object. The Offence Appraisal object
captures the type of offence, the identity of the offender, a timestamp, measure
of the offence severity and parameter values which are used to compute some of
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Fig. 3. System architecture integrating the eleven constituent motivations and the FIS
decision makers
the constituent motivation values. These include the intent, apology and repar-
ative actions offered by the offender. The embarrassment propensity constituent
motivation is a constant value that has been stored in the input conversion layer.
The motivations that rely on historical data, such as offence frequency, histori-
cal relationship, similarity and prior familiarity between the offender-victim and
visible acknowledgement are computed separately in the input conversion layer
to be later passed as signals to the decision maker. Upon completing the in-
teraction, both the Collaboration Report and the Offence Appraisal objects are
stored so that each user builds up a history over time.
6 Conclusions
This article presented forgiveness in light of the prosocial and healing benefits it
brings to human societies. We proposed the inclusion of forgiveness online as a
way to encourage prosocial behaviors both in the victim and offender. The mo-
tivation behind our work is the reparative nature of forgiveness in some cases,
while the destructive consequences of its absence in others. We went on to dis-
cuss the formation of forgiveness by the collective ‘accumulation’ of four positive
motivations. Resulting from this definition, we designed an operational model
additively shaped by the motivations’ interactions, implemented with fuzzy in-
ference systems. In doing this, our guiding principle was to create a model that
is straightforward to automate, and can be integrated into any platform e.g.
multi-agent systems or configured for any application domain e.g. e-commerce.
The fuzzy sets that FIS uses as a basis to make an inference are written in a
natural processing language which is both comprehensive and replicable by a
wider audience ranging from social scientists to computer scientists. Even more,
fuzzy rules offer flexibility in changing the weights of the motivations to reflect
any expert’s judgment.
6.1 Raised Issues
The objective of this article was to bring forward the neglected but yet sig-
nificant topic of forgiveness while at the same time creating an operational
model that can be easily adapted in a number of domains. Although psychology
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offers positive prospects for forgiveness applications, we cannot neglect the pos-
sible challenges we may face when integrating and evaluating such a model in a
computer-mediated environment:
Vulnerability: Forgiveness may encourage harmful behaviors by withdrawing
well-deserved punishment [6]. As in many applications, users may ‘hijack’
the system and find ways to manipulate it to their advantage. Therefore, a
responsible and careful facilitation is vital.
Semantics: Human actors’ expectations, perception and understanding of for-
giveness often exceed the actual function of forgiveness as formally given in
psychology [3]. For example, despite colloquial beliefs, forgetting or trusting
is not part of forgiveness. We intend to address this point with the design
of clear and communicative language during the forgiveness facilitation. It
should be emphasised that forgiveness does not automatically repair trust.
Even more, given the disparity between lay understanding and formal defi-
nitions of forgiveness, it is argued that the word ‘forgiveness’ should not be
displayed directly during the users interaction.
Training and Incentives: A well-known problem in reputation mechanisms
is that users are not inclined to report their experiences unless they are
negative. In order for the forgiveness model to work properly, this issue
has to be resolved. It is therefore vital that users are trained on why this
mechanism is important, what information it requires to work efficiently, and
given incentives to report equally on their positive and negative experiences.
This issue should be also considered when designing the reporting interfaces
so that the information input required is minimal.
Promotion of inhibition: The ‘collection’ and presentation of judgment fac-
tors may enhance prosocial decisions during offences that warrant forgiveness
but they may have the opposite effect during severe offences that are well-
deserving of punishment. Often, online users are more uninhibited (e.g. [16])
compared to their offline conduct. One could clearly argue that due to this
online disposition, higher severity offences emphasized in the interface, may
support unjustifiably severe punishments. It is therefore proposed that the
forgiveness facilitation takes place only in the event of positive forgiveness
decisions, while users can rely on ‘traditional’ trust and reputation mecha-
nisms during negative forgiveness decisions.
The offender’s privacy: In presenting the relevant constituent motivations to
the victim of the offence, it could be argued that the offender’s privacy is
compromised. Although we do not address this issue directly, it is recom-
mended that users are first trained on the purpose of the tools and also given
the choice to turn off the forgiveness component if desired.
Objective Ratings: The severity and utility ratings for each offence and col-
laboration are provided by the overall community. Therefore, the ratings
used by the model to make its inference are objective and representative of
the collective opinion. To that effect, studies have shown weak correlations
between subjective and objective judgments [4]. In arguing for personaliza-
tion rather than objectivity, we choose objectivity as we believe it is impor-
tant to promote a collective view rather than to allow for individuals skewed
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judgments. While we believe that objective assessments of this kind are im-
portant, users autonomy should be respected. In that sense, the interface
will output the eleven constituent motivations so that users’ decisions can
be informed both by their own judgment but also by the FIS inference.
6.2 Further Work
Further work on forgiveness will focus on four separate lines of investigation: re-
fining the constituent motivation formulas, evaluating the fuzzy rules, designing
the presentation of the facilitation tool and exploring the impact of the forgive-
ness mechanism on human behaviour. Specifically, we intend to address the first
point with the design of more sophisticated formulas for the eleven constituents.
For instance, the victim’s beneficial history with the offender can be seen in
light of the utility and frequency of benefits, while it is also possible to mea-
sure utility in terms of relative utility. An offender of medium utility may be
considered a good partner in a community of overall low beneficial transactions.
Secondly, although the fuzzy rules were tailored around the theory of forgiveness,
there is still a need to evaluate the forgiveness mechanism to determine whether
the inference is accurate. This will be done through a series of questionnaires
correlating users’ judgments to the ones generated by the system. Thirdly, as dis-
cussed earlier, the word forgiveness is loaded with different meaning, depending
on who the speaker is. In designing an intelligent interface which will facilitate
forgiveness, it is important to convey the constituent motivations and the final
forgiveness decision in the appropriate language. Finally, the most important
point of interest is whether the forgiveness mechanism offers the benefits hy-
pothesized. Some open research questions on this topic are whether people will
follow the forgiveness recommendation and if the act of forgiving via this form
of facilitation will alleviate anger resulting from a disrupted interaction.
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Abstract. Many reputation systems mainly concentrate on avoiding
untrustworthy agents by communicating reputation. Here arises the
problem that when an agent does not know another agent very much
then there is no way to notice such ambiguity. This paper shows a new
protocol in which an agent can notice that ambiguity using the notion
of statistics, and illustrates the facility of designing agents’ algorithms
as well as existing reputation systems.
1 Introduction
In P2P networks, agents can communicate their own opinions for collaboration in
order to avoid other agents that are not so trustworthy among strangers. Here
it occurs that an agent is unconfident about its opinions to others. It would
be better that other agents that received an opinion of another agent take the
ambiguity into account. In the existing systems, however, such ambiguity has
rarely been considered.
This paper gives a novel protocol for communication of their opinions. It
uses the notion of statistics, that is, in this protocol reputation is considered
as a tuple that consists of the average and the variance. The average and the
variance of reputation correspond to the level of trustworthiness and the expected
fluctuation, respectively.
This approach is quite different from researches [13, 16, 17] that use the beta
function to represent trust and reputation. In their researches, reputation is
considered as a probabilistic distribution by each agent but only the alternative
evaluation, say, “cooperate” or “defect”, is used, and so agents do not communi-
cate the parameters of their probabilistic distributions themselves. On the other
hand, we assume that the degree of the performance is defined as a real num-
ber in [0, 1], which we will mention later, and agents need to communicate the
parameters themselves.
In our protocol there are two kinds of reputation, reputation as a recom-
mender and that as a participant, as well as in [12, 14]. Higher reputation as
a recommender means that its opinions to other agents as a participant seem
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 412–422, 2006.
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closer to their actual performance. Reputation is updated after knowing agents’
actual performances. Here, it should be noted that the variance of reputation
that the agent had sent together with the average should be taken into account
in updating its reputation.
We do not think that showing the way to design algorithms or to evaluate
them is so important. Thus in this paper, we show the facility of designing
efficient algorithms of agents as well as the existing protocols through several
simulations instead. In our simulations, we consider several typical malicious
agents that may be harmful for others, and we show the examples of designing
efficient algorithms against such attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes reputa-
tion in P2P networks. Section 3 gives the formal model and several definitions.
Section 4 explains our idea and our representation for reputation. Section 5
shows our result for appealing the facility of designing strategies. In Section 6
we mention several related papers. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 Reputation in P2P Networks
In P2P networks, each agent can be a participant, which has several files and
allows to download them, and can be a recommender, which has opinions to other
agents and tells them to others. In [12, 14], trust or reputation as a participant
and that as a recommender are defined as the different types and we follow their
definition.
2.1 Reputation as a Participant
Reputation as a participant of agent A represents the degree of trustworthiness
about A’s performance, for example, downloading speed or the number of files
A treats. It should be calculated with the performance of A, and its reputation
in the eyes of other agents, and their opinions as a recommender to A. In the
following discussion, this is denoted by RepP.
2.2 Reputation as a Recommender
Reputation as a recommender of agentA represents how trustworthyA’s opinions
about others are. It should be calculated with performances of agents whose
reputation has been sent by A. We should note that there may be agents that
are trustworthy as a recommender but untrustworthy as a participant. In the
following, this reputation is denoted by RepR.
3 Formal Model
In this section, we give the definition for modeling P2P networks. Suppose that
there are n agents each of which acts independently on others. These agents
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Fig. 1. Communication between agents with a billboard
communicate their own opinions through a billboard, where each agent can know
all the opinions of others1 (see Fig. 1).
3.1 Performance of Agents
In [12], performances of agents are distinguished according to the contexts and
thus reputation is also distinguished. In P2P networks, the contexts are a down-
loading speed, the number of files an agent treats, security, and so on. We define
agent A’s performance as a service vector sA = (s1A, . . . , s
k
A), where k is the
number of contexts and siA ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, . . . , k.
3.2 Satisfaction
Next, we define the satisfaction of an agent with the performance of another
agent. It may occur that two agents have different satisfactions with the same
performance of the other agent. Namely, suppose that there are two agents one
of which prefers a downloading speed and another emphasizes security. Then
their their opinions to others would differ. Thus we assume that each agent
has a preference vector. A preference vector of agent A is denoted by pA =
(p1A, . . . , p
k
A), where p
i
A corresponds to how much A emphasizes the ith item and
piA ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, . . . , k.
The satisfaction of agent A with agent B, SA(B), is defined as an inner
product of B’s service vector sB and A’s preference vector pA, that is,
SA(B) =
k∑
i=1
siB · piA.
Note that by the definition SA(B) ∈ [0, 1] holds.
3.3 Flow at Each Round
In our settings, we have T rounds at which each agent gives its performance.
At the beginning of one round, each agent performs and knows its satisfactions
1 In [7], Douceur called such a structure a communication cloud.
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with others. After that, it updates the opinions to others as a recommender
with such satisfactions. Then it updates the opinions as a participant with such
satisfaction and the opinions as a recommender that are already updated. After
all agents decide their opinions, they send those to a billboard and they know
opinions of other agents, which are updated at the current round. (Note that in
[12], the opinions as a participant are first updated. However, we do not follow
because the error of evaluating them would cause worse results in reality.)
In the settings aforementioned, we execute several simulations where an agent
tries to protect itself against malicious attacks. We assume that there are αn
agents that execute our method, which we call honest agents, and each honest
agent does not know even which agents are honest.
4 Protocol with Statistics
As we mentioned above, we introduce the notion of statistics for representing
reputation. In our protocol, reputation is defined as a tuple that consists of two
elements, the average and the variance.
Our idea is as follows: suppose that the performance of an agent is extreme,
i.e., it gives the performance of 0 or 1 alternatively. Then the average of the
performance is 0.5, but it does not seem so useful for other agents because its
performance is either completely good or completely bad. Thus we consider that
introducing variance enables us to represent such the performance more precisely.
As we told in Section 1, the average of reputation means its level and the
variance means the degree of the fluctuation. In the above case, other agents
would have higher variances for the agent.
In the following discussion, reputation of B in the eyes of A is denoted by
RepA(B) = (EA(B),VarA(B)), where EA(B) and VarA(B) denote the average
and the variance of B’s reputation, respectively. It should be noted that there
may be agents that report only an average or ones that do not report their
opinions at some round.
5 Experiments
In this section, we show the results of several experiments. Before we mention the
result, we need to explain our strategy that each agent executes independently.
Note that as we mention in Section 1, it is not so important to design algorithms
themselves but it is important to show the facility of designing algorithms. Thus,
our algorithm looks kind of simple.
5.1 Our Strategy
Our strategy decides the opinion of an agent together with the current perfor-
mance of the target agent and opinions of other agents. When agent A calculates
RepRA(B), the reputation of B in the eyes of A as a recommender, the strategy
decides that using the difference of SC and RepPB(C), where C is in set C, which
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denotes the subset of agents which has RepPB , the reputation in the eyes of B,
that is, the subset of agents that are observed by B.
Before we mention the method, we define a useful function gA(B, t). We define
g′A(B,C, i, t) =
1
t (SA(C, i)−EPB(C, t))2/{VarPB(C, t)}1/2, where SA(C, i) denotes
the satisfaction of A with C at round i. Intuitively, g′A means the ratio between
the variance of the difference between SA and the average of an other’s opinion
as a participant, and its standard deviation, the square root of the variance. So
we define gA(B, t) as follows:
gA(B, t) =
1
(t + 1)|C|
∑
C∈C
t+1∑
i=1
min{g′A(B,C, i, t), 1/g′A(B,C, i, t)}.
gA(B, t + 1) gets larger when the difference between SA and EPB is similar to
VarPB
1/2
. Note that by the definition, it holds that gA(B, i) ∈ [0, 1] for any A,B
and i. Next, we give the definition of hA(B, t) for representing the normalized
difference between SA and EPB, namely,
hA(B, t) =
1
(t + 1)|C|
∑
C∈C
t+1∑
i=1
{1 − norm(|SA(C, i) − EPB(C, t)|,EPB(C, t))},
where norm(x, y) means that for x, y ∈ [0, 1], if y < 0.5 then norm(x, y) = x/(1−
y) and otherwise then norm(x, y) = x/y. By the definition, norm(|x − y|, y) ∈
[0, 1] for any x, y ∈ [0, 1] and thus hA(B, i) ∈ [0, 1] for any A,B and i. hA(B)
gets larger when SA − EPB is relatively small at each round.
Here, RepRA(B, t+1) = (E
R
A(B, t+1),Var
R
A(B, t+1)), Rep
R
A(B) at round t+1,
is calculated as follows:
ERA(B, t + 1) = β · gA(B, t) + (1 − β) · hA(B, t),
VarRA(B, t + 1) =
1
(t + 1)|C|
×
∑
C∈C
t+1∑
i=1
{β · gA(B, t) + (1 − β) · hA(B, t) − ERA(B, t + 1)}2,
where β is a constant between 0 and 1 for weighting gA(B, t) and hA(B, t). In
our simulations, β is fixed 0.5, i.e., we consider gA as well as hA.
After that, we calculate RepPA(B, t + 1), B’s reputation as a participant in
the eyes of A at round t + 1, with RepPD(B) and SA(B), where D is in D that
is the subset of all agents that observe agent B. So, RepPA(B, t+1) is calculated
as follows:
EPA(B, t + 1) = γ ·
1
t + 1
t+1∑
i=1
SA(B, i)
+(1 − γ) ·
∑
D∈D
ERA(D, t + 1) · EPD(B, t)
ERA(D, t + 1)
,
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VarPA(B, t + 1) = γ ·
1
t + 1
t+1∑
i=1
(SA(B, i) − S¯A(B))2
+(1 − γ) ·
∑
D∈D
ERA(D, t + 1) · VarPD(B, t)
ERA(D, t + 1)
,
where γ is a constant in [0, 1] for weighting and S¯A(B) denotes the average of
SA(B, i) for i = 1, . . . , t + 1. The second terms of these two formulas mean the
weighted average of EPD(B) and Var
P
D(B) by E
R
A(D), respectively, which means
the average taking into account the degree of the recommenders’ trustworthiness
(c.f., see [12]). In our simulations, we set γ = 0, namely, we consider only other
agents’ opinions, to show the importance of them like [12].
In the following, we consider two typical kinds of agents that do not execute
the algorithm above. One of those uses the simpler algorithm to calculate repu-
tation and another does not report variance or take variances of reputation into
account. What we need to do is to show that reputation of such malicious agents
in the eyes of honest agents as a recommender becomes lower than that of other
honest agents. We will show in the following sections that the algorithm above
can perform better than such agents. Here, our setting is as follows:
– the number of agents: 100
– the ratio between the number of honest agents and that of all agents α = 0.1
– the total number of rounds T = 100
– the initial values of average: values in [0, 1] are assigned at random
– the initial values of variance: values in [0, 0.1] are assigned at random
– preference vectors: each element is assigned a value in [0, 1] randomly
– service performance: values in [0, 1] are assigned at random, that is, the
average is 0.5 and the variance is 1/12.
5.2 Against Superficial Agents
We consider the agents that emphasize only the difference between the opinions
of others and the actual performance, which we call superficial agents. Formally,
a superficial agent Asf calculates reputation as a recommender as follows:
ERAsf(B, t + 1) =
1
(t + 1)|C|
∑
C∈C
t+1∑
i=1
|SAsf(B, i) − RepPC(B, t)|,
VarRAsf(B, t + 1) =
1
(t + 1)|C|
×
∑
C∈C
t+1∑
i=1
(|SAsf(B, i) − RepPC(B, t)| − ERAsf(B, t + 1))
2,
and reputation as a participant as follows:
EPAsf(B, t + 1) =
1
t + 1
t+1∑
i=1
SAsf(B, i),
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Fig. 2. Comparing E¯R between honest agents and superficial agents
VarPAsf(B, t + 1) =
1
t + 1
t+1∑
i=1
(SAsf(B, i) − EPAsf(B, t + 1))
2.
We compare E¯RAhonest , the average of E
R
Ahonest
, over other honest agents and
that over superficial agents. See Fig. 2. You can see that after the third round E¯R
over honest agents gets greater than that over superficial agents. Thus we succeed
to get the reputation of superficial agents in the eyes of honest agents lower than
that of other honest ones.
5.3 Against Lazy Agents
Next, we consider the lazy agents, which report only the average of reputation
and at each round they do not calculate the variance at all. Namely, lazy agent
Alazy calculates the reputation as a recommender as follows:
ERAlazy(B, t + 1) =
1
(t + 1)|C|
∑
C∈C
t+1∑
i=1
norm(|SAlazy(B, i) − EPC(B, t)|,EPC(B, t)),
where norm(x, y) is defined in Section 5.1, and that as a participant as follow:
EPAlazy(B, t + 1) =
1
t + 1
t+1∑
i=1
SAlazy(B, i).
In this case, honest agents have to speculate the variance of a lazy agent’s
reputation because it does not calculate the variance at all. Here, they speculate
that from the history of ERAhonest(Blazy). More precisely, they use the difference
between ERAhonest(Blazy, i) and E¯
R
Ahonest
(Blazy), the average of ERAhonest(Blazy, i)
over the whole rounds. The speculated variance of lazy agent Blazy’s reputation
in the eyes of Ahonest, which is an honest agent, is calculated as follows:
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VarRAhonest(Blazy, t + 1) =
1
(t + 1)|C|
×
∑
C∈C
t+1∑
i=1
(ERAhonest(Blazy, i) − E¯
R
Ahonest
(Blazy))2,
VarPAhonest(Blazy, t + 1) =
∑
C∈C E
R
Ahonest
(C, t + 1) · E¯RAhonest(C)∑
C∈C E
R
Ahonest
(C, t + 1)
,
where E¯RAhonest(Blazy) and E¯
R
Ahonest
(C) denote the average of ERAhonest(Blazy, i)
for agent Blazy and that for agent C according for round, respectively.
In the same way as Section 5.2, we compare E¯RAhonest over other honest agents
and that over lazy agents at each round. The result is shown in Fig. 3. You can
see that ERAhonest(Blazy) gets lower than E
R
Ahonest
(Bhonest).
Fig. 3. Comparing E¯R between honest agents and lazy agents
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Changes of Rep of (a) other honest agents and (b) lazy agents in the eyes of
an honest agent
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Here we show another interesting feature. Fig. 4(a) and (b) show the changes
of Rep, at every 10 rounds, of (a) other honest agents and (b) lazy agents in
the eyes of an honest agent, respectively, considering their standard deviations
together. One can see that the averaged standard deviation of lazy agents’ rep-
utation gets smaller gradually as the round goes by. It should be noted that in
the previous simulation we could not find such a feature.
6 Related Work
There are many researches on trust and reputation systems. Policymaker [5] and
KeyNote [6] proposed the protocols of trust networks without a decentralized
server, namely, they work in networks where each agent has to decide its own
action independently. However, they considered only one type of trust and in
order to tackle with actual problems several kinds of trust and reputation are
required.
Moreton and Twigg [14] introduced two kinds of trust, trust as a recommender
and that as a participant, and showed the safety of their system by using two
different layers of networks. Their measure of trust is represented with logic
symbols, and so we are just not sure that using those is useful for more precise
representation of trust and reputation. Liu and Issarny [12] considered the similar
structure in ad hoc networks and showed the results of several simulations. They
considered reputation as a degree of how trustworthy an agent is, but we consider
that it is not enough for representing reputation as we mentioned in Section 4.
Mui et al. [13] proposed the formal model of trust and reputation, and there
are several advanced results using their model (see [16, 17], for example). In their
research, those are considered as a probabilistic distribution but they considered
satisfaction of agents as 0 or 1. We think it may less useful to represent trust
and reputation.
Recently, on the other hand, theoretical researches on trust and reputation have
been done for several years. On collaborative filtering, where agents try to avoid
untrustworthy peers without having knowledge in advance if an agent is trustwor-
thy or not, Kumar et al. [9] first proposed the theoretical approach to recommen-
dation and there are several noticeable results [1, 2, 3, 4, 10]. Drineas et al. showed
that it is possible to construct recommendation systems which is guaranteed on
the performance by the theoretical analysis. Moreover, Kamvar et al. pointed out
that reputation networks in P2P networks have the similar properties as PageR-
ank [15]. However, in either paper, it is kind of hard to consider what the measure
means, namely, what we can achieve as a benefit by improving algorithms. Nowwe
consider tomodel our framework to a theoreticalmodel in which themetric we aim
to achieve is easy to represent the concrete benefit.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we show a novel protocol for communicating reputation using
the notion of statistics and the facility of designing algorithm against typical
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malicious attacks. Our protocol enables to give more precise representation of
reputation and we are sure that it can be applied into other systems. Comparing
to existing systems, our protocol only requires one more parameter and it gives
more flexible representation of reputation.
Here we consider two points to do in the future; one is to give a theoretical
analysis. There are several theoretical analyses that shows the efficient algorithm
for reputation system. Thus we consider to model this framework and analyze
the efficiency. Another one is to implement our protocol into P2P networks. It
is also important to show the advantage of our protocol in real networks as well
as execution of simulations.
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Abstract. The Semantic Web will only achieve its full potential when users 
have trust in its operations and in the quality of services and information 
provided, so trust is inevitably a high-level and crucial issue. Modeling trust 
properly and exploring techniques for establishing computational trust is at the 
heart of the Semantic Web to realize its vision. We propose a scalable 
probabilistic approach to trust evaluation which combines a variety of sources 
of information and takes four types of costs (operational, opportunity, service 
charge and consultant fee) and utility into consider during the process of trust 
evaluation. Our approach gives trust a strict probabilistic interpretation which 
can assist users with making better decisions in choosing the appropriate service 
providers according to their preferences. A formal robust analysis has been 
made to examine the performance of our method. 
1   Introduction 
Just as the Internet is shifting its focus from information and communication to a 
knowledge delivery infrastructure, the Semantic Web extends the current Web to 
enable Web entities (software agents, users and programs) to work in cooperation in 
which information and services are given well-defined meaning. The philosophy of 
the Semantic Web is that anybody can produce information or provide services or 
consume and enjoy anyone else's information and services on open environment full 
of uncertainty and dynamic. There is likely to be a service-rich environment, 
necessitating the selection between similar services being offered by different 
providers. The Semantic Web, conceived as a collection of agents, brings new 
opportunities and challenges to trust research. One of these challenges is modeling 
trust properly and exploring techniques for establishing computational trust and 
determining the provenance and quality of content and services. We need to face this 
important issue of how to decide how trustworthy each information source is and 
which service we should choose according to these trustworthiness. Trust is a 
response to uncertainty and uncertainty can be considered as the lack of adequate 
information to make a decision. Uncertainty is problem because it may prevent us 
from making the best decision and may even cause a bad decision to be made. Some 
fundamental questions should be answered before trying to find the best way of 
modeling trust. These are: what is the exact meaning of trust from the Semantic Web 
point of view, what information is relevant when evaluating trust, and how to 
combine information from various sources to produce final trust value. Scalable 
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probabilistic approximation seems a direction for future research to deal with this 
uncertainty. In this paper, we try to answer these questions and propose a composite 
trust model based on Bayesian sequential analysis which gives trust a formal 
probabilistic interpretation. Our model combines prior and reputation information to 
produce a composite assessment of an agent's likely quality and balances the costs 
(operational, opportunity service charge and consultant fee) and benefits (utility) 
when communicating or dealing with other agents. 
Consider a scenario in which a user (initiator agent) want to find a service provider 
(provider agent) to fulfill a special task on the Semantic Web, and his problem is 
which provider may be the most suitable for him. Assuming that he maintains a list of 
acquaintances or neighbors (consultant agents), and gives each acquaintance a 
reliability factor that denotes what degree this acquaintance's statements can be 
believed. Each agent also has such a set of acquaintances. During the process of his 
evaluating the qualities of different providers and making the decision in selecting the 
best one among them, he can "gossip" with his acquaintances by exchanging 
information about their opinions on providers' qualities, termed statements. This 
process can be described as using the strategy of exploiting transitivity. The idea of 
this strategy is that an agent sends a message out to request opinions on the quality of 
the agent who can provide given service. The network of acquaintances of that agent 
will then either send back an opinion based on experience, or pass the message onto 
its acquaintances, many of which will be unknown to the first agent. The aim is to 
enhance the scope of an agent's knowledge by exploring the network feature of agent 
communities to bring in information from other, unknown, agents. We call it 
reputation of a given provider agent that integrates a number of opinions from 
acquaintances and acquaintances of acquaintances. Besides reputation information, 
we also consider initiator agent's prior information that is direct experience from 
history interactions with the provider agent and the various relationships that may 
exist between them (e.g. owned by the same organization, relationships derived from 
relationships between the agents' owners in the real life such as friendship or 
relatives). And then, the trust can be generated by incorporating prior and reputation 
information in our opinion. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a brief overview 
of research on trust is presented and Section 3 proposes our closed and open trust 
models based on Bayesian sequential analysis. Then, in Section 4, we give 
experimental results that show how our models work across a wide variation of the 
number of agents, the quality of agent population and the accuracy of the survey in 
terms of precision and the corresponding costs. The conclusions and future work are 
summarized in Section 5. 
2   Related Work 
Given its importance, a number of computational models of trust have been developed 
in security, e-commerce and multi-agents systems. Probably the most widely used 
trust models are those on eBay and Amazon Auctions. Both of these are implemented 
as a centralized rating system so that their users can rate and learn about each other's 
reputation. For example, in eBay, sellers receive feedback (+1, 0, −1) for their 
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reliability in each auction and their trust is calculated as the sum of those ratings over 
the last six months. Both approaches are completely centralized and require users to 
explicitly make and reveal their ratings of others. However, it is questionable if the 
ratings reflect the trustworthy behavior of sellers, since in the online marketplaces, it 
is very likely for users to misbehave or trick with malice. The worse is that these 
systems are not convenient for users to receive a personalized set of trusts according 
to their preferences.  
Social network analysis techniques are used in [J. Golbeck et al., 2003] to measure 
trust over a Friend of a Friend (FOAF) network, extended with trust relations. This 
work describes the applicability of social network analysis to the Semantic Web, 
particularly discussing the multi-dimensional networks that evolve from ontological 
trust specifications. But this work uses simply function to calculate trust and does not 
consider more in depth investigation of algorithms for calculating trust. So, it is nearly 
impossible for application in real world. Moreover, the algorithm for evaluating trust 
in this method is just heuristic and no reasonable explanation in terms of mathematics. 
[S. D. Ramchurn et al., 2003] develops a trust model, based on confidence and 
reputation, and shows how it can be concretely applied, using fuzzy sets, to guide 
agents in evaluating past interactions and in establishing new contracts with one 
another. But this model is rather complex and cannot be easily used in today's 
electronic communities. The main problem with their approach is that every agent 
must keep rather complex data structures, which can be laborious and time-
consuming. Also, it is not clear how the agents get needed information and how well 
the model will scale when the number of agents grows. 
[E.M. Maximilien and M.P. Singh, 2003] proposes a centralized agent to measure 
the reputation of Web services by monitoring and collecting client feedback, and 
making this information available to other agents. Relying on centralized institutions 
to measure trust takes the burden off the interactive agents when deciding which 
agents to trust. However, such systems raise the question of how trustworthy is the 
sources of their trust information in the first place, and why such trust warehouses 
should be trusted at all. We argue against these centralized units for measuring trust 
because of their scalability limitations and the implicit trust measurement mechanisms 
they adopt. 
[Dong Huynh, 2004] presents FIRE, a trust and reputation model that integrates 
interaction trust, role-based trust, witness reputation and certified reputation to 
generate a comprehensive assessment of an agent’s likely performance.  But this work 
assumes that all agents are honest in exchanging information, uses static parametric 
model that can not dynamically adjust themselves to the change of environment, and 
has no learning abilities, so, it can not be used in real open environment. 
[Yao Wang and Julita Vassileva, 2003] proposes a Bayesian network-based trust 
model for a file sharing peer-to-peer application which enables an agent consider its 
trust in a specific aspect of another agent's capability or in a combination of multiple 
aspects. According to this model, peers make recommendations to each other, by 
exchanging and comparing their Bayesian networks. After this comparison, the agents 
update their trust ratings of each other, depending on whether they share similar 
preferences, on the assumption that an agent with similar preferences is more likely to 
give suitable recommendations than others. However, the model's mathematical 
formulation for the calculation of trust can at best be described as intuitive—without 
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justifications and their experiments just use a very simple naïve Bayesian network, 
which cannot represent complex relationships. Furthermore, this model is applicable 
in small-size network and does not scales well to any social network size because 
maintaining and comparing more complex Bayesian network for each agent will be 
computationally intractable. 
3   Trust Model 
The main point of a trust model is to provide a way to operate under uncertainty, not 
taking too many risks, not missing too many opportunities, not deliberating too long 
before making commitments. Therefore, before presenting our trust model it is 
necessary to understand the risks and benefits associated with the trust evaluation. 
There are many different kinds of costs and benefits an agent might incur when 
communicating or dealing with other agents and the trust model should balance these 
costs and benefits. We begin by extending the viewpoint of [K. O'Hara et at., 2004] 
and discussing four types of costs: operational, opportunity, service charge and 
consultant fee and continue by introducing utility function that is used to reflect the 
preferences of agent's owner. 
Operational Cost. Operational cost is the expenses of computing trust value. In other 
words, this is the cost of setting up and operating the whole trust plan. Therefore, the 
more complex the algorithm is, the higher this cost is expected to be. 
Opportunity Cost. Opportunity cost is the lost of missing some possibility of making 
better decision via further investigation. Generally, the more observations, the lower 
the opportunity costs. 
Service Charge. Service providers differ from each other not only in their qualities 
but also in their charges of services. Service charge is that will be paid to the selected 
provider agent who provides fee-based services. 
Consultant fee. Consultant fee is incurred when an agent asks the opinions of other 
agents who (may be professional in given domain) charge for their opinions. 
Utility Function. To work mathematically with ideas of "preferences", it will be 
necessary to assign numbers indicating how much something is valued. Such numbers 
are called utilities, and utility theory deals with the development of such numbers. 
Utility function can be constructed to state preferences and will be used to estimate 
possible consequences of the decisions. 
3.1   Closed Trust Model 
In our model, the quality of provider agent can be considered to be an unknown 
numerical quantity, and will represent it by ș (possibly a vector) and it is possible to 
treat ș as a random quantity with a probability distribution. Consider the situation of 
an agent A try to make an estimate of agent B's trust value. A holds a prior information 
(subjective) of B, represented by distribution ʌ(ș) (for either the continuous or 
discrete case), and request A's acquaintance to give opinions on B's quality. After A 
receives the assessments of B's quality from its acquaintances, A takes these 
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statements as sample about ș. Outcome of these sample is a random variable and will 
be denoted X (Often X will be a vector). A particular realization of X will be denoted 
x and X will be assumed to be either a continuous or a discrete random variable, with 
density f(x|ș). Then, we can compute "posterior distribution" of ș given x, denoted 
ʌ(ș|x). Just as the prior distribution reflects beliefs about ș prior to investigation in B's 
reputation, so ʌ(ș|x) reflects the update beliefs about ș after (posterior to) observing 
the sample x. In other words, the posterior distribution combines the prior beliefs 
about ș with the information about ș contained in the sample, x, to give a composite 
picture of the final beliefs about ș. We take the posterior distribution of ș, ʌ(ș|x), as 
the estimate of B's trust. If we want to take another investigation on B's quality for 
more accuracy, ʌ(ș|x) will be used as prior distribution for the next investigation 
instead of original ʌ(ș). 
When several similar provider agents exist, A need to decide which one should be 
selected. At that time, the preferences of agent A's owner should be considered 
properly to make this decision. Therefore, utility function should be constructed for 
agent A's owner, which represented by UA(r), to express his preferences, where r 
represents rewards of the consequences of a decision. Supposing that ʌ(ș|x) is the 
posterior distribution of provider agent B, the expected utility of function UA(r) over 
ʌ(ș|x), denoted Eʌ(ș|x)[UA(r)], is possible gain of consequence of selecting B. If there 
are several provider agents can be considered, we simply select one that will result in 
the most expected utility as decision. 
By treating an agent as a node, the "knows" relationship as an edge and remember 
that trust is an asymmetric relation, a directed graph emerges. To facilitate the model 
description, agents and their environment are to be defined. To clarify the idea of our 
trust model, we begin with a simple illustration. Consider the scenario that agent A is 
evaluating trust value of B and C for being business. The set of all consultant agents 
that A requests for this evaluation as well as A, B, C can be considered to be a unique 
society of agents N. In our example (see Figure 1), N is {A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, 
K} and is called a "closed society of agents" with respect to A. 
 
Fig. 1. A "closed society of agents" with respect to agent A 
Decisions are more commonly called actions and the set of all possible actions 
under consideration will be denoted A. In our example, initiator agent A is trying to 
decide whether to select agent B (action b) or C (action c) as business partner 
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Fig. 2. Utility function 
(A = {b, c}). Service charges of B and C are 250 and 210 units respectively (SCB = 
250, SCC = 210, where SC denotes service charge). We will treat the quality of 
service, ș, as a continuous variable here, and the unknown quantity ș that affects the 
decision process is commonly called the state of nature. See Figure 1, a notion on an 
edge between initiator and consultant agent or between the two consultant agents 
represents reliability factor, that between consultant and provider agent is the 
assessment of service quality and that between initiator and provider agent is prior 
information. According to Figure 1, the agent A feels that șB, the service quality of B, 
has a normal prior density, N(0.64, (0.08)2) (subscript denotes which an provider 
agent is being taken consideration). We also suppose that the prior density of șC is 
N(0.5, (0.15)2) here1. The probability distribution of X that represents the assessments 
of service quality from consultant agents will, of course, depend upon the unknown 
state of nature ș. Therefore, we assume that X is another continuous random variable 
with density f(x|ș) ~ N(ș, (0.05)2). We also assume that users can be divided into three 
types, "Rich", "Bourgeois", and "Poor", and agent A's owner belongs to "Bourgeois". 
The curves of their utility functions are shown in Figure 2. We use polynomial 
regression up to fourth degrees to get fitted model of utility curves and we have 
URich(r)       = 280.2 + 334.1r + 705.7r2 − 944.1r3 + 524.5r4 
UBourgeois(r) = 208.4 + 459.8r − 17.95r2 − 99.84r3 
UPoor (r)      = 179 + 294.1r − 77.62r2 − 80.03r3 + 34.97r4 
Note that ș
 
and X have joint (subjective) density 
)()|(),( θπθθ xfxh =  (1) 
and in making decision it is clearly important to consider what the possible states of 
nature are. The symbol Ĭ will be used to denote the set of all possible states of nature. 
So, X has marginal (unconditional) density. 
                                                          
1
  Here, we use simple noninformative prior, [James O. Berger, 1985] discussed other methods 
to construct prior distribution, such as histogram, relative likelihood, maximum entropy, 
moment, marginal distribution and ML-  approaches. 
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θθπθ dxfxm )()|()( ³Θ=  (2) 
it is clear that (providing m(x)0) 
)(
),()|(
xm
xh
x
θθπ =  (3) 
In discrete situations, the formula for ʌ(ș|x) is commonly known as Bayes's theorem. 
Assume a sample X = (X1, X2, ... , Xn) from a N(ș, ı2) distribution is to be taken (ı2 
known), and Let be prior information, ʌ(ș), a N(ȝ, Ĳ2) density, where ȝ and Ĳ2 are 
known. Since X  is sufficient for ș and noting that X ~ N(ș, ı2/n). Therefore, the 
posterior distribution ș of give x = (x1, x2, ... , xn) is N(ȝ(x), ȡ), where 
x
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we also need to understand how to calculate the value of n and x  in the Formula 4 
and 5. Following formulas are used to get n and x , where m represents how much 
opinions from a variety of sources (sample information) are used to evaluate the trust 
value. ri and si denote the reliability factor and the statement of service quality for 
given provider on path i respectively. 
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(7) 
Now, we can evaluate trust value of B for A by using above formulas and 
information. We take the assessments of B's quality from consultant agents as sample 
about șB and combine these sample information (x) and prior information into 
posterior distribution of șB given x. As shown in Table 1, nB and Bx  are: 
nB = 0.82 + 0.72 + 0.648+ 0.4896 = 2.6776 
5555.0
6776.2
4896.057.0648.048.072.062.082.055.0
=
×+×+×+×
=Bx   
No. Path Statement Reliability Factor 
1 AĺDĺB 0.55 0.8200 
2 AĺEĺGĺB 0.62 0.7200 
3 AĺEĺFĺB 0.48 0.6480 
4 AĺEĺGĺHĺB 0.57 0.4896 
Total − 2.6776 
Table 2. Calculating n and x  of Agent C Table 1. Calculating n and x  of Agent B 
No. Path Statement Reliability Factor 
1 AĺEĺC 0.46 0.9000 
2 AĺIĺJĺC 0.58 0.8075 
3 AĺIĺJĺKĺC 0.60 0.6137 
Total − 2.3212 
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hence, ʌB(ș|x) ~ N(ȝB(x), ȡB), where 
5663.05555.0
6776.2/05.008.0
08.064.0
6776.2/05.008.0
6776.2/05.0)( 22
2
22
2
=×
+
+×
+
=xBμ  
2
22
22
0285.0
05.008.06776.2
05.008.0
=
+×
×
=Bρ  
Note that we employ multiplying to merge two or more than two reliability factors. 
For example, the reliability factor of the edge AĺE is 0.9 and that of EĺG is 0.8, 
then the value of reliability factor on the path AĺG is 0.72 (0.9 × 0.8). The reason 
behind using multiplying is that if the statement is true only if the agents that 
propagate this statement all tell the truth and it is considered to be independent for any 
two agents to lie or not to lie. Like B, agent C has a posterior distribution of ʌC(ș|x) ~ 
N(0.5370, 0.03212). After obtaining the final posterior distribution of B and C, we can 
compare the result of the expectation of UA(r) over ʌB(ș|x) minus SCB with that of the 
expectation of UA(r) over ʌC(ș|x) minus SCC, and simply select the agent that possibly 
will produce more utility. Expected utility of B and C are (Simpson method is used to 
solve definite integral): 
Utility of B BBA SCdxrU −= ³
+∞
∞−
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hence (224.46 > 194.72), action c should be performed which means that C is more 
appropriate than B in the eyes of A . 
3.2   Open Trust Model 
Above discussion is under the condition that the "closed society of agents" must be 
defined at first, but it is nearly impossible for inherent open and dynamic Web. Our 
idea is that at every stage of the procedure (i.e., after every given observation) one 
should compare the (posterior) utility of making an immediate decision with the 
"expected" (preposterior) utility that will be obtained if more observations are taken. 
If it is cheaper to stop and make a decision, that is what should be done. To clarify 
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Fig. 3. The process of trust evaluating 
this idea, we transform Figure 1 to the structure of tree, shown in Figure 3. The root 
of tree is an initiator agent, a no leaf node represents a consultant agent (a provider 
agent also is allowed in real application) and a leaf node represents a provider agent. 
The goal of preposterior analysis is to choose the way of investigation which 
minimizes overall cost. This overall cost consists of the decision loss (opportunity 
cost) and the cost of conducting observation (consultant fee). Note that these two 
quantities are in opposition to each other. To lower the decision loss it will generally 
be necessary to carry out a larger observation, whereby the cost of consultant fee will 
be increased. In this section, we propose an approach to balance these two costs. 
We continue above example used in the illustration of the closed trust model. As 
shown in Figure 3, we begin at the stage 1 when A only hold the prior information of 
B and has no any information about C (even the existence of C, but it is more likely 
that an agent with the prior distribution of N(0.5, (0.15)2) and the expected service 
charge of 210 is near in the network). Agent A either can make an immediate decision 
(to select B) or can send request to its acquaintances for their opinions by extending 
the tree of Figure 3 down to the next layer. 
Suppose that the cost of consultant service is determined by how much agents will 
be requested at the next stage and consultant fee is the constant of 1 for each times 
(for example, at the stage 1, agent A can ask Agent D, E and I for their opinions, 
therefore the cost of consultant fee at stage 1 will be 3). When preposterior and 
Bayesian sequential analysis are performed in our sample, we use the 1-step look 
ahead procedure for simplicity. 
The utility of an immediate decision is the larger of  
78.217)()( =−³
+∞
∞−
BBA SCdrU θθπ  
here, ʌB(ș) ~ N(0.64, (0.08)2). 
And 54.207)()( =−³
+∞
∞−
CCA SCdrU θθπ  
here, ʌC(ș) ~ N(0.5, (0.15)2). 
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(note that C is not known at this stage, we use subscript of C in above equation just 
for convenience). Hence the utility of an immediate decision is 217.78. If the request 
message is sent and x observed, the posterior density ʌB(ș|x), is N(ȝB (x), ȡB), where  
xxxB )7191.0(1798.0)(05.008.0
08.0)64.0(
05.008.0
05.0)( 22
2
22
2
+≅
+
+×
+
=μ  
0018.0
05.008.0
05.008.0
22
22
≅
+
×
=Bρ
 
However, that we do not know which x will occur, but we know the marginal 
distribution of X, m(x), is N(ȝ, ı2 + Ĳ2) and the "predictive" distribution, mB(x), which 
in this situation is N(0.64, (0.08)2 + (0.05)2). Note that if x < 0.5914 is observed, the 
expected utility of ʌB(ș|x) is less than 207.54, so we prefer to select C instead of B. 
Hence expected utility of not making immediate decision is 
+³
∞−
dxxm B )(54.207
5914.0
 
3)())|()((
5914.0
−−³ ³
+∞ +∞
∞−
dxxmSCdxrU BBBA θθπ  
24.219=  
This is no other than the opportunity cost (3 is consultant fee in above equation). 
Because 219.24 > 217.78, and then further investigation would be well worth the 
money, in other words, A should send request to its acquaintances for their opinions. 
In order to answer the question of which sample information should be used with 
higher priority, we prescribe that the sample from the agent with shorter referral 
distance should be used first.  
Remember that the further exploiting should be terminated immediately along the 
path on which a cycle is detected. Table 3 and 4 show the each stage of the process 
for agent B and C respectively and the residual process of Bayesian sequential 
analysis are shown in Table 5.  
See Table 5, at the stage 3, the expected utility of C begins to larger than that of B, 
and because 216.79 > 214.78, making an immediate decision is more profitable 
(There is no need for the opinions of agent H and K). Therefore, A should stop 
investigating and select C as a decision. The advantage of sequential analysis should 
be clear now. It allows one to gather exactly the correct amount of data needed for a 
decision of the desired accuracy. 
No. Sources of  Opinions ȝB(x) ȡB Utility 
1 None 0.6400 0.0800 217.78 
2 D 0.5790 0.0454 198.80 
3 D, G, F 0.5656 0.0311 194.45 
4 D, G, F, H 0.5663 0.0285 194.72 
Table 4. The process of evaluating C's trust Table 3. The process of evaluating B's trust 
No. Sources of  Opinions ȝC(x) ȡC Utility 
1 None 0.5000 0.1500 207.54 
2 E 0.4644 0.0497 197.65 
3 E, J 0.5157 0.0371 216.79 
4 E, J, K 0.5370 0.0321 224.46 
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Table 5. The process of Bayesian sequential analysis 
Agent B Agent C Utility 
Prior 
Distribution 
Marginal 
Distribution 
Prior 
Distribution 
Marginal 
Distribution Stage 
μB τB μx|B ıx|B μC τC μx|C ıx|C 
Consultant 
Fee Immediate 
Decision 
Further 
Investigation 
Decision 
1 0.6400 0.0800 0.6400 0.0943 0.5000 0.1500 − − 3 217.78 219.24 Continue 
2 0.5790 0.0454 0.5790 0.0675 0.4644 0.0497 − − 3 198.80 199.36 Continue 
3 0.5656 0.0311 − − 0.5157 0.0371 0.5157 0.0623 2 216.79 214.78 Stop 
4   Experiments 
In this section, we developed a simulation system to measure some properties of our 
trust models. We present three sets of experiments. The goal of the first experiment is 
to see if our trust models help users to select the appropriate providers that match 
better their preferences. We compared the performance of the closed and open models 
in terms of precision and consultant fee. The second experiment is to examine the 
effect that varying the accuracy of the survey has on the overall performance of the 
system, and finally, we want to see what quality of agent population is necessary for 
the system to work well. 
For the sake of simplicity, each agent in our system played only one role at a time, 
either the role of service provider or the role of consumer (including initiator and 
consultant agents). The numbers of provider and consumer agent were equal and had 
half each. Every consumer agent kept two lists. One was the list of "neighbor" that 
recorded its all acquaintances to each of which a reliability factor was attached. The 
other was the provider list that recorded the known providers and the corresponding 
prior information. The number of total items in above two lists is defined as "the 
degree of outgoing" and in our experiments the degree of outgoing is set to 5. 
Following [M. Richardson et al., 2003], we expected the information on the 
Semantic Web to be of varying quality, so we assigned to each consumer agent i a 
quality Ȗi [0, 1]. A consumer's quality determined what degree that a statement 
passed or issued by the consumer was true. Unless otherwise specified, the quality of 
consumers was chosen from a Gaussian distribution with ȝ = 0.8 and ı = 0.15. For 
any pair of consumer i and j where i trust j: 
tij = uniformly chosen from [max(Ȗj − į, 0), min(Ȗj + į, 1)]  
Where Ȗj is the quality of consumer j and į is a noise parameter that determines how 
accurate consumers were at estimating the qualities of other consumers, and for these 
experiments we let į = 0.2. We also generated randomly each provider agent's quality 
that was represented by distribution ʌ(ș) (the mean of ș was chosen from a Gaussian 
distribution N(0.5, (0.20)2) and the variant of ș was chosen from a Gaussian 
distribution N(0.08, (0.02)2), see Section 3 for more detail) and its corresponding 
service charge, and assumed that consultant fee was the constant of 1 for each times. 
Unless otherwise specified, the probability distribution of X that represents the 
assessments of service quality from consultant agents (the accuracy of the survey) 
was N(ș, (0.05)2).  
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As above mentioned, we assumed that the consumers are divided into three types, 
"Rich", "Bourgeois" and "Poor", and which type a consumer belong to was decided 
randomly during the experiments. The curves of the consumers' utility functions are 
shown in Figure 2.  
 
Fig. 4. Effect of the number of agents on the precision 
Let G be the set of all provider agents in an experiment. The symbol Mi is used to 
denote the maximum utility that a provider in G can bring consumer i and let Oi be the 
utility that is produced by a provider selected by i using certain trust model, so 
precisioni can be defined as Oi / Mi. The maximum path length was 10 in our 
experiments. The program would terminate and generate the results when reaching 
this maximum. We run each configuration for 10 times and use the means for the final 
experimental results. 
Varying the Number of Agents. We explored the effect of varying the number of 
agents for the closed and open trust models introduced earlier. As shown in Figure 4, 
we found that the precision differed only slightly between the closed and open 
models. We also did the experiment for 10000 agents and the average precisions of 
closed and open models are 0.6147 and 0.7745 respectively. To our surprise, the open 
model began to outperform the closed model when the number of agents reached to 
700. Through careful investigation, we believe this is because the closed model will 
meet with more noise in the network than the open model when the number of agents 
grows. We also found that the average precision of the open model decreased slightly 
when the number of agents grew from 100 to 10000. Therefore, the results show that 
the open trust model is robust to the population of agents. 
As shown in Table 6 and Figure 4, we found that the average consultant fee of the 
open trust model was significantly lower than that of the closed trust model, though 
two models differed only slightly in terms of precision. This also meant that the open 
model had less runtime for trust evaluation. Furthermore, the average consultant fee 
of the closed model dramatically went up after 200 agents, otherwise, that of the open 
model increased comparatively smoothly (since the maximum path length was set to 
10, the average consultant fee of the closed model did not increase significantly after 
 A Scalable Probabilistic Approach to Trust Evaluation 435 
300 agents. If the experiments were not restricted to this maximum, it would larger 
than the numerical value shown in Table 6). This is because that if more investigation 
is not profitable, the open model will terminate exploration and make an immediate 
decision. Therefore, the open model is computational scalability that may not the case 
for the closed model.  
Table 6. Average consultant fee of closed model vs. open model during the process of trust 
evaluation 
Average Consultant Fee Average Consultant Fee Number 
of Agents Closed Model Open Model 
Number 
of Agents Closed Model Open Model 
100 1048.36 11.23 600 2044.53 13.23 
200 1948.54 12.85 700 2034.93 13.08 
300 2075.07 13.61 800 2267.41 13.38 
400 2062.19 13.27 900 2287.80 13.57 
500 2302.92 13.14 1000 2581.62 13.31 
Varying the Accuracy of the Survey. It is necessary to know the effect that the 
accuracy of consultant agents' assessments of service quality has on the average 
precision of the system. We explored this by varying the variant of X (the accuracy of 
the survey) from 0.02 to 0.12. We set the number of agents to 100 here. As shown in 
Figure 5, we found that the more accurate the assessment, the more exactly we 
estimated value of trust. So, the closed and open trust models all depended on the 
accuracy of the survey. Also the high correlation between the precision of the open 
model and the accuracy of the survey was observed. 
Varying the Population Quality. It is important to understand how the average 
precision is affected by the quality of agent population. We explored this by the 
varying the mean quality of agents and set the number of agents to 100 too. To 
measure the robustness of the models to bad agents, we selected agent qualities from 
six Gaussian distribution, with means from 0.4 to 0.9 and the same variant of 0.15. 
We varied the fraction of agents drawn from each distribution. Overall, as shown in 
Figure 6, we found that the system using the closed and open models differed only 
slightly in terms of precision, and the better the agent population, the higher the 
average precision was, which makes sense because in this case, the agent should get a 
more accurate estimate of provider's quality.  
The results show that the closed and open trust models are robust to the quality of 
agent population and the accuracy of the survey generally, and the open trust model is 
robust to the number of agents. Also, the open model outperforms the closed model in 
terms of precision and consultant fee after the number of agents exceeds 700. We 
believe the reason underlies these results is: the closed model uses the transitivity 
strategy to prune its searches and is affected by the length of a chain of 
recommendations, falling as the chain gets longer. This pruning is likely to result in 
the loss of too much investigation. However, the idea of the open model is that at 
every stage of the procedure (after every given observation) one should compare the 
posterior Bayesian risk (or utility) of making an immediate decision with the 
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"expected" posterior Bayesian risk (or utility) that will be obtained if more elaborate 
observations are taken. If it is cheaper to stop and make a decision, that is what should 
be done. Experimental results also show that the open model will stop mostly before 
pruning its all searches and its precision is not bad than the close model. Furthermore, 
the open model scales well to any social network size, as only tiny subsets of 
relatively constant size are visited and is computational scalability. 
   
Fig. 5. Average precision for various accuracy 
of the survey 
Fig. 6. Average precision for various qualities 
of agent population 
5   Conclusions and Future Work 
To achieve a pervasive, worldwide Semantic Web, an enhancement of computational 
trust model should be designed to support and enable computers and people to 
acquire, represent, exchange and integrate data and information available efficiently 
and conveniently. The Semantic Web is full of heterogeneous, dynamic and uncertain. 
If it is to succeed, trust will inevitably be an issue. After the cost and utility associated 
with the trust evaluation are discussed, two trust models have been formalized. We 
extend our trust models from discrete case of previous work to continuous case and 
improve the performance and precision of the system in this paper. Our work's 
contributions are: (1) The closed and open trust models have been proposed based on 
Bayesian sequential analysis. These models give trust a strict mathematical 
interpretation in terms of probability theory and lay the foundation for trust 
evaluation; (2) The utility and four types of costs: operational, opportunity service 
charge and consultant fee incurred during the process of trust evaluation have been 
considered sufficiently and an approach is proposed to balances these cost and utility; 
(3) Our approach enables users to combine a variety of sources of information to cope 
with the inherent uncertainties within the open Web environment and each user 
receives a personalized set of trusts, which may vary widely from person to person. 
(4) Experiments and some formal robust analyses have been made to examine the 
performance of our trust models. However, our proposed approach goes beyond other 
approaches in the kinds of representations of trust, the algorithms of trust evaluation 
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and the formal analysis. Experimental results show that our open trust model is 
computational scalability and able to select the appropriate service providers for users 
effectively and efficiently according to their preferences. 
For the future more robust analysis should be made properly, but we can mention 
that robustness can be dealt with more easily in Bayesian analysis. Service quality is 
multi-faceted. For instance, the file providers' capability can be presented in various 
aspects, such as the download speed, file quality and file type. We would like to 
consider multi-valued trust in the future. 
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Abstract. The Agent Reputation and Trust (ART) Testbed initiative
has been launched with the goal of establishing a testbed for agent
reputation- and trust-related technologies. The art Testbed serves in
two roles: (1) as a competition forum in which researchers can compare
their technologies against objective metrics, and (2) as a suite of tools
with flexible parameters, allowing researchers to perform customizable,
easily-repeatable experiments. In the Testbed’s artwork appraisal do-
main, agents, who valuate paintings for clients, may purchase opinions
and reputation information from other agents to produce accurate ap-
praisals. The art Testbed features useful data collection tools for storing,
downloading, and replaying game data for experimental analysis.
1 Introduction
The Agent Reputation and Trust (art) Testbed [1] serves two roles: (1) as a com-
petition forum for comparing technologies against objective metrics, independent
from participating researchers, and (2) as an environment for performing cus-
tomizable, easily-repeatable experiments. In the testbed’s art appraisal domain,
agents valuate paintings for clients and gather opinions from other agents to pro-
duce accurate appraisals. As a versatile, universal experimentation site, the art
Testbed scopes relevant trust research problems and unites researchers toward
solutions via unified experimentation methods. Through objective, well-defined
metrics, the testbed provides researchers with tools for comparing and validating
their approaches. The testbed also serves as an objective means of presenting
technology features—both advantages and disadvantages—to the community. In
addition, the art Testbed places trust research in the public spotlight, improving
confidence in the technology and highlighting relevant applications.
 Corresponding author.
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2 Testbed Domain Problem
The art Testbed provides functionality for researchers of trust and reputation
in multi-agent systems. As such, it operates in two modes: competition and
experimentation. In competition mode, each participating researcher controls a
single agent, which works in competition against every other agent in the system.
At the 2006 iTrust conference, we will demonstrate the art Testbed with a
variety of agents (e.g., participants in the First art Testbed Competition, at
AAMAS 2006). To utilize the testbed’s experimentation mode, the Testbed is
downloadable for researcher use independent of the competition [5]: results may
be compared among researchers for benchmarking purposes, since the testbed
provides a well-established environment for easily-repeatable experimentation.
The testbed operates in an art appraisal domain (see [2] for a detailed justi-
fication), where researchers’ agents function as painting appraisers with varying
levels of expertise in different artistic eras. Clients request appraisals for paint-
ings from different eras; if an appraiser does not have the expertise to complete
the appraisal, it may purchase opinions from other appraisers. Other appraisers
estimate the accuracy of opinions they send by the cost they choose to invest
in generating an opinion, and opinion providers may lie about the estimated ac-
curacy of their opinions. Appraisers produce appraisals using their own opinion
and opinions received from other appraisers, receiving more clients, and thus
more profit, for producing more accurate appraisals. They may also purchase
reputation information from each other about third-party agents. Appraisers at-
tempt to accurately valuate their assigned paintings; their decisions about which
opinion providers to trust directly impact the accuracy of their final appraisals.
In competition mode, the winning agent is selected as the appraiser with the
highest bank account balance.
3 Testbed Architecture
As shown in Figure 1, the testbed architecture, implemented in Java, consists
of several components (see [3] for a detailed description of the art Testbed ar-
chitecture). The Testbed Server manages the initiation of all games by starting
a Simulation Engine for each game. The Simulation Engine is responsible for
controlling the simulation environment by enforcing chosen parameters. In each
timestep, the Simulation Engine assigns clients with paintings to each appraiser.
Then appraisers conduct reputation and opinion transactions with each other
as described above. Finally, the Simulation Engine assesses each appraiser’s ac-
curacy based on the opinions the appraiser purchases and the ‘weights’ the ap-
praiser places on those opinions. Weights are real values between zero and one
that an appraiser assigns, based on its trust model, to another’s opinion.
Through the Simulation Engine, the Database collects environment and agent
data, such as true painting values, opinions, transaction messages, calculated
final appraisals, client share allocations, and bank balances. With access tools
for navigating, downloading/uploading, and replaying Database logs, data sets
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Fig. 1. The art Testbed architecture
Fig. 2. The Game Monitor Interface for viewing game data
are made available to researchers after each game session for game re-creation
and experimental analysis.
User Interfaces permit researchers to observe games in progress and access
information collected in the Database by graphically displaying details. Figure 2
shows the Game Monitor Interface, by which observers can view opinion and
reputation transactions between agents on the left and detailed statistics, such
as bank balance, about each appraiser agent on the right. The Game Mon-
itor Interface’s play-pause buttons permit games to be played and replayed,
regardless of whether the game is in progress or completed.
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Finally, the abstract Agent class is designed to allow researchers to easily
implant customized internal trust representations and trust revision algorithms
while permitting standardized communication protocols with entities external to
the appraiser agent. Users simply create a class inheriting from the Agent class,
implementing a method for each of the agent’s necessary strategic decisions. The
abstract class Agent handles all required inter-agent communication, as well as
communication between agents and the Simulation Engine.
4 Conclusions
The art Testbed 1) provides researchers with a common experimentation envi-
ronment and 2) allows researchers to compete against each other to determine
the most viable technology solutions. Initial experimentation by Fullam and
Barber [4] and by participants in the First Annual ART Testbed Competition
(held in May, 2006 at AAMAS-06) and the First Spanish ART Competition
(held in April, 2006 together with the AgentCities.es school) shows the testbed’s
art appraisal problem to be non-trivial. However, in the future, game rules may
be changed to keep the competition challenging (for example, not revealing ac-
tual painting values to appraisers, changing the format by which reputations
are represented or introducing multi-dimensional trust characteristics, such as
quality, timeliness, and availability). Further, the Testbed may be expanded to
incorporate multiple problem scenarios relevant to a wider range of trust-related
research. Possible improvements to the Testbed include logging additional data
and developing data processing utilities for forensic analysis of games and wrap-
pers to permit designing agents in languages other than Java. In addition,
organizing the development effort to permit contributions from the research com-
munity via the Testbed’s SourceForge webpage [5] will speed the implementation
of these features and the correction of bugs. Development progress can be mon-
itored through the testbed website [1], where updates to testbed development
are posted.
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Abstract. Access to medical information, e.g. current medication,
blood group, and allergies, is often vital, especially in case of emergency.
An emergency physician has to know medication incompatibilities and
to access to the patient’s treatment history. It raises the issue of patient’s
privacy. Thus a patient grants access to his medical information to his
physician because he has a pre-established trust relationship with this
physician. But he wants to prevent any other physician to gain access to
his medical information. In emergency case, due to the patient’s uncon-
sciousness, it is difficult to establish a trust relationship between patient
and emergency physician. In our demonstration, we show how to exploit
context information to address the problem of granting access to medi-
cal information without a pre-established trust relationship between an
emergency physician and a patient.
1 Motivation
Today, management of data-flow within health care systems is still mostly paper-
based. Severals projects [1], [2], [3] try to address this by introducing an electronic
infrastructure for health insurances, physicians and patients. The vision is to
create an electronic health record for patients containing among others personal
data, treatment history, X-ray pictures or current medication. In emergency case,
for example, physicians know patient’s allergies and are able to choose the most
appropriate treatment.
This approach raises a major privacy issue with respect to patient’s medical
information. In order to cope with this privacy issue, the project Gesundheit-
skarte [3] introduces mechanisms for authentication and authorisation, requiring
patient’s interaction, therefore not adapted to emergency cases.
In our demonstrator, we propose a solution using contextual information (e.g.
user’s location and health condition), as a part of access control policies. This
demonstrator shows the feasibility of such extended access control mechanisms.
After a short description of the demonstrator scenario in section 2, we give
an overview of existing context-aware access control solutions in section 3. In
section 4, we describe the demonstration infrastructure.
Moreover, we raise the issue of trustworthiness of context information. As
our access control exploits context information, it implies that acquired context
information have to trustworthy enough to be exploited.
K. Stølen et al. (Eds.): iTrust 2006, LNCS 3986, pp. 443–448, 2006.
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2 Scenario
The demonstrator adresses one of the use cases defined within the MOSQUITO
project [4]. MOSQUITO aims at enabling secure and trusted collaboration be-
tween mobile workers in ubiquitous environment. MOSQUITO’s vision is that
mobile workers have secure, trusted and ubiquitous access to business applica-
tions. The project provides the required technical infrastructure so that workers
and their clients can perform daily business processes collaboratively and safely
according to determined security policies. Networks have tremendously evolved
in terms of wireless technology and mobility, but business application and service
support have lagged behind.
In this scenario, a patient, Bob, carries a health monitor device containing
his medical information and health sensors (e.g heart rate, body temperature or
blood pressure sensors). Bob’s medical information are protected by means of a
context-aware access control mechanism, defined by the following rules:
– If Bob is unconscious, any physician, close to Bob, can get access to any
Bob’s medical information.
The statement ”Bob is unconscious” or “Bob is healthy” is evaluated using his
pulse, whereas the statement ”Physician is close to Bob” is evaluated from the
physical distance between Bob and physician. This scenario clearly demonstrates
context-aware access control.
3 Context-Aware Access Control
In this section, we discuss related work on context-aware access control solu-
tions. Context-aware access control can be defined as any kind of access control
mechanism, which exploits context information. Several architectures have been
developed for context-aware access control:
– Gaia
Roman et al. [5] defined a generic context-based software architecture for
physical spaces, so-called Gaia. A physical space is a geographic region with
limited and well defined boundaries, containing physical objects, heteroge-
neous networked devices, and users performing a range of activities. Derived
from the physical space, an Active Space provides to the user a computing
representation of physical space.
– Authorisation mechanisms for Intranet
This context-aware authorisation architecture, based on Kerberos authenti-
cation, enables to activate or deactivate roles assigned to a user depending
on his context [6]. For example, if a user is not in a secure place such as air-
port terminal, the access to sensitive data is denied whereas in the corporate
building of the user, he has access to confidential data.
– Environmental Roles
Covington et al. [7] propose a uniform access control framework for envi-
ronmental roles. It is an extension to the Role-Based Access Control
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(RBAC) model. In the RBAC model, permissions are associated with roles.
In an administrative domain, a role can be a developer or a manager. An
environmental role is a role that captures environmental conditions. Envi-
ronmental roles are based on General Role Based Access Control. As op-
posed to the RBAC model which is only subject-oriented, GRBAC allows
defining access control policies based on subject but also on object and
environment.
In the scope of our demonstration, Gaia enable us to represent the patient and
physician and their proximity. But it is too restricted to physical environment.
it does not permit us to take into account the patient’s health condition. With
respect to authorization mechanims for intranet, we believe that the Kerberos
infrastructure is not appropriate for mobile application in an ubiquitous envi-
ronment.
We believe that GRBAC is the most suitable approach for our demonstration.
We define the following environment-based role: “physician close to unconscious
patient”. This role implies physician’s authentication (e.g. role), patient’s and
physician’s proximity and patient’s health condition evaluation. It implies a rea-
soning about low-level context information (e.g. users’ location, patient’s pulse
or body temperature) to derive high-level context information (e.g. users’ prox-
imity, patient’s health condition).
4 Demonstration Infrastructure
Figure 1 depictes the three main element of our demonstration: the patient, the
physician and the Medical Information Portal (MIP). The patient carries a pulse
sensor, a GPS receiver and a health monitor. Based on the acquired pulse, the
health monitor delivers the patient’s health condition. The physician carries a
Web-browser enabled mobile device and his mobile phone. The only requirement
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regarding the mobile Web-browser enabled mobile device is the support of SSL
connection to the MIP. Finally, the MIP delivers patient’s medical information.
The MIP is a Web-based application hosted by SAP Netweaver server. Our
context-aware access control policy is enforced at the Pluggable Authentication
Service (PAS) on the SAP Netweaver server.
An overview of the data-flow between the main elements of the demonstrator
is described in figure 2. In our demonstration, we suppose that (1) the nearest
physician to the unconscious patient received an emergency notification with the
patient’s location and (2) the physician goes to the patient’s location. The noti-
fication can be sent via SMS to the physician’s mobile device with the patient’s
location and unique identifier to the MIP.
When (3) the physician logins to the MIP, the physician has to authenticate
himself with his mobile phone. For authentication of the physician, we use a one-
time password mechanism, so called wLogin [8]. It generates random passwords
and sends them via SMS to the client, who can use this password to get authen-
ticated. wLogin combines a good level of security, especially when compared to
standard username/password schemes, with low deployment effort and no addi-
tional equipment. Thus, the PAS module uses the wLogin (4.a-4.b) solution to
send a one-time password via SMS to physician’s mobile device. The physician
has to enter this one-time password to his web browser. Once the physician is
authenticated, PAS module acquires the physician’s GPS location from the GSM
operator (5). Finally, the PAS module acquires patient’s health condition and
position (6).
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According the physician’s authentication, location and patient’s health con-
dition and location, the PAS grants or denies access to the patient’s medical
information. The physician get access to the MIP via an SSL connection (7).
To allow modularity within the architecture and platform independency, we
choose Web Services as interface between the different entities where applicable.
Further enhancements concern physician notification via SMS and evaluation
of the proximity between the physician and the patient. Regarding physician’s
notification, we aim at trigerring emergency alert from the patient’s health mon-
itor either to an emergency center or by broadcasting notification to the closest
physician to the health monitor. With respect to proximity evaluation, we focus
on combination of WiFi-based, GPRS-based and GPS location service.
For gaining confidence in the proximity between the physician and the pa-
tient, we reason about different context information. We evaluate the distance
between the physician and the patient based on their GPS and WLAN loca-
tions. We compare also cell ID of their respective mobile phones. Even if those
three measurements do not have the same accuracy, they support us for gaining
confidence in the proximity between the physician and the patient.
5 Conclusion
In the scope of MOSQUITO, this demonstrator is considered as a proof of con-
cept regarding context-aware access control. Moreover, we demonstrate the need
of adapting trust relationship establishment depending on the context.
In our demonstration, we have two pre-established trust relationships: be-
tween the MIP and the physician and the patient and the MIP. The physician-
MIP trust relationship permits the MIP to authenticate the physician, and trust
his location. Moreover, with the MIP-patient trust relationship, patient’s context
information are considered as trusted by the MIP.
We do not require any pre-established trust relationship between the patient
and the physician. In our demonstrator, we propose a combination of physician’s
authentication, proof of proximity between the patient and the physician and
the patient’s health condition support us for building this trust relationship.
The exploitation of context information raises the issue of trust in this con-
text information. Even if the patient and the physician are trusted, it does not
implies that the context information is trustworthy. Trust evaluation of context
information is a subject of our ongoing research work. Our goal is to provide
metric and operators to combine trust evaluation about context information in
ubiquitous environment.
6 Disclaimer
IST-Directorate General / Integrating and strengthening the ERA: the project
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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to show how to use Caution,
a tool for the specification and evaluation of credential networks. The
resulting degrees of support and possibility allow to make decisions con-
cerning the authenticity and/or trustworthiness of an unknown entity
in an open network. The specification of a credential network and the
subsequent computations will be illustrated by examples.1
1 Introduction
The recently introduced notion of credential networks is a new generic approach
for handling trust and authenticity in a distributed environment [1]. Its main
concept are credentials, which are digitally signed statements about an unknown
entity’s trustworthiness and/or authenticity. Authenticity relates to the entity’s
public key, which is an indispensable requirement for verifying digital signatures.
In a completely decentralized environment any network user is allowed to
issue credentials. The set of users and involved credentials forms a credential
network. Such a network is always considered from the viewpoint of a particular
user, called the owner X0 of the network.
The problem is, from the perspective of the owner, to judge another network
user Y in two ways, namely with respect to Y ’s general trustworthiness (i.e.
w.r.t. any possible trust matter), denoted by TrustY , and the authenticity of
Y ’s public key, denoted by AutY . In most cases, Y will be unknown to X0.
Consequently, X0 has to rely upen credentials issued by third parties in order
to prove the truth or falsity of TrustY or AutY .
There is a distinction between two classes of credentials, depending on whether
the credential contains a statement about the trustworthiness or authenticity of
the recipient. Furthermore, credentials may be positive (certificates and recom-
mendations), negative (revocations and discredits), and mixed (authenticity and
trust ratings), resulting in six different credential types.
For a more detailed definition of credentials and credential networks, as well
as the exact semantics of the various credential types, we refer to [1, 2].
1 This research is supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation, project
no. PP002–102652, and the Hasler Foundation, project no. 2042.
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2 CAUTION
The Caution (Credential-based Authenticity and Trust In Open Networks) sys-
tem is both a specification language and an evaluation tool for credential net-
works. Its user interface is a simple macro language. The following list gives a
short overview of the Caution language, for more details see [3].
(users <X1> . . . <Xn>) ::= Creates n new users X1, . . . ,Xn.
(owner <X>) ::= Specifies the owner of the network.
(cert <X> <Y > [<π>]) ::= Specifies a certificate issued by X for Y with (op-
tional) weight π.
(rec <X> <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for recommendations.
(rev <X> <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for revocations.
(dis <X> <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for discredits.
(a-rate <X> <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for authenticity ratings.
(t-rate <Y > <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for trust ratings.
(aut <Y > [<π>]) ::= Specifies a certificate issued by the owner for Y .
(trust <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for recommendations.
(negaut <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for revocations.
(distrust <Y > [<π>]) ::= Analogous for discredits.
(show-args [<X1> . . . <Xn>]) ::= Starts the evaluation and outputs the sets of
arguments for each specified user X1, . . . ,Xn.
(show-counter-args [<X1> . . . <Xn>]) ::= Analogous for counter-arguments.
(show-dsp [<x1> . . . <xn>]) ::= Starts the evaluation and outputs the degrees
of support for each specified user X1, . . . ,Xn.
(show-dps [<x1> . . . <xn>]) ::= Analogous for degrees of possibility.
Using the above commands, one can specify a credential network, compute ar-
guments supporting or defeating respective hypotheses AutX and TrustX , and
compute corresponding degrees of support (dsp) and degrees of possibility (dps).
These metrics allow the owner to judge another user with respect to his or her
trustworthiness and public key authenticity [1, 3].
3 Examples
Example 1. The first example shows how to model a PGP Web of Trust as
a credential network. Suppose that the owner A signs directly the public keys
of B, C, and D, as shown in Fig. 1(a). In our language, this corresponds to ab-
solute certificates of weight π = 1.0. In PGP’s web of trust, all certificates are
absolute (the explicit labels +1.0 are omitted in the picture). Furthermore, the
trust values full, marginal, and none are assigned solely by the owner (we omit
ultimate trust in this example for the sake of simplicity). We translate them here
into recommendations of weight πfull = 1.0, πmarginal = 0.5, and πnone = 0, re-
spectively. By doing so, issuing a recommendation of weight 0 is like not issuing
a recommendation at all, like in the case of User E, H , and I. Consequently, cer-
tificates issued by those entities will have no further impact, which corresponds
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Fig. 1. Two credential networks: The nodes represent users, the owner is doublecircled,
and arrows represent credentials. (a) A network with absolute certificates and owner-
assigned trust. Full, marginal, and no trust is emphasized with dark-grey, light-grey,
and white circles, respectively. (b) A network with different types of credentials and
varying weights, issued by various users.
to the behavior of the PGP trust model. The network in Fig. 1(a) is the result
of evaluating the following Caution commands:
> (users a b c d e f g h i j)
> (owner a)
> (trust b 1.0)
> (trust c 0.5)
> (trust d 0.5)
> (trust e 0.0)
> (trust f 0.5)
> (trust g 0.5)
> (trust h 0.0)
> (trust i 0.0)
> (trust j 0.5)
> (cert a b)
> (cert a c)
> (cert a d)
> (cert b e)
> (cert b f)
> (cert c d)
> (cert c g)
> (cert d g)
> (cert d h)
> (cert d i)
> (cert f j)
> (cert g j)
> (cert g h)
> (cert h g)
> (cert h j)
Assume now we want to evaluate the network and we are interested in User J .
The results of the evaluation are shown below: there are three minimal arguments
for AutJ and one minimal argument for TrustJ . The dsp for AutJ is 0.68 and
for TrustJ it is 0.5. But the dps for both AutJ and TrustJ is 1.0, since there
are no counter-arguments which would decrease the dps.
> (show-args j)
USER: J
args(Aut J):
0: ((REC A D)(REC A G))
1: ((REC A C)(REC A G))
2: ((REC A F))
args(Trust J):
0: ((REC A J))
> (show-dsp j)
USER: J
dsp(Aut J) = 0.69
dsp(Trust J) = 0.50
> (show-dps j)
USER: J
dps(Aut J) = 1.00
dps(Trust J) = 1.00
These results allow the owner to consider User J as being trustworthy to a degree
of 0.5, whereas concerning the authenticity, a higher support of 0.69 has been
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computed. In both cases, however, collecting more evidence may be appropriate
since the dsp are not very high and the dps are still maximal, as apparent from
the output above.
Example 2. In the second example, trust is not only assigned by the owner,
but also by other users, and by means of recommendations and trust ratings.
Furthermore, certificates are no longer necessarily absolute, but have varying
weights. The network is shown in Fig. 1(b) and can be specified in an analogous
manner as in the first example. Due to restricted space, this is omitted here.
For the evaluation we use the same commands as before. For example, the ar-
guments and counter-arguments, as well as dsp and dps for User G are shown
in the output box below:
> (show-args g)
USER: G
args(Aut G):
0: ((REC A D)(CERT A D)(CERT D G))
1: ((REC A C)(CERT A C)(CERT C G))
2: ((REC A C)(REC A D)(CERT A C)(CERT C D)(CERT D G))
3: ((REC A C)(REC C D)(CERT A C)(CERT A D)(CERT D G))
4: ((REC A C)(REC C D)(CERT A C)(CERT C D)(CERT D G))
args(Trust G):
0: ((REC A B) (REC B G) (CERT A B))
> (show-counter-args g)
USER: G
counter-args(Trust G):
0: ((REC A B) (CERT A B) (DIS B G))
> (show-dsp g)
USER: G
dsp(Aut G) = 0.72
dsp(Trust G) = 0.58
> (show-dps g)
USER: G
dps(Aut G) = 1.00
dps(Trust G) = 0.86
The hypothesis AutG has a relatively high degree of support and a maximal
degree of possibilty. Thus AutG might be accepted. On the other hand, TrustG
has still a high possibility, but a relatively low support. As a consequence, the
owner will probably leave it open whether to trust User G or not.
4 Conclusion
This short article describes how credential networks are described and evaluated
by means of the Caution language. Complex networks can be described conve-
niently in an intuitive manner. The measures dsp and dps serve as authenticity
and trust metrics, which are used to judge and decide on a user’s trustworthi-
ness and authenticity. This decision process allows many possible strategies (e.g.
the use of thresholds), depending on the context and application. But this is a
separate issue and beyond the scope of this paper.
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1 Introduction
This paper describes an application of our prototype implementation of Jiminy,
a scalable distributed architecture for providing participation incentives in on-
line rating schemes. Jiminy is based on an incentive model where participants
are explicitly rewarded for submitting ratings, and are debited when they query
a participating reputation management system (RMS). Providing explicit in-
centives increases the quantity of ratings submitted and reduces their bias by
removing implicit or hidden rewards, such as those gained through revenge or
reciprocal ratings. To prevent participants from submitting arbitrary or dishon-
est feedback for the purpose of accumulating rewards, Jiminy halts rewards for
participants who are deemed dishonest by its probabilistic honesty estimator.
Using this estimator, Jiminy can also perform classification of users based on
their rating behaviour, which can be further used as criteria for filtering the
rating information that users obtain from the RMS.
More background on the theoretical foundations of Jiminy can be found in [1],
while [2] provides details on the system design, implementation and performance
evaluation.
2 Application Scenario
Jiminy follows a cluster-based architecture and is deployed on a number of com-
puters, for real-time computation of the statistical analysis of ratings. This al-
lows online monitoring and classification of the rating behaviour of users. Jiminy
operates in the following steps:
Bootstrapping. Jiminy starts its operation by connecting to the ratings
database, discovering the available slaves, and deciding how to partition the
problem space — we use the Grouplens1 ratings data set — among the slaves,
based on the number of slaves available. It then communicates to each slave the
part of the problem space it is assigned, and starts a network daemon listening
to requests from the reputation management system (RMS).
1 http://www.grouplens.org
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Fig. 1. Interface of the Jiminy master during periodic Noselength updates
Fig. 2. Run-time monitoring of a user’s Noselength, and classifications
Periodic Honesty Recalculation. Jiminy periodically runs the algorithm
that calculates and updates the Noselength value for each user — our honesty
metric, as described in [2]. The Jiminy GUI provides a log of honesty recalcu-
lation events — as shown in Figure 1. It also displays a certain user’s Nose-
length value by producing a graph of his Noselength in real time, as shown in
Figure 2. Submitting dishonest ratings will have a negative effect on the Nose-
length of the user who submitted them, which can be reversed by submitting
honest ratings.
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Fig. 3. Honesty and dishonesty thresholds, and probationary period
Probation and Classification. At the end of each honesty recalculation iter-
ation, Jiminy identifies whether each user is to be considered honest or dishonest,
and whether she is to face a probationary no-rewards period, as follows:
– A user stays outside the probationary period, if she is currently outside and
her Noselength is below the dishonesty threshold
– A user enters the probationary period, if she is currently outside and her
Noselength is above the dishonesty threshold
– A user stays in the probationary period, if she is currently inside and the
probationary period has not passed yet, or if her Noselength is above the
honesty threshold
– A user leaves the probationary period, if she is currently inside and her
Noselength is below the honesty threshold and has been there for the whole
probationary period
The Noselength value is also used by the system for classifying users into dif-
ferent categories. On one end of the spectrum, radicals are users who disagree
with others much more often that other users. The other extreme class is fol-
lowers, which consists of users who disagree the less often with others. Those
users that maintain a healthy level of disagreement amongst them fall into the
average class.
Consultation to the RMS. The reputation management system contacts
Jiminy to query the trustworthiness of a certain user, in order to determine
whether to reward her for submitting statements. A trustworthy user receives a
credit amount for each statement she has submitted since the last query. The
RMS interface during a query to Jiminy and the result returned by Jiminy are
shown in Figure 4.
Use of Classification Information. The class in which a user resides — in
terms of rating behaviour — can be obtained from Jiminy. This can be used to,
for instance, transparently filter ratings taken into account for a given user. As
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Fig. 4. Interface of the RMS for querying Jiminy
an example, a retailer web site linked to Jiminy could automatically calculate
the average rating of a product based on the ratings of users in the same class
as the user who is viewing the product. A radical user is likely to prefer seeing
the ratings of other radical users, rather than those of sheep users.
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Abstract. In this demonstration, we present Traust, a flexible autho-
rization service for open systems. Traust uses the technique of trust ne-
gotiation to map globally meaningful assertions regarding a previously
unknown client into security tokens that are meaningful to resources
deployed in the Traust service’s security domain. This system helps pre-
serve the privacy of both users and the service, while at the same time
automating interactions between security domains that would previously
have required human intervention (e.g., the establishment of local ac-
counts). We will demonstrate how the Traust service enables the use of
trust negotiation to broker access to resources in open systems without
requiring changes to protocol standards or applications software.
1 Introduction
Making intelligent authorization decisions in large computer systems is a non-
trivial task. Traditional authorization systems require some explicit notion of the
users accessing the resources provided by the system; this knowledge is usually
in the form of a user account protected by a password or some other digital
credential. While systems such as Kerberos [5] and hierarchical PKIs [4] help
reduce the overhead of managing these systems on a per-organization basis, it
is widely accepted that they do not scale well in large-scale open systems where
information and resources are shared across organizational boundaries.
The increasing popularity of the Internet has led to a surge in the number of
resources provided through open environments such as the world wide web, peer-
to-peer networks, virtual organizations, disaster response networks, joint task
forces, and grid computing environments. In these systems, it is unreasonable to
 This work was supported by the NSF under grants IIS-0331707, CNS-0325951, and
CNS-0524695 and by NCSA. Lee was also supported by a Motorola Center for Com-
munications Graduate Fellowship.
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assume that entities will have—or even need to have—explicit knowledge of the
peers that they are communicating with. For instance, can users of a peer-to-
peer network reasonably be expected to enforce access controls on their shared
resources based on the identities of the thousands of other peers in the system?
We argue that in the context of large-scale open systems, authorization decisions
are best made based on the attributes of the users in the system, as this allows
for better scalability as the number of users continues to increase.
Trust negotiation [10] is a technique developed to allow peers to conduct
bilateral and iterative exchanges of digital credentials to bootstrap trust rela-
tionships in open systems. Current work in trust negotiation has focused on
the development of languages and strategies for trust negotiation [6, 7, 12], or
the embedding of trust negotiation into commonly used protocols [3, 9]. In fact,
little attention has been focused on designing a general-purpose authorization
system based on trust negotiation. In this demonstration, we present Traust,
a general purpose authorization service based on trust negotiation. Traust pro-
vides a uniform interface for clients to obtain the credentials necessary to access
resources provided by systems in a different security domain and acts as a viable
migration path for the adoption of trust negotiation research into existing open
systems.
2 Goals
The design of Traust embodies five major design goals. These goals build on the
strengths of trust negotiation techniques developed in the past and help Traust
act as a scalable and flexible authorization service for large-scale open systems.
Bilateral trust establishment. It is important not only for a service provider
to trust the clients requesting its services, but for clients to trust the ser-
vices that they choose to interact with. Before disclosing any requests or
credentials to the Traust service, clients may conduct a content-triggered
trust negotiation session [2] to protect their potentially sensitive requests.
Run time access policy discovery. In open systems, clients cannot be ex-
pected to know the access requirements of services of interest a priori. Traust
supports the discovery of these policies during the authorization process.
Privacy preserving. An interaction between a client and the Traust service
should not reveal any extraneous information about either the client or the
service. Trust should be established iteratively, each entity providing more
sensitive credentials in response to the disclosures of the other entity.
Support for legacy and trust-aware applications. Incorporating the
Traust service into existing open systems should not involve completely re-
designing deployed applications or protocols. Traust should support tight
interaction with trust-aware applications via the use of a public API, but
also remain accessible to clients who wish to access legacy applications.
Light-weight, yet robust. The Traust service should be light-weight enough
for a single user (e.g., a peer-to-peer client) to deploy on her local machine,
yet robust enough to meet the demands of a large security domain.
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3 Design and Implementation
The Traust service was designed to provide a mechanism through which trust
negotiation can bridge the security gap that exists between security domains in
large-scale open systems without requiring widespread protocol or application
software updates. Traust servers act as authorization brokers that distribute ac-
cess tokens for certain services deployed within their security domain to qualified
outsiders. Traust client software allows users to carry out a number of trust ne-
gotiations with the Traust server; these negotiations allow both the client and
server to establish some degree of trust in one another.
Traust relies on SSL to protect the confidentiality and integrity of connections
between clients and the service. Upon connecting to the Traust service, clients
have the opportunity to conduct a content-triggered trust negotiation with the
service to gain some level of trust before disclosing a potentially sensitive resource
request. If this negotiation succeeds, the client then discloses its resource request
to the Traust server. Resources can be as specific as a particular RPC method call
or as broad as a request for access to a system-wide role. When the Traust service
receives such a request, it locates the policies protecting the requested resource
and initiates a trust negotiation with the client to determine if the client is a
qualified outsider. If this negotiation succeeds, the Traust service issues the client
any credentials needed to access the requested service. The server can obtain
these tokens through either accessing static tokens in its credential repository,
referencing files in its file system, or interfacing with external processes (e.g.,
one-time password generators, Kerberos servers, or MyProxy servers [8]). There
are no fundamental limits on the types of credentials that can be issued.
Our implementation of the Traust service is written in Java and leverages the
TrustBuilder framework and protocol for trust negotiation [11]. TrustBuilder has
been successfully incorporated into several protocols [3, 9] and currently supports
the use of X.509 attribute certificates as its native form of credentials and the
IBM Trust Establishment language [1] for trust negotiation. Our implementa-
tion of the Traust service currently supports the issuance of username/password
pairs and X.509 proxy certificates. We have developed both a stand-alone client
application that can be used to obtain credentials to access legacy services and a
client API that can be incorporated into the design of trust-aware applications.
4 Demonstration
In our demonstration, we show how the Traust service can enable the use of
trust negotiation to grant qualified users access to a legacy resource without
requiring any changes to the underlying resource or applications used. We il-
lustrate how a volunteer search and rescue dog handler can use Traust to gain
access to a web-based information portal used to coordinate the recovery ef-
fort for an earthquake, despite having no pre-existing trust relationship with
the portal. The user first browses to this web site and is presented with a lo-
gin form and resource descriptor to pass into her Traust client. She then uses
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Fig. 1. Screenshot of the graphical Traust client
our graphical Traust client to initiate an interaction with the Traust server
responsible for protecting access to this site (see Fig. 1). This interaction al-
lows the client to establish trust in the server (by verifying that the server
can demonstrate proof-of-ownership of a state-issued disaster response coordi-
nator credential) and allows the server to gain trust in the user (by verifying
that she can demonstrate proof-of-ownership of trusted credentials which indi-
cate that he is a certified rescue dog handler with up-to-date vaccinations). The
Traust server then returns a one-time-use password for the web site. Further
information regarding our demonstration can be found at the following URL:
http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/~adamlee/research/traust/demo/
disaster demo.html.
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Abstract. Distributed reputation systems are a self-organizing means of support-
ing trusting decisions. In general, the robustness of distributed reputation systems
to misbehavior is evaluated by the means of computer based simulation. However,
the fundamental issue arises of how to anticipate kinds of successful misbehavior.
Existing work in this field approaches this issue in an ad-hoc manner. Therefore,
in this paper, we propose a methodology that is based on interactive simulation
with human subjects. The requirements for such interaction are discussed. We
show how they are met by the Interactive Cooperation Tournament, a simulation
environment for identifying promising counter-strategies to the distributed repu-
tation system EviDirs which is showcased in our demo.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we propose a demo of our Interactive Cooperation Tournament (ICT).
ICT is a simulation environment that provides realistic evaluations of the robustness of
our distributed reputation system. We describe why systems like ICT are needed and
what functionality they need to provide in order to facilitate the engineering of robust
distributed reputation systems.
Context. If you look at computer systems, there is a clear trend away from closed mono-
lithic systems towards self-organizing artificial societies composed of autonomous en-
tities with no central control and no commonly trusted unit. Examples are peer-to-peer
systems, open multi-agent systems, and ad hoc networks. All these systems have a
number of characteristics in common: In order to achieve their individual goal, it is
necessary for the entities in the system to cooperate. However, due to their autonomy,
on the one hand, entities will only cooperate, if it is beneficial to them, but on the other
hand, entities are able to cheat in the course of a cooperation. In order to avoid being
cheated on, an entity will only cooperate with entities it trusts. Yet, trusting decisions
 The work done for this paper is funded by the German Research Community (DFG) in the
context of the priority program (SPP) no. 1140.
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can only be taken by an entity if it has formed its beliefs regarding the other entities
based on prior experiences. The means of doing so are prescribed by the algorithms of
the distributed reputation system. Several of such systems have been proposed in the
past (e.g. [1, 2, 3]). The distributed reputation system of [3] (EviDirs) exhibits several
desirable properties and, thus, builds the foundation of the remainder of this work. We
distinguish between two types of computational entities. Normative entities adhere to
the prescriptions of the distributed reputation system. In an application scenario, these
entities are found on the devices of those human principals who make use of the origi-
nal system software, as it has been distributed by system’s initiator. On the other hand,
strategic entities are not compelled to comply to the prescriptions and, thus, exhibit
selfish behavior. This situation arises whenever human principals are able to tamper the
original system software.
Problem. Analytic proofs are a viable means of displaying core properties of a dis-
tributed reputation system. Yet, their application is restricted to specific behavior within
the overall system. This becomes apparent in their idealizing assumptions that have to
be made in order to apply the methodology of game theory. Thus, they fail to capture
and consider every opportunity of misbehavior by strategic entities. Consequently, a
means of testing the robustness of the distributed reputation system is required. In anal-
ogy to the methods applied in evolutionary game theory, computer based simulation
appears as a natural solution to both problems [4]. Even though this approach is viable,
it poses a fundamental question to the designer and evaluator of distributed reputation
systems: Is it possible to anticipate how the system software is tampered and, if yes,
what kind of tampering has to be anticipated?
The state of the art regarding this question is as follows: The evaluator defines the
counter-strategies to the system design according to his intuition. This approach suf-
fers from two considerable drawbacks. First, the evaluator may overlook more intricate
means of misbehavior. The existence of such means is probable due to the complex-
ity of common distributed reputation systems. Second, the evaluator is, in general, also
the designer of the distributed reputation system. Consequently, he might be induced to
consider only those counter-strategies that his design is able to cope with. As a result
of these drawbacks, we require a means of reliably identifying counter-strategies that
should be included in the system’s simulative evaluation.
Outline. In order to solve this problem, we propose the following approach: The sim-
ulation environment is made interactive such that human subjects may assume the role
of certain entities. The simulation environment is built such that the human subjects are
both able and motivated to find promising counter-strategies. In Section 2 the ensuing
requirements and its implementation example for EviDirs is discussed. The obtained
simulation environment ICT. It will be showcased in our demo.
2 The Interactive Cooperation Tournament (ICT)
In this section, we discuss the requirements that arise from our approach of interactively
identifying promising counter-strategies. For each requirement, we point out how it can
be implemented. In this regard, the ICT acts as a point of reference.
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Fig. 1. The user interface of the Interactive Cooperation Tournament
As a basic requirement, the human subjects have to be informed about the incidents
that happen in the overall system. Furthermore, mere information is not enough since
it has to be presented in a user-friendly manner. Only if this is achieved, the human
subjects are able to intuitively grasp the context of their behavioral decisions and choose
their respective strategies accordingly. Figure 1 illustrates how the ICT implements this
requirement. Each participating entity is assigned an avatar so that the human subjects
are more likely to recognize them and remember their prior behavior. The avatars and
the labeling of the entities are assigned randomly for each tournament so that the human
subjects do not know which entity is controlled by the simulation environment and
which are not. This corresponds to the situation in real system in which the entities
do not know who is normative and who is strategic. Each human subject is able to
access the complete record of the experiences his entity has made. That information is
aggregated and displayed by additional icons nearby the avatars.
A further requirement consists of the accessibility of the simulation environment.
The human subjects do not have to be experts of the distributed reputation system Ev-
iDirs in order to participate. Only by this means, the number of potential human sub-
jects is not restricted and, hence, a wide range of counter-strategies can be obtained.
The ICT takes this requirement into account by providing a tutorial, a glossary and a
forum in which system-specific questions are debated. As a further assistance for the
human subjects, the simulation environment may control behavioral aspects (e.g., the
more intricate recommendation behavior) that novice subjects are not able to cope with.
The third requirement refers to the motivation of the human subjects. In real applica-
tion scenarios, tampered system software is used in order to reduce one’s own costs or
enhance one’s own benefits of participating to the system. As a consequence, we have
to anticipate counter-strategies that aim at maximizing the individual utility of the enti-
ties that follow them. The ICT makes use calories as the metaphor of individual utility.
On the one hand, the cost category of transactions is illustrated by adequate food icons
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(a pizza has more calories than an apple...). On the other hand, one’s own individual
utility is visualized by a guy on the lower left corner: the fatter he is the more suc-
cessful the human subject has performed. A further source of motivation is the policy
to contact the most successful subject after termination of the tournament and to ask
for the counter-strategy he has followed. By this means, the evaluator obtains informa-
tion about the kind of counter-strategies that are most successful and, thus, have to be
anticipated. According to our experiences, the human subjects are able to express the
basic principles of the strategy (or strategies) they followed. By additionally consult-
ing the simulation log, the evaluator is able to define and parameterize the identified
counter-strategies.
For the demo, we run an instance of the tournament and allow visitors to explore
themselves how it works and find out how good the strategies are that they follow.
3 Conclusion
Distributed reputation systems are a self-organizing means of supporting trusting de-
cisions. In order to simulate such systems, we have to be able to anticipate successful
(and thus likely) counter-strategies that could be pursued by misbehaving entities. In
this paper, we have proposed a methodology that is based on interactive simulation
with human subjects. The requirements for such interaction are threefold: The simu-
lation environment has to inform the human subjects appropriately about the system’s
incidents, it has to be accessible to a wide range of potential subjects and, finally, the
human subjects have to be motivated to maximize the individual utility of the respec-
tive entity they control. Furthermore, we have shown how these requirements are met
by the ICT, an interactive simulation environment of the distributed reputation system
EviDirs. As a result of meeting the requirements, the participating human subjects have
identified promising counter-strategies to EviDirs in a hands-on manner.
In the future, similar interactive simulation environments have to be developed for
other distributed reputation systems. This necessity arises from the fundamental prob-
lem of anticipating realistic means of misbehavior. Even though the development of
adequate simulation environments or, if possible, of a generic simulation environment
is an intricate task, it provides the only means of solving this problem and, thus, credi-
bly testing the robustness of arbitrary distributed reputation systems. The discussion of
this paper provides the basis for such future work.
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Abstract. Securing the evolving telecommunications environment and
establishing trust in its services and infrastructure is crucial for enabling
the development of modern public services. The security of the under-
lying network and services environment for eBusiness is addressed as
a crucial area in the eEurope action plan [2]. In response to this Spe-
cialist Task Force (STF) 292 associated with the European Telecommu-
nication Standardisation Institute (ETSI) TISPAN [3] under contract
from eEurope, has developed a threat, vulnerability and risk assessment
(eTVRA) method and tool for use in standardisation. Using the eTVRA
method and tool, the threats to a next generation network (NGN) can
be analyzed and a set of recommended countermeasures identified that
when implemented will reduce the overall risk to users of NGNs. In this
paper we present the eTVRA method and tool along with the results of
using the eTVRA for an analysis of a Voice over IP (VoIP) scenario of
the NGN.
1 Introduction
During the past decade in Europe we have seen the evolution from single, na-
tionally owned and operated networks featuring voice services to the situation of
today with numerous network operators, and service providers featuring a wide
range of different types of services. There is a trend for fixed and mobile networks
to converge, sharing a single IP-based core in the emerging next generation net-
work (NGN). Standardisation plays an important role in enabling operators to
deliver services to the users and ensure that the regulatory, interconnection and
interoperability requirements are met.
 This work is supported by the eEurope initiative [1] and by the Research Council of
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Standardisation also applies to provision of security mechanism as an impor-
tant means for achieving and establishing trust between the operators and the
parties they serve. The emerging NGN is destined to become the platform for
eBusiness and eGovernment, both of which require an assurance of the level of
security that the NGN will provide. ETSI is in the process of developing stan-
dards for the NGN and as part of that process is also preparing guidance on
methods of developing security standards.
Fundamentally providers and users of systems such as the NGN need some
assurance that their use of the NGN will not give rise to unwanted incidents.
The probability of such incidents arising is inherent in the system design and
the role of standards bodies is to ensure that the likelihood of such incidents
arising is low and the impact of their occurrence is also low, and to ensure that
the standards do not contribute to the risk. This can be achieved by providing
a systematic method for security design from conducting a threat, vulnerability
and risk analysis through to specification of an appropriate set of security coun-
termeasures within a standards context, and by integrating systematic methods
in standards development. The route adopted in ETSI for the first of these areas
has been to develop a method for eTVRA based on the common criteria for secu-
rity evaluation [4], the ETSI standard for threat analysis and risk assessment [5]
and CORAS [6]. The eTVRA has been adapted to meet the needs of the current
and future standardisation environment. This paper presents both the eTVRA
method and the tools created to support it within the context of the NGN.
2 eTVRA Method
The eTVRA method involves a systematic identification of the unwanted in-
cidents to be prevented in the system, and for the system itself, identifying
the assets it is composed of and their associated weaknesses, the threats and
the threat agents that will attack the system, before determining the risk to the
system by modelling the likelihood and impact of attacks on the systems vul-
nerabilities. Although in this sense, the eTVRA method builds on existing risk
assessment methods (e.g. CORAS [6]), it is different in detail from such existing
methods that are primarily designed for assessment of commercial products or
systems, often in isolation, and often to determine commercial risk for purposes
of financing a venture.
This is because the purpose of risk assessment in a standards environment
is different and intended to address the concerns of a broad set of stakeholders
including consumers, service providers, network operators, vendors, and regu-
latory authorities. The concerns of the different stakeholders must be weighed
and taken into account by the analysis. Indeed, these stakeholders may own or
control different assets in different parts of the NGN, each of which is exposed
to threats, and which may pose threats to each other. The outcome of a stan-
dards based eTVRA is intended to drive subsequent standards decisions, i.e.
to find those vulnerabilities common to a set of stakeholders where common
development and deployment of a countermeasure is warranted. The documen-
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tation resulting from applying the eTVRA may also be incorporated in a Pro-
tection Profile (PP), as described in [7].
The eTVRA method uses a model as shown in Fig. 1. The eTVRA models
a system consisting of Assets. An Asset may be physical, human or logical.
Assets in the model may have Weaknesses that may be attacked by Threats.
A Threat is enacted by a Threat Agent, and may lead to an Unwanted Incident
breaking certain pre-defined security objectives. A Vulnerability, consistent with
the definition given in [8], is modelled as the combination of a Weakness that can
be exploited by one or more Threats. When applied, Countermeasures protect
against Threats to Vulnerabilities and reduce the risk. The eTVRA method
process consists of the following steps:
1. Identification of the objectives.
2. Identification of the requirements, derived from the objectives from step 1.
3. Inventory of the assets.
4. Identification and classification of the vulnerabilities in the system, the
threats that can exploit them, and the unwanted incidents that may result.
5. Quantifying the occurance likelihood and impact of the threats.
6. Establishment of the risks.
7. Identification of countermeasures framework (architecture).
Each step in the method has guidance attached to lead the analyst. In partic-
ular for step 5, which involves detailed calculations of the likelihood and impact
values, the use of repeatable metrics is essential to the repeatability of the anal-
ysis over time. The metrics used in step 5 are developed from the guidance given
in [5] and [4]. One characteristic of the method is to include an evaluation of
whether an attack exploiting a vulnerability can be automated thereby offering
an additional metric to be used in assessing risk. The product of occurrence
likelihood and impact values from step 5 gives a measure of the risk to the as-
set. A countermeasure will reduce the likelihood of the threat being successful
and/or reduces its impact. This step results in a set of countermeasures to pro-
tect the vulnerabilities against threats. Note that countermeasures may create
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new vulnerabilities, indicating that the eTVRA will need to be executed again,
and the method should be repeated until all the risks have been reduced to an
acceptable level. Furthermore, by allowing the analysis to be rerun when attack
likelihood changes, the risk to the system may be re-evaluated as knowledge of
new or revised attacks becomes available.
3 eTVRA Tool
The eTVRA has been developed as a database structure. The database accepts
the full model represented in Fig. 1 to be entered and produces the likelihood
weighting, and the computation of the impact of automated threat agents and
countermeasures as well as the resulting risk values. We are using the eTVRA
method and the eTVRA tool to conduct a Threat Vulnerability and Risk Anal-
ysis of a Voice over IP (VoIP) deployment using the session initiation protocol
(SIP) [9] and the telephone number resolution system called Enhanced Number
(ENUM) [10]. Using the current database version of the tool we have demon-
strated the eTVRA method and tool on a test-case of a typical SIP and ENUM
system.
Table 1. Some critical risks found by the VoIP eTVRA
Asset Vulnerability Threat Threat Family Likeli- 
hood 
impact Unwanted 
Incidents 
call state IN SIP 
or other session 
server 
illegal message 
content 
closing of 
sessions 
Denial of service likely High Loss of service 
availability 
call state IN SIP 
or other session 
server 
illegal message 
format 
overload of 
communication 
Denial of service likely High Loss of service 
availability 
data in transit IN 
link to ENUM 
leaf server 
limited 
transport/processing 
capacity 
overload of 
communication 
Denial of service likely High Loss of service 
availability 
ENUM query IN 
SIP or other 
session server 
limited 
transport/processing 
capacity 
overload of 
communication 
Denial of service possible High Loss of service 
availability 
server keys IN 
Leaf server 
accessable 
credentials 
credential 
manipulation 
Manipulation possible High 1. Loss of service 
availability 
2. Data security 
breaches 
A summary of some of the critical risks found in this case is given in Table 1.
The table shows the assets (logical assets in physical assets), the type of vul-
nerability the risk applies to, the threat that may impact this vulnerability, the
likelihood, the impact, and the resulting unwanted incidents. The computed like-
lihood is calculated taking into account the expertise level necessary to execute
the threat, the level of access that is required, and the time needed to mount
the attack. Each of the threats listed in Table 1 can lead to partial or total loss
of service availability. The threats involving manipulation of credentials also can
lead to consumer data security breaches. The resulting major unwanted incidents
for the service provider are Loss of reputation, Loss of revenue, and in the case
of consumer data security breaches, legal issues.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper we have described the eTVRA method and tool as developed by
STF292 in ETSI/TISPAN under contract from eEurope. The model has been
validated in a case study carried out on SIP and ENUM which has demonstrated
the usability of the eTVRA. The model has been implemented in a database and
a web-front-end is being constructed allowing the wider community to use the
tool. While the work is ongoing the results are being applied to the development
of standards for the NGN. In particular, it is demonstrating that one of the
major challenges for the NGN is ensuring availability of the network and ser-
vices, demonstrated by the eTVRA of SIP and ENUM, for which the unwanted
incident of loss availability is associated with a large number of critical threats
and vulnerabilities.
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